MEMORY *in* ANCIENT ROME & EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Edited by KARL GALINSKY

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Preface

Memory studies have burgeoned, nay exploded, in the past three decades. There are multiple, and mostly good, reasons for that phenomenon and I will survey and discuss them in the Introduction. One of the strongest aspects of memory studies is their multidisciplinary nature: concern with memory has moved to the forefront of major scholarly areas, such as the humanities, social sciences, and media studies. Fortuitously, these developments have been accompanied by important breakthroughs in the neuroscience and neuropsychology of memory providing the opportunity, and in fact necessity, of transdisciplinary approaches and dialogue transcending self-imposed boundaries like that of the two cultures. One of the several positive corollaries has been the absence of orthodoxies and rigid, if not mechanical, theoretical frameworks. Memory studies do not lack conceptual definitions, but, due to the multifaceted nature of memory, which is a constant work in progress, they incorporate a great deal of empiricism as well. And they have resonated because memory is not an abstract notion but an ever-present entity that shapes much of the lives of individuals, groups, and civilizations.

There are two primary reasons, then, for this volume. One is that memory was a defining aspect of Roman civilization and played a major role in all its aspects: literature (including historiography and poetry), social and political history, art and architecture (*monumenta* by definition are carriers of memory), and religion. Early Christianity was embedded in this context that contributed to shaping the identity of the early Jesus movement; several contributors, therefore, address the topic from various perspectives. What their chapters, and those on Roman topics, have in common is engagement with current memory scholarship beyond routine invocations of 'cultural', 'collective', or 'social' memory. That engagement is, and has to be, selective because of the sheer plethora of publications that comprise the 'memory boom', but it is also overdue. It is important for classicists to share in important scholarly conversations that are taking place in other fields and to contribute their own points of view. The aim, as always, is to employ and test some methods and impulses from current work on memory studies over a broad spectrum of Roman phenomena, to determine their utility, and to see what new perspectives might result.

That, in short, has also been the objective of the *Memoria Romana* project that was made possible due to a generous award from the Max-Planck Society and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (www.utexas.edu/research/memoria). It has funded, on an international basis, fourteen doctoral students and, with smaller grants, seventeen postdocs and more advanced scholars, in addition to several conferences and panels at meetings of learned societies. The chapters in this volume originated with these programmes and, on a selective basis, have been greatly refined and expanded in light of further discussion and criticism. They were chosen for this volume both because of the topics they address and because they contribute to the discussion of continuing themes in this collection; we wanted a variety of subjects and perspectives without producing *disiecta fragmenta*. The collection, therefore, should be useful especially to those interested in the classical world as an introduction to memory studies and the light they can shed on the importance of memory in ancient Rome and for nascent Christianity. It is my hope, too, that the reader will use our work as a springboard for further reflection and argument and that it will stimulate more endeavours in this very rich area.

I am grateful to the Max-Planck Society and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for their outstanding support; to the Seminar for Classical Philology at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, its director, Professor Reinhold Glei, and Dr Wolfgang Polleichtner, who were excellent hosts for the locus of the project; to Dr Bartolo Natoli, my project assistant at the time, for his patient help with the preparation of the manuscript; and to the contributors for the constructive and, at times, time-consuming dialogue we carried on. I am also most grateful to Hilary O'Shea for her early interest and encouragement; to the two readers for the Oxford University Press for their supportive suggestions; and to Hilary's successor, Charlotte Loveridge, her assistants Alex Johnson and Annie Rose, and our copy-editor Rowena Anketell with whom it has been a genuine pleasure to work throughout the editorial and production process. On the basis of the initial discussions, we decided to conceptualize this volume as a Roman companion to *Historical and Religious Memory in the Ancient World* (ed. by B. Dignas and R. R. R. Smith, 2012) that was published in honour of the late Simon Price. This volume, too, is dedicated, fittingly, to the memory of this uniquely influential scholar much of whose work was devoted to ancient Rome and early Christianity.

Karl Galinsky

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List of Contributors

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Introduction

Karl Galinsky

MEMORY AND MEMORY STUDIES

Memory is ubiquitous. This applies both to its manifestations in just about any culture and, more recently, to its topical (omni)presence in major academic disciplines, such as the humanities, social sciences, media studies, and neuroscience and neuropsychology. The two phenomena are, of course, related: all cultures to a large extent depend on memory. Neither is there just one 'cultural' or 'collective' memory, but memories are culture-specific and, even within the same culture, pluralistic and always a work in progress. Thus, their many aspects, layers, and evidences beg to be studied. That is exactly what has happened on an explosive scale—the so-called 'memory boom'—over the past three decades. It will be useful to visit some of the issues involved in this development—which, because of the abiding role of memory in civilization, will be more than another ephemeral academic fad[1]—and then provide some general perspectives on the utility of some of the resulting insights and methodologies for the study of ancient Rome and early Christianity and on the role memory played in both.

The surge of memory studies has been due to multiple and, often, interrelated factors. In terms of events, the Holocaust,[2] the horrors of

[1] Cf., succinctly, Winter (2006) 282: 'The archives of the memory boom are multiple and growing', and Erll's 'Afterword: Whither Memory Studies?' (2011, 172–5).

[2] For a judicious assessment see Olick et al. (2011) 29–36. Cf. Kammen (1995) who lists nine reasons overall.

the regime that perpetrated it, and the monumental experience of the Second World War stand out. Consciously or not, they led to the realization that academic history is inadequate to deal with such cataclysms which millions of people experienced. Their recollections were a powerful force that had to be accommodated in other ways and it was no accident that oral histories burgeoned in this context. It was not just a matter of coping or 'coming to terms' with history (the German *Geschichtsbewältigung*), but there was the critical need to preserve the memories of the survivors who are dying out. Put simply, the interest in memory is far more than another academic construct. Instead, people can relate to it and it resonates with them not only because of staggering events, trauma, and atrocities,[3] but because we deal with memory and its various configurations in our everyday lives and personal histories. This further connects with a shift in historical research that has become discernible during this same time, i.e. the increasing attention that is paid to non-elites, including those in the Roman Empire and early Christianity.[4]

Memory and History

As memory studies asserted themselves, the issue that promptly raised its academically territorial head was its relation to history. The debate has been fruitful, moving from early dichotomies (on both sides) to more nuanced approaches. Champions of memory studies such as Aleida Assmann and Pierra Nora tended to echo the distinction made by Maurice Halbwachs, who pioneered concepts like 'social' and 'collective' memory (see section 'Reassessing the Role of Halbwachs'): history begins where memory ends, with a loss of vitality in the process[5]—a variation, perhaps, of Plato's opposition of

[3] For a variety of good perspectives on such issues—whether in Europe, Rwanda, or Australia—see most recently Assmann and Shortt (2012). The systematic eradication of cultural memory at ancient sites in Iraq provides an even more recent example.

[4] Cf. also the general observations by Simon Price (2012) 16: 'The interest in studying memory in the past is that it places centre-stage the self-understandings of particular peoples, and so gets us closer to understanding their world.' The increasing attention deficit in that regard in much of modern historiography, which prized theories and abstractions, was another cause for the rise of memory studies; cf. my brief remarks in *Memoria Romana* (2014) 5.

[5] Halbwachs (1925); cf. Nora (1984) and Assmann (1999) 314–22, esp. 317. A useful ancient perspective is the lament of Cicero's Atticus about the jejune nature

(the invention of) writing and memory (*Phdr.* 275D).[6] Historians responded by labelling the resulting discourse as 'elegiac' and 'auratic' or, in Kerwin Lee Klein's summation: 'Memory can come to the fore in an age of historiographic crisis precisely because it figures as a therapeutic alternative to historical discourse.'[7] But like the culture wars, the memory wars have abated and yielded to productive discussion and reflection. There is neither the need nor the space here to recapitulate the many differentiated viewpoints that ultimately centre on the dynamic relation and compatibility between memory and history as complements, especially as surveys of the whole debate are readily available.[8] A few markers should be mentioned nonetheless, such as Alon Confino's exhortation that 'perhaps the first task of the history of memory is to historicize memory';[9] the ongoing dialogue in the journal *History and Memory*; and Jay Winter's choice of the term 'historical remembrance'.[10]

There are two perspectives (assuredly among many others) that deserve some brief further comment. First, there is a certain irony—irony of course is a ready staple in retrospective observations—as one of the stated effects, if not goals, of cultural/collective memory today is precisely the same as the one that was asserted for the writing of national histories and their distinctness from memory, i.e. the creation of national identity. This was a nineteenth-century development related to the European nation state; until then, memory and history had been pretty much symbiotic,[11] and, as it turned out, the practice of 'the invention of tradition' could be shared by both.[12] Neither was this development hailed as a great advance in the direction of 'objective truth' and the like for cultures for which statehood

of much historical writing (*Leg.* 1.2.5–7) even while (*Leg.* 1.2.8) he is not questioning the then normative equation of history and memory (see below). In other words, even when history is the same as memory, the result can be less than vital.

[6] See below, n. 30. [7] Klein (2000) 145.

[8] e.g. Erll (2011) 39–45, with some good comments on 'fallacious assumptions'; yet more succinctly: Olick and Robbins (1998) 110–11; Galinsky (2014) 1 n. 2. There is good discussion of the conceptual framework by A. Beise, 'Geschichte', in Pethes and Ruchatz (2001) 220–2. Cf. the general discussion by Ricoeur (2004) 133–411. For a valuable non-Western perspective see Tai (2001) 920 who observes: 'In a sense, the distinction between history and memory is too simplistic'.

[9] Confino (1997) 1403.

[10] Winter (2006), esp. 8–13, summarized in Olick et al. (2011) 426–9.

[11] On this, see, e.g. P. Hutton (1993) and Hedrick, Ch. 5 in this volume.

[12] Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) is still the classic treatment.

was not a factor, such as the Jewish people. For this diaspora people, as has been powerfully argued by Yosef Yerushalmi, there was no structured history after the destruction of the Second Temple and the maintenance of memories was an essential, living tradition to which the rise of Jewish historiography, in his view, was only detrimental.[13] From a different perspective, and in a much-cited article, the British historian Peter Burke rejected any such dichotomy altogether without, on the other hand, returning to a simple equation of history with memory. His own definition of history as social memory serves 'as a convenient piece of shorthand which sums up the complex process of selection and interpretation'.[14] But to return to the irony: just as the rise of national histories in Europe was occasioned by the perceived need for the creation of national identity amid a landscape of regional and local memory traditions, so the central aim of Pierre Nora's seven-volume collection on French *lieux de mémoire* (more on it below) was to be a beacon of *l'identité française* at a time when the nation experienced massive multicultural immigration. In a way we have come full circle.

Secondly, and obviously relevant to the particular subject of this volume, it is useful to compare Roman perspectives on the relation of history and memory. We can be brief: for all practical purposes, there was no distinction between history and memory. Instead, the two are largely identified with another. Testimonia abound.[15] Among the most famous is Cicero's pronouncement that *historia* is *vero testis temporum* and *vita memoriae* (*De or.* 2.36)—no truth claim here for history in opposition to memory. He summarily equates Atticus' short universal history with *omnis rerum memoria* (*Brut.* 14; cf. *Orat.* 1.120). Further, he links *memoria* with the preservation of *res gestae* (*Orat.* 1.120) and not just in the private realm: *historia* is 'nothing other than the arranging of the *annales* for the sake of retaining public memory' (*erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio . . . memoriae publicae retinendae causa*, *De or.* 2.52). Or, quite simply, *historia* means *memoriam deposcere* (Cic. *Leg.* 1.2.8).

[13] Yerushalmi (1982).

[14] Burke (1989); here cited from Olick et al. (2011) 188.

[15] See, e.g. *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, s.v. *memoria* 8.675.56–676.36. A concise survey is Gowing (2005) 7–17, supplemented by Walter's discussion of the various meanings of *memoria* in our Roman sources (2004, 26–41).

A distinction is sometimes made, without eliding the equation of history with memory, in terms of the chronological horizon: '*Historia* is an account of a deed accomplished, but at a remove from the memory of our time' (*historia est gesta res, sed ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota*, *Auctor ad Her.* 1.13).[16]

Mainly, as Alain Gowing has observed, 'for the Romans *historia* is less a genre than a definition of subject matter'.[17] The medium of history, therefore, was not limited to historiography proper, but included all kinds of literature and notably poetry, such as Ennius' *Annales* (Cic. *Leg.* 1.2.5). This is, of course, unsurprising in light of the homology of *historia* and *memoria*. It also provides a productive connection, which could be explored further, with the attention in current memory studies on the significant role of novels, plays, poems, and the like in shaping our historical memories along with media like film.[18] I will return briefly to a paradigm, Vergil's *Aeneid*, later. Here it may suffice to stress the holistic perspective of memory studies, which has contributed much to overcoming facile dichotomies like history vs. memory and, at the same time, can help us appreciate Roman practices as precursors and in a modern light. Similar discussions took place in Rome. Cicero, for instance, prompted by his brother Quintus, posits different standards (*leges*) for *historia* and poems (we do not know whether this applied to his poem *De consulatu suo*): truth (*veritas*) for the former and enjoyment (*delectatio*) for the latter, although he proceeds immediately to point out that Herodotus, the father of history, combined both (*Leg.* 1.2.5). In contrast, Quintilian rejects that notion. *Historia*, he writes, 'is close to the poets. It is written for the purpose of narrative, not proof, [and] it is composed for the memory of posterity' (*historia . . . est enim proxima poetis . . . et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum . . . ad memoriam posteritatis componitur*, *Inst.* 10.1.31).

[16] Cf. Cicero's statement that the *memoria* of Servilius Rufus' *nobilitas* is not known to people in the present but has to be dug up from *vetustas annalium* (*Mur.* 16).

[17] Gowing (2005) 11 with reference, e.g. to Cic. *Brut.* 57 and 60.

[18] Here Aleida Assmann's work, notably (2011), has been pioneering. Cf. also Erll (2011) 113–71 for an overview of media and literature and scholarly assessments thereof; Gudehus et al. (2010) 189–240 (incl. a discussion of the Internet); and Braun (2013) for further discussion of individual works and stimulating points of view. For another important medium, monuments, see below.

Memory Studies: Some Basic Themes

As can be seen even from this brief sample, prominent thematic issues in current memory scholarship readily connect with aspects of *memoria* in Rome. I will proceed, therefore, with some further comments on the former instead of reversing the procedure. This is done on the assumption that most classicists are probably less familiar with the landscape of memory studies than with the presence of *memoria* in Rome. Memory, of course, was pervasive in Roman culture and also played a fundamental role in the early Jesus tradition; I will duly take up these topics more specifically at the end of this introduction while continuing to connect my discussion of memory studies with some relevant examples from these areas. My aim here is not to provide a detailed survey because such overviews by now are readily accessible in English;[19] further, Diana Ng presents an informative summary, from the perspective of a Roman archaeologist, at the beginning of Chapter 8 in this volume. I will concentrate, therefore, on a few characteristic aspects of memory studies, both in terms of their genesis and their present constitution, and on points of contact with Rome and early Christianity.

Even some fifteen years ago, the field of social memory studies, in the words of some of its most knowledgeable practitioners, presented itself as 'a nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless enterprise'.[20] Its acknowledged strength was its richness, but, as is true of individuals, one's greatest strength can also be one's greatest liability: 'But the benefit of richness cannot overcome a sense that the term "memory" is depreciated by surplus use, while memory studies lack clear focus and have become somewhat predictable.'[21] What was noted, then, if not regretted, was the absence of a firm guiding framework and theoretical underpinning, certainly by comparison with the theory boom in other areas of the humanities and social sciences in the previous decades.

[19] Notably Erll (2011); Olick et al. (2011) 3–62; and the still invaluable survey article by Olick and Robbins (1998). Cf. Gudehus et al. (2010).

[20] Olick and Robbins (1998) 105. Cf. Winter (2006) 276: 'The memory boom is overdetermined. It has many sources and many facets, indeed so many facets that the field seems to expand more rapidly than the conceptual tools we have to comprehend it.'

[21] Confino (1997) 1387.

Reassessing the Role of Halbwachs

It is instructive to reassess the role of Maurice Halbwachs in that light. He is, of course, recognized as one of the founding figures of memory studies for his work from the 1920s to the 1940s (he died at Buchenwald in March 1945) that established the categories of 'social' and 'collective' memory. His work did not have an immediate impact but attracted prominent attention when memory studies came to the fore and was looking for definition. The citations above, made in mid-development of this burgeoning field, illustrate that Halbwachs's work,[22] while totemically invoked, was insufficient to provide a 'clear focus' or centre. Neither, and that is the important point, was it meant to do that job, and certainly not in the sense of imposing a constraining structure. His contribution lies elsewhere; besides his merit of generating a lively and productive debate about his terminology, which has been critiqued, modified, and deconstructed in numerous ways, the following points are worth noting:

1. His finding that memory is a phenomenon that occurs not just in individuals but is also shared by groups is, like a good number of other insights and tenets in memory studies, an insight into the obvious. That does not lessen its merit; at the time he wrote, it was an important reaction against the overemphasis on the individual on the part of Freud—who famously likened the layers of the human psyche to palimpsestic Rome—while also being written against the backdrop of nineteenth-century national histories. Certainly, the phenomenon of 'collective' or 'social' memory was well in evidence in ancient Rome and, in particular, among its senatorial oligarchy during the Republic; so was the ongoing effort to control that memory.[23] Just as applicable is Halbwachs's corollary finding: there is not just one collective memory, let alone groupthink, but there is always a plurality of often competing memories; again Rome and the early Jesus movement (see Kloppenborg, Chapter 10 in this volume) provide ample illustrations. Similarly, Halbwachs's observation that individual memory is conditioned by its *cadre social* comes as no surprise,

[22] *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (1925), Eng. trans. by Coser in 'The Social Frameworks of Memory' (Halbwachs 1992) 35–189; *La mémoire collective* (posthumously published in 1950), Eng. trans. F. J. and V. Y. Ditter (1980).

[23] The extent to which aristocratic control in this area, too, was eroded by what has been called Rome's 'cultural revolution' (Wallace-Hadrill 2008) could be analysed further.

to give but one example, to the reader of Cicero's and Pliny's letters and especially their endeavours at self-fashioning.

2. Even if it occurred in the context of his rigid distinction between history and memory, Halbwachs's emphasis on the instability and waywardness of memory anticipated an important topic in memory studies, including its ample confirmation in the neuroscience of memory. Halbwachs's concern was not with autobiographic memory, where the characteristics he lists, such as distortion and fictional elements, are well attested today. Instead, he marked off collective memory from history by observing, quite correctly, that memory does not provide a reliable reproduction of the past (a claim that few, if any, historians would make today, not least as a result of reflecting on the contingencies suggested by memory studies) but, rather, reconstructs it, usually in light of the present: 'A remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past with data borrowed from the present, a reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already been altered.'[24] It is an apt characterization, too, of Roman historiography and the way our brain works (cf. Chapter 13 by Güntürkün and his colleagues in this volume). Here as elsewhere, the keenness of Halbwachs's observations elevates them beyond the kind of truisms that other memory scholars have been fond of recycling, such as the past reaching into the present and so on. One is the notion of process: memory is not an archive or, in modern terms, hard drive, but involves continuing change, renewal, and (re)construction. Neither autobiographic nor collective/cultural memories are static. Rather, they keep evolving and adding new layers, which can be contradictory, and often quite rapidly at that—we should not be entirely surprised to see that memory studies reflect the same process. Accordingly, Halbwachs's abiding merit is not that he provided a tight conceptual framework (as discussed in point 4). Rather, he identified ideas which could be further developed and even validated with information that was not available at his time.

3. Hence, in this volume some special attention is paid to his third work, which has not received the same degree of attention as the others, possibly because of the lack of a complete English translation. *La topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte: Étude de*

[24] Halbwachs (trans. Ditter) (1980) 69.

mémoire collective (1941) was, as the subtitle indicates, intended as a demonstration of how collective memory works in practice. The topic was well chosen: sites in the Holy Land were continually (re)constructed and (re)identified by later generations of Christian pilgrims and visitors. A related phenomenon was the desire of these groups to find specific locales for episodes and stories told in the Gospels—in other words, *mémoire* looking for a *lieu* (and it was of course a matter of seek and ye shall find). Halbwachs's presentation is that of a sympathetic but incisive observer: 'Sacred places thus commemorate not facts certified by contemporary witnesses but rather beliefs born perhaps not far from these places and strengthened by taking root in this environment.'[25] Jodi Magness (Chapter 11 in this volume) updates Halbwachs's findings through the lens of a specialist in the archaeology of the Holy Land while Milton Moreland (Chapter 12 in this volume) explores the relevance of Halbwachs's observations to the tradition of Peter in Rome and the creation of its *lieux de mémoire*. And, again, Halbwachs's statement and general methodology, with the usual cultural modifications, is applicable to Greek and Roman sacred sites; there are numerous points of contact, for instance, with Pausanias' *Periegesis*.[26] Halbwachs had a good sense of the importance of material places and this important contribution of his has been somewhat neglected as *lieux de mémoire* have acquired a more symbolic connotation. At the same time, one of the most substantive areas of memory studies of the classical and medieval periods has been precisely that dealing with cult and grave sites, such as those of Christian martyrs.[27]

4. It has been well observed that Halbwachs's 'writings have not been able to serve as a single, coherent theory of cultural memory; this might be because his broad concept of *mémoire collective* is insufficiently differentiated'.[28] Several issues are involved here. As I suggested earlier, the memory boom also needs to be viewed

[25] Halbwachs (ed. Coser) (1992) 199.

[26] Elsner's (1995, 125–55) analysis of Pausanias in terms of a Greek pilgrim in the Roman world would be an obvious starting point. The importance of memory in Pausanias has been well emphasized by W. Hutton (2005) and De Angelis (2007).

[27] Notably the important studies of Castelli (2004) and Diefenbach (2007); similarly, Moss's (2012 and 2013) revisionist view of the historicity of Christian martyr accounts invites further treatment from scholarly memory perspectives. For the Middle Ages, see, e.g. Oexle (1994) and Carruthers (1990).

[28] Erll (2011) 18.

against the backdrop of the preceding theory boom, hence the expectation for memory studies, too, to be oriented around some guiding theories. Such an outcome has not materialized; quite on the contrary, the richness and multidisciplinarity of the field has proved resistant to being reined in with a few overarching taxonomies (although some brave attempts in that direction have been made) or tenets, which then can be applied routinely by anyone joining the endeavour. The ultimate reason is the nature of memory itself. It is, just in neurobiological and cognitive fact, quite differentiated; aside from its complicated neurological structure there are phenomena such as false memories, involuntary memories, the effects of emotion on memory, and last but not least, forgetting.[29] The same applies to the level of collective memory: there is no all-encompassing theory to which the varieties of its manifestations can be conveniently subordinated. Broad concepts, therefore, are reasonably as far as Halbwachs could go. It was left to others, as it still is today, to particularize their application and use in varied contexts. Had Halbwachs done so, the overall result would still be the same.

An instructive parallel is furnished by Plato. His discussion of memory does not result in anything systematic; he takes up the subject of memory in different contexts where he tries to conceptualize it to varying degrees, and he develops different perspectives on it without aiming at unitary consistency.[30] He is probably best known for his metaphor of wax tablets of the mind (191C, D); in this dialogue, *Theaetetus*, he problematizes the issue of memory especially in regard to its ability of truthful recall, whereas he mentions no such complications in the later *Philebus* amid the topic of the relative values of pleasure and knowledge. Yet again discrete is his claim at the end of *Phaedrus* (275D) that the invention of writing will lead to a diminution of memories through forgetting.[31]

[29] False memory: see Güntürkün et al., Ch. 13 in this volume with further references; involuntary memory: Mace (2007); on amnesia, implicit memory, and emotional memories: Schacter (1996) 134–217; source amnesia: Welzer (2005) 40–3.

[30] See the detailed analysis by Cambiano (2007), which also includes *Cratylus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and *Phaedo*.

[31] For good reason, the passage has figured in discussions by memory scholars especially about orality, memory transmission, and the impact of (the invention of) writing; the least dogmatic is A. Assmann (1999) 184–90. This is not a subject to

Lieux de mémoire, Cultural Memory, and Other Key Concepts

To continue with a brief survey, especially with a focus on the kind of scholarship that can inform work on memory in Rome and early Christianity: Pierre Nora's *Les lieux de mémoire*, which I referenced earlier, was a landmark and Nora's reflections on history and memory are still worth consideration, but the actual outcome does not provide a useful methodological framework. Tripartite like Caesar's Gaul (*La République*, *La Nation*, *Les France*) with subdivisions such as *La Gloire*, *Les Mots*, and *De l'archive à l'emblème*, it features some 140 articles on markers of French identity (*lieux* is used mostly metaphorically) like Charlemagne, the Gallic rooster, the Tricolore, the café, Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu*, the Louvre, and more. As I mentioned before, it is a document of its time: here is an evocation, if not enshrinement, of French cultural patrimony before any multicultural accretions. It struck a chord—this was an easy schema for memory work and numerous imitations followed in short order, including *Lieux de mémoire au Luxembourg* (2008). In contrast, more differentiated perspectives are provided in this volume in Chapters 6, 7, and 4 by Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp, and Eric Orlin respectively: the Roman Forum was not a static *lieu de mémoire*, but both memory management and additions were ongoing. Further, traditional anniversaries (easily falling under the rubric of Nora's *lieux*) of temple dedications, which were part of Rome's traditional cultural memory and patrimony, were changed not just for the sake of Augustus' self-glorification but because of the changed memory horizon of a multicultural empire. There the relation between regional memory identities and the overlay of the Roman *oikumene* was a constant work in progress.[32] Nora saw such globalization as a threat to collective memory and, accordingly, *Les lieux de mémoire* is nation-centred

pursue here; suffice it to say that literacy, however defined, was low in Rome and its Empire and the oral transmission of memory far from ceased. For some of the issues, cf. Wiseman (2008) and, for the Jesus tradition, White (2010) and Kloppenborg, Ch. 10 in this volume. Cf. Wiseman (2014) 57: 'Poetry in the Graeco-Roman world was not merely a literary phenomenon but continued to be embedded in the oral culture of the general population.'

[32] Alcock (2001); Cordovana and Galli (2007); and Galinsky (2015). For useful perspectives aside from memory, cf. Revell (2009) and Whitmarsh (2010).

with the resulting criticism that memory communities of *la France d'outre-mer* are not represented.[33] Were we to assemble a collection of such *lieux*, however defined, for imperial Rome it would have to be more cosmopolitan and polyphonous.

The names of Jan and Aleida Assmann loom large in the annals of memory studies and deservedly so. At the same, their work, while tremendously stimulating, does not provide a matrix for routine imitation. Memory, as I have noted earlier, is culture-specific and its context is different in archaic Greece, and certainly in Rome, from Pharaonic Egypt in the second and first millennium BC. Still, to give but one example, Jan Assmann's demonstration that 'in Egypt, the medium of cultural memory is pictures and not speech'[34] establishes a productive perspective on periods up to ours and on the dynamic between *monumenta* and the oral transmission of memory in ancient Rome; several contributions to this volume deal with related aspects.[35] Of all memory scholars, Jan Assmann comes closest to setting up systematic categories and taxonomies and much of his influence derives therefrom. What is just as important, however, is his observation that 'on all levels, memory is an open system'.[36]

In succinct terms, Assmann's foundational contribution (often in collaboration with his wife Aleida) is the shaping of the term 'cultural memory' which by now has devolved into a commonplace that tends to be used quite loosely. To that end, he distinguishes it from 'communicative memory'; the latter is characterized by direct communication with a time frame of three to four generations or some eighty to a hundred years; the image of children and grandchildren sitting on the knees of their (grand)parents and learning from them comes to mind (the growing impact of the cyber age will no doubt introduce some blurring of the lines). It is not that after this period—and here Assmann's schema again has often been used reductively—memory *ipso facto* morphs into the 'cultural' stage. In contrast to the largely informal communicative one, the latter is more formalized and is passed on in a variety of ways, including rituals, ceremonies, texts, and icons. But the transition is neither automatic nor immediate. Rather, following the researches of the anthropologist Jan Vansina

[33] See, e.g. Tai (2001); cf. Erll (2011) 25–6.

[34] J. Assmann (2011) 172.

[35] See also the divergent views of Wiseman (2014) 43–62 and Hölkeskamp (2014) 63–70.

[36] J. Assmann (2010) 113.

especially on oral societies in Africa, Assmann sees the core of cultural memory as being concentrated on stories of origins and the like, while communicative memory concerns recent history. Between the two there is flexible space or what Vansina called the 'floating gap'.

Even this short sketch—and fuller treatments are easily accessible—shows that Assmann's concepts are not meant to operate as a rigid theoretical straitjacket but can be elastically and usefully applied to cultures such as Rome. There was tremendous concentration on the story of origins (the same applies to early Christianity), though just the first book of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Roman Antiquities* and the first five books of Livy's *History* exhibit their fair share of floating details. The transmission of cultural memory evolved through the work of many agents and agencies; Peter Wiseman's hypothesis of the role of dramatic performances (the *ludi scaenici*) can be usefully considered in this additional light and so can, to give only one other example, Mary Beard's astute discussion of the competing interpretations of the Parilia.[37] Two further cardinal points made by Assmann are also of obvious relevance: memory involves forgetting, a dynamic that is very evident in Roman culture,[38] and memory is not the same as knowledge. On this latter point, we could argue: memory of customs, traditions, and practices, and the possession of such memory by the Roman aristocracy in particular constituted knowledge and that knowledge was one basis of its power, later attenuated by the Roman 'cultural revolution'.[39] Foucault was aware of the relation of memory and power, too; while never articulating it to the same extent as that between knowledge and power, he appropriately coined the term *contre-mémoire*.[40]

In sum, Jan Assmann's approaches especially to cultural memory provide many connections with Roman phenomena and need not be followed as orthodoxies. Other definitions are possible, such as Wiseman's 'popular culture' (2014). Or we might conceive of 'cultural memory' as cultural property that creates memories, and is being remembered, by different individuals and groups in different ways;

[37] Wiseman (1998); Beard (1987); and in Beard, North, and Price (1998) i.174–6.

[38] See the important studies by Hedrick (2000) and Flower (2006). On *damnatio memoriae*, a conveniently constructed modern term, cf. Flower (1998) and Galinsky (2008).

[39] See n. 23, above.

[40] Foucault (2001), esp. 85.

this pertains to both origins and the 'floating gap' period, and even to a substantial portion of 'communicative' memories.[41]

While building on concepts like communicative and cultural memory, Aleida Assmann's oeuvre does not offer a 'system', but its strength lies in the analysis of a wide range of topics *sub specie memoriae*. Her principal work, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives* (2011) is paradigmatic in this regard as a plethora of authors and phenomena are discussed, including Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, and Proust; places, such as Rome, Jerusalem, and Auschwitz; further, dreams, false memories, traumas, and more. She is familiar especially with the Roman tradition and practice of mnemotechnique and uses it for one of her organizing principles, the *ars* of memory as opposed to its *vis*, which is the more changing and transformative aspect of memory as it occurs in the process of being handed down. Scholars of classical antiquity and early Christianity will obviously deal with the ancient evidence first-hand and Assmann's categorization would have to be modified as the appeal to, and use of, memory by Roman orators went beyond purely technical aspects (see section '*Memoria* in Rome'). Extremely valuable, however, is her emphasis on the complementary nature of memory and forgetting, a large topic that we have not been able to include in this volume.[42] Assmann's second organizing principle, the contrast between 'archival' or 'stored' memory and 'functional' memory, is also subject to further shading. True, neuroscientists—and Assmann does not use their research as a basis for drawing her distinction—differentiate between 'gist' and 'autobiographical' memory (though the boundaries are not firm), but even if enshrined in archives, cultural memories are subject to constant re-evaluation, reassessment, and even reconstruction.

A precursor who has deservedly attracted more attention of late is Aby Warburg, a cultural historian who died in 1929 and whose extensive collection was transferred in 1933 from Hamburg to the University of London where it became the cornerstone of the Warburg Institute. Warburg had no theoretical bent like Halbwachs.

41 My starting point is the remarks by Rutledge (2012, 121) on 'cultural property' and its inherently dynamic and varied receptions, an aspect he develops in the subsequent chapters of his book.

42 But see the extensive studies by Hedrick (2000) and Flower (2006). Assmann has returned to the topic especially in contemporary contexts, most recently in (2012) 53–71.

His main contributions to the study of social memory were twofold: his emphasis on art and the continuing cultural symbols it provided, involved as they were in changing reinterpretations and reactualizations, and his equally strong emphasis on the interdisciplinary study of culture.[43] Both are principles that are easily applicable to Roman culture and the study of it, starting with Roman copies of Greek masterworks.[44] Other, more recent scholarly landmarks have already been briefly mentioned, in particular the concept of the 'invention of tradition' by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and Paul Connerton's *How Societies Remember* (1989). Although the former is a collection of only seven essays with a focus on such inventions in the eighteenth and nineteenth century for Scotland, Wales, and parts of the British Empire, the concept clearly is applicable more widely and its methodologies can be readily connected with the study of Graeco-Roman historical, mythological, and aetiological traditions and their shaping of memory and identity. Connerton's thesis, articulated in some densely written 100 pages, is that besides written texts memory is primarily performative. While this is obviously true of ceremonies and ritual re-enactments, Connerton posits that the transmission of memories also takes place by incorporation in the literal meaning of the word, that is bodily practices (termed by him 'habit memory') such as table manners, physical gestures and bearing, and clothing. Basically, as he admits, such perspectives are the social anthropologist's reaction to overemphasis on other aspects of memory transmission and create a yet more complete horizon for that process.

PERSPECTIVES FROM NEUROBIOLOGY AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGY

What emerges from all this is yet another impetus and reason for the exponential growth and vitality of memory studies: the lively nature of the field itself, thriving on a multiplicity of transdisciplinary impulses and dimensions. Not the least of these has been the steady

[43] On Warburg, see, e.g. Pethes (2013) 45–50.

[44] Anguissola (2014) offers a stimulating perspective on this much-discussed phenomenon from the perspective of memory studies, even if there is no explicit reference to Warburg.

advance of neuroscientific and neuropsychological research pertaining to memory. The reason this volume includes a chapter summing up some of these findings is quite simple: 'In order to understand cultural memory it is essential first to understand memory in general.'[45] This is not to espouse what has been waggishly called neurocentrism—the mind is not the same as the neurological operations of the brain. Rather, being aware of how memory actually works provides an informed reality check against the tendency, which sometimes exhibits itself especially in the humanities and social sciences, to hypostatize memory. It is important to know the fragility, limitations, and vagaries of the instrument we call memory. There is no need to engage in simplistic equations, but unsurprisingly, neurological memory and historical/cultural memory exhibit some of the same characteristics. To highlight only the most important; others will readily suggest themselves from Chapter 13 by Onur Güntürkün and his colleagues in this volume:[46]

1. Memory, at both levels, is an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction. Instead of 'collective memory', therefore, James Wertsch, for instance, prefers the term 'collective remembering' because it brings out the notion of process and evolution.[47]
2. We can distinguish between semantic memories and episodic or autobiographic memories. The former pertain to facts, like two times two being four, but, as Güntürkün and his collaborators point out, 'Most of our semantic memories about historical facts and events are eventually based on the episodic memories of contemporary witnesses' (if that). Therefore they are just as susceptible to phenomena like false memories and source amnesia or contamination;[48] these liabilities and others are shared by individual/autobiographic and collective/cultural memory.

[45] Markowitsch (2010) 275.

[46] Cf. Markowitsch (2010); also, Kloppenborg, Ch. 10 in this volume. Tulving and Craik (2000) is an excellent resource for informative and detailed discussions of individual aspects of memory by neuroscientists and neuropsychologists.

[47] Wertsch (2009) 121.

[48] For false memories, see Güntürkün et al., Ch. 13 in this volume. Source amnesia in autobiographical memory is the commingling of actual events in our life with episodes deriving, e.g. from books we have read or films we have seen. The result is unintentional rather than deliberate. Welzer (2005) 41–5 offers a concise discussion,

3. Memory, at both levels, is a decentralized process with many contributors, impediments, and vicissitudes. Even in its aspect of the acquisition of knowledge, it is relational, associative, and embedded in networks: neuronal in the brain, social and cultural in human life.
4. Again at both levels, emotions and anything extraordinary have a great effect on the way memory is shaped. Hence, for instance, the advice by Roman writers on rhetoric to concentrate on such aspects.[49]
5. Whether autobiographic, semantic, cultural, collective, or historical, memory is selective.

MEMORIA IN ROME

As may already be seen from the preceding there are constant connections between memory and Roman life. That, of course, is no accident. Ancient Rome was a memory culture par excellence. Memory pervaded all the areas mentioned in our survey: texts and oral tradition, art and architecture, religion, ceremonies, performances, and social and political history. Memory, therefore, is a concrete entity in Roman civilization and modern memory approaches, as we have seen, do not need to be imposed artificially or extraneously on this organic presence. They can, and should, however, be employed to study it with increased understanding. I will briefly outline the role of memory in Rome in these areas but begin with one that was rather specific to it, namely mnemotechnique.[50]

Through the agency of oratory, it was embedded in everyday life. Effective organization of memory was essential for rhetorical success and therefore a staple of handbooks on rhetoric, such as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Quintilian. Beyond the technical details, two points deserve mention in the larger cultural context. One is the

with Ronald Reagan's tale of the sacrifice of a brave bomber pilot in the Second World War as a paradigm; the story Reagan presented as fact came, in fact, from a movie.

[49] A good example is the author of the *Rhet. Her.* (3.22).

[50] Small's discussion is still the best resource (1997) 95–137. For other, more expansive overviews of the role of *memoria* in Rome see Walter (2004), esp. 26–41, and Heusch (2011) 21–47, both with a good collection of source material.

emphasis on place: the orator is instructed to arrange his items in places, *loci*, such as the rooms of an imagined house, to facilitate retrieval. Aristotle, too, had recommended topoi, but what remained an abstract exercise in Greek connected with a much more pronounced Roman sensibility for place and its realities and evocations. According to Cicero, 'no object (*corpus*) can be understood without a place' (*De or.* 2.358) and his comments on how the Curia in Rome and the grounds of Plato's Academy in Athens generate memories are paradigmatic (*Fin.* 5.1.1–2). The importance of place does not end here; as Simon Price has emphasized, it is an essential aspect of Roman religion (again in contrast to Greece) and such connections again invite further study.[51] Neither, and this is my second point, was the result of memory training limited to technique. The orator needed to use *exempla* and most of these were provided by *res gestae Romanorum*. When it came to choosing appropriate exemplars and events, a major consideration applied to which I have just adverted: avoid the quotidian, normal, and routine and instead play up the extraordinary, exceptional (both good and bad), and unbelievable, for the memories of them stick around longer. Disfiguring is fine and so is creating fiction.[52] It is such presentations that shaped one's understanding of Roman history and, to some extent, identity, rather than the accounts of Livy and Tacitus, which certainly are not devoid of drama (especially as the historians had undergone rhetorical training themselves) but were far less accessible especially for a populace that was far from steeped in literacy.

Written and oral traditions, however, were not discrete. Turning to the historians, we already have seen that they viewed their writings in terms of preserving memory. Livy's preface, with its emphasis on *rerum gestarum memoriae* (3) and *rerum gestarum monumenta* (6), is a key exhibit. It has been well suggested that the *ars memoriae* was 'a likely model for Livy's conception of the past'.[53] Further, Livy's use of *monumenta* is emblematic; Varro's etymology (*Ling.* 6.49) explicitly relates *monumentum* to *memoria* and *meminisse* (cf. below). As for memory's role in poetry, Vergil's *Aeneid* is a cynosure. The national

[51] Price in, e.g. *CAH* x. 812–37, and in Beard, North, and Price (1998) 167–201.

[52] The *locus classicus* is *Rhet. Her.* 3.22.35–7.

[53] Jaeger (1997) 20–1. As can be expected, terms for memory, such as *memoria*, *memorare*, *memor*, and *meminisse* occur frequently especially in Books 1–5: http://www.utexas.edu/research/memoria/livy1_5.html, accessed 8 June 2015.

epic is a poetic (re)construction of Roman historical and cultural memory and the reader or listener is alerted to the role of memory from the very beginning: unlike Homer, Vergil does not ask the Muse to 'sing' or 'tell', but to 'bring to remembrance'—*Musa, mihi causas memora* (1.8). Accordingly, he uses the cognate *mone* in his invocation to the Muse at the beginning of the poem's second half (7.41) and he returns to *memorare* and *meminisse* when he calls on the Muses before presenting his catalogue of the Latin heroes (7.645):

> et meministis enim, divae, et memorare potestis
>
> For you, divine ones, you remember it all and can bring it to remembrance.

Memory, therefore, in its many varieties is a major theme in the *Aeneid*, corresponding to its omnipresent role in Roman culture.[54] Neither is the theme restricted to epic; its occurrence in Statius' *Silvae* is a good example besides, to mention just one more instance, Horace's presentation of his lyric poetry as *monumentum*.[55]

Mnemosyne, of course, was the mother of the Muses (Hes. *Theog.* 53–62) and Livius Andronicus refers to her as Moneta in his Latin translation of the *Odyssey*.[56] But she also had a physical presence in Rome: the temple of Moneta on the *arx* of the Capitolium.[57] Fittingly, it served as the early repository of archives, the *libri lintei*, the annalistic records of magistrates and important events that were kept by the priests of the temple. Dionysius, following an older source, knows of her as a deity who, along with other children of Kronos, was honoured at a festival (*Ant. Rom.* 7.72.13) and Cicero numbers her among deities like Fides and Concordia who represent social values (*Nat. D.* 3.47). Hence the concept of *memoria publica* (e.g. Cic. *Leg.* 3.46); Hadrian's creation of the office of *magister a memoria* (later *magister memoriae*) falls into the zone between private and public.

[54] See now the initial exploration by Seider (2013) and the compendious documentation by Raymond (2011). Phrases like *forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit* (1.203) are, for good reason, among the most quoted from the *Aeneid*. See also http://www.utexas.edu/research/memoria/vergil_aeneid.html.

[55] For Statius, see Rosati (2014); Hor. *Carm.* 3.30.1. *Monimenta* also figures at the end of the *Aen.* (12.945).

[56] Frg. 21 (Blänsdorf); cf, Hyginus: *ex Iove et Moneta, Musae* (*praef.* 27).

[57] See 'Iuno Moneta, Aedes' (G. Gianelli) in *LTUR* iii (1996) 123–5; cf. F. Coarelli, *LTUR* iii. 279–80.

That brings us to the hugely important presence of physical *monumenta*, mainly buildings (including temples) and statues. By definition, they were generators of memory. A commentator on Horace put it succinctly:

> Monumentum non sepulcrum tantum dicitur, sed omne quidquid memoriam testatur.
>
> The term 'monument' is applied not only to a burial site, but to anything that attests memory. (Porphyrio on Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.15)

That, in essence, was also the purpose of statues:

> in omnium municipiorum foris statuae ornamentum esse coepere propagarique memoria hominum et honores legendi aevo basibus inscribi, ne in sepulcris tantum legerentur. mox forum et in domibus privatis factum atque in atriis: honos clientium instituit sic colere patronos.
>
> Statues began to adorn the forum of every town, the memory of men began to be perpetuated, and honours to be read for ever began to be inscribed on the bases, so that they shouldn't be read only on tombs. Soon a forum was made in private houses and *atria* as well; the respect of clients began to honour their patrons in this way. (Plin. *HN* 34.17)

But how, exactly, did the process work? What was remembered and how was it remembered? Did later viewers in particular rely on the *titulus*, the inscription on a statue, for information, especially as such inscriptions were not free of falsifications?[58] Once more, memories could not be expected to be uniform and the use of 'cultural' or 'historical' memory needs to be calibrated carefully.

Other well-known habits and practices round out this landscape or panorama of memory in Rome. There were the ancestor masks in the house, which were displayed in the funeral processions (*pompae*), and prescribed commemorations of the dead.[59] Rituals, such as the triumph, depended on memory just for their performance; moreover, the triumph meant to create lasting memories and its procession was increasingly embedded in a landscape of buildings that commemorated predecessors.[60] The memories attendant on all of these and others never stood still and the same was true of developments

58 On such issues, see the lively exchange of Wiseman (2014) and Hölkeskamp (2014).

59 Ancestor masks: Flower (1996); concisely on the cult of the dead: Wissowa (1912, repr. 1971) 232–40.

60 Popkin (forthcoming).

outside Rome where the incorporation of peoples with their own traditions led to varied dynamics of memory, ranging from reconfigurations of memory—including inventions of tradition—especially in the Greek East to forgetfulness about memories of a native past as, for instance, in Gaul.[61] As for nascent Christianity, it was part of this cultural environment and shaped by it.

In sum, because memory was such an essential component of Roman civilization it is an extraordinarily rich subject for scholarly investigation and study. There is still a lot to be done; there is no simple matrix and, accordingly, the chapters in this collection exhibit a variety of perspectives and approaches. I will briefly highlight some of the principal issues raised by each of them with the aim of encouraging the reader to pursue them further.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME

Memory and Roman Writers

Exemplars of conduct, both virtuous or the opposite, played a large role in Roman memory culture. The prevailing notion, therefore, which is just as time-honoured as the exemplars themselves, is that such *exempla maiorum* served as a spur to action and, specifically, to equal or surpass a good model. This function of remembrance is one of the avowed objectives of an historian like Livy (*praef.* 9), for instance.

As Alain Gowing in Chapter 1 makes clear, however, things were not that simple in the early Principate. While Tacitus in his role as historian produces the memory of the past, the characters of his histories most often do not and pay remarkably little attention to lessons based on past memory. And even Tacitus himself, in contrast to his predecessors, is chary of holding up such memories as an explicit cause for action. The distinction he introduces in such discussions is significant. *Vetus memoria* is the memory of the pre-imperial past and pre-imperial individuals and is rarely used as a motivating factor. By contrast, *recens memoria* is. In terms of

[61] On the former, see, e.g. Alcock (2001); on the latter, Woolf (1996). Cf. Galinsky and Lapatin (2015).

theoretical distinctions, communicative memory plays the predominant role and, with 'cultural memory' centring on origins, as we have seen, most of the Republican past becomes a matter of the 'floating gap'.

This development makes perfect sense in its historical context. As Gowing illustrated in his book on the memory of the Republic in imperial culture (2005), we are far from dealing with universal nostalgia. Reactions were mixed and in flux as Romans navigated the new political landscape; the same is true of the provinces with regard to phenomena like native memory traditions (cf. above) and the imperial cult.[62] As Andrew Gallia has observed in his recent book on the same subject, 'the Roman Republic came to be regarded as but one of many potential sources of authority' in 'this growing store of Imperial memories' and within 'the expanding cultural horizons of Roman Imperial culture'.[63]

In the end, as Gowing notes astutely, Tacitus himself is selective in his use of the past, but far from idealizing and lamenting the loss of *vetus memoria*, 'He is enough of a realist to know that *vetus memoria* must inevitably—and rightly—give way to *recens memoria*.'[64] Two important and related themes are struck here that bear further reflection. For memory to last, it needs to involve more than digging into the past; Nietzsche's strictures about excessive preoccupation with the past being the gravedigger of the present come to mind and Tzvetan Todorov's extensive critique is an eloquent recent restatement of the same view.[65] For memory, by nature, looks backwards and forwards, shaping as it is the memory of present and future generations. Thus Cicero, in a letter to Caesar (*Epist. ad Caes.* frg. 7):

> sed ego quae monumenti ratio sit nomine ipso admoneor: ad memoriam magis spectare debet posteritatis quam ad praesentis temporis gratiam.
>
> As for the raison d'être of a monument, I am reminded by its very name: it must look more to the memory of posterity than the favour of the present time.

[62] For the latter, see Price (1984) and Brodd and Reed (2011); it was a matter of 'constructing the reality of the Roman empire' (Price 1984, 248).

[63] Gallia (2012) 252.

[64] Cf. Tacitus' similar attitude in his *Dialogus de oratoribus*.

[65] Nietzsche: *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen* (ch. 1): *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben* (sect. 1); Todorov (1995).

Aptly, this applies to Tacitus' own undertaking; as Gowing notes, 'Tacitus' work carries the memory of Rome forward, not backward; his work not only records memory, it constitutes memory as well.'

Using the intertextual relation between Catullus' Ariadne and Vergil's Dido episode as a starting point, Brigitte Libby carries this theme forward in Chapter 2 by investigating intertextuality from the perspective of memory: 'it is important to recognize that memory, like allusion, ensures continuity because it also works both backwards and forwards in time'. Gian Biagio Conte coined the term 'poetic memory' just around the time the memory boom began and used this central characteristic of Roman poets as the basis for a *sistema letterario* (which should not be understood as rigid systematization).[66] Libby enlarges the horizon by bringing in multiple aspects of cultural memory, as defined and argued about in recent scholarship, and demonstrates that poetic and cultural memory need to viewed in conjunction: 'Vergil, then, uses poetic memory (in the form of Dido's allusions to Ariadne) to highlight the changing roles of cultural memory in Rome' especially at the time of Augustus; the topic will be taken up again by Orlin in Chapter 4 with reference to Augustan religion. As I noted earlier, Vergil's epic can be seen as a poetic endeavour to (re)construct Roman cultural memory and Jan Assmann's observation that cultural memory tends to focus on origins is clearly apropos. An alternative would have been—and it is salutary to keep in mind that Vergil, who composed the *Aeneid* at an average speed of some three verses per day, had ample time to reflect on alternatives for each word, each verse, each episode, each book, and the entire epic—to write an *Augusteid*, something he seems to contemplate in the proem to the *Third Georgic*. In other words, concentrate on recent, communicative memory and blend in the origins in retrospect. For various reasons, Vergil chose not to do so, which again does not mean that he treated the cultural property of Rome as a static entity. Far from it, and we will encounter the same phenomenon in regard to the physical memory landscape of the Roman Forum (see Chapter 6 by K.-J. Hölkeskamp): as Libby points out, 'Vergil engineers his use of poetic memory to flag the evolution in cultural memory so crucial to Rome's foundation myth.' Further, she helpfully discusses the complementary roles of forgetting and

[66] Conte (1974, 2nd edn, 1985).

memory. Again, there is no simple matrix as they are played out, and with some crucial misunderstandings, at the personal level but then also operate within the larger historical and cultural dimensions.

Exempla, as illustrated earlier in Chapter 1 by Gowing, played a significant role in Roman tradition and practice; for the latter, we need only recall the resort to them by orators, as noted above. In Chapter 3, Jörg Rüpke focuses on the collection of *exempla* by Valerius Maximus who was hugely popular, as attested by the uncommon number of some 350 complete manuscripts from the medieval and early modern periods, aside from numerous translations and commentaries. Why his neglect in more recent times? The short answer is that he was not considered a 'historian'. We are returning to some of the issues I outlined earlier: a major factor in the rise of memory studies was to restore people, through what they remember, to the centre of historical discourse. This aligns with Valerius' programmatic objective (1.1.1): to recount *urbis Romae exterarumque gentium facta simul ac dicta memoratu digna* ('Deeds and sayings of the city of Rome and foreign peoples that are worthy of being remembered').[67] *Facta* is lower key than *memoria rerum gestarum*, which was, as we have seen, a conventional definition of *historia*, and Rüpke masterfully sorts out various connections and differentiations while adding the dimension of knowledge and its role. One of the lively by-products of memory scholarship has been the work in progress on definitional aspects of concepts such as 'history' and 'memory'. Hence Rüpke, in his well-grounded discussion, makes use of the term 'second-order historiography' just as Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp will speak of *memoria* of the first and second order in Chapter 6.

As befits one of the foremost contemporary scholars of the subject, Rüpke then concentrates on a major aspect of Valerius' work, religion. Traditionally, Valerius has been mined by scholars for information about Roman religious practices. Rüpke situates Valerius' roles more precisely: Valerius 'developed a way of presenting religion that goes beyond both memory *and* history, namely "knowledge"'.[68] Religious knowledge was both memory-based and part of Roman

[67] Cf. Paus. 3.11.1: 'To prevent misconception, I added in my account of Attica that I had not mentioned everything in order, but had made a selection of what was most worthy of memory (*τὰ δὲ μάλιστα ἄξια μνήμης*).'

[68] For a similar distinction made by neuroscientists in regard to memory see Güntürkün et al., Ch. 13 in this volume.

cultural memory (broadly defined), and religion, like memory, incorporated change. At the time of the early Principate, the locus of its knowledge and memory management was not the aristocracy anymore, but rising professional experts, such as Varro, who were patronized by their ruler;[69] indications are that Valerius, who dedicated his work to Tiberius, probably was not a member of the nobility. The result is complex: on the one hand, a historicized religion that is based on knowledge; on the other, Valerius' memorialization of it is selective, giving a pivotal role to the sacralization of the emperor. As is clear from several chapters in this volume, the changes taking place in the early Empire profoundly affected the ways Romans remembered (or chose to remember). As always, the contours of the changes are much clearer to us in hindsight than they were to contemporaries.

Memory and Roman Emperors

In Chapter 4 on the effect of the Augustan rebuilding of Rome on memory, Eric Orlin continues the discussion of these topics by looking at the material fabric of the city. It is a truism that architectural environments shape our memories, if not identities, and so does their change. Change in this area was another transition that characterized the early Empire. As usual, Augustus' procedure was not uniform: some Republican structures were rebuilt only with minor changes, others with a great many more, and a few—like the Temple of Pietas (an instance that might astound readers of the *Aeneid* not accustomed to Augustan unorthodoxies)—were actually removed and thereby consigned to oblivion. Another significant change, already mentioned earlier, was Augustus' changing the original dedication and anniversary dates from foundational events in the Republic to those connected with him (his birthday, the conquest of Alexandria, etc.). As argued by Orlin, one of the intended results was that such memories resonated more strongly with inhabitants of the Empire for whom the maintenance of earlier Roman cultural memories was irrelevant. It should be added that the development went hand in hand with Augustus' providing a fuller and clearer structure to the traditional calendar, which had been a motley

[69] Cf. section 'Reassessing the Role of Halbwachs', point 1 and n. 23, above.

collection of festival days, by inserting many commemorations of signal events of his life; calendars, of course, are principal markers of memory.

Two related perspectives open up here, both illustrating the increasing awareness to involve a larger, non-traditional audience. *Fasti* ceased being the prerogative of the aristocratic state. Whether calendars or lists of functionaries, or a combination of the two, they also started becoming the cultural property of towns like Praeneste, the freedmen officials of the neighbourhoods (*vici*) in Rome, the slaves of an imperial villa, and others.[70] Secondly, the city itself was becoming more cosmopolitan, mirroring the Empire at large. Richard Jenkyns has aptly observed that 'it was not only the buildings of Rome that were changeable; there were the inhabitants too'.[71] He does so in the context of his astute demonstration that it was not the material fabric of temples or other buildings in Rome that mattered for keeping up and cultivating memory. Structures burned down and were replaced with updated ones continually and the memories they evoked were not dependent on antiquarian restoration. Augustus, then, by making the changes Orlin describes, moves the whole process another step forward. And we can extend the horizon yet further by looking at the converse and reciprocal process around the Empire where many buildings took on a Roman look. Roman architectural forms and detail, which often were linked to specific memories, were used in their new settings without evoking these associations and became part of a new, and more universal, collective cultural memory; a prime example is support figures, such as caryatids.[72]

In Chapter 5, in keeping with the deliberate variety of perspectives on memory in this volume, Charles Hedrick takes the subject of the false Nero as the starting point not for recounting every detail of this episode but for reflecting on some of the basic notions that need to be disentangled in conceptual approaches to memory. After Nero's death, just as after Caligula's, the fantasy arose (*pluribus fingentibus*, in Tacitus' words) that he was still alive. Fantasy and memory, as Hedrick points, have always had a lively symbiosis, both being part of apprehension. In that connection, Hedrick returns to Freud, whose work provides an essential background for Halbwachs's reaction, as mentioned earlier. Hedrick's chapter strongly complements my

[70] See Wallace-Hadrill (2005) 59–62. [71] Jenkyns (2014) 23.
[72] Von Hesberg (2007). Cf. Galinsky (2015) 7–8.

earlier survey of memory studies, ranging over essential aspects of memory from neurophysiology to the creation of national histories in the nineteenth century and their ostensible repudiation of diverse popular memories. He reiterates a recurring theme in this volume, namely the pluralism of memories (whether social, cultural, or collective), and he proceeds to analyse in depth the locus and agency of a specific memory group during Nero's lifetime and after his death: the soldiery. In doing so, he highlights another recurring issue: Tacitus, like other historians, has access to information about their memories, but what about the millions of non-elite provincials? How can we gauge, in this particular case and generally, what was memory for them and what was fantasy, and the degree of their twinning? Other valuable perspectives taken up by Hedrick include the much-studied relation between memory and emotion/trauma, and the obstacles, especially for the *cadre social* of the soldiers, to transforming their emotional investment in a living emperor into a 'collective memory' of the man—we are made aware again that such processes are not schematic and, accordingly, should not be projected in schematic terms.

Roman Honorific Statues: Memory or Just Honour?

We saw earlier that the sight of the Curia triggered the memory of great men for Cicero (*Fin.* 5.1.1–2) and it can be expected that he was not alone in this. Without a doubt, buildings and statues in the Roman Forum were embedded in a memory landscape. How specific were its ramifications? That is the issue Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, who has been prominent in bringing aspects of memory in Roman culture to the forefront of scholarship, investigates in Chapter 6, starting with Cicero's brief allusion in one of his *Philippics* to the statue of Marcus Tremulus that was visible to his audience in the Forum. Hölkeskamp's treatment exemplifies a way topics like this one can be navigated even if conclusive answers may elude us as we have only Cicero's words and not those of his 'imagined community'. As always, modern scholars with our present resources can construct an ideal spectator or listener; a much-discussed example is the layered dimensions and memories evoked by the Arch of Constantine and its artistic decoration.[73] To what degree such spectators or listeners

[73] See, most recently, Hughes (2014), esp. 113–14.

existed in antiquity is an equally layered phenomenon and global invocations of 'cultural memory', which Hölkeskamp carefully avoids in favour of nuanced and detailed argumentation, would only throw a blanket over the state of the question. Instead, we need to take into account many variables, such as personal memories of members of the audience, the specific degree of their knowledge of what Hölkeskamp calls (hi)story, and the fact that memory was manipulated by the falsification of information provided on the *tituli* of honorary statues. The ensemble of the buildings and statues created a chain of associations, but would many listeners and viewers be aware of every link in such a chain? It is helpful, therefore, to differentiate, as Hölkeskamp does, between *memoria* of the first and second order. Finally, Hölkeskamp sounds another key theme in memory studies: memory does not stand still. The Forum was not an archaeological museum and a *monumentum* like Tremulus' statue underwent ongoing (re)contextualization—not unlike texts and intertexts in literature.

Theorists may argue about the exact meanings of 'cultural' or 'collective' memory, but ultimately it all comes down to concrete examples. In Chapter 7, Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp offers such a case study, specifically of Sulla's memory management in Rome. He literally left no stone unturned; besides being one of the first to write an autobiography, he intervened in Rome's two principal memorial landscapes, the Forum and the Capitoline, on an unprecedented scale. The importance for memory that Aby Warburg, for one, placed on material witnesses, such as artefacts, is amply illustrated by the sources Stein-Hölkeskamp cites and especially those that recognized the significance of Sulla's actions and criticized them. Of course statues and other monuments wield communicative power in just about any culture,[74] but, as Karl Hölkeskamp documents in Chapter 6, the Romans were absolutely obsessed with memorial statues, which therefore proliferated. As Stein-Hölkeskamp points out, the censors stepped in as early as 158 BC to regulate the resulting excess; a similar measure by Caligula later, which included forced relocation, was driven by both the practical objective to clear-cut the forest of statues that had sprung up throughout the city and by the desire to marginalize their residual memories. Besides terms of

[74] For a recent discussion of Armenian monuments, for instance, see Allison (2013).

memory, others can be used, such as 'accumulation of symbolic capital', but the end result is the same: someone like Sulla knew exactly what he was doing and sent out shock waves by breaking with precedent as his measures included the gilding of his equestrian statue, its placement next to the Comitium, and the attempt to consign his rival Marius to oblivion by removing his statues and monuments. All this went well beyond symbolic gestures and a symbolic destruction of memory: it was for real. Overall, this chapter provides a palpable illustration of the literally monumental powers that Romans perceived as shaping memory in the city of Rome.

As so often, however, this is a (micro)culture-specific matrix that cannot be conveniently overlaid on the Empire at large. And even from the examples in the City it is clear that what mattered was the embedding of a statue into a memory-charged context. We need to be careful, therefore, with declaring especially stand-alone statues as automatic carriers of collective memory. To facile claims of that sort Chapter 8 by Diana Ng provides a healthy corrective on the basis of representative examples from Roman Asia, including the valuable first-hand comments by Dio Chrysostom in his *Rhodian Oration*. Ng expertly reviews some of the memory scholarship that has been applied and finds some of the resulting claims to be excessive. She then offers a constructive and nuanced analysis of the evidence; cultural and local differences need to be very much taken into account in order to assess the import of honorary statues properly.

The savvy Rhodians, alas, had a very practical view of the statuary, especially of Roman officials: the guiding thought seems to have been that if you had seen one of these, you had seen them all, and therefore the same statue could serve different individuals as only the inscription (*titulus*) was changed. It is, of course, a procedure that would be completely unimaginable for the honorees in the *caput mundi*. And even when it comes to other free-standing portrait statues, the primary function that can be reliably ascertained, including again on the basis of literary sources, 'was not to prolong memory but to display public recognition'. Such statues were carriers of personal memory for family and friends, but not *ipso facto* of collective memory for the wider citizenry; in the social realm, they served the purpose of social affirmation rather than social memory. To control her findings, Ng further turns to statues of prominent individuals in Ephesus and Perge that were placed next to others, such as founding figures. But

the result is not the same as in Rome: while the presence of the founder arguably conjures up some cultural memory relating to origins, he or she remains at great remove and there is no evocation of a continuum; the juxtaposition invites comparison but does not amount to the creation of ongoing collective memory. In sum, Ng injects a welcome cautionary note into the discussion of such phenomena in terms of memory and memory studies. *Caveat spectator*, therefore, before reaching too readily for notions that may not apply.[75]

Memory in Late Antiquity and Early Christianity

As we have already seen, some of the most acute constructions of memory occur at times of political, cultural, and social change, such as the transitions that took place from the late Roman Republic to the early Empire. Another obviously important juncture was the forcible establishment of Christianity as the state religion. We know that there were many 'pagan' survivals ranging from unobtrusive morphing into Christian phenomena, in both art and cult, to contestation. Memory, unsurprisingly, is part of that juncture and its spectrum. 'Thinking with memory', therefore, and again eschewing schematic labels, in Chapter 9 Nicola Denzey Lewis examines a concrete and richly evocative instance of remembering and disremembering in this context, namely the paintings with Alcestis and Hercules in a cubiculum of the Via Dino Compagni Catacombs in Rome, dating to 350–70 CE. Here we are dealing with a many-layered phenomenon both in terms of artistic production and reception and of the creation of memory, individual and collective. These aspects are interwoven in various ways; what complicates matters is that we have no information about the commissioning individual even while it can be safely inferred that he or she belonged to an upper, though not the top, echelon of Roman society. Denzey Lewis challenges previous Christianizing and antiquarian interpretations and instead deduces that the sponsor was a pagan woman, who, well educated as she was, crafted a specific set of memories. It is an illustrative example, though not a universal paradigm, of late fourth-century non-Christians

75 Cf. Klein's (2000, 129) critique that resorting to memory has evinced its share of 'auratic' idioms.

'remembering' the past.[76] What the process has in common with other such instances, like those analysed by Gowing, Orlin, and Hedrick, is that this kind of remembering, especially in a period of major change, is a reconfiguration that involves both disremembering (a term aptly chosen by Denzey Lewis because it does not denote simple forgetting) and newly constructing (parallel, once more to the way memory works in the brain), thereby becoming the basis for new memories. Euripides' *Alcestis*, for instance, 'is remembered here in complicating ways'. And, more comprehensively, 'this figuring and refiguring of the past also creates and asserts new memories, as visual commentaries on myth'. As so often, the underlying creative process makes all this different from mere continuity (as stored in a supposed 'archival' memory) or discontinuity.

We can now turn to Christianity and the early Jesus tradition in particular. Memory traditions are at its centre and therefore have begun deservedly to attract the attention of memory scholars.[77] Chapter 10, John Kloppenborg's contribution to this volume, is foundational in many respects and its interfaces with memory aspects in ancient Rome—and after all, Christianity originated in the cultural context of the Roman Empire—will be obvious to any reader. A good example is social control over memory. Like other memory scholars, Kloppenborg goes back to the work of Sir Frederic Bartlett, a contemporary of Halbwachs who, however, worked independently of him as his field was neuropsychology rather than sociology. Hence Kloppenborg's discussion which, in addition to more recent work in that area such as Daniel Schacter's, also draws widely on studies of orality and memory undertaken by anthropologists and others, and complements Halbwachs's findings on the *cadre social* of memory with an emphasis on the performative aspect of such memories. Halbwachs, as we have seen, did not posit that group memories were static, but the work of scholars cited by Kloppenborg looks more closely at the actual performative context in which such

[76] 'Remembering' is closer to the German *Erinnerung* whereas 'memory' is more like *Gedächtnis*. The distinction—*Erinnerung* connotes a more active process—helpfully pervades German scholarship on memory, but tends to be elided in English.

[77] See, e.g. Thatcher (2005) and Kirk and Thatcher (2005). Several panels at recent annual meetings of the Society of Biblical Literature have been devoted to this subject; Kloppenborg's Ch. 10 grew out of a presentation on a panel organized by the Max-Planck Award *Memoria Romana* project.

memories were continually shaped and changed.[78] The main result, again clearly applicable to Rome, is that such a process of social control

> reduces the arbitrariness of specific events in time to a well honed cultural pattern where the cultural institutions of the village, whether linguistic, material . . . or social . . . are used to reorder the events of the past so that they accord with timeless values and beliefs.[79]

Mutatis mutandis, this process has its parallel in what neuropsychologists call 'pattern completion', as discussed by Kloppenborg earlier in his chapter: memory retrieval is an active process that combines, from different parts of the brain, not only the information that is sought after but also other information that is adapted to the needs of the environment in which such memory is solicited, the aim being to make things more cohesive.[80]

Kloppenborg, therefore, carefully scrutinizes the assumptions of those who have postulated a reliable memory tradition of the sayings of Jesus. Here as elsewhere, memory is not an accurate and simple archive of the past but is instead in a constant process of construction that is affected by many factors and variables. A specific illustration is the aphorism, originally (and typically) grounded in agrarian practice and metaphor, of 'measure for measure'. It occurs in Q, the three Synoptic Gospels, and 1 Clement. It is cited from memory and there may even have been some scribal version, but in each of these instances it is recast significantly to take into account context and occasion. There are additions and reductions relative to the other versions and the variations can be understood in light of five quite distinct performative contexts. The always altered nature of the memory of Jesus' sayings, then, is an example of 'the fallibility and constructive nature of memory'. And the exact 'original' version eludes us; here it is a matter not only of 'What Would Jesus Do?' but of 'What Did Jesus Actually Say?'

Just as many of Jesus' sayings were constructed in and throughout the process of memory so were many of the sites of his activities. As I briefly mentioned in my discussion of Maurice Halbwachs, precisely

[78] This connects, e.g. with the work of T. P. Wiseman (1998) on the importance of dramatic performances at festivals for creating Roman memory traditions.

[79] Bloch (1998) 107.

[80] This process, of course, can lead to distortions, as discussed by Güntürkün et al., Ch. 13 in this volume.

that process was the subject of his treatise on *La topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte*. He used it as an extensive and concrete example of what 'collective memory' was, hence the subtitle *Étude de mémoire collective*. Briefly, his analysis centred on the endeavour of later Christian pilgrims to associate, in various groups and over time, manifest sites with events in Jesus' life for which no such specific topographical indications existed in the New Testament Gospels.

Jodi Magness, who is one of the leading authorities on the archaeology of ancient Jerusalem, updates Halbwachs's conclusions in two important ways in Chapter 11. First, the Gospel of John, which stands apart from the synoptic ones in both chronology and perspective, in fact often endeavours to provide specific *lieux de mémoire*. Secondly, through the archaeologist's prism, we can probe far more expertly into the realities of such connections. Were they simply inventions of tradition or were there pre-existing traditions, supported by archaeological evidence, about a given site on which new ones could be grafted? Magness's approach and findings are judicious: although some details provided by John 'might correlate with sites or artefacts known from archaeology, this does not prove they were associated with the historical Jesus or derive from traditions that go back to the time of Jesus'. What does emerge is that John, more than the other Gospel authors, is intent on creating palpable memories and therefore adds details that serve that purpose. As for places, miracle stories in particular are almost begging to be localized, and John readily provides such locations. Similar specificity rules, to give but one more example, about the garment Jesus wore; here some of Connerton's observations on the role of such material indications for creating and strengthening memory are relevant. In sum, these constructions of memory accord with Halbwachs's observations but already occur at a much earlier time, showing the Fourth Gospel to be a precursor of the developments studied by Halbwachs.

Milton Moreland continues this theme in Chapter 12 and extends it to early traditions of Peter and the relocation of his principal *lieu de mémoire* to Rome with the result that reaches into the present time: 'The fact that Peter became a focus of memorialization in Rome has been a scholarly and ecclesiastical obsession and conundrum for the past century.' In this instance, too, Halbwachs's interest in the spatial dimension of the collective and social memory process is particularly relevant. The destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 CE and

Hadrian's diaspora edict (*c.*135 CE) created the necessity for some early Christians to reimagine aetiologies and reinvent traditions, and to create new memories in the process. Even though some New Testament scholars still persist on this path, we are not dealing with viable historical reconstructions but the construction and elaboration especially of social and collective memories. As Moreland points out, an analysis of why they 'became so popular among early Christian groups can help us better understand the more complex power relations, sociopolitical settings, economic interworkings, and community formation efforts that led people to identify as Christians'. He then proceeds with a critical exploration of these constructed memories, the evidence for them, and the process of localizing memory as it applies to the Tomb of Peter—a fine illustration of Güntürkün's conclusion that 'dealing with memory to some extent resembles sleuthing'. Among other considerations, the emphasis on a tangible *locus memoriae* may also be understood as a response to the Gnostics, who had no interest in memorials grounded in the physical world. Finally, Moreland highlights the 'reciprocal relationship between the material space and the production of social memory'. The memorials were not based on a pre-existing past in Rome, but, as Cicero noted in the letter to Caesar quoted earlier, *monumenta* are designed to stimulate memory in the future. In the case of the Tomb of Peter and other instances, social memory leads to ritualized behaviours (an essential aspect emphasized Jan Assmann and Paul Connerton) at sites of memory.

As we have observed repeatedly, the study of memory is a transdisciplinary enterprise. It not only offers the welcome opportunity to supersede conventional academic compartmentalizations but actually demands this perspective. Therefore, as pointed out earlier, it is essential that anyone doing work on cultural, collective, or social memory be informed about how memory actually works in our brain. Hence Chapter 13 by Onur Güntürkün (and colleagues), a recent recipient of Germany's most prestigious scholarly recognition, the Leibniz Prize, which presents an overview in a way that is accessible to scholars in other fields. In those fields, such as the humanities and social sciences, we have come to differentiate between various concepts and meanings of memory and that approach needs to be extended to include our understanding of the neuroscience of memory. Quite simply, it is important to be familiar with what kind of entity memory is, how it functions, and to have an insight into the

neurological and cognitive processes that condition our memories. Just like cultural or collective memory, the processes of memory in our brain are many-layered. Güntürkün and his co-authors explain some basic distinctions, such as declarative, episodic, and semantic memory, and place due emphasis on the role of emotions and value systems both in the acquisition of sensory information and the subsequent formation of memory structures. Reactivation of existing memories never is a matter of simple retrieval; owing to various factors, new layers are always accruing due to the neurological activation of associations that often are separate from and unconnected with the original event(s). In addition, false memories are a common occurrence. In sum, 'every time we (try to) retrieve a piece of information it is re-formed and reactivated, putting it at risk of being influenced, distorted, or even changed by our current state, opinions, and knowledge'. As noted earlier, some analogies between the neuronal operation of memory and the characteristics of cultural and collective memory readily suggest themselves;[81] what is important is an awareness of the fragile neuronal nature of memory and the ever-changing construction of memory in all its aspects.

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[81] Cf. 'Perspectives from Neurobiology and Neuropsychology' above, and, e.g. Roediger et al. (2009).

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Part I

Memory and Roman Writers

1

Memory as Motive in Tacitus

Alain M. Gowing

> Recalling the past (remembering) occurs only with the intention of making it possible to foresee the future; we look about us from the standpoint of the present in order to determine something, or to be prepared for something.
>
> Reinhart Koselleck (*Conceptual History*, 133)

> remembering is . . . an act of will, with a purpose or aim or object
>
> Hayden White (*Metahistory*, 348)

> Tacitus writes history with the accent upon personality, penetrating to the deepest recesses in his search for motive.
>
> Sir Ronald Syme (*Tacitus*, 526)

INTRODUCTION: MEMORY AS AN ETHICAL INCENTIVE

The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (*TLL*) devotes nineteen columns and two parts to its long entry for *memoria*. At the end of part I, which deals with *memoria* as an intellectual phenomenon (part II, with roughly four columns to part I's fifteen, covers the metonymic aspects of *memoria*, as manifested physically by tombs, etc.), we find a small selection of twenty-four passages that recognize instances when *memoria* is used to specify the *cause* of a particular action (*sensu causali*). Among the authors cited, Cicero, Livy, and Tacitus figure prominently.

Despite being relegated to the end of part I of the *TLL* entry, and despite the relative paucity of passages cited, the degree to which Latin authors adduce *memoria* (and its cognates and synonyms) as the motive behind or cause of an action is considerably more substantial than this brief afterthought suggests. This is especially true of Tacitus, the author on whom I wish to concentrate here in order to examine—and try to account for—the phenomenon of 'memory as motive' in this historian's works and especially as expressed at a verbal level, i.e. signalled explicitly through the use of *memoria* vel sim.[1] Given the fact that the medium of historical writing attempts both to record and account for human actions, the firm connection in the Roman mind between history and memory, and the importance of memory in Roman culture generally, it is perhaps to be expected that Roman historians would count memory among the plausible causes behind certain events. Certainly, the notion does not originate with Tacitus.[2]

Sallust, for instance, an author notably absent from this part of the *TLL* entry, provides one well-known illustration of the motivational, causal role *memoria* could play:

> Nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maximum, P. Scipionem, <alios> praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, cum maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissime sibi animum ad virtutem adcendi. Scilicet non ceram illam neque figuram tantam vim in sese habere, sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius sedari quam virtus eorum famam atque gloriam adaequauerit. (*Iug.* 4.5–6)
>
> For I often heard Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and other famous statesmen of ours who used to say that when they gazed on the portrait masks of our ancestors, their hearts were kindled with a desire to aspire to virtue. Certainly it is not the wax nor the form that has such great

[1] I am not, that is, concerned here with the much broader issues of memory in Tacitus' work examined in the stimulating scholarship I cite below, most notably Devillers (1994), esp. 117–25; O'Gorman (2000); and Sailor (2008). The numerous occurrences of *memoria* (and related terms) in Tacitus may be most conveniently observed in Gerber and Greef (1903).

[2] Nor, of course, with Romans. Thucydides adduces memory of past events as a motive on several occasions, most notably as an explanation for what caused the Athenians to suspect those who had desecrated the Hermae and the Mysteries of oligarchic and tyrannical designs (they 'remembered' the tyranny of the Peisistratids, ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ... μιμνησκόμενος, 6.60.1; 2.21.1). In general, however, this particular formulation is far more common in Roman than in Greek historians.

> power in it, but rather the memory of their deeds causes a flame to grow in the hearts of outstanding men and not to die down until their own virtue matches the fame and glory of their models.

This passage, which is largely conventional, illustrates well both the importance of memory in Roman culture and one way in which it is imagined to work.[3] There is the material prompt in the form of funeral masks; the images in turn prompt memories of the deeds of these famous men, assuming therefore that the viewer is familiar with—has a memory of—these individuals in the first place; and finally, the images and the memories they bring to mind induce one to action, specifically, to emulate and equal the *virtus* these ancestors possessed. For Sallust, the text stands in for the funeral masks, but the effect intended is the same.

Livy expresses similar sentiments, as will Tacitus. And like Sallust, Livy imagines that his *History*, also conceived in physical terms, as a *monumentum*, will equip the reader with *memoria*, a word with which *monumentum* is etymologically cognate:[4]

> (9) ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit; labente deinde paulatim disciplina velut dissidentes primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est. (10) Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites. (*Praef.* 9–10)

> (9) Let each of my readers give full attention to the following: the lives and habits of those people through whom and by whose talents our empire was obtained and expanded, both at home and abroad; and then, as our discipline gradually deteriorated, let the reader trace in his mind our habits, which at first weakened, then progressively broke apart, and finally came crashing down, until we have arrived at the present time when we can tolerate neither our faults nor their remedies.

[3] On the passage see Paul (1984) ad loc.; Chaplin (2000) 25–6. Ledentu (2010) offers a succinct discussion of this passage in comparison with the similar sentiments expressed by Tacitus. Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 1.3; Livy, *Praef.* 3, 9–10; Tac. *Agr.* 1; *Ann.* 3.65.1 (see n. 5); 4.32.

[4] Varro, *Ling.* 6.49. For a trenchant analysis of this notion and of this important section in Livy's *Praefatio*, see Jaeger (1997) 15–29.

> (10) This is what is particularly beneficial and useful in the study of history: to gaze upon examples of every sort of model as though displayed on a well-known monument. From that you may learn for yourself and for your state that which you should imitate, and also that which is disgraceful from beginning to end and which you should avoid.

Knowledge of the past thus provides you, the reader, with models to emulate, models to avoid. In short, written history, a form of memory constituted as a monument, has the power to motivate you to better yourself. We shall return to this passage presently.

Tacitus voices a somewhat similar purpose at *Annales* 3.65 in a famous and much-discussed sentence,[5] but in the concluding chapter of the *Agricola* he states the idea concretely, tied to the life of a specific person, his father-in-law. He insists that the life of Agricola—his words and his deeds—must be studied, for these convey Agricola's mind and character, and this is what we must seek to emulate in our own lives:

> Id filiae quoque uxorique praeceperim, sic patris, sic mariti memoriam venerari, ut omnia facta dictaque eius secum revolvant, formamque ac figuram animi magis quam corporis complectantur, non quia intercedendum putem imaginibus quae marmore aut aere finguntur, sed ut vultus hominum, ita simulacra vultus imbecilla ac mortalia sunt, forma mentis aeterna, quam tenere et exprimere non per alienam materiam et artem, sed tuis ipse moribus possis. Quidquid ex Agricola amavimus, quidquid mirati sumus, manet mansurumque est in animis hominum in aeternitae temporum, fama rerum; nam multos veterum velut inglorios et ignobilis oblivio obruit: Agricola posteritati narratus et traditus superstes erit. (*Agr.* 46.3–4)

> I would advise your daughter and wife alike to cultivate the memory of their father and husband, respectively, in such a way that they ponder all his deeds and words within themselves, and embrace the form and figure of his mind rather than of his body. It's not that I think we ought to forgo images that are created from stone or wax. But just like a man's

[5] *Exsequi sententias haud institui nisi insignis per honestum aut notabili dedecore, quod praecipuum munus annalium reor, ne virtutes sileantur utque pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate et infamia metus sit* ('I have not recorded views expressed in the Senate unless they are especially praiseworthy or notably disgraceful, because the particular aim of my annals, I think, is that virtues not remain silent and that fear of disgrace in the future be engendered from base words and actions', *Ann.* 3.65.1; cf. 4.32). Turpin (2008) provides a full and convincing explanation of this sentence, with ample discussion of earlier interpretations.

> face, so too is the image of his face feeble and fleeting, whereas the mind's form is deathless—something that you yourself may possess and replicate not through some foreign material or skill, but in your own way of life. Whatever we have loved or admired about Agricola remains and will remain in the minds of men for all eternity because of the fame of his achievements. For forgetfulness has overtaken many, as though they were without either glory or esteem. But Agricola, his life recorded and handed down to posterity, will survive.

Agricola thus embodies the qualities of a good man: if we study him, if we remember and emulate his words and deeds (and not merely a lifeless *imago*), if we become *like* him, we will in turn be bettered and make better decisions.[6]

These passages, which imagine an ideal, confirm that Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus all view memory as an essential component of proper or right-thinking action, as a conduit to *virtus* especially. There is, then, a moral or ethical dimension to their injunctions to the readers of the text and to how they suppose memory might work. What about the characters *in* the text? Do we ever witness a character turning the ideal into (historical) reality? In order for these claims about the power of memory to be credible, that is, we might reasonably expect some illustrations of it in the text itself. We should expect, that is, to encounter characters who *themselves* put memory to work.

And in fact, we do find in Sallust's work a few individuals who do precisely this, if not always towards the right end and not precisely as Sallust imagines in the passage from the *Bellum Iugurthinum* quoted above. In some sense, Catiline offers an example of the ideal in reverse, of a man who has *not* learned from the past. For Sallust, Catiline is moved to evil actions *primarily* because he is naturally predisposed to evil actions (e.g. *Cat.* 5.1). He does, however, impute to some of those who followed Catiline the 'memory' of what for them are the happy atrocities of Sullan rule. Not all memories, it turns out, lead to correct action, for *this* memory makes them long for civil war once again (*quod plerique Sullani milites, largius suo usi, rapinarum et uictoriae ueteris memores ciuile bellum exoptabant*, *Cat.* 16.4; cf. 37.6). Yet in his speech to the conspirators (*Cat.* 2), Catiline does not *quite* exploit the past to the degree that he might; there is, at least, no explicit mention of 'memory'. Rather, it is *res tempus, pericula egestas,*

[6] See Ogilvie and Richmond (1967) ad loc.; Sailor (2008) 106–10. In the *Annales* Seneca is made to utter a similar idea on his deathbed (15.62.1).

belli spolia magnifica that serve to incite the men, not his speech (*oratio*, *Cat.* 20.15). Contrast with this the revered Caesar's explicit summoning of memory in making his speech at *Cat.* 51 (see 51.4): Caesar (and Cato in his speech, for that matter) understands the role of memory—of history—in making decisions to a degree Catiline does not. Ironically, however, at the end Catiline exhorts his men to go forth with a recollection of their former courage (*memores pristinae virtutis*, *Cat.* 58.12; cf. 60.3). Only at the end does Catiline seem to regain the memory of his own origins—*memor generis atque pristinae suae dignitatis* (60.7)—and with it some measure of dignity and, one might even say, *virtus* (cf. 61.4).

With allowances for the vastness of Livy's extant work in comparison with that of his predecessor, Livy cites memory (*memoria*) as a motivating factor to a much greater degree than Sallust.[7] This is why the famous passage from the *Praefatio* quoted above is so crucial to understanding his *History*. It gestures towards the *exempla* tradition, the cornerstone of Roman memory as well as, one might say, Livy's text. As Jane Chaplin (2000) has shown, Livy's belief in the power of *exempla* plays out in his narrative, with characters taking on the status of *exempla* themselves or, like Livy's readers, reacting to *exempla*. With respect to Livy she poses a question similar to the one I am asking of Tacitus: what prompts action? She finds part of her answer in the *exempla* tradition—in memory, in other words. But Tacitus, I suggest, is not interested in *exempla* in the same way Livy is, nor does he write 'exemplary' history in the Livian manner.[8] While he agrees with Livy that knowledge of the past frequently informs action in the present, the majority of instances in which we see this principle in operation are of a considerably different order and magnitude.

[7] e.g. 2.45.2; 5.47.11; 6.42.7; 7.40.1; 8.16.6; 30.36.9; 38.27.1; 39.49.5. In each instance, however, it is a collective rather than individual memory at work, and typically in a military context, where the 'memory' of a previous event gives rise to fear, anxiety, etc., rather than specific action. Miles (1995) 8–74 discusses 'History and Memory' in Livy, demonstrating that he furnishes numerous examples of 'the critical importance of memory to the Roman identity and its decisive influence on Romans' behavior' (1995, 70).

[8] For a nuanced examination of the ways Tacitus *is* interested in *exempla*, see Turpin (2008).

THE *SENSUS CAUSALIS* OF MEMORY IN TACITUS

The causes of or motives behind human action are of course many: emotion, logic, and madness are among them, and more broadly the quest for political, personal, or economic advantage. To be sure, one could plausibly argue that at some level virtually *every* action engages memory. Yet the fact that Tacitus so often and *explicitly* adduces memory—*memoria*, *recordatio*, *memoro*, etc.—as the cause of an effect, actual or intended, underscores the importance he attaches to memory as a component of the human psyche.[9] The preponderance of terms such as these in Tacitus has not gone unremarked.[10] I suggest, however, that Tacitus' deployment of such words goes beyond the undisputed *cultural* importance of memory in Rome, and the idealized form of it that aims principally at moral edification, to the heart of the *practical* function of memory—memory that functions not so much at the collective level, but in the decision-making processes of an individual. This is largely what separates Tacitus from his predecessors, his interest in memory as it figures in an individual's thought processes. With this in mind, I turn to some specific examples of memory as motive in Tacitus' historical works.

To begin with, it is important to note that the ideal imagined at the end of the *Agricola*, and in a somewhat similar way by Sallust and Livy, is almost never realized in Tacitus. One is hard-pressed, that is, to find in the pages of his work anyone who gives the impression of having been inspired by memory and the lessons of the past, or a character from the past, to better him- or herself. This is not at all to say that characters in Tacitus do not act on memories, simply that the ideal student of memory envisioned by Tacitus seems to be largely a fiction or at least a rarity in the period of time and events he chronicles.While this last observation will eventually warrant explanation, what we find is a good deal more interesting. To anticipate some conclusions: (1) memories in Tacitus do not inevitably lead to

[9] Griffin (2009) is concerned with exploring Tacitus' 'interest in motive', which she rightly concludes is 'to be conceived broadly' (175). In general, however, she leaves to one side Tacitus' interest in human psychology.

[10] See esp. Santoro L'Hoir (2006) 103–4, who sees the preponderance of such terms as a manifestation of Tacitus' 'tragic poetics'.

good, prudent actions; some memories have unfortunate consequences; (2) recent memory is more often adduced as a motivating factor than the memory of the pre-imperial past and of pre-imperial individuals; and perhaps most importantly (3) Tacitus' emperors are often shown to be preoccupied with memory and with manipulating memory towards particular ends.

Let us first consider a few of the numerous instances that illustrate the general observation that Tacitus often adduces memory as a motivating factor. In the majority of cases this is denoted by *memoria* in the ablative + noun or a similar construction. In some instances the memory of an event or a person can lead to positive or beneficial results.[11] The memory of Vindex, for example, the governor of Gallia Lugdunensis who led a revolt against Nero in AD 68 with the collusion of a number of Gallic leaders, proves to be a contributing cause for Gallic loyalty to Galba later that year (*Hist.* 1.8.1). Memory may prevent bad men from gaining the upper hand: such is the case with the enemy of the much-admired Thrasea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus, the vile Eprius Marcellus, the memory of whose misdeeds leads to reprimand as well as blunts the advantages of his wealth (*Hist.* 2.53.1; 4.7.1; cf. the damaging effects of Vitellius' memory at *Hist.* 2.91.2—positive in the sense that memories of him diminish his support). On the other hand, the memory of a life lived honourably can produce positive effects after death. Such is the case with Burrus, memory of whose *virtus* stimulates sympathy for his death (*Ann.* 14.51.2), and Drusus, Tiberius' brother and the father of Germanicus, the very favourable memory of whom proves to be a considerable factor in Germanicus' own popularity (*Ann.* 1.33; 1.43.3; 2.8). It should be stressed that in each of these examples the memory invoked is invariably a relatively recent memory, a point to which we shall return.

[11] In addition to the examples cited in this paragraph, we find memory leading to essentially positive results in the following passages: *Hist.* 2.101.2 (memory of Otho, ironically, causes soldiers to support Vespasian against Vitellius; cf. 3.44); *Hist.* 4.34.4 (memory of recent victory motivates Romans); *Hist.* 4.63.1 (Civilis defers retribution out of memory of how well his son was treated in captivity); *Hist.* 5.14.1 (Civilis camps at Castra Vetera to exploit 'positive' memories associated with that place; cf. *Ann.* 1.61.1 with O'Gorman (2000) 49–56); *Ann.* 4.25.3 (memory of suffering incites soldiers against the forces of Tacfarinas); *Ann.* 14.40.3 (Asinius Marcellus escapes punishment because of the *memoria maiorum*); *Ann.* 14.63.2 (memory of Agrippina and Julia prompts sympathy for Octavia).

Conversely, remembering may lead to or be used to provoke unwelcome results. The Batavian Civilis, for instance, parades before the Roman forces sent to confront him the legionary standards he captured during an earlier engagement: this was intended to trigger a humiliating and terrifying memory in the Romans and keep fresh in his own men the memory of their glorious victory (and thus spur them on to further victory) (*ut suo militia recens gloria ante oculos et hostes memoria cladis terrerentur*, *Hist.* 4.18.2; cf. 5.4.2). Similarly, Germanicus dispatches to Raetia the veterans among those who had mutinied on the Lower Rhine in AD 14 in order to remove them from camp, the scene of the 'crime', in the (apparent) hope that distance would mitigate the *sceleris memoria* and thus thwart repetition of their mutinous behaviour (*Ann.* 1.44.4). Fear of, or fear-inducing, memory is thus another impetus to action.[12]

It is worth considering the small—and perhaps surprisingly small—role memories of the more distant or pre-imperial past play in Tacitus' historical narratives. Tacitus actually addresses this issue directly in the *Historiae*, at the conclusion of a digression telling the story of a soldier in the service of Pompeius Strabo during the battle with Cinna on the Janiculum in 87 BC. This particular soldier had killed his own brother and subsequently committed suicide. The story is told by way of contrast with a similar, recent event during Antonius Primus' marauding march through Italy in AD 69: on this occasion, however, the soldier who killed his brother is neither rewarded nor punished. Tacitus adduces the historical parallel in order to emphasize the degenerate nature of the present in comparison with the *virtus*-rich past (*tanto acrior apud maiores, sicut virtutibus gloria, ita flagitiis paenitentia fuit*, *Hist.* 3.51.2). It is, of course, *Tacitus* who produces this memory of the past, not the characters in his text; by implication, Primus and his men have *forgotten* the *exemplum,* which leads to less than admirable conduct. By way of apology for the rare historical digression, he explains when readers should

[12] Further examples: *Hist.* 2.10 (memory of vile Vibius Crispus leads to softening of condemnation of an equally vile and guilty defendant); *Hist.* 2.101 (memory of Otho's defeat causes his veterans to join forces arraying against Vitellius); *Ann.* 2.3 (negative memory of his father prompts dislike of Artaxias); *Ann.* 5.2.2 (memories of scathing jokes about an emperor linger; cf. 15.68.3). 'Forgetting', in itself a useful topic for investigation, may also lead to poor decisions, e.g. *Hist.* 1.56.1 (mutiny in Lower Germany accompanied by the 'forgetting' of their previous oath to Galba, *nec cuiquam . . . memoria prioris sacramenti*; cf. 4.77.3).

expect them: *sed haec aliaque ex vetere memoria petita, quotiens res locusque exempla recti aut solacia mali poscet, haud absurde memorabimus* ('But however often circumstance and occasion demand a model of correct conduct or consolation for bad behaviour, it will not be inappropriate for me to recall these and similar items culled from ancient memory', *Hist.* 3.51.2). Of particular interest is the phrase *vetus memoria*, implying that there is a distinction to be drawn between 'old' and 'recent' memory; and that *vetus memoria* has limited application, usually in the form, as here, of an *exemplum*.

Yet we seldom find Rome's ancient history referenced by Tacitus' characters or indeed by Tacitus himself as the explicit *cause* of action.[13] One memory that surfaces more than once, and with causal effect, is of Rome's civil wars. Fears about Otho (cf. Hedrick, Chapter 5 in this volume) and Vitellius stir in people the memory of the civil wars of the late Republic, which in turn engenders further fear and ambivalence (*Hist.* 1.50.2–3). Tacitus again makes a distinction between recent examples of a savage peace (*recentia saevae pacis exempla*) and those culled from memory (*repetita bellorum civilium memoria*). Similar fears lead to the trial of Cremutius Cordus under Tiberius (*Ann.* 4.34–5), a passage to which we shall return, though Cordus' defence essentially rests on the irrelevance of the memory of the civil wars to the present (*Ann.* 4.35.2). But the threat of the resurgence of civil war is, understandably, of particular concern both to the people and to the emperors. For the Caesars, of course, the memory of the tyrannicides is especially concerning (cf. Nero at *Ann.* 16.7.7).

EMPERORS AND MEMORY

Emperors, one expects, should be attentive to the lessons of the past. Perhaps this is why Tacitus seems especially concerned with their use and abuse of memory. For while like other characters in the narrative,

[13] I distinguish, that is, between simple references to Rome's past, which are plentiful (see esp. Ginsburg 1993), and those adduced to account for an action. A couple of rare instances of where memory of Rome's past underlies action: at *Ann.* 3.31 (unidentified) *exempla maiorum* are 'recalled' (*memorabantur*) in senatorial speeches; at *Ann.* 15.13 Corbulo's soldiers remember and are inspired by (among other past events) the battles at the Caudine Forks in 321 BC and Numantia in 137 BC.

Tacitus' emperors are often moved to action by memory, more often than not they misuse or misunderstand the memories they deploy. In the interests of space (the subject, however, warrants a much more detailed investigation and discussion), I shall confine my remarks to two especially suggestive examples, Otho in the *Histories* and Tiberius in the *Annales.*[14]

Otho and the *memoria Neronis*

Following Nero's death in AD 68, it was Galba who put on the purple. But he was old, and recognizing the need to identify a successor quickly, he chose Piso, an aristocrat of illustrious lineage. In the adoption speech Tacitus assigns him, Galba schools Piso in the need for memory. One particular important piece of advice he gives him is this: *sit ante oculos Nero* ('Let Nero be before your eyes', *Hist.* 1.16.2).[15] Now, Galba wants Piso to remember Nero precisely to *reject* his example; in Galba's eyes, Nero is a negative model, a character not deserving of emulation (cf. *Hist.* 1.16.3), yet curiously, he offers Piso no *positive* model. Of course, five days later, Piso was killed along with Galba, clearing the way for Otho to become emperor. Otho had been one of Nero's boon companions—that is, until Nero fell in love with Otho's wife Poppaea and sent Otho himself to Spain where he remained until Nero died. He thus had cause to hate Nero, had in fact allied himself with Galba, and was bitterly disappointed when Galba chose Piso over him. Yet whereas Galba counselled Piso to reject Nero, Otho embraces and exploits the memory of Nero.

What Otho realizes is that whatever Nero's character defects may have been, he was in fact extremely popular with a substantial portion of the population and in particular with the army (cf. Hedrick, Chapter 5 in this volume). Thus straightaway Otho begins to make use of that popularity, of that memory. At several points in the narrative we witness Otho overtly evoking Nero's memory, both with the soldiers and with the populace. And the fact is, it works. Even before his accession he had softened up the soldiers by

[14] Sailor's (2008) discussion of Domitian (62–4 and *passim*), Nero (esp. 215), and memory in Tacitus is instructive and insightful, and touches on many of the general observations I make about Tacitus and memory here.

[15] Galba ironically anticipates the substantial role the 'specter of Nero' will play in the *Historiae*, on which see Haynes (2003) 34–70.

reminding them of their joint service under Nero (*memoria Neroniani comitatus contubernales appellando*, *Hist.* 1.23.1). The result is the 'kindling' of their enthusiasm for him (*flagrantibus iam militum animis*, *Hist.* 1.24.1). It is the 'memory of Nero' (*memoria Neronis*, *Hist.* 1.25.2) that lies behind the decision of some soldiers to support Otho's planned coup. And eventually, once emperor, Otho exploits the memory of Poppaea, the former wife whom Nero had stolen away, by restoring her statues. Tacitus wryly remarks that he did so because he had 'not even then forgotten his loves' (*ne tum quidem immemor amorum*, *Hist.* 1.78.2). The statues, however, had been torn down following the death of Nero because of her association with the emperor, not with Otho. In effect, therefore, this act was associated with Otho's rehabilitation and exploitation of Nero's memory, signalled by the fact that he simultaneously planned a ceremony 'in memory of Nero' (*de celebranda Neronis memoria*). But the ultimate aim of these acts—the effect they are meant to *cause* and which they achieve—is an increase in Otho's own popularity. So closely allied had he become in people's minds with Nero that they began to refer to him as 'Nero Otho' (*Hist.* 1.78.2).

Thus in Tacitus' account of Otho we find an especially clear instance of where memory motivates and is used to motivate. But it is not a positive instance. While Otho is astute enough to realize the power of Nero's memory, he is unconcerned with whether Nero is a good or a bad man; what matters is simply that Nero's memory may be manipulated, and in this instance towards a bad end. Otho faces, after all, the imminent threat of civil war with Vitellius, and this is why he needs the army, as well as the people, on his side. In order to do this, he needs to be able to control memory: *abolete memoriam*, he instructs, in the wake of his ousting of Galba and the eve of his campaign against Vitellius (*Hist.* 1.84.2), as though he has the authority to issue such a command and the men have the ability to comply. Otho, in short, is among those who put memory to 'bad' uses, a man not sufficiently moral or perhaps well educated enough to learn from and use memory positively.

Tiberius, Germanicus, and the *memoria Augusti*

If the action of the *Historiae* plays out in the shadow of Nero's memory, it could fairly be said that the memory of Augustus provides

the backdrop for the action of the *Annales*. And certainly, the memory of Augustus is a point of profound anxiety for Tiberius. Tacitus portrays Tiberius as an emperor deeply aware of the past, of the force of Augustus' memory, and also very concerned about how he himself is to be remembered.[16] Memory often motivates Tiberius.

I have already written briefly of one particularly arresting instance of this, but it is worth revisiting.[17] I refer to the events surrounding the funeral of Augustus, of which Tacitus writes:

> conclamant patres corpus ad rogum umeris senatorum ferendum. remisit Caesar adroganti moderatione, populumque edicto monuit ne, ut quondam nimiis studiis funus divi Iulii turbassent, ita Augustum in foro potius quam in campo Martis, sede destinata, cremari vellent. die funeris milites velut praesidio stetere, multum inridentibus qui ipsi viderant quique a parentibus acceperant diem illum crudi adhuc servitii et libertatis improspere repetita<e>, cum occisus dictator Caesar aliis pessimum, aliis pulcherrimum facinus videretur: nunc senem principem, longa potentia, provisis etiam heredum in rem publicam opibus, auxilio scilicet militari tuendum, ut sepultura eius quieta foret. (*Ann.* 1.8.5–6)

> The fathers shouted that the body of Augustus should be carried to the pyre on the shoulders of senators. With a forbearance tinged with arrogance, Tiberius declined. Through an edict he warned the people not to repeat the disturbances, caused by excessive zeal, that attended the funeral of Julius Caesar by pressing for Augustus to be cremated in the Forum instead of the Campus Martius, his appointed place of rest. On the day of the funeral soldiers stood as though to provide protection, an act mocked at length by those who had either seen or learned from their parents about the day that saw slavery as yet fresh and freedom unsuccessfully recovered, when the dictator Caesar was murdered. To some the event was the worst of crimes, to others a thoroughly splendid accomplishment. Now, it was said, in spite of a protracted reign and also providing his heirs with the means to suppress the Republic, the old emperor Augustus even needed a military guard to guarantee that his burial would be undisturbed.

Striking about this episode is how it shows Tiberius motivated to issue an edict based on his fear of the power of memory. And of course, according to Tacitus, Tiberius was right about this memory in

[16] See esp. *Ann.* 4.38 with Gowing (2005) 62–4; on Tiberius and Augustus, O'Gorman (2000) 23–5 and Gowing (2009) 97–106.

[17] Gowing (2005) 28–30.

the sense that the people *do* remember. But Tacitus dismisses the idea that they would be prompted by that memory to attempt some action themselves. Tiberius tries to control what he *thinks* their memory will induce them to do, but he misreads the people because he does not understand the nuances and reach of his power.

Nonetheless, Tiberius' fears about the power of memory—and in particular the memory of Augustus—are not entirely unfounded. The foil to Tiberius in the first hexad, as is commonly acknowledged, is Germanicus, the popular and competent son of Tiberius' deceased and equally popular brother Drusus.[18] The *memoria* of Drusus, in fact, is adduced as one of the causes for Germanicus' own popularity (*Drusi . . . memoria . . . unde in Germanicum favor et spes*, *Ann.* 1.33.2). Germanicus is successful in almost every way Tiberius is not, rendering all the more tragic his death—or rather his murder—in Book 2. As Tacitus famously remarks, had Germanicus lived to become emperor, as he was in line to do, Rome would have witnessed a truly exceptional emperor (2.73.3). The grandson of Livia, and married to the granddaughter of Augustus himself, Germanicus was in some sense an Augustus reborn. While Tacitus forbears to compare him to Augustus explicitly, he does say that had he lived, he would have surpassed everyone in military glory, clemency, temperance, in all the virtues. It is not a stretch to imagine that Tacitus means he would have been better than Augustus. Germanicus is as close as we come in Tacitus to a man who has taken to heart the memory of the past, emulated what is good in his ancestors, and applied those lessons to his own life. As Pelling observes of him, Germanicus is one character in the *Annales* who is 'distinctively connected with the past'.[19]

And this is why Tiberius fears him. On more than one occasion, we witness Germanicus invoking the memory of Augustus, most notably as one of the means by which he quells a mutiny in the Rhine army (*Ann.* 1.43.3). His wife Agrippina, too, in that event prompts a memory of Augustus to the same effect (1.41.2; cf. 3.5.2). Moreover, Germanicus is shown to express reverence for the memory of his ancestors, and of Augustus in particular: travelling east in AD 18, he pauses at Actium to pay his respects, inspired by 'memory of his

[18] Pelling (1993), however, persuasively demonstrated that Tacitus' Germanicus is a much more nuanced character than had previously been thought.

[19] Pelling (1993) 73.

ancestors' and of Augustus in particular (*recordatio maiorum suorum*, 2.53). Such was the power of Augustus' memory. We rarely, however, see Tiberius successfully or positively deploying Augustus' memory. On the contrary, Tacitus tells us Tiberius studiously avoided comparisons with Augustus because he knew he would not come off well in the comparison (1.76.4; cf. 1.46.3).

There is an interesting twist to this nexus of relationships, for following his death, the memory of Germanicus begins to exert itself, becoming something of a leitmotif for the rest of the Tiberian narrative.[20] This is not unlike what we saw in connection with Otho and Nero, though in this instance the memory is of an admirable individual, and invoked to suggest contrast with Tiberius, the man many believed was ultimately responsible for Germanicus' death.Perhaps the most interesting manifestation of the force of Germanicus' memory occurs in Book 3, when his ashes are returned to Rome and brought to the Mausoleum of Augustus in AD 20 (*Ann.* 3.5). On this occasion the whole procession—and in particular the presence of Agrippina, who puts people in mind of Augustus—prompts the nameless crowd to remember Augustus and past funerals and to reflect on the fact that Germanicus is not being accorded the same honours as would have been the case in the past. All the accoutrements of a funeral have been stripped away, leaving them with none of the traditional incentives to inspire them to the memory of Germanicus and his *virtus*: *ubi illa veterum instituta, propositam toro effigiem, meditata ad memoriam virtutis carmina et laudationes et lacrimas vel doloris imitamenta?* ('Where were traditions of old, the effigy propped on a couch, songs, eulogies, tears—or at least the trappings of grief—meant to inspire the memory of his virtue?', *Ann.* 3.5.2). In essence, Tiberius has tried to deny them Germanicus' memory, and in the process access to the kind of *exemplum* Tacitus envisioned Agricola to be and idealized by both Livy and Sallust.

[20] e.g. *Ann.* 2.76.3 (*memoria* of Germanicus induces fear in Piso); 2.79.3 (soldiers rally around memory of Germanicus, *Germanici memores*); 4.15.3 (sight of Nero Drusus, Germanicus' son, arouses *memoria* of Germanicus himself . . . and thus resentment of Sejanus and Tiberius; cf. 11.12.1); 11.12.1 (persistent *memoria* of Germanicus exacerbates popular resentment of Messalina); 14.7.4 (memory of Germanicus binds praetorians to emperor). Explaining the predominance of memory in the Germanicus narrative, O'Gorman (2000, 56–69) argues that Tacitus ultimately turns Germanicus himself into an *imago*. See also Kraus (2009) 110–12.

Even more troubling for Tiberius, the memory of Germanicus lives on in his children. Thus when one of his sons, Nero Caesar, is brought out to participate in a public ceremony, the very sight of the boy provokes memories of Germanicus, as though Germanicus had been reborn in his son (*Ann.* 4.15.3). This leads to further increased resentment on the part of Tiberius, who dislikes the children precisely because they are Germanicus' sons.

Tiberius' deep anxieties about the past come to a head in the trial of Cremutius Cordus, the historian brought up on charges in AD 25 that he was inciting people to civil war through favourable treatment of the tyrannicides in his historical work (*Ann.* 4.34–5). This episode has been extensively discussed in secondary scholarship, and there is no need for me to pursue it here.[21] It remains, however, one of the best examples in Tacitus of the intimidating power of memory and what it can prompt people to do. Memorably, following a defiant speech in which he stresses the absurdity of the charge, Cremutius takes his own life. Tacitus concludes with one of his pithiest comments on the inviolability of memory: *quo magis socordia<m> eorum inridere libet, qui praesenti potentia credunt exstingui posse etiam sequentis aevi memoriam* ('For this reason one is more inclined to laugh at the foolishness of those who imagine that today's regime can extinguish the subsequent generation's memory', *Ann.* 4.35.5).

Let me conclude with one final example of Tiberius' attempt to control memory. In AD 33 Agrippina, Germanicus' widow, died on the island of Pontia, to which she had been exiled several years earlier. We have seen already how her memory was closely linked to that of Augustus and thus she was always regarded as something of a threat to Tiberius, hence her exile. On the day that she died, Tiberius issued another edict, this time decreeing that it should be 'handed down to memory' (*memoriae prodendum*) that Agrippina had died on the very same day that Sejanus had been executed (*Ann.* 6.25.3). His aim was to link her memory with that of a man who had proven to be not his best friend but his worst enemy. The irony of this would not be lost on Tacitus' readers, for whom the blameless Agrippina is almost on a par with the much-admired Germanicus. Like Germanicus, she is merely another victim of the emperor's efforts to control memory . . . and in the process, to influence behaviour.

[21] See esp. Moles (1998); Gowing (2005) 26–7; Sailor (2008) 250–313.

In Tiberius, therefore, we encounter a man who is in one sense imprisoned by his memories and who desperately seeks to control what he perceives to be threats caused to himself by the memories of, in particular, Augustus and then Germanicus. In contrast to Nero, Tiberius is shown to have a keen memory for events (cf. 4.31), but rather than be prompted to good action by those events, more often than not his memories lead him to less than favourable actions. This is why he stands in such stark contrast to Germanicus: Germanicus not only leaves behind a good memory of himself, but he is also someone who embodies the positive lessons of the past, and of his forebears. Tiberius, while deeply concerned about his legacy and very much bound, it appears, to precedent, really has not learned, or learned well, from the past.

CONCLUSION

The epigraphs to this paper juxtapose statements from two well-respected modern scholars of historical writing, both of whom recognize the role of memory in a genre that seeks to record and explain human action, and Ronald Syme, the greatest Tacitean scholar of our time. Both Koselleck and White acknowledge, in somewhat different ways, that memory of the past informs action in the present. Memory, in other words, provides motive. And it is motive, according to Syme, that is the particular object of Tacitus' historical inquiry, the reason why he focuses so sharply on personality. Memory, I have argued, is firmly among the motives that Tacitus imputes to many of his characters. While we can find precedents for this in Tacitus' predecessors, Sallust and Livy, and in other authors as well, Tacitus is far more likely than they to link recollection, at least as expressed through the use of words such as *memoria*, and action. That Tacitean practice anticipates a point of view expressed by modern scholars points to a suggestive coincidence of perspective. In this respect, Tacitus' deployment of memory as motive underscores his unusual, almost modernist view of memory as central to individual human psychology and thus crucial to the writing of history.[22] Because it lies

[22] A characteristic of Tacitus often remarked, but perhaps no more cogently than by Bessie Walker (1952) in her classic study *The Annals of Tacitus*, 187–96.

behind almost every action of importance, memory is beyond question among the chief 'reasons and causes' for events he seeks to uncover for his readers (*ratio . . . causaeque*, *Hist.* 1.4.1).

I have suggested, however, that we seldom encounter in Tacitus characters who recall, much less learn from, the idealized world of Rome's past, whose virtuous and heroic men formed the foundation of the *exempla* tradition that was the cornerstone of Roman ethics. Tacitus' imperial Rome instead seems at times to be a world where memory has gone slightly awry, a world in which few seem capable of learning from the past, of applying to the present lessons gleaned from memory, a situation that would be anathema to most Romans. But it would be overly facile to imagine that Tacitus subscribes to an idealized Roman past, lamenting the loss of *vetus memoria*. Rather, as the passage cited and discussed above suggests (*Hist.* 3.51.2), Tacitus is willing to summon the past when it serves an appropriate purpose. He is enough of a realist to know that *vetus memoria* must inevitably—and rightly—give way to *recens memoria*. While he may still believe in the ideal articulated by Sallust and Livy, he is aware that in order to remain vital Rome must constantly fashion new *exempla* (or refashion the old). This is why the case of Agricola (or Germanicus) is so important: this is a new paradigm or *exemplum* for a new Rome. Tacitus' work carries the memory of Rome forward, not backward; his work not only records memory, it constitutes memory as well.

His point, in short, is a simple one: human beings must remember. Yet what men remember is as significant as what they *do* with it. This is why the examples of the emperors are so informative, because they suggest that Tacitus locates one of the flaws of the Principate in the emperors' uncertain relationship with the past, even the recent past. This has to be one of the chief aims of Tacitus' works, to demonstrate not merely the value of memory but the risks to a society subject to the whims of a man who seeks to control memory and whose own memory is problematic.

The focus on the recent past, on *imperial* history, may help explain why we so seldom see characters, even 'admirable' characters, in Tacitus' adducing of the Republican past. When this *does* happen, we sit up and take notice. One especially notable occasion—and my final example of memory providing motive—occurs in the course of the debate in AD 48 about the admission of the Gauls to the ranks of the Roman senatorial class. Opponents of Claudius' proposal

immediately adduce examples from the past, both distant and near. Memory figures prominently in their reported argument; the memory of the past, they insist, should *stop* them from accepting this proposal:

> non adeo aegram Italiam, ut senatum suppeditare urbi suae nequiret. suffecisse olim indigenas consanguineis populis, nec paenitere veteris rei publicae. quin adhuc memorari exempla, quae priscis moribus ad virtutem et gloriam Romana indoles prodiderit. an parum quod Veneti et Insubres curiam inruperint, nisi coetu alienigenarum velut captivitas inferatur? quem ultra honorem residuis nobilium, aut si quis pauper e Latio senator foret? oppleturos omnia divites illos, quorum avi proavique hostilium nationum duces exercitus nostros ferro vique ceciderint, divum Iulium apud Alesiam obsederint. recentia haec: quid si memoria eorum moreretur[23] qui <in> Capitolio et ar<c>e Romana manibus eorundem prostrati s<int>? fruerentur sane vocabulo civitatis: insignia patrum, decora magistratuum ne vulgarent. (*Ann.* 11.23.2–4)

> Italy is not so unwell that it cannot supply the city with a senate. Once upon a time native senators were quite sufficient for related peoples, and we had no regrets about the old Republic. Indeed, even now we recall to memory the *exempla* that the Roman character with its time-honoured ways furnished, in order to prod us to virtue and glory. Is it not enough that Venetian and Insubrian Gauls have burst into the Senate, without something resembling captivity being imposed on us by a gang of foreigners? What career remains for the nobles who are left? for the poor senator from Latium? Every post will be absorbed by wealthy men whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers, as leaders of hostile peoples, cut down our armies through force of arms, besieged the divine Julius Caesar at Alesia. Those are recent memories. What will happen if the memory dies, the memory of our men who in the shadow of the Capitoline, Rome's citadel, perished at the hands of these same people? It's sufficient that they have the title of Roman citizens—but don't let them debase the insignia of the Senate, the glory of office.

To this the emperor produces counterarguments, also from history (and memory), and ends up beating them at their own game. Showing himself to be a master memory manipulator, he concludes the argument with a remarkably prescient observation: that which today they

[23] I retain here the MSS's *moreretur*, not Bach's emendation to *oreretur* printed by Heubner in his 1983 Teubner edition of the *Annales*, the text I otherwise use throughout. For the history of this troubled sentence, see the *apparatus criticus* for the passage in Borsák and Wellesley's (who retains *moreretur*) 1986 Teubner edition (vol. i/2, pp. 144–5).

argue by adducing *exempla* from Rome's past will one day *become* an *exemplum* (*quod hodie exemplis tuemur, inter exempla erit*, *Ann.* 11.24.6). It is not the past that matters so much, he seems to suggest, but rather the present, what we do now.

Tacitus, I believe, is in sympathy with Claudius on this point. It should be emphasized that this is *Tacitus*' reworking of Claudius' speech, a reworking that appears to cast the entire debate in terms of the relevance of the past, of memory. Both sides call on the authority of memory to justify their position, but who is right? On balance Claudius' argument seems to hold more weight, especially given that Tacitus' own family was most likely the beneficiary of this policy. In the end, of course, it does not really matter who is right; what matters is that the emperor gets his way. It is *his* version of memory that wins the day. But the passage also serves to illustrate a development in the early Empire, when the grip of the Republican past is beginning to be loosened. Just as Claudius argues, new precedents and new memories are taking shape.

If Tacitus does not satisfactorily come to grips with the risks of neglecting the Republican past, he does clearly wonder what role memory will play in this new society. That it *has* a role is beyond dispute; the sheer number of occasions on which he frames a story or action in terms of memory should be enough to persuade us that this is the case. Romans long believed memory to be fundamental to the historian's task; but few illustrate as consistently and graphically as Tacitus how it operates in the individual decision-making process. Under a principate, this must have seemed an increasingly important component of power and thus something to which an insightful historian would pay attention. In this respect Tacitus comes closer to the modern views of history and memory than any of his predecessors. To expand the epigraph from Hayden White: 'Man chooses to remember *in a particular way*, and the way he chooses to remember a thing is evidence of whether his attitude with respect to himself is destructive or constructive. A *look* back at his past is a way of defining his present and his future; *how* he sculptures his past, the kind of image he imposes upon it, is preparatory to launching himself into the future. He may decide either to stride heroically into the future or to back into it, but he cannot avoid it.'[24] This strikes me as

[24] White (1973) 348–9.

exactly the problem Tacitus faced as a historian, which in turn becomes a problem for the characters who inhabit his history. It is *Tacitus'* task to decide when, how, and what they remember, whether their memories will be destructive or constructive—and to decide whether they remember at all. While his characters, and the things they choose to remember and then do, may not necessarily inspire his readers to *virtus*, they nonetheless cause us to reflect on the conduct of our own lives and the place of the past in the present.

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2

Forgetful Theseus and Mindful Aeneas in Catullus 64 and *Aeneid* 4

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INTRODUCTION

Dido is most remembered for being abandoned. She sacrificed everything when she fell for the shipwrecked Trojan, Aeneas. She went against her own vow never to remarry after the death of her husband, and she endangered Carthage by joining herself with a foreign refugee instead of the neighbouring king, Iarbas, who did not take rejection easily.[1] All the same, Aeneas set sail away from her to found his own city in Italy, and Dido's grief at this betrayal ultimately leads to her suicide. In her final laments, Dido paints Aeneas as a heartless deserter who forgets even his most sacred vows, like many so-called heroes before him. Part of what gives Dido's rhetoric such strength is her sustained allusion to Catullus 64's Ariadne, another mythic heroine who sacrifices everything only to be abandoned by her forgetful lover. And the laments of Ariadne, herself, gain extra poignancy from Catullus' constant reminders in Poem 64 of the story of Medea, yet another woman abandoned by the very foreigner she betrayed her family to help. Vergil's Dido, then, becomes more than a single woman betrayed by a faithless man; she becomes the latest victim of an age-old cycle of heroes who forget about the women who gave up everything to help them.[2]

[1] See Verg. *Aen.* 4.320–4 for Dido's loss of honour and for the danger to Carthage. See *Aen.* 4.375 for Dido's reminder that she saved Aeneas and the rest of his fleet.

[2] For a summary of the echoes of other literary characters in the portrayal of Dido, see Galinsky (2012) 157–8.

While it is widely accepted that Dido presents herself as another Ariadne, and, by extension, another Medea, our focus on memory will turn this famous set of allusions on its head. We will see that Dido's accusations of forgetfulness in *Aeneid* 4 do not convince. Instead, it will become clear that Dido's failed use of allusion offers a lesson in the changing role of memory in Augustan Rome, where it was paradoxically more important to remember the future than to remember the past. While Dido may want us to see her as another Ariadne and Aeneas as another forgetful Theseus, Vergil makes it clear that Dido's echoes of Ariadne are misleading. The juxtaposition of Aeneas and Theseus highlights the differences instead of the similarities between the two heroes. While Theseus leaves Ariadne because he is forgetful of his love for her, Aeneas leaves Carthage precisely because he is not forgetful of his duties to found Rome. Dido's abandonment stems not from Aeneas' self-centred forgetfulness but rather from his unselfish mindfulness.

It is not enough to say, however, that Dido mistakes Aeneas' mindfulness for forgetfulness. We must also ask why Vergil allows Dido to make such an obvious mistake and how that mistake is useful for the reader of the *Aeneid*. I argue that Dido's confusion draws attention to a crucial shift in Aeneas' conception of memory that readers might otherwise have taken for granted. To Aeneas, memory is evolving into something that has less to do with the individual than with the community and, oddly enough, less to do with the past than with the future. We will see that Aeneas is struggling to replace his personal recollections with a new kind of memory that bears the hallmarks of what theorists might call cultural or collective memory.[3] Dido's misguided allusions to the story of Theseus and Ariadne, then, are not simply wrong; they play a central role in celebrating Aeneas'

[3] Cultural memory is a broad term, but for my purposes I refer to the memories of the past that are handed down in social groups and that help to define a sense of national identity for those who receive, adapt, and transmit them. Terms used to describe subsets of cultural memory include social, public, historical, popular, collective, communicative memory. Erll (2011) 13–37 and Erll and Nünning (2010) 1–15 provide an excellent overview of the field. For the division of cultural memory into formalized tradition and the more informal and ephemeral communicative memory, see J. Assmann (1995) 130–2; (1992) 16–18 and 56; and (2010). For 'social memory', see Fentress and Wickham (1992). For 'collective memory', see Confino (1997); Halbwachs (1992); Olick and Robbins (1998), esp. 111–12; Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011); Zerubavel (1996). Seider (2012) 242–3 considers how the different subsections of cultural memory fit into our reading of Vergil's *Aeneid*.

newly future-directed attitude towards the past and marking it as a new and particularly Roman development. Dido draws attention to the hero's struggle to redefine how he will use memory and how to decide what to remember and what to forget as he evolves from Trojan to Roman. Aeneas' growing ability to revise his personal past to fit a communal future should be read as a reflection of the complex uses of memory in first-century Rome, where Augustus paradoxically appealed to a collective nostalgia for the glorious Roman past to justify his changes to its core structure.

Vergil, then, uses poetic memory (in the form of Dido's allusions to Ariadne) to highlight the changing roles of cultural memory at Rome. It turns out, too, that literary allusion is a strikingly apt method of reflecting revisions of cultural memory.[4] Allusion itself, like cultural memory, also relies on a memory system in which future developments revise the past as much as the past itself influences the future.[5] In both literary and cultural memory we see the past reshaped to fit the present as much as the present is shaped by and gains legitimacy from the past. The result is that literature offers not only a medium for shaping cultural memory but also an illustration of how memory itself is reshaped over time. Vergil's manipulations of poetic memory in *Aeneid* 4 will emerge as more than purely poetic play; Dido's echoes of Ariadne allow Vergil to draw attention to and even to model the collective redefinitions of the past that characterize Augustan Rome.

DIDO AND ARIADNE: A FAMILIAR STORY

We can start our investigation of the intersections of poetic and cultural memory in *Aeneid* 4 by looking more closely at Dido's attempt to slot herself in as another Ariadne and Aeneas as another Theseus. When she learns that Aeneas is set on leaving her without delay, Dido laments, *felix, heu! Nimium felix, si litora tantum* |

[4] Rosati (2014) defines literary intertextuality as a form of cultural memory in and of itself.

[5] Dido's use of Ariadne's lament is clearly influenced by the Catullan model to which it alludes, but we also understand that Dido's allusions will retroactively colour our reading of the Catullan model. Similarly, on the level of cultural memory, Augustus may well in some way recall Aeneas, but the legend of Aeneas is also rewritten to fit Augustus, the hero's descendant.

numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae ('I would have been happy, alas, too happy, if only the Trojan ships had never touched our shores', *Aen.* 4.657–8)! This counterfactual wish mimics Ariadne's regret that foreign ships had touched her shores in Catullus 64.171–4:

> Iuppiter omnipotens, utinam ne tempore primo
> Cnosia Cecropiae tetigissent litora puppes,
> indomito nec dira ferens stipendia tauro
> perfidus in Creta religasset navita funem . . .

> All-powerful Jupiter, would that the Attic ships had never touched Crete's shores and that the faithless sailor bearing the harsh tribute to the savage bull had never fastened his ship's cable in Crete.

This wish (*utinam ne*) that foreign ships had never arrived is also familiar from Euripides' *Medea* as well as from Ennius' *Medea*, where the nurse begins the play with her wish that the Argo had never even been built.[6] In Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* (4.26–33), Medea herself speaks the famous counterfactual.[7]

Yet Dido does not simply rely on the traditional wish that foreign ships had never touched her shores to make the connection between herself and these other forgotten women. In her denunciation of Aeneas, she deploys the word *perfide* in the same position in the hexameter as Ariadne did in Catullus 64.[8] Dido questions the departing Aeneas: *dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum | posse nefas tacitusque mea decedere terra* ('faithless one, did you really hope to be able to hide such a crime and to abandon my land in silence', *Aeneid* 4.305–6)? The question echoes Ariadne's similar challenge to her absent lover, Theseus in Catullus 64.132–5:

> sicine me patriis avectam, perfide, ab aris,
> perfide, deserto liquisti in litore, Theseu?
> sicine discedens neglecto numine divum
> immemor ah devota domum periuria portas?

> Faithless one, have you left me thus carried away from my home, faithless Theseus, on a deserted shore? Leaving like this, with the will of the gods forgotten, ah forgetful one, do you thus carry home accursed perjuries?

[6] For opposing readings of Catullus' allusions to Ennius, see Thomas (1982) and Zetzel (1983).
[7] See Clausen (2002) 108–9.
[8] See Clausen (2002) 86–7 and Wills (1997) 26–7.

The repetition of *perfide* at the beginning of the second line in Catullus does not immediately appear in Vergil's version, but, as Jeffrey Wills has pointed out, a few lines later (*Aen.* 4.365–7), we encounter *perfide* once again, and it is, as expected, placed at the opening of the line this time to match the second *perfide* from Ariadne's lament:[9]

> nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,
> perfide, sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens
> Caucasus Hyrcanaeque admorunt ubera tigres.

> Faithless one, neither was a goddess your parent nor was Dardanus the author of your race, but horrible Caucasus brought you forth on his harsh cliffs and the Hyrcanian tigresses nursed you.

If we look back for a moment at the two lines (134–5) that follow that original repetition of *perfide* in Catullus 64, we find two more key words that appear again and again in Ariadne's speeches: *immemor* and *periuria*.

> sicine discedens neglecto numine divum
> immemor ah devota domum periuria portas?

> Leaving like this, with the will of the gods forgotten, ah forgetful one, do you thus carry home accursed perjuries?

This is neither the first nor the last time that Ariadne will accuse Theseus of being forgetful. Ten lines earlier in her lament, she accused the hero of leaving her with an *immemori . . . pectore* (Catull. 64.123) and sixty-five lines before that, the narrator already calls Theseus an *immemor iuvenis* as he propels his ship away from Ariadne, who looks on from the beach (Catull. 64.58). Finally, after Theseus has abandoned Ariadne, he is still forgetful, especially when, with his *oblito . . . pectore*, he fails to remember the promise he made to his father to change the colour of his ship's sails, and, so, leads his father to suicide (Catull. 64.208). Men, according to Ariadne, say whatever the moment requires and do not seem to remember what they have said: *sed simul ac cupidae mentis satiata libidost, | dicta nihil meminere, nihil periuria curant* ('but as soon as the desire of their lustful mind is satisfied, they neither remember what was said nor care about their perjuries', Catull. 64.147–8). This *periuria* typical of heroic men

[9] Wills (1997) 26–7.

reappears in Dido's complaints against Aeneas, whom she sees as showing his Trojan ancestry in the shameless way that he goes back on his promises. She says to herself, *perdita, necdum | Laomedonteae sentis periuria gentis* ('lost one, do you not yet perceive the perjuries of the Trojan race', *Aen.* 4.541–2)?

Again and again, Dido's words echo Ariadne's and try to slot the Trojan ships of Aeneas into a growing list of ships whose sailing we are meant to regret: the Argo, Theseus' ship, and perhaps even Paris' ship, which carried off Helen and began the Trojan War. Dido never uses the key word *immemor* herself; instead, she allows her constant references to Ariadne implicitly to accuse Aeneas of Theseus' most central fault: forgetfulness. Those around Dido seem to pick up on that one key word *memor* that she omits but alludes to constantly. Aeneas himself responds to Dido's implied criticism of his memory when he assures the queen repeatedly that he will not forget her: *nec me meminisse pigebit Elissae, | dum memor ipse mei, dum spiritus hos regit artus* ('nor will it shame me to remember Elissa, while I have memory of myself, and while breath rules these limbs', *Aen.* 4.335–6).

DIDO'S MISTAKE: WHY THE FAMILIAR STORY DOESN'T FIT

Yet while scholars have long recognized Dido's attempt to set herself up as another abandoned Ariadne, this attempt fails, and it is perhaps most significant for its failure. Unlike Theseus who abandoned Ariadne because of his self-centred forgetfulness, Aeneas is leaving precisely because he remembers his duty and the collective Roman future in Italy.[10] Dido accuses Aeneas of forgetfulness because she cannot recognize that the hero's attempt to sever his attachment to her is in fact proof of his memory and key to its preservation. Her obvious mistake in likening Aeneas and Theseus helps us realize how

[10] Commentators since Servius have interpreted the Dido episode as a dramatization of the victory of civic responsibility over private loves. For Aeneas' need to replace personal love with patriotism, see Williams (1968) 383–6. For the conflict between Dido's emphasis on the individual 'at the expense of the supra-personal historical elements' in motion in the *Aeneid*, see Feeney (1998) 117–19.

strikingly different Aeneas has become from the prototypical hero of the Greek tradition. In the *Aeneid*, personal, erotic love is so far from the appropriate subject for memory that it can actually be blamed for causing forgetfulness.

The gods in *Aeneid* 4 clearly see love as a threat to memory, and their use of the words *immemor* and *oblitus* is diametrically opposed to Ariadne's in Catullus 64. *Fama* is the first to accuse the lovers of forgetfulness, calling Dido and Aeneas *regnorum immemores turpique cupidine captos* ('forgetful of their kingdoms and captured by disgraceful passion', *Aen.* 4.194). Mercury, too, when he is sent down to remind Aeneas of his duty, reproaches Aeneas for allowing his devotion to Dido to make him forgetful (*Aen.* 4.265–7):

> tu nunc Karthaginis altae
> fundamenta locas pulchramque uxorius urbem
> exstruis? heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum!

are you now laying the foundations of high Carthage and are you, in your wife's service, building up a beautiful city? Alas, you are forgetful of your kingdom and your fates!

Finally, Jupiter himself expresses this same sentiment when he orders Mercury to visit Aeneas (*Aen.* 4.220–5):

> audiit omnipotens, oculosque ad moenia torsit
> regia et oblitos famae melioris amantis.
> tum sic Mercurium adloquitur ac talia mandat:
> 'vade age, nate, voca Zephyros et labere pennis
> Dardaniumque ducem, Tyria Karthagine qui nunc
> exspectat fatisque datas non respicit urbes . . . '

Jupiter heard him, and turned his eyes towards the regal walls and lovers forgetful of their better fame. Then he speaks thus to Mercury and gives these orders: 'Go on, son, call the Zephyrs and glide on your wings and speak to the Trojan leader who now waits in Tyrian Carthage and does not look to the cities given by the fates . . . '

While the faithless lover Theseus seemed in Catullus 64 to be *immemor* and *oblitus*, the terms have now been reversed in their meaning, and it is now the faithful lover Aeneas who seems *immemor* and *oblitus*. So long as the lovers' minds are held captive by desire (*cupidine captos*, *Aen.* 4.194) they cannot remember anything else, and so they are *immemores* in a Vergilian sense precisely because they are still in love and not yet *immemor* in the Catullan sense.

The reversal in the use of these adjectives in Catullus 64 and *Aeneid* 4 helps to highlight the paradox facing Aeneas: forgetting Dido is the only way for Aeneas to stop being forgetful. This observation sounds illogical, but, as we have learned from theoretical work on memory, forgetfulness is a necessary corollary to memory, not its opposite.[11] The ability to forget most of our experiences ensures our ability to remember the most important ones. Without forgetfulness, our memories would not only struggle to sift through so much detail, but we would lose our flexibility to re-remember the past so that it fits into a coherent narrative of where we think we are and where we hope to be going. Vergil himself seems to have been attuned to the irony of memory's need for oblivion: his hero Aeneas must remember to forget or risk forgetting to remember.

Forgetfulness is a crucial corollary to cultural memory, too, because it allows individuals to forget or re-remember personal experiences that clash with the versions formed by political or social consensus and reflected in different media. Forgetfulness provides the adaptability that cultural memories need to draw together large groups with conflicting experiences over the span of generations.[12] Since memory is not an infallible and complete recording of the past, each act of remembering is based on the reconstitution of an impression of the past. For that reason, our memories are always at least passively affected by our present circumstances, and we can often actively adjust our memories of the past to fit a particular agenda.[13] This plasticity that makes cultural memory so powerful, then, requires a complex interplay between remembering and forgetting as we revise our personal memories to fit collective goals.

[11] A. Assmann (2011) 19–20, 86–9, and 120; Assmann and Shortt (2012) 3–5; J. Assmann (2010), esp. 112–13; Buckley-Zistel (2012) 73–4; Erll (2011) 8–9; Esposito (2010) 185; Fentress and Wickham (1992) 39; Nietzsche (2011, orig. 1874) 73–9; Ricoeur (2004) 448–56.

[12] It is important to think of cultural memories in the plural because, just like individual memories, cultural memories are not static or homogenous. Instead, they are a constant work in progress; cf. the summary by Galinsky (2014).

[13] A. Assmann (2010) 97–9 distinguishes between active and passive types of forgetting. Active forgetting implies an intentional act of destruction while passive forgetting simply implies loss or neglect. For relevant neuropsychological aspects, see Güntürkün et al., Chapter 13 in this volume.

REMEMBERING THE COLLECTIVE FUTURE

A memory theorist might argue that what Aeneas is experiencing as he forces himself to forget his love interest is the painful but necessary development of his Roman cultural memory, which will overwrite his personal recollections. Eviatar Zerubavel (1996) has analysed how our communities define what we remember; our collective memory, which we share with our mnemonic community, can supersede our individual recollections and make us feel pride or shame for events that we took no part in.[14] Ensuring that all new members of a community learn that community's particular take on the past is a key part of orienting and incorporating them. As Aeneas himself moves towards forming a new community in Italy, it is fitting that he has begun to subscribe to a form of memory that focuses on national rather than personal concerns.

A second seemingly paradoxical aspect of Aeneas' new form of memory is that it looks to the future as much as to the past.[15] This change in the directionality of memory is apparent in the idea that what Aeneas remembers as he leaves Carthage is the prophesied rise of the Rome yet to come. Once again, however, this seemingly illogical development in Aeneas' memory matches modern theoretical insights into the workings of memory. It is another commonplace that when we reconstruct our memories of the past we often adapt them to fit not only the present but also our projected future.[16] This ability to 'remember the future' helps to protect the coherence of cultural memory during and after periods of change and upheaval. Because of Jupiter's intervention, however, Aeneas is able to make

[14] Fentress and Wickham (1992) 120–1 give examples of how social memories of working in a factory can supplant a worker's individual memories of day-to-day events.

[15] Conte (1986) 180–1 explains how the subjective aspect of Aeneas' character shows through behind his commitment to his role as epic hero. Conte points out that if we were to map these competing parts of Aeneas' character temporally, we would see that his personal longings are directed to his past, while his function as protagonist in an epic directs him into the future.

[16] A. Assmann (2010) 99 and (2011) 19–21; Assmann and Shortt (2012) 1–14; J. Assmann (1992) 16–18 and (1997) 8–9; Bartlett (1995, orig. 1932) 204–14; Erll (2011) 17, 34–7, and 112; Fentress and Wickham (1992) 201; Halbwachs (1992) 46–51; Hobsbawm and Ranger (2005, orig. 1983) 1–14; Koselleck (1979); Middleton and Brown (2010) 241–51; Olick and Robbins (1998) 128–30; Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011) 37; Rosa (2001); Straub (2010) 218–19.

concrete this rather theoretical notion that we remember according to our hopes for the future. Aeneas goes further than reimagining the past to fit the future because he is literally able to remember the future itself.

Jupiter's phrase *fatisque datas non respicit urbes* ('and he does not look to the cities given by the fates', *Aen.* 4.225) in his assessment of Aeneas helpfully encapsulates for us the type of bidirectional memory that the hero needs to develop as he makes his way from Troy to Italy. *Respicit* has the double meaning of looking back on the past, and also providing for the future.[17] When Jupiter says that Aeneas no longer looks to (*respicit*) the cities given to him by the fates, he implies that Aeneas must be reminded to remember what is to come at Rome. And perhaps, given the double meaning of *respicit*, there is also a sense that Aeneas' love for Dido threatens to take away not only his mindfulness of his Roman destiny but also his memory of his actual past at Troy, a city whose fall demonstrated rather starkly the danger of privileging personal romantic desires over the common good. Dido endangers Aeneas' memory of both the past and the future by upsetting the precise balancing act that will allow Aeneas to forget his past enough to move on while remembering it enough not to repeat past mistakes.[18]

THE INTERACTION OF POETIC AND CULTURAL MEMORIES

By the end of Book 4, Aeneas has displayed the central traits that make cultural memory such a powerful force in social groups: the ability, through a balance of remembering and forgetting, to subordinate personal memories to collective ones and to remember the future along with the past. It is no coincidence that precisely at this very important moment in Book 4, when Aeneas develops his enhanced understanding of the goals of memory, we hear Dido accuse him of forgetfulness. And it is likewise meaningful that

[17] *Respicio* carries the opposing senses of looking back on the past (*OLD*, s.v. *respicio*, 5) and also looking forward to a new topic (*OLD*, s.v. *respicio*, 6).

[18] A. Assmann (2012) 53–71 discusses the difficulty of striking the balance between forgetting enough to move on while remembering enough to avoid past mistakes.

Dido's accusation of forgetfulness comes couched in a misuse of another type of memory, allusion.[19] Literature plays an important role in cultural memory, but it also famously comes with its own memory system in the form of allusion. Each text situates itself in relation to the existing literary tradition and uses references to previous texts as part of its system of signification. In our case, it is the recollection of Catullus' earlier poem that generates the clash between Dido's mistaken view of Aeneas as forgetful of his past attachments and our understanding of him as particularly mindful. As Alessandro Barchiesi has explained, much of the appeal of literary allusions exists in the way they reverse the temporal relationship between the poet who is alluded to and the poet who does the alluding.[20] In other words, the later poet writes after the original poet whom he cites, and so Vergil writes his poetry in reaction to or on the basis of the earlier poem by Catullus. But we as readers recognizing an allusion must necessarily reverse this process because we travel backwards in time, being reminded in Vergil's later poem of Catullus' earlier one. So while our reading of Catullus clearly influences our reading of Vergil, it is also true that the allusions in *Aeneid* 4 have made Catullus' Ariadne irrevocably into a model for Dido. Thinking of Dido while we read Ariadne's lament may cause a reader to see new connections in Poem 64 between the ecphrasis in which Ariadne appears and the frame narrative of Peleus and Thetis' wedding. For instance, it suddenly becomes more meaningful in retrospect that the tale of Ariadne is told on the coverlet of Peleus and Thetis' wedding bed. As we are reminded at the conclusion of Poem 64, Peleus and Thetis are to conceive Achilles, who would later help to destroy Aeneas' homeland, Troy.

[19] Intertextuality is often described as a form of memory: Conte (1986) 38–9; Eliot (1975, orig. 1919) 38; Erll (2011) 70–82 and 144–51; Hinds (1998) 10–11; Lachmann (1997) 15 and (2010) 303–5. In fact, the nexus of allusions connecting Medea, Ariadne, and Dido has become one of the most famous cases of how poets self-consciously manipulate literary memory. In Ovid's *Fasti*, when Ariadne claims to remember her usual, plaintive role (*memini*, 3.473), she emerges as a self-referential symbol of literary memory and the games that poets play as they echo one another. For Ovid's versions of Ariadne, see esp. Barchiesi (1993) 346–50; Conte (1986) 61–3; Hinds (1998) 3–4.

[20] Barchiesi (1993) 333–4. Hinds (1998) 99–104 also offers an excellent account of how Roman poets used literary memory (in the form of allusion) retroactively to make space for themselves in the literary tradition. In particular, Hinds traces how Ovid and Statius use Vergilian echoes as a way to refashion the *Aeneid* as a prelude to their own works.

To this formulation of allusion as a process that works both backwards and forwards, I would like to add one more layer—that the bidirectionality of poetic memory makes it the perfect tool to reflect the reversals of past and future that can complicate cultural memory as well. Especially in a cultural narrative of foundation, it is important to recognize that memory, like allusion, ensures continuity because it also works both backwards and forwards in time. When we remember the story of the settlement of Italy by Aeneas and his fellow Trojans, we are not only reminding ourselves of the past but also projecting that past into the future by reminding ourselves of the type of future we want to head towards. We might, for example, consider how politicians in the United States often support a political or judicial decision as the best way forward by referring back to what the founding fathers might have done or said. At the same time, it is clear that this mechanism works in both directions because current events and aspirations naturally change how Americans conceive of their founding fathers.[21] Present political and cultural circumstances, then, can also reach back to redefine what we remember from our foundation stories and how we interpret those memories, just as an allusion in a later text can retroactively change our understanding of the original poem to which it alludes. Cultural memory and poetic memory seem to work similarly backwards and forwards, stretching out alternately to define the future based on the past or to redefine the past based on future or present circumstances. It should not surprise us, then, to find that Vergil engineers his use of poetic memory to flag the evolution in cultural memory so crucial to Rome's foundation myth. Dido's abuse of literary memory works to draw our attention to the role of memory more generally in Book 4 and to the transformation that Aeneas undergoes as he extracts himself from the cycle of forgetful heroes defined by their romantic entanglements.

THE AUGUSTAN CONTEXT

We can now begin to see how Vergil's treatment of memory here plays out in the wider context of the Augustan period. The focus on

[21] For a study of the changing views of George Washington, see Schwartz (1991). More generally on the history of American sites of memory, see Hebel (2010).

the change in both the subject matter and the directionality of Aeneas' memory (from the past to the future and from his erotic desires to the collective destiny of his followers) seems keyed to match the manipulations of memory that recent scholarship has shown to be of special importance in Augustus' Rome. We now recognize Augustus in retrospect as the first emperor of Rome, but this moment of demarcation would have been much less clear to a Roman of the first century BC. While Augustus was building his new authority at Rome, he was also insisting that he was reviving and restoring Rome's traditional Republic, and scholars have grown increasingly attuned to how Augustus justified his changes to the Republican system by styling them as restorations of older practices.[22] The most striking example of Augustus' technique of rewriting the past to match the future is his forum's sculptural programme of famous Romans, which securely locates Augustus and his adoptive father in a continuous line of Roman heroes reaching all the way back to Troy and Aeneas. At the focal point of Augustus' forum was the Temple of Mars Ultor, designed to lead every visitor through a tour of Rome's great heroes. Statuary of successful generals and statesmen lined the porticoes and exedras of the temple. The statuary led back in time to picture Romulus, the son of Mars, and the rest of Rome's Alban kings, before finally featuring Trojan Aeneas and his mother Venus, the original progenitor of both the Roman race and Augustus himself, the leader of Rome.[23] So even as Augustus breaks with tradition in becoming a one-man centre of authority at Rome, he also characterizes himself as the continuation of the Republican tradition of heroic statesmen.

Especially because so much was at stake under Augustus in how Romans recollected the past years so full of civil war, memory grew increasingly into a way of shaping the future rather than commemorating the past. After his decisive civil-war victory at Actium, Augustus was able to use the propaganda machine he had built against his opponent Antony to equate his victory in civil war with victory in foreign war. While still known as Octavian, Augustus had painted Antony as an Eastern despot, debauched, and enslaved by

[22] Flower (2006) 116; Galinsky (1996) 49 and 76; Gowing (2005) 7–23 and 138–45; Orlin (2007); Rea (2007) 21–63; Seider (2012) 260–2; Sumi (2009); Wallace Hadrill (2008) 239. For political uses of the past across cultures, see Fentress and Wickham (1992) 128–9 and Hobsbawm and Ranger (2005, orig. 1983) 1–14.

[23] Zanker (1988) 193–5. Descriptions of Augustus' forum include Ov. *Fast.* 5.545–78; Plin. *HN* 22.13; Suet. *Aug.* 19.1–2 and 31.5.

Cleopatra, who might even have convinced him to move Rome's capital once again into the East.[24] The naval battle at Actium could accordingly be portrayed in Augustan monuments and literature not so much as a civil war but as a necessary fight against the encroachment of an Eastern foe. The idea was that when Augustus conquered Antony at Actium he was fighting not against another Roman but against a debauched and foreign Easterner in a second Battle of Salamis.[25]

The message is clear if we remember that the Temple of Mars Ultor memorialized simultaneously two very different victories: the civil war victory against the assassins of Caesar and also the Roman conquest of the Parthians. The temple worked in a kind of sleight of hand to link the memories of civil and foreign war. Instead of thinking of one as civil and one as foreign, they were both above all to be remembered as successful revenge missions, because Octavian had set out in the civil war to avenge his adoptive father Julius Caesar's murder and in the foreign war with the Parthians to avenge the defeat of Crassus. In the hands of Augustus, then, memory could be modified, emended, and excised without being considered misleading as long as it guided in the right direction for the future. Personal recollections yielded to a revised collective memory, which could be re-engineered to provide continuity into the future. Augustus' paradoxical use of memory to justify the civil wars can best be summed up in his need to downplay the reasons behind Caesar's assassination while still using that assassination itself to justify his authority as avenger of his father's death.[26]

HOW TO REMEMBER TROY UNDER AUGUSTUS

Aeneas' redefinition of memory fits the manipulations of the past so common in the Augustan Age, but there is still more to the story of

[24] Cass. Dio 48.30 and 50.5. Antony presented himself as a 'new Dionysus' and opened himself up to Octavian's propaganda calling him un-Roman. Beacham (2005) 156–7 and Zanker (1988) 52–65 and 348 describe how Antony was betrayed by his own image as an Eastern dynast and his association with Egyptian Cleopatra.

[25] Galinsky (1996) 203–5; Hölscher (1984); Reed (2007) 105–6; Zanker (1988) 57. Vergil famously emphasizes the foreignness of Antony's troops in his description of Actium on the shield of Aeneas (*Aen.* 8.675–728).

[26] Quint (1993) 61–76.

how Vergil's Augustan context affects what Aeneas chooses to remember and to forget as he leaves Dido. Connected to his choice to leave Dido and her sumptuous palace is Aeneas' decision to give up hope of recreating Priam's palace at Troy and accept that he must found an entirely new city. As David Quint has shown, Trojan survivors in the *Aeneid* spend the epic learning that they cannot relive the past by simply setting up a new Troy as an empty echo of the razed city as Helenus did at Buthrotum in Book 3.[27] At first, Vergil's Aeneas considers remaining in Dido's Eastern court, which resembles Priam's Trojan palace, and he makes several failed attempts to recreate Troy in different locations.[28] Aeneas explicitly connects his struggle to break off his relationship with Dido and his need to stop wishing that he could recreate Troy. As he explains to Dido, his future in Italy trumps both his love for her and his desire to see Troy again (*Aen.* 4.340–7):

> me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam
> auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas,
> urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum
> reliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent,
> et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis.
> sed nunc Italiam magnam Gryneus Apollo,
> Italiam Lyciae iussere capessere sortes;
> hic amor, haec patria est . . .

If the fates were allowing me to lead my life according to my own wishes and to arrange my cares the way I wanted to, I would tend the city of Troy and the sweet remains of my people, and Priam's high house would remain, and I would have set up with my own hand a revived Troy for the conquered. But now Grynean Apollo has ordered me to pursue great Italy—Italy and the oracles of Apollo; this is my love, this is my homeland . . .

The last phrase, *hic amor, haec patria est*, clearly links Aeneas' realization that he must give up his romantic attachment to Dido

[27] Aeneas' realization that he cannot refound Troy is a central lesson of the *Aeneid*: Bettini (1997) 16–17; Conte (1986) 180–1; Feeney (1984) 358–60; Hardie (1993) 14–18; Labate (1991) 180; Otis (1964) 251–3; Putnam (1980); Quint (1993) 30–8 and 58–9; Rossi (2003) 178 and (2000) 576–9; Suerbaum (1967).

[28] Reed (2007) 106–9 notes how the brazen hinges of Juno's temple at Carthage (Verg. *Aen.* 1.448–9) recall those of Priam's palace (*Aen.* 2.480–1) and how the golden-fretted roof (*laquearibus aureis*, 1.726) of Dido's sumptuous banquet hall also recalls Priam's. Such details are absent from the description of Latinus' palace in *Aen.* 7.170–91.

with his understanding that he must also give up much of his attachment to his past at Troy. Aeneas would prefer, if he were able, to rebuild Priam's palace. Yet just as Aeneas understands that he cannot live life as a new Paris in Dido's gilded palace, he also understands that there can be no *recidiva . . . Pergama*.[29] Vergil's readers might also have appreciated the irony that while Aeneas cannot rebuild conquered Troy, his descendant, Augustus, would famously rebuild conquered Carthage as *Colonia Julia Carthago* in 29 BC.[30] What Vergil's Dido could not foresee is that her promise of eternal hostility between Carthage and Italy would lead to the destruction of her city and finally to the refoundation of Carthage as a Roman colony after all. The city that Aeneas helps Dido to found in the *Aeneid* 4 is reminiscent of Troy in its glory days, but Aeneas' talk of rebuilding conquered cities reminds us that Carthage will also fall and that Aeneas' own descendants will refound that fallen city in the image of Rome, not Troy.

We as readers can easily understand how Aeneas' Italian destiny makes it impossible for him to have allegiances to any other city, whether patriotic or romantic. In fact, we might not even credit Aeneas for his insight and skill in managing his past to fit his Roman future were it not for Dido's repeated inability to grasp the concept. It is Dido's failure to understand Aeneas' recognition that makes Aeneas' future-directed and community-oriented attitude seem new and innovative despite its familiarity to us and to the Romans of Vergil's time. By contrast with Aeneas, Dido herself displays a chronic inability to balance her own personal memories of the past and her hopes for Carthage. When Aeneas arrives at Carthage, Dido has already refused remarriage to any neighbouring king because she still mourns for her late husband. Neither, after Aeneas has left, can she stop her memories of Aeneas from

[29] On *Troia/Pergama recidiva* (Verg. *Aen.* 4.344; 7.322; 10.58), see esp. Anderson (1957); Bettini (1997) 16–17; Commager (1962) 216–25; Labate (1991) 180; Otis (1964) 251–65; Rossi (2000) 576. For more on how the affair with Dido threatens to keep Aeneas from leaving his past at Troy behind, see Reed (2007) 73–109. For a more general overview of the problem of Aeneas' Eastern origins and associations, see Buchheit (1963).

[30] On Augustan Carthage, see Cass. Dio 52.43.1; Strabo 17.3.15; Tert. *Pall.* 1. Rakob (2000) 75–6 offers a helpful overview of the colony and how Vergil's description of Dido's Carthage might reflect the contemporary building project. Galinsky (2009) 81–2 suggests that Vergil signals the Augustan appropriation of Carthage by giving Aeneas such a prominent role in the city's original foundation.

consuming her and threatening her city. With Dido's negative example before us, then, we give credit to Aeneas for breaking out of the mould and accomplishing what Dido cannot. He must marry the Italian princess Lavinia and make Rome possible by blending Trojan survivors and Italian natives.[31]

Aeneas' struggle to find the right balance in remembering and forgetting Troy is especially worth emphasizing because it reflects a central tool of Augustan rhetoric, the increasingly complex exploitation of Rome's Trojan prehistory. Given Augustus' claim to Trojan ancestry, the questions of how to remember Troy and which parts of Rome's Trojan heritage to record were crucial for Augustus and for Augustan poets.[32] In fact, retelling Rome's Trojan foundation myth became a way of reflecting on the recent civil wars that had put Augustus in power, and how one conceived of Rome's relationship to its Trojan past was closely linked to how one understood the outcome of the civil wars. On one hand, the story of Rome's rise out of Troy's fall could be seen as parallel to the rise of Augustus' new golden age out of the ruins of the civil wars at Rome. On the other hand, the worry of whether Rome had escaped a replay of Troy's fate recurred in the question of whether Augustus could end Rome's cycle of civil violence. In other words, the civil wars could be seen as another Trojan disaster or as another opportunity for Roman rebirth, led by the descendant of Aeneas.

There was much at stake, therefore, in developing a precise way of framing Rome's connection to Troy and in isolating certain strengths to remember and cling to, and certain weaknesses to forget and disown as un-Roman. We might say that the emergence of Aeneas' forward-directed memory in *Aeneid* 4 is part of a wider split developing in Augustan literature between two different sides of Rome's Trojan past. The resilience of Aeneas, who leads his men west and into their Roman future, stands in contrast to the tragedy of the Trojan king Priam, whose status as an Eastern dynast links him to Dido and would always mark him out as un-Roman. Accordingly,

[31] As Juno requests, the Italians and Trojans will join together and be known as Romans rather than Trojans: Verg. *Aen.* 12.819–28.

[32] Julian coinage as early as the 40s BC highlights the link through Venus to Troy: Weinstock (1971) pl. 6.10–12 shows a coin bearing a bust of Venus on the obverse and an image of Aeneas carrying Anchises out of Troy on the reverse. Erskine (2001, 17–23) compiles useful evidence for the prominence of the Julian link to Troy.

Horace describes Aeneas in his *Carmen Saeculare* 41–4 as a leader about to give his men more than they left behind:

> cui per ardentem sine fraude Troiam
> castus Aeneas patriae superstes
> liberum munivit iter, daturus
> plura relictis . . .

> those for whom pure Aeneas, survivor of his homeland, paved an open way without harm through burning Troy, about to give more than had been left behind.

The future participle *daturus* is a perfect modifier for Aeneas, who from the fall of Troy on was devoted to paving the way for the future. The qualifying phrase *sine fraude* in line 41 may be directed at alternate versions of the Aeneas legend in which the hero was allowed to leave Troy only because he helped the Greek forces, but it also echoes the fraudulence of the Trojan king Laomedon who first initiated Troy's troubles by deceiving the gods. Aeneas is specifically leading a group of Trojan survivors who are free from the stain of Troy's ruling house. King Priam and his father, Laomedon, are left securely in the past (*relictis*), and *castus* Aeneas, and his descendant Augustus, look ahead to ensure Rome's continuing success.[33]

In aligning himself with Aeneas rather than a son of Priam, Augustus struck a balance that allowed him both to celebrate his Trojan ancestry and to accuse his rival Antony of imitating an Eastern dynast. Augustus set himself up as the guardian who preserved the work that Aeneas had done to help Trojans evolve into Romans. By contrast, Antony's imitations of Troy's decadence, threatened to reverse that progress and to make Rome un-Roman once again. Antony himself, it was said, wished to be buried not at Rome but at Alexandria.[34] The result is that the civil war between Augustus and his rival Antony can be reframed to look less like a battle between two Romans, or even between Rome and an Eastern foe, but rather between two parts of Rome's Trojan inheritance—the forward-looking resilience that Rome should embrace and the decadent

[33] This forward-looking ideal anticipates Nietzsche's famous warning (2011, orig. 1874, 74) that part of the 'past has to be forgotten if it is not to become the gravedigger of the present'. See also the remarks in Todorov (1995) 24–8. For more on the complementary functions of memory and forgetting, see above, n. 11.

[34] Cass. Dio 50.3. See Zanker (1988) 57.

weakness that Rome should leave behind. In the *Aeneid*, Aeneas risks shading into an Antony figure when he considers remaining in Dido's Eastern court or trying to recreate Troy. Yet, his sense of duty and fate forces him to begin his evolution from Trojan victim to Roman victor by leaving Dido's charms and her luxurious palace. Aeneas' choice to leave Dido makes clear that the man responsible for leading the Trojans to Rome was no Antony, enslaved by his passion for an Eastern and decadent queen. Aeneas redefines the relationship of past, present, and future in a way that Dido cannot understand but that Romans of Vergil's day would see as increasingly familiar.

CONCLUSION

We can end by recalling one moment even further back in the poetic tradition—in Homer's *Odyssey*. When we compare Aeneas' departure from Dido with Odysseus' departure from Circe, we can see even more clearly Dido's difficulty in using and recognizing all types of memory and how that difficulty emphasizes Aeneas' mnemotechnic sophistication. In *Odyssey* 10.472–4, Odysseus' men convince him to leave Circe after a year by pleading with him to remember (*μιμνῄσκεο*) the land he left—his native land, Ithaca, and his wife and son that we know he left there.[35]

> *δαιμόνι', ἤδη νῦν μιμνῄσκεο πατρίδος αἴης,*
> *εἴ τοι θέσφατόν ἐστι σαωθῆναι καὶ ἱκέσθαι*
> *οἶκον ἐϋκτίμενον καὶ σὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.*

> Leader, remember now your fatherland, if it is fated for you to arrive safely at your well-built house and at your fatherland.

Thinking back to Odysseus' situation helps us to see the final mistake that Dido has made in her attempt to link herself with Ariadne. By now it is clear that Aeneas is no Theseus, but Dido is certainly not straightforwardly an Ariadne figure, either. She is not deserted on a lonely island away from her home; instead, she risks taking Aeneas from his future home, wife, and sons just as Circe almost made Odysseus forget his own wife and son. Dido is wilfully forgetting

[35] Clausen (2002) 82 compares Aeneas' struggle to leave Dido with Odysseus' struggle to leave Circe and Jason's to leave Hypsipyle.

that she is at her new home and that Aeneas, like Odysseus, has a city that he needs to (re)found.[36] The audience of the *Odyssey* does not fault Odysseus for leaving Circe, and we might instead fault him for staying so long despite his memories of his wife, son, and country. Dido, like Circe, represents a threat to memory rather than a proper object of memory, and her inability to understand memory is highlighted by her misuse of poetic memory. She is, in the end, remembering the wrong poetic model and interpreting her affair with Aeneas as a replay of the affair of Ariadne and Theseus rather than as a replay of Circe's hold on Odysseus.

The differences between what Odysseus and Aeneas are asked to do only emphasize the sacrifice that Aeneas must make to become a founder hero of Rome rather than a refounder of Troy (or Ithaca). While Odysseus must give up present pleasures to return to his previous life, Aeneas must sacrifice present happiness for an abstract and untested idea of his future wife, homeland, and descendants yet to come. Aeneas evolves from a man who carried his father to safety on his shoulders into a national hero who will shoulder a shield depicting Rome's national history (*Aen.* 8.626–728). In the time frame of the poem, the shield depicts Rome's future rather than its history, and so the image dramatizes Aeneas' change in focus, whether or not he realizes it, from carrying his personal past to supporting the future of the community as a whole.[37] Since Aeneas is the mythical ancestor of Romans, this shift in his conception of memory becomes key to the emergence of Roman identity as told in the *Aeneid*. Dido's laments succeed not in vilifying Aeneas but rather in emphasizing his courage as he establishes a set of civic-minded men who will, like Augustus, value the cultural memory of Rome over their own personal memories and commemorate the past always with an eye towards securing the future.[38]

[36] Dougherty (2001) 161–83 shows how Odysseus' *nostos* is in many ways a refoundation of Ithaca and a reflection of the settlements colonized throughout the archaic Mediterranean.

[37] Lyne (1987) 188–9 focuses on the tension between Aeneas' personal story of familial loss at Troy's sack and the national story of Troy and Rome. Lyne notes that it is the promise of a Trojan future that motivates Aeneas to preserve himself rather than the wishes of his wife Creusa.

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3

Knowledge of Religion in Valerius Maximus' *Exempla*

Roman Historiography and Tiberian Memory Culture

Jörg Rüpke

THE PROBLEM: MORE THAN RHETORIC

One of the most popular texts of Roman memorial culture was composed at the time of Tiberius. It was reworked into a variety of abridged versions already in antiquity and widely read in the European Middle Ages and the early modern period; about 350 complete manuscripts have been preserved.[1] Writing during the reign of Tiberius, Valerius Maximus collected 'memorable deeds and sayings' by sifting through a large amount of late Republican and Augustan historical writing. Ordering his material by topic rather than as a continuous narrative, he assembled in a handy form numerous 'documents' of historical individuals who in one form or another manifested *virtus*. There seems to be no doubt about Valerius' intentions and choice of genre. He offers examples rather than historiography and aims at his readers' moral improvement rather than throwing light on an uncertain past.[2] *Exempla* or *paradeigmata* enjoyed a prominent place in ancient (and post-ancient) rhetoric. Aristotle, for instance, differentiates between examples and enthymemes (arguments from probability) as

[1] Schmidt (2002) 1116.
[2] See, e.g. Bloomer (1992); Honstetter (1977); Skidmore (1996); Lucarelli (2007).

the main categories of rhetorical proof, further differentiating between historical events and fictitious ones (*Rh.* 2.20.1–2, 1393a23–31); the early first-century BC *Rhetorica ad Herennium* combines rational demonstration with the argument from (historical) example.[3]

It is not Valerius himself, however, who uses the term *exempla*,[4] but Iulius Paris, one of his two preserved late-antique epitomators, in his brief dedicatory epistle. The other epitomator, Ianuarius Nepotianus, does not use the word in his preface but stresses the need to epitomize Valerius in order to render the books, too long and too ornate, useful once more.[5] *Exempla* is not a master key. The present chapter takes its starting point from two further observations. First, religion, or more precisely the 'cult of the gods', takes pride of place, occupying the very first of Valerius' nine books. Why should moral improvement begin with an institution so dominated—and this is Valerius Maximus' point—by fixed rules? The second observation is even more disquieting. If we look through modern historical accounts of Roman religion, we encounter an image heavily reliant on Valerius Maximus.[6] This leads me to ask: Why are Valerius Maximus' collected anecdotes on religion so attractive to historiographers of Roman religion? How did he 'historicize' religion? It is the very specific forms of historical remembrance, which Valerius tried and succeeded in introducing into Tiberian memorial culture, that form the subject of my analysis.

TOOLS: MEMORY, HISTORY, KNOWLEDGE

The emphasis given to rhetorical examples and moral didactics in recent scholarship focuses on contemporary function and tends to underplay the diachronic aspects of the work, which this volume invites us to reconsider. To tackle this issue, we must take seriously Valerius'

[3] *Rhet. Her.* 4.57. See 4.62 for a more precise explanation of *exemplum*: *est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio.*

[4] Varro (*Ling.* 6.62) explains *documenta* as *exempla docendi causa*, in a discussion of words connected with teaching, defined as an intellectual activity. The term as used by Valerius Maximus cannot be considered a synonym of the common term *exemplum* in the context of rhetoric.

[5] Praef. (p. 592 Kempf); see Honstetter (1977) 12–13.

[6] Wissowa (1912); Cancik (1991); Beard, North, and Price (1998); Rüpke (2007).

own expression *memoratu digna*, 'what is worth remembrance', in the very first sentence of the work. In recent years, 'memory' has developed into a powerful heuristic tool, extending far beyond the metaphorical transfer of cerebral and psychic mnemonics to social processes initiated by Maurice Halbwachs nearly a century ago.[7] Ignoring rhetorical exhortation as implied in 'example', 'memory' now evokes complex processes of association, of temporal marking, of individual appropriation, and selective social recall. But this same extendability has robbed the term of any precise meaning—it is in danger of becoming an 'empty concept'[8] if not given more precision. The problems I address here require that 'memory' be combined with a term for which it frequently substitutes, namely 'history'. The conceptual pair 'memory' and 'history' admittedly demands some clarification, which I offer below. As a pair, they offer the possibility of a more probing analysis that goes beyond mere generic classification and arguments about intention. Karl Galinsky has offered a concise overview of the relationship between the concepts.[9]

Geoffrey Cubitt has described 'history' and 'memory' as 'proximate concepts: they inhabit a similar mental territory'.[10] They are in permanent tension, interacting with each other rather than moving away into clearly defined territories.[11] We may think of them as analytical tools that afford a different focus on the same field of cultural processes and products. Taking memory first, we can propose that memory focuses on 'relationships to the past that are grounded in human consciousness'. Conversely, memory designates those parts of knowledge that include a self-reflective knowledge about the past temporal circumstances of the sedimentation of this knowledge.[12] Such a focus on the individual generation of knowledge is, however, not at all exclusive. 'The challenge for broader thinking about memory lies in the quest for connections—in the exploration of the complex relationships that may exist between the ways in which individuals remember the pasts that fall within their personal experience, the ways in which they define or experience their social involvement, and the ways in which representations and understandings of a

[7] Halbwachs (1925, 1992); see also Nora and Ageron (1984).

[8] See Pethes and Ruchatz (2001) 9.

[9] Galinsky (2014), esp. n. 2; cf. his Introduction to this volume. I am grateful to him for referring me to Gowing's analysis of the concepts in ancient Rome (2005, 7–17).

[10] Cubitt (2007) 4.

[11] Cubitt (2007) 5.

[12] Berek (2009) 70. For the neuropsychological background see Welzer (2002).

social or collective past are generated within the larger society.'[13] Since intersubjectivity is crucial for any form of memory,[14] it seems reasonable to use the term 'memory culture'.[15]

From that point of view, history is just a form of social memory—if, with Paul Ricoeur, we take it in a narrow sense, as a discursive, usually narrative, reconstruction of the past.[16] Paul Connerton has been most explicit in describing the manifold forms and processes of 'social memory'.[17] This has led to a fruitful historicization of historical narrative and the discipline of History proper,[18] which will prove helpful to our treatment of the type of historiographic literature offered by Valerius Maximus. At the same time, the orientation produced by such a concentration on memory implies an undesirable reification of social memory.[19] Admittedly, written histories offer individual views onto the past, which are simply alternative versions, not 'the truth' about the past.[20] Any written history would engage with individual and collective memory,[21] and gain in plausibility and stature through such memories, but it would engage with them critically. Whether implicitly or explicitly, narrative history is a critical enterprise, competitive and perhaps even overtly argumentative. It is no doubt this dialectical relation to memory that marks a difference from mythical narrative, which is otherwise, in form and function—and often even in its material—close to or identical with memory.[22] In the European tradition, history invented itself by attempting to question mythical narrative, not always very plausibly: the best example is of course Thucydides' excursus on Minos and the Trojan War in his introduction (1.3–12). In other words, *especially* in literate societies, individual memory is typically shaped in a pluralistic world both of memories and of histories.[23]

My title introduces yet a third concept, namely 'knowledge'. Even more than history, 'knowledge' reflects upon the medial form of

[13] Cubitt (2007) 13. [14] Berek (2009) 187.
[15] Berek (2009); Rüpke (2012b). [16] Ricoeur (1984–5).
[17] Connerton (1989). [18] See LeGoff (1992) 102; Sandl (2005) 118–19.
[19] Cubitt (2007) 18. [20] Ankersmit (2001).
[21] On the problematic concept of 'collective memory', see Green (2011).
[22] Rüpke and Rüpke (2010).
[23] The shifting place of individuals in relation to the social frameworks had already been stressed by Maurice Halbwachs; see Cubitt (2007) 162–3, and 242–3 for some consequences as regards modern pluralistic societies. Erll (2005) 178–84, characterizes such relationships by the term 'antagonistic mode', but I would argue that this is not a specific 'mode' but rather a basic condition of all historiography.

what is known, and upon its systematization, transforming items of information into areas or even systems of knowledge. Just as with history, I take 'knowledge' to be justified not so much by its relation to truth as by its subjective and social status as arguable conviction.[24] Under the conditions of a scriptographic society, copying even written knowledge exclusively by hand,[25] such knowledge, permanently in need of reproduction, is precarious, always threatened by extinction and vulnerable to social pressures.[26] At the same time, command of knowledge is a powerful instrument in structuring social relationships and maintaining power. My hope is that analysing Valerius Maximus' transformation of memories not merely into the mapping of spaces of memory, as Ute Lucarelli has recently done,[27] but also into available knowledge will tell us something about the changing role of religion in the Tiberian period.

VALERIUS MAXIMUS AND THE GENRE OF *EXEMPLA*

Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta* is clearly not continuous or narrative history. As I have already observed, the arrangement of the brief narratives is not chronological but thematic.[28] There is, however, no doubt that they could be used to evoke a social memory relating to factual history as well as social norms. The frequent explicitly normative statements underline the decisive role played by the author in directing such evocations.[29] In themselves, the examples are usually susceptible to different interpretations. They do not often invoke historical circumstances as explanation.[30] Are they on that account, then, a mere repository for rhetoricians?

Some scholars have thought so,[31] and we cannot exclude the possibility that Valerius was used in this way. There are, however, many indications that Valerius imagined his audience reading his work

[24] Williamson (2000); see also Carrette (2007). [25] Wandhoff (1996).
[26] See Mulsow (2012) 14–26. [27] Lucarelli (2007).
[28] For an overview see Themann-Steinke (2008) 32–7.
[29] Lucarelli (2007) 282; see also her fine analysis at 26–35 of how the examples function, taking David (1998a) as her point of departure.
[30] See Lucarelli (2007) 288.
[31] Most recently Themann-Steinke (2008).

continuously.[32] This is of course not to claim that he just wrote a bungled history of the Republic and early Empire. It is characteristic of modern bias regarding the writing of history that, despite his enormous influence, Valerius Maximus is hardly ever mentioned in treatments of Julio-Claudian historiography.[33] But Mueller's apodictic 'Valerius did not write history' must leave us unsatisfied.[34] Velleius Paterculus' brief universal history, finished shortly before Valerius' books in the very early 30s AD, also frequently interrupts the chronological sequence with thematic passages.[35] There is a coherence to Valerius' narratives, even if it is not totalizing. There is a historical vision, even if there is no continuous historical narrative.[36]

Research on memory suggests that exemplarity is by no means necessarily opposed to history. Exemplarity is a quality of the past, which relates the past to the present in a rather intensive manner. This means of acknowledging the importance of the past and its continuing normativity (whether critical or affirmative, depending on the author) was popular well into the early modern period.[37] From the fourth century BC, from Xenophon, Ephorus, and Theopompus onwards, exemplarity was a defining quality of much ancient historiography.[38] It did not need to exclude temporalization.[39] Both focus on different aspects of memorization, the normative and the chronological, without sacrificing the one for the other. The long-lasting marriage of both is demonstrated in the European tradition by historiography from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment: 'The dominant conception of history was that of an exemplary history, didactic in intention, inductive in method, and founded on the commonplaces of the Roman Stoics, rhetoricians, and historians.'[40]

[32] I base this hypothesis on a reading of Honstetter (1977), who has demonstrated the omnipresence of literary ornament in Valerius. See also, e.g. Lucarelli (2007) 287 on the effects of entire sequences.

[33] There is no reference to him even in Grafton (2007), who himself emphasizes the long-lasting influence of the normative model of historiography.

[34] Mueller (2002) 6.

[35] Rich (2011) 82. The history must have been written before the end of Seianus: Hennig (1975) 133.

[36] Cf. Bloomer (1992) 146. Felmy (1999) 281 and *passim*, has demonstrated the value of *exempla* as media for creating a vision of the past in late antiquity.

[37] See Burke (2011) criticizing Hartog (2011). Grafton (2007) 32, calls attention to incipient change in the latter period. For the late Roman Republic see Bücher (2006).

[38] Pownall (2007). [39] Contra Grethlein (2011).

[40] LeGoff (1992) 160 (following G. H. Nadel).

Valerius, too, offers history. Not only did he use the past tense for his examples. Not only is he writing against the background of, and openly using, a rich tradition of historiography, rather than confining himself to reproducing earlier collections of examples, such as those by Pomponius Rufus or Hyginus.[41] Presupposing a chronological framework consisting of famous wars and magistrates, Valerius often elegantly introduces his less well-known protagonists at the very beginning of the narrative as contemporaries, colleagues, participants in an expedition, and so on. Very occasionally, such temporal markers occur only at the end, thus underlining his interest in the date even more clearly (see, e.g. 1.6.5).

To differentiate between examples and history is not serving an interest in rigid classification of genres, but necessary in order to elucidate the extent of the implications. 'Learning from history', as Katherine Clarke has pointed out, 'not only requires a belief in continuity and constancy of character, behaviour, and principles, it also entails some self-awareness of one's own place in the longue durée.'[42] It is history which is always threatened by forgetting.[43] Valerius sets out to assist historiography in achieving its proper ends, namely the provision of orientation and legitimacy. This might be called 'second-order historiography', but in fact it is simply one of the pragmatic products of history-writing in literary form, alongside oral performance and transformation into monuments.[44] As Jörn Rüsen has put it, 'There is no human culture without a constitutive element of common memory. By remembering, interpreting, and representing the past peoples understand their present-day life and develop a future perspective on themselves and their world. "History" in this fundamental and anthropologically universal sense is a culture's interpretive recollection of the past serving as a means to orient the group in the present.'[45]

Valerius' introduction is full of historiographic terminology. It is the work of the historiographer, not a moral stance, that gives him

[41] See Val. Max. 4.4.1 and briefly Schmidt (2002).

[42] Clarke (2008) 276.

[43] Clarke (2008) 286; see also LeGoff (1992) 64–5, on religious treatments of the problem of forgetting rather than remembering, adducing Mnemosyne and Orphic concepts of salvation.

[44] See the exemplary study of Flower (2003) on the figure of Marcellus. The pragmatic dimension also includes the politics of obliterating memory: Flower (2006).

[45] Rüsen (1996) 8. To this definition the element of space must be added, cf. Torre (2002).

authority. The exemplary behaviour is of course that of historical agents. Yet there is a double shift in authority. In the very first sentence, Valerius stresses that his enterprise spares those interested in first-hand documents (*documenta sumere volentibus*) the trouble of lengthy research. *Urbis Romae exterarumque gentium facta simul ac dicta memoratu digna*, 'the deeds and sayings of the city of Rome as well as of foreign peoples worthy of memory', as the very first sentence has it (foreign examples are admittedly demoted to second place in each class), are documented as a *domesticae peregrinaeque historiae series*, 'a sequence of history made at home and abroad', as one might render the phrase that follows shortly afterwards (1, praef.). For the Empire of the early Principate, only universal history (*omnis aevi gesta*) could be adequate,[46] a feeling *likewise* shared by historians of the early modern period, albeit on a still larger geographical scale.[47] This is a view that emerges already in the very late Republic, as we can see from the work of Cn. Pompeius Trogus (an author used extensively by Valerius)[48] and the lost *Chronica* of Cornelius Nepos.[49] Varro's *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* had a similar ambition, as I have shown elsewhere.[50] It is a historical work of this kind which Valerius dedicates to the person *penes quem hominum deorumque consensus maris ac terrae regimen esse voluit*, 'in whose hands the consensus of men and gods wished to place command over sea and land' (1, praef.), namely to Caesar, to Tiberius.

But the shift in authority is not only from the local to the universal, to the sole source of universal power at the limit of human potential, the emperor. For there is a second shift here, in the social *locus* of authority. The organization of the work into thematic books and chapters, into examples from Rome and abroad, reflects the extension of memorial culture and more precisely of styles of argument drawing on history beyond the sphere of aristocrats, who had had full control over what their *maiores* had or would not have done. It is a bookish person like Valerius who, in the wake of earlier historians and antiquarians, has now assumed the right to decide what

46 See Krasser (2005) 374–5, defining the achievements of Valerius Maximus and Pliny the Elder as 'Konstruktion und Stiftung einer imperialen Identität'.

47 See, e.g. Grafton (2007) 29 and 32.

48 Bloomer (1992) 99–108.

49 For Nepos see Rich (2011) 81.

50 Rüpke (2012b) 163–4.

tradition is.[51] (There are several indications that Valerius Maximus was not himself a member of a noble family, but rather a client of one.[52])

Even if Valerius offers only second-order historiography, his selection is far from innocent. Previous research has tended to concentrate on the ethical content of the selection and its social function.[53] More recently attention has turned to the historiographic elements, while avoiding the word 'history' and invoking instead 'spaces of memory' or 'spaces of recollection' (*Gedächtnisraum*, *Erinnerungsraum*).[54] Within the framework developed in the beginning, I will take up some impulses from the research on memory, but will focus my analysis by the concept of 'history'.[55] The accumulation of brief, independent narratives that focus on individuals and their conduct is a powerful means of reducing historical complexity and perception of contingency.[56] Nevertheless, the universe of norms thus assembled is still a historical universe. It does offer guidance for contemporaries but it also offers a perspective from which to interpret the past.

This is all the more important in that Valerius' readers were not confined to his contemporaries. No less than 350 complete manuscripts survive from the medieval and early modern periods, to say nothing of commentaries and translations.[57] These offered an authoritative view of Roman history that informed the image of the Republic well into the twentieth century (and no doubt beyond). It is Valerius' examples that first come to mind when one has to illustrate Roman religion of the Republic. But there is a further important issue I have not yet touched on: Why did Valerius choose to place religion in first place in his writings and his contribution to social memory?

[51] Krasser (2005) 363; Rüpke (2009). Cf. Bücher (2006) 137–40 on the diminishing aristocratic control of spaces of memory. Wallace-Hadrill (2008) provides an extensive illustration of the larger phenomenon extending to all major areas of Roman culture.

[52] Skidmore (1996) 115–16, basing himself on Val. Max. 5.5, thought that the reference to ancestor masks at home was a prosopopoieia pointing to higher magistrates among his ancestors, but see the convincing criticism of Weileder (1998).

[53] Skidmore (1996); see also David (1998b); Lucarelli (2007).

[54] Thus Lucarelli (2007) 292, 294. Cf. Diefenbach (2007) 20, differentiating a more precise concept of *Erinnerungsraum*, which includes a topographic reference and comes closer to ancient usage of mnemonic space, from the metaphorical *lieux de mémoire*.

[55] See likewise, e.g. Benoist et al. (2009).

[56] Cf. Lucarelli (2007) 296.

[57] Schmidt (2002) 1116.

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE IN VALERIUS MAXIMUS

Religion—or rather, to paraphrase the author's own words, the 'condition . . . of the cult of the gods'[58]—plays an important role in Valerius' enterprise. I will concentrate on this first book, even if religion reappears elsewhere. Recent scholarship on Valerius Maximus has elucidated his vision of a traditional but also emotional religion, permeating much of everyday life in the form of decisions in situations of crisis.[59] Although he has succeeded in recreating an important voice of religion in the age of Tiberius, however, Mueller has chosen completely to neglect the historiographic dimension: 'Time is irrelevant.'[60] Insofar as it stresses the continuing validity of religious truths and norms, the point is well taken; but it does overlook the specific historical form of legitimacy of the norms thus generated.

The very first chapter of the first book—'De religione' is surely a later title—is of major importance in establishing basic changes in space and time and in construing a specific form of authority (Val. Max. 1.1.1):

> Maiores statas sollemnesque caerimonias pontificum scientia, bene gerendarum rerum auctoritates augurum observatione, Apollinis praedictiones vatum libris, portentorum depulsi<one>s Etrusca disciplina explicari voluerunt. prisco etiam instituto rebus divinis opera datur, cum aliquid conmendandum est, precatione, cum exposcendum, voto, cum solvendum, gratulatione, cum inquirendum vel extis vel sortibus, inpetrito, cum sollemni ritu peragendum, sacrificio, quo etiam ostentorum ac fulgurum denuntiationes procurantur.
>
> Tantum autem studium antiquis non solum servandae sed etiam amplificandae religionis fuit, ut florentissima tum et opulentissima civitate decem principum filii senatus consulto singulis Etruriae populis percipiendae sacrorum disciplinae gratia traderentur, Cererique, quam more Graeco venerari instituerant, sacerdotem a Velia, cum id oppidum nondum civitatem accepisset, nomine Calliphanam peterent [vel, ut alii dicunt, Calliphoenam], ne deae vetustis ritibus perita deesset antistes.
>
> Cuius cum in urbe pulcherrimum templum haberent, Gracchano tumultu moniti Sibyllinis libris ut vetustissimam Cererem placarent, Hennam, quoniam sacra eius inde orta credebant, X viros ad eam

[58] *Et quoniam initium a cultu deorum petere in animo est, de condicione eius summatim disseram* (Val. Max. 1, praef. ad fin.).

[59] Mueller (2002). [60] Mueller (2002) 176.

propitiandam miserunt. item Matri deum saepe numero imperatores nostri conpotes victoriarum suscepta vota Pessinuntem profecti solverunt.

Our ancestors organized the regular annual festivals by means of the traditional science of the pontiffs; they guaranteed success in public affairs through the observations of the augurs; they interpreted the predictions of Apollo from the books of the seers; and they averted evil portents by the rites of the Etruscans. It has been our ancient custom to resort to religious rites such as prayer when we want to entrust some matter to the gods; a religious vow when we have to request something; a formal thanksgiving when we have to repay the gods; a search for favorable signs, either from animal organs or from lots, when the future has to be ascertained; and sacrifice when we want to perform a solemn rite. We also use sacrifice to avert evil when portents are reported or places are struck by lightning.

Our ancestors were very eager not just to preserve religious observance but even to expand it, so when the state was already very powerful and prosperous, the Senate voted to send ten sons from their foremost families to the various peoples of Etruria, so that the young men might learn the Etruscan science of ritual.

Our ancestors had from the very beginning worshiped Ceres in the Greek manner, so in choosing a priestess of Ceres, they brought Calliphana in from Velia, even though that city had not yet obtained the right of Roman citizenship. They wanted the goddess to have a priestess trained in her ancient rituals.

Our ancestors had a very beautiful temple for this goddess in the city, but when, during the Gracchan troubles, they were warned by the Sibylline Books to placate Ancient Ceres, they sent the committee of ten to propitiate her at Henna, since they believed that this place was the origin of her cult.

Our generals likewise often went all the way to Pessinus after gaining a victory so as to fulfill their religious vows to the Mother of the Gods. (trans. Walker 2004)

The most obvious dimension of this passage is the spatial one. The religion, the 'condition of the cult', that interests Valerius is not confined to the city of Rome or the *ager Romanus*. Religion is universal; on this point Valerius concurs with sketches of the history of religion by other Roman authors.[61]

[61] See my analysis of the fragments of Varro's *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* in Rüpke (2012b).

Since my concern is with authority, however, I am more interested in another feature of the text, the stress on knowledge. The 'knowledge of the pontiffs' (*pontificum scientia*), the 'vigilance of the augurs' (*augurum observatione*), the 'books of the seers' (*vatum libris*), and finally the 'Etruscan science' (*Etrusca disciplina*) set the tone. As Mueller has so clearly shown, Valerius is indeed a traditionalist: cult is to be performed *prisco etiam instituto*, 'in the ancient manner' or *vetustis ritibus*, 'in ancient rituals'; the superlative 'very old' (*vetustissimam Cererem*) is better still. However, the translation by Walker that I have used does exaggerate: the succeeding paragraphs do not in fact start (as the translation suggests) with *maiores nostri*. Moreover, as Valerius stresses, the Romans of old were eager not only to preserve but also to enlarge religion (*studium . . . amplificandae religionis*). Innovation is built into the system, and knowledge is both driving force and medium. The priests themselves initiate it. In other words, Valerius also reflects on change.

If this is the message, it is driven home by the examples that follow. The burden of the anecdote in 1.1.2 is that the *caerimoniae Martis* take priority over *Martius certamen*: cultic duties to Mars at home are more important than battle abroad. It is the *pontifex maximus*—an office held by Augustus and Tiberius at Valerius' time—who is responsible for asserting these priorities, even against a fellow priest.

It is, however, not the person of the priest but the role of knowledge that is of paramount importance. To drive home that message is the task of the next example, which is generally quoted solely for its factual content. Through reading books about public cult, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (consul 177 and 163 BC) realized that a ritual mistake had been committed during the consular elections for 162, which he had conducted. Whereupon he informed the college of augurs, whose deliberations resulted in a report to the Senate, which ordered the consuls to return from their provinces to Rome and abdicate (1.1.3):

> Laudabile duodecim fascium religiosum obsequium, laudabilior quattuor et XX in consimili re oboedientia: a Tiberio enim Graccho ad collegium augurum litteris ex provincia missis, quibus significabat se, cum libros ad sacra populi pertinentes legeret, animadvertisse vitio tabernaculum captum comitiis consularibus, quae ipse fecisset, eaque re ab auguribus ad senatum relata iussu eius C. Figulus e Gallia, Scipio Nasica e Corsica Romam redierunt et se consulatu abdicaverunt.

> We must praise the religious respect shown by his [Postumius'] twelve fasces, but we must praise even more the obedience of twenty-four fasces in a similar matter. In a letter sent from his province to the college of augurs, Tiberius Gracchus told them that he had been reading books about public sacrifices. These books made him aware that the augural tent had been wrongly set up during the consular elections, which he himself had organized. When the augurs reported this matter to the Senate, the Senate ordered Gaius Figulus to return to Rome from Gaul and Scipio Nasica to return to Rome from Corsica. Both men had to resign their consulships. (trans. Walker 2004)

Valerius cites another famous incident a little further on (1.1.8). The laudable effort to give thanks to the gods for expanding the Empire has to be restrained by even more laudable attention to religious details. This is achieved by the college of the pontiffs, even if this means conflict with a man who is consul five times over, successful in the field, and pious. Neither the man's prestige nor the additional costs hindered the college from issuing its 'admonition'.[62] M. Claudius Marcellus (consul 222, 215, 214, 210, 208), victor at Clastidium and Syracuse, and himself an augur, was forced to build two *cellae* in his temple to Honour and Virtue:

> Non mirum igitur, si pro eo imperio augendo custodiendoque pertinax deorum indulgentia semper excubuit, quo tam scrupulosa cura parvula quoque momenta religionis examinari videntur, quia numquam remotos ab exactissimo cultu caerimoniarum oculos habuisse nostra civitas existimanda est. in qua cum <M.> Marcellus quintum consulatum gerens templum Honori et Virtuti Clastidio prius, deinde Syracusis potitus nuncupatis debitum votis consecrare vellet, a collegio pontificum inpeditus est, negante unam cellam duobus diis recte dicari: futurum enim, si quid prodigii in ea accidisset, ne dinosceretur utri rem divinam fieri oporteret, nec duobus nisi certis diis una sacrificari solere. ea pontificum admonitione effectum est ut Marcellus separatis aedibus Honoris ac Virtutis simulacra statueret, neque aut collegio pontificum auctoritas amplissimi viri aut Marcello adiectio inpensae inpedimento fuit quo minus religionibus suus tenor suaque observatio redderetur.

> It is not surprising that the gods have constantly watched over us, and have had the kindness to protect and expand our empire, since

[62] See Flower (2003) 46 for the role within the image of Marcellus; see also Flower (2000).

> we seem to pay careful attention to the tiniest details of religious observance. It must not be imagined that our state ever allowed its eyes to wander from the strictest observance of religious ceremonies. After Marcus Marcellus had conquered Clastidium and later Syracuse, he held his fifth consulship and wanted to consecrate a temple to Honor and Courage in fulfillment of religious vows he had made in public. The college of pontiffs forbade this, and ruled that a single temple could not properly be dedicated to two gods. They argued that if some portent occurred in the temple, it would be impossible to distinguish which of the two gods would have to be placated by a sacrifice. They also pointed out that it was not the custom for sacrifices to be offered to two gods, except in the case of some well-established divine pairs. As a result of this ruling by the pontiffs, Marcellus had to set up statues of Honor and Courage in separate temples. The prestige of this very distinguished man did not deter the college of pontiffs, nor did the additional expense incurred deter Marcellus—he followed the proper procedure in his religious observances. (trans. Walker 2004)

Such knowledge is effective knowledge only when controlled. In the famous account of the discovery of the sarcophagus of Numa, Valerius tells us that the seven books in Latin on pontifical law were carefully preserved, but the seven books in Greek on philosophy burned, for fear that they might induce people to stop their cultic efforts:

> 1.1.12 Magna conservandae religionis etiam P. Cornelio Baebio Tamphilo consulibus apud maiores nostros acta cura est. si quidem in agro L. Petili scribae sub Ianiculo cultoribus terram altius versantibus, duabus arcis lapideis repertis, quarum in altera scriptura indicabat corpus Numae Pompili fuisse, in altera libri reconditi erant Latini septem de iure pontificum totidemque Graeci de disciplina sapientiae, Latinos magna diligentia adservandos curaverunt, Graecos, quia aliqua ex parte ad solvendam religionem pertinere existimabantur, Q. Petilius praetor urbanus ex auctoritate senatus per victimarios facto igni in conspectu populi cremavit: noluerunt enim prisci uiri quidquam in hac adservari civitate, quo animi hominum a deorum cultu avocarentur.
>
> 1.1.13 Tarquinius autem rex M. Atilium duumuirum, quod librum secreta ri<tu>um civilium sacrorum continentem, custodiae suae conmissum corruptus Petronio Sabino describendum dedisset, culleo insutum in mare abici iussit, idque supplicii genus multo post parricidis lege inrogatum est, iustissime quidem, quia pari vindicta parentum ac deorum violatio expianda est.

> (1.1.12) In the consulship of Publius Cornelius and Baebius Tamphilus our ancestors showed great scruples in their respect for religion. When farm-hands were digging rather deeply in a field under the Janiculum belonging to a scribe called Lucius Petillius, they found two stone chests. An inscription on one revealed that it contained the body of Numa Pompilius. In the other were found seven Latin books about the law of the pontiffs, and as many Greek books about the discipline of philosophy. They ordered that the Latin books should be preserved with the greatest care, but they felt that the Greek ones might in some way tend to undermine religion. Following Senate instructions, the city praetor, Quintus Petillius, ordered the sacrificial attendants to make a fire and burn the books in public. The men of those days did not want to retain anything in this state that might take people's minds away from the worship of the gods.
>
> (1.1.13) The duumvir Marcus Atilius had a book containing the secrets of public ritual entrusted to his safekeeping. He was bribed by the Sabine Petronius and gave him the book so that Petronius could make a copy of it. King Tarquin condemned Atilius to be sewn into a sack and thrown into the sea. Long afterward, this type of punishment was prescribed by law for parricides. And rightly so, because a crime against parents and a crime against the gods should receive the same punishment. (trans. Walker, 2004)

The example that follows immediately upon this (1.1.14) underlines the point about the management of religious knowledge: it does need to be preserved, but undue proliferation is itself a danger that must be curbed.

A CONTEMPORARY VOICE IN HISTORICAL DISGUISE

From the point of view of observers in the very late Republican and early imperial period, the complexities of the divine world were a matter not only of some smaller or larger shared memory, but also of a systematically organized and authoritative knowledge. This knowledge afforded the means of exploiting the religious resources offered by the divine in the shape of numerous propitious deities. The gods are present in the world as agents about whom humans can know something. They are of course also present in the form of memory, that is above all of narratives, but they can be pinned down,

given better shape by 'knowing' about them.[63] In contrast to mere mythological narrative, the new forms of knowledge could assimilate different types of discourses and integrate scattered knowledge about gods. Varro's three types of theology offered one means of organizing such knowledge,[64] Cicero's account of religion in his *De legibus* another.[65] Accounts such as these, compiled, systematized, and authorized by intellectuals, not necessarily of noble descent,[66] rather than a lived tradition of priestly accumulation of knowledge, must have shaped Valerius' imagination.

In the first chapter of the first book Valerius presents a selection of narratives and thus, by his very choices, tacitly construes his image of religion. This selection has served as the foundation for many accounts of Roman Republican religion. It is an account of religious rulings taking precedence over everything else; of public priests, thanks to their total control of knowledge, located at the very centre of religion. It is also an account that lacks, not chronological markers, but chronological sequence: change does occur, but it is change in quantity and territorial expansion, not in quality. The modern historiography of Roman religion has tended to neglect the existence of the former and accept the suppression of the latter. To pick up the bifocal starting point of this chapter, 'memory' has been allowed to take precedence over 'history'. Yet it seems to me that Valerius had developed a way of presenting religion that goes beyond both memory *and* history, namely 'knowledge'.

Knowledge about religion was not merely an academic enterprise. It was concern about divinatory knowledge that led Augustus to order the burning of 2,000 oracular books (Suet. *Aug.* 31.1). Astrological knowledge was so important to the emperor Tiberius that he employed specialists in the art such as Scribonius and Tib. Claudius Thrasyllus.[67] Divinatory knowledge was potentially dangerous.[68] In AD 17 *mathematici* were driven out of town together with Jews (Suet.

[63] Cf. Varro, *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* fr. 3: *pro ingenti beneficio . . . iactat praestare se civibus suis, quia non solum commemorat deos, quos coli oporteat a Romanis, verum etiam dicit, quid ad quemque pertineat.*

[64] Rüpke (2005).

[65] Rüpke (2012a) 186–204.

[66] See Wallace-Hadrill (2008); Rüpke (2012a) 151 and 218–19.

[67] Suet. *Tib.* 14.2 and 4. See the general judgement in 69: *Circa deos ac religiones neglegentior, quippe addictus mathematicae . . .*

[68] See Rüpke (2011) 105–9 and Fögen (1993) for the radicalization of the problem from the 3rd century AD onwards.

Tib. 36); in the previous year, some had been executed in the context of a supposed conspiracy (Tac. *Ann.* 2.32). According to Suetonius, Tiberius required those who wished to consult a *haruspex* to do so in public and with witnesses (*Tib.* 63).

Valerius may have reflected this ambivalence in the composition of his first book. The second chapter, which is only preserved in the epitomes of Iulius Paris and Ianuarius Nepotianus (the latter of whom is very critical), cited examples of famous Romans who suggested that they had intimate communication with gods. It is impossible to reconstruct the precise wording, but their headings, *de simulata religione* | *qui religionem simulaverint,* are certainly not authentic. The list of Roman examples is noteworthy: Valerius dealt with Numa, Scipio Africanus, Sulla, and Q. Sertorius (1.2.1–4). The claim that Numa met the nymph Egeria is as fanciful as the white deer carted by Sertorius through Spain. Valerius is normally very reluctant to cite examples from a period as early as Numa, and even more reluctant to include fantastic elements of such narratives.[69] The literary framing is even more telling, for the following section (1.3, esp. 1.3.2)—again bearing a late heading: *de superstitionibus*—gives examples of prohibitions of contacts with foreign deities and even includes a case of expulsion of *Chaldaei* from the second century BC. Only after this section does a new sequence begin (1.4–8), dealing with auspices, omens, prodigies, dreams, and miracles, all positively judged and presented as divine communications to be followed; if they be neglected, it is to the detriment of the protagonists.

These considerations modify the status of the first-order systematic priestly knowledge presented in 1.1. Religion is not a fixed code to be learnt by heart. Tradition or 'ancient customs', as presented in Book 2, are not a fixed resource. Historical and exemplary narrative shows this knowledge to be practical knowledge encoded in the actions of virtuous men. Here, we detect a voice in Valerius that is critical of his predecessors. As the abundant selection of late Republican examples indicates, Valerius shares with his contemporary Velleius Paterculus[70] a basic belief in the continuity of Rome, where we make a sharp division between 'Republican' and 'imperial'. This continuity is achieved by focusing on persons and virtues rather than explicit rules and offices. Again, it is Velleius who helps us to see what is at

[69] Skidmore (1996) 94–6.
[70] Cowan (2011) p. x.

stake for Valerius in the choice of genre.[71] It is the task and right of the historian to negotiate such a shift in the conception of history, one that acknowledges the greatness (and the risks) of the past in order to enhance an even greater present.[72]

One of the main sources—or rather, to take Valerius' order seriously, the primary source—of continuity is 'religion'; that is, religious practices that in some cases (the auspices, for example) go back to the founding of the city (1.4.1). Cicero and Varro were rather open about their innovations in thinking about religious matters, deploring rather than celebrating the loss of traditional knowledge. Valerius' notion of traditional religion—given the wealth of foreign examples, it would be far too narrow to call it 'Roman'—could not be based on such feeble foundations. A past suffused with values is concretized in 'documents' or 'lessons taught', universalized in narratives from both home and abroad, given profile by a few contrasting stories, and finally naturalized and immunized by the marvellous effects of Nature itself, by miracles—*ne ipsa quidem, omnis bonae malaeque materiae fecunda artifex, rationem Rerum Natura reddiderit*, 'not even she herself, fertile artificer of all substance good and bad, could explain' (1.8, ext. 18, trans. Shackleton Bailey 2000).[73] Like Varro, Valerius provides a list of gods, but it is presented as stories from history. Starting with two examples concerning Castor and Pollux (1.8.1), Valerius registers Aesculapius, Juno, Fortuna, Silvanus, Mars, the Penates, Divus Iulius, Fortuna, and Apollo (1.8.2–10). Valerius is aware that his history is not without alternatives but relies on the power of his narratives and images. The gods' power is mediated not only through visions and epiphanies but also in voices and sounds.[74] His is a historicized religion, one based on knowledge; a people that keeps faith with this knowledge is able to face the extraordinary challenges of the present. Religion is an important, if not the

[71] For Velleius' concentration on persons and virtues see Schmitzer (2000) 292; Marincola (2011) 136–7; and Schmitzer (2011) 199.

[72] Cf. Bloomer (2011) 98 on Velleius: 'three focalizations of the present . . . as restored history . . . as the end of narrative . . . as the recorder or censor of the past' The latter likewise describes Valerius' role. Cf. Bloomer (1992).

[73] Cf. the repetition of the notion 'nature' in 2, praef.

[74] Cf., e.g. Val. Max. 1.8.3 with Livy 5.22 on the reaction of Iuno Regina in her temple at Veii.

most important, part of contemporary memory, which Valerius Maximus tries to shape in his books.

In starting the list of gods with Castor and Pollux, Valerius is surely hinting at a larger framework. Tiberius had rededicated the Temple of Castor and Pollux in AD 6.[75] If we ask what holds the pointillist mode of the *exemplum* together, the answer must be clear: the emperor: Valerius' religion is centred 'on the emperor as a living god'.[76] David Wardle has rightly argued that Valerius Maximus was engaged in the 'sacralizing of Tiberius'.[77] Tiberius of course hardly needed Valerius' engagement, given his public stance of 'reluctant leadership',[78] and his resistance to being divinized in the city of Rome. But for the Empire as a whole, Tiberius was indeed a god.[79] Valerius' own contribution is the historical legitimization of this change of status. His history is a new history, narrating a religion which is centred on, but no longer confined to, the city of Rome and which offered neatly-packaged historical proof of the benefits of divinization. The story runs roughly as follows: Religion is rule-based. These rules constitute knowledge controlled by priests. They are not autonomous, however, but themselves require 'virtuosity', best exemplified by the living emperor, who is himself a god. This is Valerius' point in starting his work with religion. For modern historians of religion, however, it was a dangerous choice, for the religion he selectively memorialized is not *the* religion of the Republic. In using Valerius Maximus as a source for a 'history of Roman religion', we need to keep that point in mind. In studying Tiberian memorial culture, we have to acknowledge this strategical use of memory, too.[80]

75 Wardle (2000) 489–90. 76 Mueller (2002) 175.

77 Mueller (2002) 491; see also Wardle (2002).

78 See Hillard (2011) 237–8.

79 See Shotter (1992) 58, and Vigourt (2001) 157, for Tiberius' image as an efficient ruler in the provinces, which could be easily translated into religious terms.

80 I am grateful to Karl Galinsky for inviting me to take part in the fruitful discussions within the framework of his project and his many critical remarks and generous references for the reworking of my first drafts. Exchanges within the 'History of Religion' research group at Erfurt (supported by a grant of the federal state of Thuringia) have also helped with the analytical framework. Richard Gordon, to whom I owe many insights and ideas, has been most helpful in improving my argument and the text.

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Part II

Memory and Roman Emperors

4

Augustan Reconstruction and Roman Memory

Eric Orlin

The building projects of the emperor Augustus have long been the subject of both popular fascination and scholarly attention, and rightly so. From the time of his return to Rome following his triumph over Mark Antony until the dedication of the Temple of Mars Ultor in the Forum of Augustus, scarcely a year passed without the construction or reconstruction of a significant monument. These projects affected virtually every part of the city, from the Palatine and Capitoline hills at its heart to the Aventine on the south and the Campus Martius on the north. Augustus clearly took pride in his accomplishments, as evidenced not so much by the (possibly apocryphal) story of claiming to find Rome a city of brick and leaving it a city of marble, but by his own words: the emperor devoted three full sections (19–21) of the *Res Gestae*—his own accounting of his accomplishments—to his building efforts in the city, including his oft-cited claim that *Duo et octoginta templa deum in urbe consul sextum ex auctoritate senatus refeci nullo praetermisso quod eo tempore refici debebat* ('consul for the sixth time [28 BCE], I rebuilt eighty-two temples of the gods in the city by the authority of the Senate, omitting nothing which ought to have been rebuilt at that time', *Res Gestae* 20). These building projects have often been studied, either individually or as part of a 'programme', to shed light on various aspects of the Augustan era, and these studies have brought greater awareness of how art and other visual media can inform our understanding of a particular

period.[1] What has been overlooked, however, are the implications of the reconstruction programme for how the Romans remembered their past. Focusing on the area of the Circus Flaminius in the southern Campus Martius, this paper will reveal how these reconstructions dramatically reshaped Roman memory, helping to create a focus on the figure of the emperor as the central pillar of Roman identity.

MEMORY AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

While the importance of material objects for understanding memory has been evident ever since Marcel Proust described Swann's fateful encounter with a madeleine, the importance of the built environment for collective memory has not always been sufficiently appreciated. We might begin by reminding ourselves of the social aspect of memory, that 'social organization gives a persistent framework into which all detailed recall must fit, and it very powerfully influences both the manner and the matter of recall'.[2] That is, the culture in which we live has a powerful effect on what we remember and what we forget. This observation alone makes the physical objects among which we live our lives especially significant for memory, as they form a significant and visible part of that culture. Furthermore, memory is an active process: memories are not placed in storage and then recalled at a moment's notice through a retrieval system, but are actively recreated each time we engage in the act of remembering.[3] Thus, the link between memory and objects runs in both directions; as one scholar has phrased it, 'it is not just that individuals remember specific things, or are reminded of the past by particular objects figured against the backdrop of a shared discussion of the past. Artefacts and the fabricated environment are also there as a tangible

[1] The most significant of these studies is, of course, Zanker (1988), but other important works have followed, including Favro (1996) and Rehak and Younger (2006).

[2] Bartlett (1997) 296. Some of Bartlett's ideas served as precursors to those of Maurice Halbwachs, who is more generally regarded as developing the concept of collective memory. See also Fentress and Wickham (1992).

[3] Cf. Shotter (1990) for discussion of this point. For an application using Homer, see Tatum (1995). For a neuropsychological view, see Rose (1993).

expression of the basis from which one remembers, the material aspect of the setting which justifies the memories so constructed.'[4] Buildings, whether or not intended as monuments, both serve as reminders of the past *and* contribute to shaping the way we remember that past. These memories then become part of a society and part of the daily existence of individuals living within that society.[5]

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries furnish a number of examples of this phenomenon that may be easier to observe than the often fragmented snapshots available to Roman historians and archaeologists. Frances Swyripa's study of Jasper Avenue in Edmonton provides one instance, where the takeover of a former Hudson Bay building by the University of Alberta was felt to threaten the memory of the trading company's role in the history of the city.[6] Her analysis also demonstrates clearly the mobility of memory, that not only can memories be associated with a site change, but also sites of importance within a city can change over time, as Jasper Avenue no longer plays the central role in communal celebrations in Edmonton and its history as it once did. In a related vein, Matthew Evenden discusses how a new dam built on Lake Minnewanka in 1941 submerged both an earlier smaller dam on the site and a whole town devoted to the recreational opportunities of the area, consigning both to oblivion and thereby permanently altering memories along with the landscape.[7] Similarly, Stuart Semmel has shown how the absence of a purpose-built monument at Waterloo actually heightened the impact of the site for many nineteenth-century travellers; Dorothy Wordsworth even fretted that the repair of a farmhouse damaged during the battle threatened the memory of the battle by 'removing from the spot all vestiges of so momentous an event'.[8] The surrounding environment, particularly its man-made features, has a profound effect on shaping our memories of the past. Another perspective was offered by the Dutch king William I, who erected the monument known today as the Lion's Mound eleven years after the battle,

[4] Radley (1990) 49.

[5] For a discussion of how 'culturally transmitted memories' that reside outside an individual (labelled 'external memories') become part of an individual's memory system, see Donald (1991) 308–32, who utilizes the analogy of a networked computer system.

[6] Swyripa (2010), esp. 99–100. [7] Evenden (2010).

[8] Quoted in Semmel (2000) 23–4. Dorothy Wordsworth visited Waterloo shortly after the battle.

creating a 43-metre-high artificial hill to mark the spot not of any turning point in the battle, but where it was believed his son had been wounded by a musket ball. The topography of the battlefield was thus permanently altered, a fact bemoaned by Victor Hugo among others as interfering with a true understanding of the battle.[9] These examples show how changes to the landscape, whether unintentional or intentional, contribute to reshaping both memory and history.

Turning to the Romans, it seems superfluous to rehearse all the details of the ancient sources on memory; rather, I will merely touch on them as a springboard to the significance of place and of material culture in understanding Roman memory. The most salient point is that both Roman thinking on memory and Roman practice suggest a deep connection between place and memory.[10] Roman authors liken memory specifically to a house, where images can be placed in the atrium, around the impluvium, and in the other rooms of the house to be recalled by the orator as needed. Thus it should not be surprising that the city of Rome itself was filled with *monumenta*, structures that according to Varro, the great Roman antiquarian, helped shape Roman memory.[11] As Catherine Edwards has noted, 'particular places in the city, especially public places, might serve as a stimulus to memories of particular events and individuals from earlier times'.[12] So, for instance, the Sororium Tigilum commemorated the battle of the Horatii and Curiatii; Livy tells us that this monument continued to stand in his own day, maintained at the Senate's expense. Edwards suggests that the entire 'city was a storehouse of Roman memories, an archive which ordered them and made them accessible'.[13] Drawing on the theoretical works described earlier we might observe that the monuments both reminded Romans of the lessons to be drawn from the past and in so doing helped shape that past; that is, the 'archive' was not static, but was constantly being reshaped by the construction

[9] *Les Misérables*, ch. 7.

[10] The primary texts include *Rhet. Her.* 3.16–24; Cic. *De Or.* 2.86.351–4; Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.17–22. For modern scholarship, see esp. Bergmann (1994); Edwards (1996); Farrell (1997); Gowing (2005). See also Yates (1966), who draws on these Roman sources in a more generalized discussion of memory.

[11] See Jaeger (1997) 18, drawing on Varro, *Ling.* 6.49: 'the *monumentum* controls and directs the viewer's thoughts as they move from the present to the past, then back to the present and into the future'.

[12] Edwards (1996) 17. Cf. Hölkeskamp, Ch. 6 in this volume, for a specific example of how Cicero uses monuments as a spur to history.

[13] Edwards (1996) 18.

or reconstruction of monuments. And in the same fashion that individual memories help us understand who we are, these Roman monuments helped them understand who they were as a people. Analysis of the urban landscape of Rome needs to take into account these associations between the built environment and Roman memory.

Roman temples formed a significant part of the Roman urban landscape, and so need to be seen not only as religious sites, but also as historical monuments. Temples were vowed at specific historical moments, usually during the course of a battle or other crisis affecting the state, and often bore inscriptions that indicated the man who had vowed the temple and under what circumstances, such that we might consider them as *lieux de mémoire*, creating a shared past for the Romans.[14] The temple recalled a specific moment from Rome's past and the role played by a specific Roman, and returning to this temple every year on its *dies natalis*, the anniversary of its founding, kept that memory/history in front of the Roman people. The Temple of Lares Permarini, dedicated in 179 BCE, provides a good example. Livy recorded an inscription affixed to the temple that recorded the circumstances of the temple's construction (Livy 40.52):

> Duello magno dirimendo, regibus subigendis, patrandae pacis causa haec pugna exeunti L. Aemilio M. Aemilii filio . . . auspicio imperio felicitate ductuque eius inter Ephesum Samum Chiumque, inspectante eopse Antiocho, exercitu omni, equitatu elephantisque, classis regis Antiochi antehac inuicta fusa contusa fugataque est, ibique eo die naves longae cum omnibus sociis captae quadraginta duae. ea pugna pugnata rex Antiochus regnumque . . . eius rei ergo aedem Laribus permarinis vovit.
>
> When Lucius the son of Marcus Aemilius went out to battle to put an end to a great war and to subdue kings . . . the fleet of Antiochus, ever before invincible, was defeated, shattered, and put to flight between Ephesus, Samos, and Chios, before the very eyes of Antiochus and of his whole army, his cavalry and elephants. On that day forty-two ships of war were captured there, with all their crews. After that battle had been fought, King Antiochus and his kingdom . . . On account of this deed he vowed a temple to the Lares Permarini.

[14] On the founding of new temples in Rome, see Orlin (1997). On *lieux de mémoire*, Nora (1989) provides a starting point and a summation of much of his earlier thinking.

While the viewer would be constantly reminded of the success of the role of the gods in the success of the Roman state, he or she would also be constantly reminded of the events and the people who helped build that state. Temples thus served not only as place for religious activity, but also as monuments in which memories of the past resided, and as such they drew people's attention to the memory of the person who erected the monument and the event memorialized therein.

RECONSTRUCTION AND MEMORY IN ROME

The reconstruction of temples by Augustus thus raises questions for Roman memory, for the new buildings may not have called up the same memories as the original monument; as David Lowenthal has noted: 'Reconstruction not only reorders past scenes, it creates wholly new ones.'[15] A reconstructed temple, especially one with a new visual appearance, might consign to oblivion not only the prior building but also, more importantly, the memories associated with it.[16] The reconstructed temple might no longer point to, say, the naval battle against Antiochus, because it had been rebuilt by Augustus and might thereby remind viewers of the emperor rather than its original founder.[17] Such a situation seems especially likely when the new temple took on a distinctly different appearance from that of the original. The Pantheon, perhaps the most famous example of a reconstructed temple in Rome, highlights the challenges of reconstructions for memory (see Figure 4.1).

[15] Lowenthal (1975) 33.

[16] Jenkyns (2014) points out that the Romans sometimes favoured restorations over the original building; there was rarely a sense that ancient buildings, however valued, needed to be preserved for their own sake, or for memory's sake. When concerns are raised, the scruples are about *religio*, not the antiquity of the original building.

[17] It should be noted that Augustus did allow some buildings he reconstructed to maintain their connection to the original founder: in the *Res Gestae* (19–20) Augustus notes that he rebuilt the Porticus of Octavius and allowed it to be called after its founder and that he rebuilt the Theatre of Pompey without any inscription of his name. But these examples appear to be exceptions rather than the rule; for instance, Octavius may have been a distant ancestor, or claimed as such. On the other buildings reconstructed in the area of the Circus Flaminius and connections to other members of the senatorial class, see La Rocca (1987).

Figure 4.1 Pantheon, Rome.
Photograph by Bengt Nyman, Wikimedia Commons.

Originally constructed by Augustus' trusted colleague Marcus Agrippa, the temple as we see it today was erected during the reign of Hadrian with a design that differs dramatically from the original, notably the famous and imposing dome with its *oculus*.[18] Because Hadrian elected to keep the original dedicatory inscription of Agrippa, later viewers such as the historian Cassius Dio mistakenly believed that Agrippa had built the structure visible in their day, attesting to the power of inscriptions in shaping accounts of the past, even in antiquity (Cass. Dio 53.27).[19] Yet viewers closer to his own day were aware that Hadrian had rebuilt the temple on an entirely new plan and chosen to reinsert the original inscription, and thus reaped credit for his humility as well as for the reconstruction; indeed Hadrian seems to have made it a practice to leave the name of the original founder intact.[20] This example thus

[18] The classic work on the Pantheon is MacDonald (1976), but see also Wilson Jones (2000); Grasshoff, Heinzelmann, and Wäfler (2009).

[19] On the challenge that rebuilt temples pose for memory, cf. the comments of Wiseman (2014) 45 on the Temple of the Magna Mater, destroyed and rebuilt *twice*. Ovid (*Fast.* 4.347–8) provides only the names of the two rebuilders, while Livy (36.36.4) preserves the name of the original dedicant of the temple; unfortunately we know nothing about what the inscription on the temple itself might have said.

[20] Ramage and Ramage (1991).

highlights some of the issues straddling the line between memory and history, a topic that cannot be discussed fully here.[21] For our purposes, it demonstrates clearly that the memories associated with a building could easily shift over time, dependent both on the appearance of the building and its dedicatory inscription.

Many buildings reconstructed in the reign of Augustus present the converse situation to the Pantheon: where Hadrian maintained the connection to the older building at the cost of subsequent generations forgetting his own role, Augustan buildings frequently obscured the older building in order to forge a different memory. The Temple of Concordia and its restoration offer a prime demonstration of this process. The temple, which celebrated its *dies natalis* on 22 July, was said to have been erected originally by Camillus in 367 following the passage of the Licinian laws, as a sign of the concord that he hoped would come into existence with the resolution of the most recent dispute between patricians and plebeians. The temple was restored by the consul L. Opimius following the death of C. Gracchus in 121, apparently in an attempt to suggest that concord might come into existence now that the threat to it had been removed, and thus to throw the weight of the Senate against the emerging populist politicians.[22] It is clear that contemporaries saw the temple in these political terms, for Plutarch reported that someone carved the following graffito below the inscription on the temple: 'A work of mad discord produces a temple of concord.' As the message of this temple appears to have been hotly contested, it appears that the late Republican temple to Concordia served as much as anything as a reminder of the history of internal divisions within the Roman state between patricians and plebeians, *nobiles* and *populares*.

Augustus delegated the restoration of this temple to his stepson Tiberius, who used his spoils from Germany to fund the project, and then rededicated it to Concordia Augustae on 16 January 10 CE. Several elements of the rebuilding helped to create a set of associations for the new temple that were vastly different from those of the

[21] The topic of the connection between memory and history is far too large to be treated here. For a start on some of the problems, see the essays collected in two special issues of *Representations*, nos. 26 (1989) and 69 (2000).

[22] Momigliano (1942) doubted that the Camillan temple was built, suspecting that its construction was part of the later Camillus legend. The Opimian temple is attested by numerous authors, including Cicero (*Sest.* 140), Appian (*B. Civ.* 1.26), and Plutarch (*C. Gracch.* 17).

earlier one. First, there was a new visual appearance both in design (the new temple had a facade nearly twice as long as it was wide) and in decoration, utilizing a variety of coloured marbles familiar from other Augustan buildings (*giallo antico*, *cipollino*, and *africano* among others).[23] Secondly the renaming of the temple—from Concordia to Concordia Augusta—marked a key step in reshaping the memories associated with it.[24] Not only did it explicitly remind viewers that the peace was due to the imperial family, but it placed the name 'Augustus' at the forefront of the chain of memory. The temple with a new physical appearance now had a new name, one firmly linked to the imperial family and calling up an entirely different set of memories, as if the earlier temple had never existed. Rather than attempting to create the facade of a peaceful resolution to an internal quarrel, the new temple of Concordia took for granted the notion of an Augustan peace at home. And just as the Republican temple of Concordia looked to the hope of peace rather than its actual realization, the imperial temple of Concordia Augusta looked hopefully to the stabilization of the frontier in the wake of the disaster of the Teutoburg Forest and the ending of the Pannonian revolt just the year before its dedication. While the temple was built in the Republican tradition of manubial building, with the spoils from the campaign of a returning general, in the Empire all such buildings were constructed by members of the imperial family, who indeed were the only generals still allowed to celebrate triumphs in Rome. The temple thus recalled the military success of the imperial family and the consequent pacification of a foreign enemy.

The effacement of the original temple went further still; the restored temple was dedicated on 16 January, thus moving the *dies natalis*, the day on which the festival in honour of this divinity was held, to a completely different spot on the Roman calendar. The

[23] Barbara Kellum (1990) has discussed the decorative programme of the temple in great detail, concluding (296) that 'the *aedes Concordiae Augustae* transformed not only a venerable republican site, but also the oldest home of the gods in Rome, the Capitoline, into a distinctively Augustan entity'. It may also have served as a signal of *concordia* within the house of Augustus.

[24] One might compare the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, an apparent effort to diminish the memory of the Nationalist leader. The emphasis on Augustus in these buildings may also be usefully compared in the Chinese context to monuments centred on Chairman Mao. For the Chinese parallels, see Matten (2011); Leese (2011).

sixteenth of January was chosen no doubt because it was the day in 27 BCE on which the *princeps* had received the name Augustus from the Senate. The significance of this change should not be underestimated: the *dies natalis* was the calendar day on which a ritual procession made its way to the temple and it thus located the commemoration of the temple (and its founder) in time just as the temple itself located that commemoration within the urban fabric of the city. With the rites on a different date, the celebration no longer commemorated an imperator or other figure from the Republic.[25] As Alain Gowing has pointed out, 'a failure to commemorate, say, Camillus' capture of Veii would be to consign Camillus to oblivion'.[26] Changing the day thus removed one more link in the chain of memory connecting the temple to Camillus and/or Opimius, and reminded people explicitly of the emperor's new name and his role in bringing peace to the Roman state. In eliding the prior history of the building, the new temple focused its commemoration on the new *dies natalis* and this focus, in combination with the physical changes at the temple, makes clear the radical break with the past; in reconstructing this temple the emperor *has* consigned Camillus to oblivion. The temple thus provides an example of how 'the tangible past is altered mainly to make history conform with memory. Memory not only conserves the past but adjusts recall to current needs.'[27] The new temple adjusted its focus to the emperor, his adoptive son, and the values of the new Roman state.

RESHAPING THE SOUTHERN CAMPUS MARTIUS

If the preceding sections have outlined the general principles of how (re)construction projects in Augustan Rome held the potential to reshape Roman memory, the area of the Circus Flaminius in the southern Campus Martius allows us to explore this phenomenon in

[25] Gros (1976) 31–6, who notes that other temples similarly saw their *dies natales* moved to dates of importance to the imperial family; see further 'The Reshaped Southern Campius Martius and Roman Memory'. The same principle held for new temples as well as reconstructions: the Temple of Mars Ultor in the Forum of Augustus was dedicated on 1 August, the anniversary of Augustus' entry into Alexandria.

[26] Gowing (2005) 14.

[27] Lowenthal (1975) 27.

further detail. The Circus Flaminius itself apparently dates back to 221 and was strongly marked by its connection to the triumph.[28] The area around the Circus Flaminius was long a favoured spot for manubial constructions, with as many as eleven temples erected by victorious generals finding a home there by the second century BCE, while Q. Caecilius Metellus erected a porticus around his two temples to Jupiter Stator and Juno Regina in 147 that provided a demarcation for the north side of the area.[29] The route of the triumph seems to have come through this area and a part of the triumphal ceremony may even have taken place in the Circus Flaminius itself. As we shall see in the following discussion, Augustus revamped this entire area, replacing the Porticus Metelli with the Porticus Octaviae, restoring several temples in the area, and completing the Theatre of Marcellus that had been begun by Julius Caesar. The restructuring of both space and time in this region contributed to reshaping memories around the imperial family.

One change central to memory construction concerns the Porticus Metelli, which as noted above had been built in the middle of the second century, but which Augustus rebuilt in the 20s and renamed after his sister Octavia. While the structure itself has remained visible through the Middle Ages, most of what survives dates to a later rebuilding of the Augustan structure, which burned in a fire of 80 CE (Cass. Dio 66.24); determining the appearance of the Augustan structure and the differences from *its* pre-existing structure is no easy task.[30] Textual sources indicate that the two temples inside the porticus—to Jupiter Stator and Juno Regina—were renovated, a library was dedicated in Marcellus' name, a curia was dedicated in Octavia's name, and scholae were also added; the entire complex could be referred to as the *opera Octaviae*.[31] Recent excavations in the area have revealed

[28] On the Circus Flaminius, see especially Wiseman (1974); Coarelli (1968); Olinder (1974); and the entry by Viscogliosi in *LTUR* i (1993) 269–72.

[29] Among the temples attested are: Vulcan, Neptune, Juno Regina, Jupiter Stator, Hercules Custos, Hercules Musarum, Fortuna Equestris, Mars, Diana, Pietas, and Spes. Maggie Popkin in her recent dissertation (2012) has explored the accretion of manubial temples in spaces significant to the triumphal route, including those of the Circus Flaminius (discussed on pp. 133–41).

[30] The inscription visible on the architrave today (*CIL* vi.1034, 31231) dates to the Severan rebuilding.

[31] Temples: Plin. *HN* 36.42; Library: Plut. *Marc.* 30.6; Curia: Plin. *HN* 36.15, 28; Scholae: Plin. *HN* 35.139; 36.15; *opera Octaviae*: Plin. *HN* 34.31, et al. On the monuments in this area, see Gros (1973); Olinder (1974); Richardson (1976); Lauter

that the facade went through three phases—Republican, Augustan, and Severan—and that in the Augustan period a podium in the centre of the entrance jutted out from the southern edge of the porticus.[32] The excavations have demonstrated that section 31 of the *Forma Urbis Romae*, which displays this area, must depict the Augustan phase of the monument, and thus the apsidal structures attached to the rear of the temples must come from the reconstruction at that time. Thus, this monument saw significant changes in visual appearance and carried a new name; further, as will be discussed in more detail below, the two temples inside were rededicated on 23 September, Augustus' birthday. The visible and ceremonial link of Metellus to these buildings was eliminated, though clearly some trace of him remained among the elite; Pliny still knew the original founder, as did Velleius Paterculus. But Metellus' role in the pageant of Roman history was effectively effaced by the renovations, and his place was taken by two members of the family of the new *princeps*, one of whom had earned a reputation during the hard years of the civil wars for her devotion to her family. The monument thus shifted dramatically away from a manubial construction of the second century to a complex that reminded passers-by of the munificence (and magnificence) of the imperial family (cf. Hölkeskamp, Chapter 6 in this volume, on this kind of interconnected meaning).

Augustus boasted in his *Res Gestae* that he rebuilt eighty-two temples in the city of Rome, and a number of these temples similarly contribute to reshaping Roman memory in order to focus attention on the emperor. Many of these temples can be found in the area of the Circus Flaminius: the temples of Jupiter and Juno inside the renovated Porticus Octaviae have already been mentioned, allowing us to focus on the other temples in the area, especially those of Bellona and Apollo just to the east of the porticus. The Temple of Bellona was originally constructed in 296 BCE by Appius Claudius Caecus following a battle with the Etruscans and Samnites, and was rebuilt during the Augustan period.[33] Nothing of the temple's superstructure

(1981); *LTUR* iv (1999) 141–5. Richardson suggests that the *opera* were actually paid for by Octavia, rather than paid for by Augustus but named after his sister.

32 Ciancio Rossetto (1996). Excavations are ongoing in this area; for recent updates, which devote much attention to the medieval church of Sta Maria in Pescheria, see Ciancio Rossetto (2008) and (2009).

33 Livy 10.19 for the original vow of Appius; *LTUR* i (1993) 190–2 for discussion of the temple.

remains standing, but excavations in the area conducted in the 1930s turned up numerous marble fragments that must belong to it.[34] The temple reconstructed by Augustus presents certain similarities to the nearby Temple of Apollo, which was rebuilt at the same time, notably in the use of marble for the front and of travertine elsewhere; on the other hand, the style of the temple's decoration, and particularly the Corinthian capitals, is closer to that of the Temple of Mars Ultor in the Forum of Augustus than to its neighbour.[35] These details confirm not only that the temple was rebuilt in the Augustan age, but also that it reflected the viewer's attention onto other Augustan building projects, both those in the immediate vicinity and those further away.

Immediately west of the Temple of Bellona lay the Temple of Apollo, often known as the Temple of Apollo Sosianus and so distinguished from the new temple to Apollo that Augustus constructed on the Palatine Hill in 28 BCE.[36] This temple replaced an earlier temple to Apollo on this site which had been erected in 431 BCE in response to a plague; up until the Augustan period this structure had been the only temple to Apollo in Rome.[37] One major consideration with this temple has been the significance of the person credited with the rebuilding, Caius Sosius, consul in 32 BCE and ally of Mark Antony at Actium. At one time the temple was seen as part of a counter-propaganda campaign waged against Octavian by a partisan of Antony's—in essence a competition for the favour of Apollo—but there are reasons to believe that that temple was not completed until the 20s, by which time Antony had been defeated and Sosius pardoned.[38] Given the importance of Apollo to Augustus, as evidenced by the temple on the Palatine Hill and the credit given to Apollo for the victory at Actium, it is difficult to believe that the emperor did not at least approve of the details of the temple's reconstruction, if indeed he was not more intimately involved with the planning.

[34] Colini (1941). For recent work with these fragments, see De Nuccio (1995).

[35] De Nuccio (1995) 72–5.

[36] No Augustan source uses this label, but Pliny twice makes reference to a temple of Apollo Sosianus (*HN* 13.53 and 36.28).

[37] Livy 4.25; 7.20. As late as 179 BCE the temple was known as the Temple of Apollo Medicus (Livy 40.51).

[38] Shipley (1931) 27 n. 3 early on suggested the possibility of opposition between the temple of the Palatine and the Sosian temple *in circo*, while Gagé (1955) 496 stated forcefully that the temple was built in deliberate opposition to Octavian. La Rocca (1985) has made the case for an Augustan rebuilding, accepted by Viscogliosi (1996) 30–5. See also Hölscher (1985) 88–90.

The triumphal decorative motif of the temple's interior and the resonances between the details of this temple and other Augustan construction projects (on which see further below) provide further confirmation of his involvement, as does the fact that the temple was rededicated on his birthday: 23 September.[39] These details make it certain that the temple formed an important part of Augustus' reshaping of the southern Campus Martius.

Archaeological investigations have revealed that the new temple presented a drastically different look from the original one: while the Temple of Apollo Sosianus reused the cella walls on the east and west, the rear wall of the later temple lies to the north of the foundations that likely mark the rear wall of the Temple of Apollo Medicus.[40] This finding indicates that the new temple must have been rebuilt from scratch, rather than being a mere renovation of the existing structure. More significantly, the front of the temple also presented a different appearance: while the earlier temple apparently utilized the standard Etrusco-Italic design, with a high podium and frontal stair, the lack of space in front of the Temple of Apollo Sosianus left no room for a stair. Instead, the stairs up to the podium needed to be placed on either side of the porch, a design that solved the problem of approach to the temple but has no parallels in the city of Rome. As seen in the three columns that have been re-erected on the site, the new temple was also constructed in marble, a building material in wide use in the Augustan period but not present in Rome in the fifth century BCE.[41] The architecture alone reveals that the Temple of Apollo Sosianus was not a rebuilding on the same plan, but rather a completely new construction that presented a new image to viewers.

Not only would the use of the marble and the architecture have struck Romans as dramatically different, but the elaborate decoration

[39] See esp. Viscogliosi (1996). The scepticism of Gurval (1995) 116–18 about an Augustan date seems unwarranted, especially as he is unduly dismissive of the significance to the change in the *dies natalis* of the temple, which (so far as we know) must have happened on the occasion of its rededication.

[40] On the recent excavations carried out since 1997, see now Bianchini (2010).

[41] Marble makes its first appearance as material for temples in Rome in the 2nd century: in 173 BCE Fulvius Nobilior attempted to use the marble roof from the Temple of Hera Lacinia in Croton for his Temple of Hercules Musarum (Livy 42.3), while Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus was said to be the first to build a temple entirely of marble following his triumph in 146 (Vell. Pat. 1.11.3). Coincidentally (or perhaps not), that temple is likely to have been the Temple of Jupiter Stator, renovated by Augustus and enclosed in the newly named Porticus Octaviae.

of the temple, both outside and inside, marked a departure both from the previous temple to Apollo and from most earlier temples in Rome. The surviving columns give a hint of the sophisticated workmanship that has been seen as typical of the new Augustan style.[42] The columns are emblematic of the temple as a whole; the numerous small fragments that have been recovered from the temple and in some cases painstakingly reassembled give evidence of its sumptuous decoration. The interior of the temple was embellished with numerous small aedicula in different coloured marbles with alternating semicircular and triangular pediments, and the entablatures and frieze display the same fine carving exhibited by the exterior columns. In addition, the exterior pediment of the temple contained a scene of an Amazonomachy sculpted from Parian marble; on stylistic grounds the sculptures appear to date to the fifth century BCE, and so must have been taken from a temple in Greece.[43] The temple presents a facade of grandeur not evident in the manubial constructions elsewhere in the city, including the nearby temples of Spes, Juno Sospita, and Janus, but one that connected it to other Augustan constructions throughout the city, just as the carvings of the Temple of Bellona connected it to these other structures.

The sculptural programme of the temple is significant in another way as well: it changed its focus and message. The original temple had, as noted, been constructed on account of a plague ravaging the city, and as late as 179 BCE the shrine was known as the Temple of Apollo Medicus.[44] The focus of the new temple, however, was victory, as several elements of the temple demonstrate clearly. The Amazonomachy on the external pediment of course contributed to this message, representing the victory of civilized Greeks over barbarous Amazons. Romans may also have noticed a resonance with the recent victory of the civilized Romans over the barbarous

42 Cf. Viscogliosi (1996) 202–18.

43 La Rocca (1985) 59–72. La Rocca suggests further (76–7) that the sculptures come from the temple of Apollo Daphnephoros in Eretria, though this idea is more tentative and has not been fully embraced.

44 Livy 40.51. One should note that the *ludi Apollinares* were founded in 212 BCE 'for the sake of victory, not health as most people think' according to Livy (25.12.15). On the one hand Livy makes a clear statement in favour of the association with victory, but his final phrase suggests that this association had not become embedded in the consciousness of his contemporaries. Cf. Miller (2009) 29.

Figure 4.2 Column capital from the Temple of Apollo Sosianus.
Photograph by the author.

Egyptians who were also led by a female; modern scholars certainly have.[45] The victory theme is also visible on the column capitals from the temple, many of which display an image of a battlefield trophy in the centre of the Corinthian foliage (see Figure 4.2). The theme of victory continues on the frieze inside the temple, which portrays a triumphal procession, complete with sacrificial animals and captives seated beneath a *tropaion*. As clearly as any monument erected by Augustus, the Temple of Apollo Sosianus celebrated his military triumphs and, in the best tradition of Roman generals, ascribed those victories to the support of a divinity.[46] While this development may not seem surprising to scholars familiar with Apollo as the bringer of victory and the golden age, we must remember that up until this point Apollo had been worshipped in Rome for his healing aspect. The new temple presented not only a different physical appearance but also a completely different aspect of the god, and called up an entirely different set of associations, connected with the emperor and his military triumphs rather than the history of the Republic.

[45] Cf. esp. La Rocca (1985) 89–92, where he also notes the presence of Amazonomachy scenes on a statue base from Nicopolis, the new city founded by Augustus overlooking the Bay of Actium.

[46] Cf. La Rocca (1985) 94–5, where he notes that the temple is simply part of the logic of the new regime.

The buildings examined so far involved reconstructions of previously existing ones, but the appearance of the area was most dramatically changed by the construction of an entirely new structure, the Theatre of Marcellus. This theatre was initially conceived by Julius Caesar, who bought land and removed structures in order to clear the area, but its construction fell to Augustus.[47] The theatre was used during the course of the Secular Games in 17 BCE, but was not dedicated until some time around 12.[48] It is of course noteworthy that the theatre was named after Marcellus, the prematurely deceased son of Octavia by her first husband, and so the nephew of Augustus; this region thus acquired another monument directly connected with the imperial family, though not the emperor himself. But the importance of the theatre goes beyond this simple point; its construction led to a complete revamping of this significant spot in Roman topography. Not only did a large semicircular structure came to dominate the eastern edge of the Circus Flaminius, but several structures had to be removed to make way for it. Most prominent among these was the Temple of Pietas that had stood next to the Temple of Janus since 181 BCE.[49] Under the Republic, the removal of a temple would have been no small matter, necessitating the deconsecration of the land on which the temple had been built, and no such destructions are attested prior to this point. Because temples served as sites for both religion and memory as discussed above, the removal of this temple had further repercussions. The temple had been vowed by M. Acilius Glabrio at the battle of Thermopylae, one of the critical battles of the First Syrian War against Antiochus III; although no record of the inscription survives, it would surely have noted this fact among others. Its complete removal eliminated the tangible link to this action and effectively removed the memory of Glabrio's role in the battle, just as the memory of Metellus had been effaced by the renaming of his porticus after the mother of Marcellus. If cultural identity is shaped by both collective remembering and collective forgetting (on which see section 'The Reshaped Southern Campius

[47] Suet. *Iul.* 44; Cass. Dio 43.49; Plin. *HN* 7.121.

[48] Cass. Dio 54.26 gives 11 BCE for the dedication, while Plin. *HN* 8.65 gives two years earlier.

[49] On Caesar's removal of the Temple of Pietas, see Plin. *HN* 7.121; cf. Cass. Dio 43.49, where unspecified temples were removed. For recent excavations on the temple of Pietas, see Ciancio Rossetto (1995) and (1997–8). Most recently, see Vitti (2010) 550, who notes that the temple of Diana may also have been removed.

Martius and Roman Memory'), the absence of buildings that served as reminders of Metellus and Glabrio contributed as much to the Augustan programme as the presence of the new theatre.

While the foregoing discussion should make clear that the entire area between the theatre and the temples to Apollo and Bellona was in fact reshaped during the Augustan era, further evidence indicates that these changes formed part of a coherent programme of renewal. The presence of travertine paving dating to the Augustan period in the area between the two temples and the Theatre of Marcellus suggests that the projects were linked together, that the region was receiving an intentional makeover and should be considered as a unit. Smaller monuments also populated the area, installed on top of the paving. The largest of these was a circular monument just over 5 metres in diameter, which stood in front of the Temple of Apollo; the structure has been identified as a monopteros, a circular colonnade.[50] Made of Pentelic marble, it boasted finely carved Corinthian column capitals and an entablature of laurel leaves. The architectural fragments appear to be stylistically different and are carved in different styles, suggesting that the structure may have been initially constructed in the late Augustan or early Julio-Claudian period, and then restored under Vespasian; an inscription with the latter's name is visible on the architrave.[51] Because the monument stood on an axis with the Temple of Apollo and the Theatre of Marcellus (see Figure 4.3), it seems probable that the conception of the monument dates back to Augustus, even if the actual execution may not have occurred until after his reign. It has been proposed that the monopteros contained a *perirrhanterion*, or lustral basin, since such a basin is known to have existed in approximately this location during the late Republic.[52] The monopteros would then have provided an arresting monumental enclosure, further drawing attention to the intervention—parallel to that in the calendar—of the imperial family in this part of the city.

The Augustan building projects thus had a substantial impact on the overall topography of the southern Campus Martius. The consequences for the Temple of Apollo were noted above: the area between

[50] See La Rocca (1993); Bertoletti (2008). See also La Rocca's entry in *LTUR*.

[51] *CIL* vi. 40446; cf. Bertoletti (2008).

[52] In the Sullan period, Catiline is reported to have washed his hands in a *perirrhanterion* near the Temple of Bellona (Plut. *Sull.* 32); La Rocca (1993) proposed that the monopteros should be associated with the *perirrhanterion*.



Figure 4.3 Plan of the Temple of Apollo, Theatre of Marcellus, and Porticus Octaviae. The monopteros lay on round foundations between the temple and the theatre.

Courtesy of A. Viscogliosi.

Figure 4.4 The Temple of Apollo Sosianus from the rear, with the Theatre of Marcellus in front. Note the limited space between the two buildings.
Photograph by the author.

the front edge of the temple podium and the outside edge of the theatre was too narrow to allow the normal frontal staircase for the temple, especially with the presence of the monopteros just in front of the podium, so the stairs up to the podium had to be placed on the sides of the temple. The distance from the theatre to the south-easterly corner of the Porticus Octaviae was even narrower, and the area was further crowded by the presence of other monuments such as the Columna Bellica near the Temple of Bellona, filling up much of the remaining space between the theatre and the temples in the area. These buildings—the renamed porticus, the reconstructed temples, the new theatre, and the monopteros—created a dramatically different appearance for this corner of the city of Rome (see Figure 4.4). Each building contributed to the monumentalization of the area, and each presented different associations to the viewer passing through the region. As Popkin has observed, 'the Roman experience

of monumental architecture was, in real and significant ways, an aesthetic one, a sensory reaction to monuments that incited emotional response and contemplation'.[53] The changed monumental architecture of this edge of the Circus Flaminius in turn effected a dramatic change in how it was experienced by people passing through the area and thus elicited a different response from them.

THE RESHAPED SOUTHERN CAMPUS MARTIUS AND ROMAN MEMORY

For the purpose of shaping memories, the changes in Roman ritual wrought in the area at this time may be even more significant. During the Republic, the triumph had been one of the signal ceremonies of the Roman state, celebrating the military virtues of a victorious general and promoting his name and accomplishments. While the route of the Roman triumph has been one of the most vexed questions in Roman topography, it is generally agreed that the Circus Flaminius played an important role, as it is attested on several occasions as a staging ground for the procession.[54] The most obvious route for a triumphal procession heading out of the Circus Flaminius would be to pass in front of the temples of Apollo and Bellona, and there is reason to believe that this route was in fact taken by many triumphs.[55] But with the construction of the Theatre of Marcellus and the erection of the monopteros in front of the Temple of Apollo, such a route was not physically possible; the troops and the wagons with spoils and captives simply could not pass in that narrow space.[56] This most characteristic of Roman rituals needed to adapt to the new topography.

[53] Popkin (2012) 176.

[54] Livy 39.5.17, 45.39.14; Plut. *Luc.* 37.2. The triumphal connections of the Circus Flaminius are furthered by the numerous temples, as many as twelve, in the area built by victorious generals; see Popkin (2012) 133–41. On the triumph and its route, see Beard (2007) 92–105; Coarelli (1992) 363–414.

[55] On this topic, see most recently Vitti (2010) 554.

[56] La Rocca (1993) 17–18 calculated that one would need at least 4.5 metres' width to stage a triumph (e.g. allow space for the four-horse chariot), based on the dimensions of the surviving triumphal arches; the distance between the corner of the Temple of Apollo and the Theatre of Marcellus is less than 3 metres.

Two possibilities exist for what might have happened to the route of the triumph. One option is that the triumphal way was rerouted entirely, that it no longer passed through the Circus Flaminius at all and so did not need to exit from that area. The implications of this change would be that the Circus Flaminius was completely deprived of its connection to the triumph, opening it up to a brand new set of associations. The second possibility, which seems more likely, is that the triumph passed through the orchestra of the Theatre of Marcellus, with the cavea open for spectators.[57] This routing may be confirmed by Josephus' account of the triumph of Vespasian and Titus following their return to Rome in 71 CE, where the procession is said to have 'marched through the theatres, that they might be the more easily seen by the multitudes' (*BJ* 7.131). In this scenario, the Circus Flaminius retained its historical role in the triumph, while the focus on the imperial family became even stronger, as thousands of inhabitants of Rome would now congregate in a new structure built by the emperor and named after a member of the imperial family.

The changes to the triumphal route need to be seen in the context of other changes to the triumph occurring at approximately the same time. The triumph celebrated by L. Cornelius Balbus in 19 BCE, just two years before the theatre was complete enough to be used in the Secular Games, is apparently the last which was celebrated by a person outside the emperor's immediate family. As a result, the total number of triumphs celebrated in Rome dropped precipitously after 19 BCE: only five are known from Balbus' to the triumph of Vespasian noted above.[58] So the impact of the new route for the triumph would have been felt infrequently, but the effect of these changes was to focus attention directly and exclusively on the imperial family: triumphs were celebrated only by emperors or their close kin, and would pass through structures erected by the imperial family as a reminder of the role of that family in rebuilding Rome. Through the ritual and the associated monuments, an entirely new set of associations was created that submerged the historical role of the triumph in Roman history and focused attention exclusively on the emperor and his family.

[57] Cf. Favro (1994) 164; Bertoletti (2008) 211; Vitti (2010) 554–7.

[58] Beard (2007) 68–71. On the significance of these changes, see Beard (2007) 295–305 and also Hickson (1991).

A further set of ritual changes that also focused attention away from historical memories from the Republic and towards the emperor should be noted. As indicated at the outset of this paper, a significant number of the eighty-two temples restored by Augustus can be found in the southern Campus Martius: not just the temples of Apollo and Bellona, but also those of Jupiter Stator and Juno Regina in the newly named Porticus Octaviae, the Temple of Neptune further along the north side of the Circus Flaminius, and the Temple of Mars along its western perimeter, among others.[59] Significantly, these five temples were rededicated on 23 September, though most likely in different years; 23 September was, of course, Augustus' own birthday. The *dies natalis* for these temples was thus shifted from five separate occasions to a single date, and the ritual procession to these temples instead of being observed on different days was now held on the emperor's birthday. As discussed earlier in the case of the Temple of Concordia Augusta, the new date for the celebrations eliminated another key element in the prior history of the temple, putting the focus squarely on the emperor. The fact that these ceremonies were held in an area now significantly refurbished and dominated by buildings named after members of the imperial family only furthered the work of replacing memories of the conquering generals of Roman history with those of Augustus and his family.

Indeed, it appears that a significant shift in the festival calendar took place under Augustus, with a concomitant shift in memory and identity. Considered broadly, commemorative ceremonies and their 'calendrically observed repetition' provide a key means for a community to remind itself of its identity by forging a link to the past.[60] It has been demonstrated that other festivals in Rome saw a shift in their meaning over the course of the Republic, notably the Parilia which came to mark Rome's founding.[61] Shifting the *dies natalis* of a temple might therefore have a profound impact: such adjustments seem to have been part of a fluid process, but the shift of the *dies natalis* of a

[59] While the temples to both Neptune and Mars are located by the ancient sources *in circo Flaminio*, our knowledge of their locations is due to the painstaking topographical work of modern scholars. For Neptune, see Tucci (1997) 15–42; Coarelli (1997) 397–446. For Mars, see Zevi (1976) and Coarelli (1997) 492–7. See also the respective entries in *LTUR*.

[60] Connerton (1989), esp. 48–70.

[61] On the Parilia and its changed significance for what it meant to be Roman, see Beard (1987).

temple marked a more radical break. Festivities held on the new date at the restored temple would have served as a reminder of the temple's refoundation under Augustus rather than recalling its original foundation in Rome, and so underlined the disavowal of its prior history in Rome. Reinforcing this emphasis, the stone *fasti* recovered from different locations in Italy that date to these years evince the same focus as these restored temples on dates of interest to the imperial family. As Andrew Wallace-Hadrill phrased it, this insertion of Augustus into the Republican festival calendar 'inserts Augustus into the heart of this way of representing what it means to be Roman'.[62] The changes to the ritual calendar played an important role in effacing the prior connections of temples in Rome: Camillus or Opimius or another Roman leader was not commemorated at the same building or on the same day, but rather the ceremony on that site commemorated the new leader of the Roman state. The reconstructed temples, especially those rededicated on a separate day, almost insist upon a wilful forgetfulness of the prior history of the temple in order to centre attention upon the emperor.

Such forgetfulness was an essential ingredient in the construction of a new sense of Roman identity for the Roman Empire. John Gillis has noted that 'national memory is shared by people who have never seen or heard of each other, yet who regard themselves as having a common history. They are bound together as much by forgetting as by remembering.'[63] Memories of the Republican period might prove problematic for developing a shared sense of identity that would help hold the Roman Empire together. Those memories often served as a reminder of the divisions that existed within the Roman state, whether that be the conflict between patricians and plebeians, between aristocrats and plebs, among the leading aristocrats themselves, or the military subjugation of Italy at the hands of Roman armies. Intentional forgetting provided one means of creating a sense of unity.[64] The task was made easier because memory is by nature selective—no one can remember everything that has

[62] Wallace-Hadrill (1987) 226. On the changes to the festival calendar under Augustus, see also Fraschetti (1990) 9–41.

[63] Gillis (1994) 7.

[64] Cf. the comments of Henderson (2000) 1–26, who suggests another example of such intentional forgetting may be at play in Vergil's allusions to the town of Ardea in the *Aeneid*. For another kind of intentional forgetting in Rome, memory sanctions, see now Flower (2006).

happened—and because, as noted earlier, social institutions drive the processes of remembering and forgetting: 'If events do not fit into the frameworks provided by one's social institutions—into which one has been socialized—then they are not remembered.'[65] Just as the emperor developed new frameworks for the Empire, so the monuments helped to eliminate memories that no longer fitted and provided artefacts for the creation of new memories. This discussion should not be taken to imply that every person passing through the southern Campus Martius had the same reaction or called up the same memories; these buildings held multiple meanings, and a Greek slave passing through the area and seeing an authentic Greek Amazonomachy might well make a different association from a member of the Roman elite: memory is of course contestable. But all the reconstruction projects of this region, as well as the reconfiguration of the festival calendar, directed attention to the central figure of the emperor, a tangible visible reminder of Augustus as the focal point of a new Roman society. Where different aspects or elements of being Roman may have been unpalatable or unavailable to some people during the Republic, belonging to an Augustan state was available to everyone, and so these projects attempted to replace memories of the former with the latter.[66]

In concluding, it may be appropriate to consider the ways in which the monuments of Augustan Rome have shaped *our* memories of this transformative period. In the Augustan period and beyond, these buildings continued to be functional: religious ceremonies took place at the Temple of Apollo, shows were staged in the Theatre of Marcellus, people consulted the scrolls in the library in the Porticus Octaviae. For moderns, however, these objects serve only as a means by which to remember the Romans; they have become artefacts whose sole purpose is to define Roman culture for us, rather than objects through which specific aims might be achieved within that culture. This designation 'not only alters their status as "things" (by removing their mundane function), but produces (constructs) a Past of which they are held to be a part and to which people then owe (or disavow) a certain allegiance'.[67] Just as Augustus' reconstruction of

65 Shotter (1990) 131.

66 Cf. the succinct observation of Momigliano (1940) 80, in his review of Syme: 'The monarch was, inevitably, monarch of everybody.'

67 Radley (1990) 57, drawing on the work of Shanks and Tilley (1987).

the southern Campus Martius helped shape memories and produce a state in which all people could owe the emperor allegiance, so the ruins of those monuments produce an image of Rome for us that has shaped the collective memory of European-based cultures. We are the ones who have decided that Rome and its values should hold a privileged place in our historical memories, and we look to selected monuments for confirmation of what we want to remember about Rome. We have followed the dicta of Aeneas, the emperor's literary alter ego: 'Perhaps one day it will be useful to remember even this' (*forsan et haec olim menimisse iuvabit*, Verg. *Aen.* 1.203). Perhaps also, as in the Augustan age, one day it will also be useful to forget and forge a new, more expansive, sense of identity for ourselves.[68]

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5

Qualis Artifex Pereo

The Generation of Roman Memories of Nero

Charles W. Hedrick, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

'Rumours swirled around Nero's death and many imagined and believed that he was alive' (*vario super exitu eius rumore eoque pluribus vivere eum fingentibus credentibusque*). So says Tacitus at the beginning of his account of one of several 'false Neros' who appeared in the wake of the emperor's demise (*Hist.* 2.8–9). The true identity of the impersonator was uncertain. Whoever he was, he had something of Nero's look and knew how to sing and play the cithara. A few deserters rallied round, and 'fear spread wide' (*inde late terror*). 'Many came for the fame of the name, stimulated by a longing for change and a hatred of present circumstances' (*multi ad celebritatem nominis erecti rerum novarum cupidine et odio praesentium*). And the provinces of Asia and Achaea trembled. His reputation was 'swelling by the day' (*gliscentem in dies famam*) when fortune destroyed him. He was caught and executed; his remains were shipped to Rome. He was not the only imperial impostor to trouble the Empire in these years. Tacitus promises to tell of more in his *Histories* but does not. Earlier in the work he had mentioned a 'false Nero' in Parthia (*Hist.* 1.2; cf. Suet., *Nerva* 57 and *Dom.* 6). The stories of the others he presumably recounted in sections of the work that have not survived.[1]

[1] For Nero's afterlife, Champlin (2003); cf. generally, e.g. Malitz (2005).

Nero enjoyed an enviable afterlife, and not only because of the scrupulousness of pretenders. In this case, it is tempting but wrong to understand his vicarious survival as a consequence of social memory. The susceptibility of the public to the impostor's charade is not evidence for the persistence of the emperor in memory; it reflects a failure by the state to make a memory of Nero at all. The 'false Nero' is a symptom of a popular fantasy, not a collective memory.

There is nothing remarkable about the blurring of the line between memory and fantasy: the tendency to confuse the two is well known.[2] The affinities between the memory and fantasy are clear: consider, for example, the overlap between a favourite erotic or romantic fantasy and comparable memories. Fantasy can never be pure, abstract invention; it incorporates elements of experience. For Tacitus, as conventionally today, the distinction between the two appears to be founded on a common-sense criterion of external truth: illusion is a figment of the mind, make-believe, while memory is the mental residue of a real sensory experience.[3] If we leave aside the question of the correspondence of perception to truth, however, and regard both fantasy and memory from a formal perspective, the two share an essential quality: both are imaginative portrayals, representations of the mind to itself of things inaccessible to the senses. The common basis of both fantasy and memory in imagination is doubtless one of the chief reasons that the two so frequently shade into one another. From this perspective the two differ mainly in the temporal qualities attributed to them. Fantasy attempts to conjure up the thing as if it

[2] The problem has been discussed by psychologists since Freud (and long before by philosophers). The literature continues to accumulate. The issue has perhaps been most notoriously manifested in recent years in the controversy over 'repressed memory': see, e.g. Loftus and Ketcham (1994) and Loftus (1996). The tension between the apprehension of fantasy and reality is neatly encapsulated in Roman culture in the various uses of the verb *fingo*. In the passage dealing with the false Nero I have translated this word 'imagining' because of its close association with 'believing' (*fingentibus credentibusque*): that is, Tacitus believes that some Romans accept the illusion of the survival of Nero as true. The same word, however, might also be rendered as 'pretending': on that interpretation, Tacitus would be saying that the illusion is cherished or promoted in the knowledge that it is false. Most modern derivatives of *fingo* imply cognizance of the illusory quality of fantasy: cf., e.g. feign, figment, fiction, but the meaning of the word in Latin denotes only fabrication, with no necessary implication about belief: cf. *OLD*, s.v.

[3] The dynamic relationship between illusion and reality is, like the tension between silence and expression embodied in memory, central to Tacitus' account of the Principate. See, e.g. Rudich (1993); Hedrick (2000) ch. 5; Haynes (2003).

were present. Memory, on the other hand, evokes the thing as absent, or more precisely it represents the thing to mind under the sign of the past.

Fantasy and memory belong to a promiscuous family of ideas about apprehension, along with the notions of 'experience' and 'history'. Members of this family mix incestuously, and it can be as difficult to make simple, clean distinctions among them as it is to describe the genealogical relationships among a family of concupiscent, polydactylic alley cats. It has lately become reflex among scholars to oppose memory to history,[4] ignoring its relationship to other categories of mental apprehension. In Tacitus' account of the 'false Nero' the salient problem is not memory's opposition to history, but its relationship to experience and fantasy: the nature of a group's perception of contemporary political figures and its memories of the illustrious dead, as well as the ways in which the passage from one mode of perception to another is facilitated or hindered.

EXPERIENCE AND FANTASY, MEMORY AND HISTORY

The words 'experience' and 'fantasy', 'memory' and 'history' have in common usage a range of connotation. For the purposes of this essay I will define the words and their relationships more narrowly. The structured pairing of what I will call the perceived 'means' of apprehension (i.e. the imaginative vs. the sensory) and the felt 'temporality' of the apprehension (present vs. past) is essential to the structuring of the relationships among several of the traditional categories of mental apprehension. The felt contrast between imaginative and sensory apprehension is fraught with elemental associations, including such ideas as 'inside' vs. 'outside', 'the subjective' vs. 'the objective', 'the

[4] Consider, e.g. the journal *History & Memory*, founded in 1989. Whether the relationship between history and memory is conceived as antagonistic—as for example by Halbwachs (1992) or A. Assmann (1999)—or in some way complementary—as by Le Goff (1992), Yerushalmi (1982), or Ricoeur (2006)—it has become central to the scholarly literature. Cf. further the comments of Galinsky in the Introduction to this volume. The scholarly interest in the topic is doubtless due to the apparent similarity of memory and history: both are 'of the past', as Aristotle famously defined memory (*de mem*. 449b4).



Figure 5.1 Categories of apprehension.
By the author.

simulatory' vs. 'the real'. The temporal distinction of 'present' vs. 'past' likewise has various connotations: the dichotomy is, for example, typically associated with the physical distinction of 'present' vs. 'absent'.

Ambiguities, problems, and implications quickly proliferate. In the interest of economy and clarity, I offer a diagram of the structural relationships I am proposing among these (see Figure 5.1).[5] These categories of apprehension and the distinctions among them have been subjected to millennia of misgivings, ranging from the popular to the poetic to the philosophical. Each category can be regarded as in some way uncertain, incoherent, or threatening. The problem is rooted in insecurity about the place of subjective consciousness: its integrity or contingency, persistence or mortality, in relation to the objects of its perception. For example, even so intuitively obvious a phenomenon as experience, the straightforward sensory perception of the present, external world, may on reflection be disconcerting, because of the implicit contrast of the insentient endurance of the material world with the fleeting mortality of the subjective consciousness of the observer.[6]

[5] The diagram takes the form of an Aristotelian 'semiotic square': cf. Greimas (1976).

[6] There is no need to appeal to the famous existentialist anxiety in the face of the material world, memorably dramatized in Sartre's *La Nausée* (1938). Traditional reflections on death are uniformly founded on the contrast, implicit or explicit, of transient life with the enduring world, and provide the basis for countless poems, essays, and personal reflections.

The diagram maps the relationship between four categories of apprehension. The temporality of *experience* is present; the mode of apprehension is sensory. The temporality of *fantasy* is likewise present, but the mode of apprehension is, by contrast with experience, understood to be internal, imaginative. *Memory*, like fantasy, is understood as an internal, imaginative representation of mind to itself, but it is temporally marked as 'past'. Furthermore, unlike fantasy, memorious apprehensions are regarded as correspondent to something actual: if fantasy is the simulatory evocation of experience, memory is its replicatory 'realization'. The modern idea of *history* is the product of the monstrous collocation of external sensory apprehension with the temporality of the past—I say monstrous because the combination of the two seems intuitively impossible. How can something that is no longer present be perceived, except through imaginative recollection? In general, traditional historians dealt with the problem by repudiating it; by assimilating evidence and the written history itself to memory. Evidence is present to be seen, but its relation to the past is only unlocked with the engagement of the memorious imagination.[7] By contrast modernist historians have since the early nineteenth century imagined that it is possible to eliminate the necessity for the subjective engagement from history by practising a form of systems analysis, historicism: surviving evidence of the past is understood as a kind of writing, which can speak for itself, without the aid of memory, to the present.[8]

The attempt to describe these various attitudes towards present and past, mind and world, as 'problems' at such a level of abstraction may seem a perverse complication of self-evident phenomena. The sensory perception of present experience after all seems immediate and unmediated, more an imposition on the mind than a mental figment. The primacy of experience is privileged as 'truer' than fantasy or memory because of its grounding in sensory apprehension. Fantasy, the simulation of experience, and memory, the residue of experience, are typically understood to be derivative of sensory experience. Nevertheless, although these categories are typically sharply distinguished by individuals and by society, they are also conceived as trafficking with one another. More specifically, experience is understood to be primary and the source for the other two.

[7] Cf., e.g. Hedrick (1995). [8] Hedrick (2006).

The circulation of thought among these modes of apprehension is seldom subjected to popular scrutiny: the transition from present sensory experience to fantasy or to recollection seems so seamless as to defy elucidation, or even questioning.

Despite such attitudes, it is clear that even present sensory experience must be understood, like fantasy and memory, as a construction of mind. The temporal quality of experience, the sense of the sensory world as 'here' and 'now', takes its meaning only with reference to the moment and place of the subject's consciousness. The discernment of objects through the senses as external to consciousness must be the consequence of qualities attributed to them by mind. The experience of the world as present is itself the product of a mysterious integration of the scattered stimuli of sensory perception of the world. The input of various senses—sight and sound, touch and smell—arrive at different places in the brain and at different speeds; and there is a lag of half a second, an eternity in brain time, between their arrival and their synchronization into a unified conscious awareness of the world as 'present'. Our minds manufacture the sensory perception of the world as present and external on a kind of 'tape delay'.[9]

Confusions of these categories of apprehension inform Roman attitudes towards their emperors, whether 'real' and 'pretend'. The population of the Roman Empire was large, scattered, and immobile. Relatively few of its inhabitants can have had direct experience of the real emperor Nero during his lifetime. To the vast majority of the population of the Roman world, every emperor was, in a very real and practical way, pretend: a figure apprehended, like the false Nero, 'through imagination and belief' (*fingentibus credentibusque*), rather than through direct sensory experience. The popular understanding of Nero as a living contemporary could only stem from an inculcated belief—fantasy. Likewise the apprehension of an emperor as 'past'—dead and gone—could not be gained from direct experience, but only

[9] The means by which scattered sensory apprehensions are integrated in consciousness (to form unified perceptions, memories, or consciousness itself) are not well understood. Neuroscientists, following philosophers, describe this as the 'binding problem'. Articulation of this 'problem' is recognized to go back at least to Kant, though under various names. Doubtless the most famous early account of the issue was offered by William James, who described it as the 'combination problem' in his 1895 book, *The Principles of Psychology*. For a recent review of the history and literature on 'the binding problem' see Revonsuo (2006); on the relative temporalities of apprehension and consciousness, Libet (2004).

from instruction. In this case, experience, fantasy, and memory are so confused that they cannot easily be disentangled.

GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERCEPTIONS

The transition in the previous paragraph from individual experiences and fantasies and memories to collective experiences, fantasies, and memories should not pass unremarked. The idea that such apprehensions can be collectively held remains controversial. Reservations stem from the deeply ingrained habit of discriminating between information (what is known) and apprehension (the means of knowing). No one doubts that members of groups hold information in common: knowledge of language, traditions, customs is conspicuously shared among members of groups. Such knowledge, however, when affiliated with intimate modes of apprehension, is regarded as the bedrock of consciousness, the mysterious and idiosyncratic kernel of what makes individuals themselves. Consequently the attempt to treat apprehension—memory, fantasy, and experience—as collective phenomena is often understood as an assault on the ideal of individuality. The problem has been discussed with much sweaty handwringing, and I do not propose to rehearse the arguments and reservations at length here.[10] A telegraphic response would be that some cognitive effects are shared by virtue of physiology, a consequence of the common architecture and chemistry of the human brain; others are learned as a consequence of group interactions. As a consequence of recent progress in neuroscience, the line between what is physical and social is being relocated almost daily. Minimally and generally, nature and culture are far more deeply and pervasively implicated with one another than many would like to recognize. Culture is in many respects natural, and nature is in essential ways plastic, responsive to circumstance.[11] The brain is an organ whose function is to remake itself physically in response to environmental

[10] The influential modern statement of the position goes back to publications by Maurice Halbwachs from the 1920s and later: see, e.g. the translated collection, Halbwachs (1992).

[11] The early history of neuroscience is characterized by an understanding of brain function as anatomically 'localized'. The attitude remains influential. Carter (1998) for example presents a very static, architectural vision of the brain (the revised edition of

challenges: thus, learning. Readers may make what they will of all this. Tacitus, at least, regards collective apprehension as unproblematic: as will be seen in the next section, he attributes the sharing of emotions and conscious, volitional agency to various groups in Roman society in his account of the 'false Nero'.

Memory is not just information about the past—divorced from mind this would be mere writing; it is information formed and infested by the living, responsive consciousness of the individual. The qualification has been definitional at least since Plato's distinction of memory and writing in the *Phaedrus*.[12] Traditional histories are overtly conceived as supports of memory, not replacements of it. It is only with the late eighteenth century and the run-up to German historicism that professional historiography comes to be idealized as an objective content, a pure writing, uninformed by and antagonistic to memory. The intellectual developments that support the emergence of this position are legion; but for me the most elementary cause and political impetus behind the emergence of historicism was the need to create an authoritative base for a national community, which would replace the more spontaneous, bottom-up traditions of the groups of the nation's constituent and divisive regional ethnicities.[13]

Because of its definitional implication with consciousness, memory cannot be studied as if it were simply a formal or objective content, in the way that modern (and for that matter postmodern) literary critics and historians like to deal with their 'texts' and 'evidence'. Such an approach ignores the defining quality of memory, and reduces it to a

2010 rehearses the same 'localizationalist' orientation). For a readable popular introduction to the idea of brain plasticity, Doidge (2007).

[12] Cf., e.g. Hedrick (1994).

[13] So one theme of Hedrick (2006), laid out succinctly in the first chapter and developed with reference to the emergence of the historicist conception of evidence, as manifested in the various specialist 'ancillary' disciplines of classical philology. The general point has of course been made by others as well. The replacement of traditional forms of collective memory by centralized nationalist regimentation is a central topic of Pierre Nora's (1984–92) resolutely misunderstood edited volumes on modern, nationalist *lieux* (as opposed to traditional *milieux*) *de mémoire*. The idea that nationalism is to be understood in terms of the centralized construction and dispersal of consciousness was famously advanced by Benedict Anderson (1983). And the point has been made by many others before and after him: cf., e.g. the essays collected in the special issue of *Representations* on history and memory (no. 26, Spring 1989).

form of writing: that is, it views memory from the critical and ultimately dismissive perspective of the philological/historical project launched in the nineteenth century. The necessary first step in approaching memory is not to evaluate its formal content, but to specify *whose* memory it is, and then, ideally, to document the point by specifying the ways in which the memory is produced and fostered.

TACITUS ON SOME COLLECTIVE ROMAN MINDS

Almost as bad as the tendency to treat memory formally, as if it were disembodied information, is its casual or unexplained association with vague groups and contexts.[14] The subtitle of this paper is 'The Generation of Roman Memories of Nero'. I hope I have preserved my point by referring to Roman 'memories' rather than 'memory'; nevertheless readers should be wary of the qualifier 'Roman'. The word is used by modern scholars to describe a variety of different groups, typically without much explanation: the population of the Roman Empire, the inhabitants of the city of Rome, and the senatorial aristocracy, for example, are all regularly used as unqualified referents of the word 'Roman'. For the purposes of a discussion of collective memory the term is not only too vague, but also too general. I doubt that it is accurate to speak of a 'Roman memory' or 'cultural identity' held by all inhabitants of the entire empire.[15] The Romans had neither the means nor the ambition to produce a common cultural identity among all their subjects. The creation of mass culture is the project of modern nationalism, and it is a difficult-enough undertaking even for states that can resort to the tools of a mass media and a state-mandated system of education.[16]

[14] Halbwachs (1925) makes this point, though his scheme is structured on the monumental economic classes inherited from nineteenth-century political economy. These categories are too gross and restrictive—unnuanced and inflexible—to be of much use for historical analysis of a premodern society. Even in modern societies, all social groups, from small-town churches to nation states, to the extent that they are communities, develop an idiosyncratic group-knowledge, including a 'collective memory'.

[15] This will be the subject of a forthcoming collection of essays on 'Cultural Memories in the Roman Empire' (Getty Publications).

[16] Hedrick (2011) and, more succinctly, (2013).

Tacitus, be it observed, does not speak of a general 'Roman memory' in his account of the 'false Nero'; in fact, he does not speak of memory at all—doubtless, as I argued above, because the passage is concerned with fantasy, not memory. In a crucial passage from the beginning of his *Histories*, however, he provides an admirably nuanced discussion of the reaction to Nero's death among various groups of the Roman Empire. 'Although Nero's death had been at first welcomed with joy, it roused different emotions (*varios motus animorum*), not only in the city among the senators and people and the city soldiery, but also among all the legions and generals' (*Hist.* 1.4).

The beginning of the passage is marked by a programmatic statement:

> Before I deal with my intended subject, I think I must consider what was the condition of the city, the attitude of the armies (*mens exercituum*), and the disposition of the provinces (*habitus provinciarum*), what throughout the world was healthy and what was sick, so that not only the incidents and outcomes of affairs may be known, which are for the most part due to chance, but also their logic and cause.

The statement is recapitulated briefly to mark the end of the passage (1.11). The account is divided between reactions in the city (1.4–7) and those in the provinces (1.8–11).[17]

In the city Tacitus distinguishes briefly and in turn, among the attitudes of the various groups, beginning with the elite and moving to the humblest members of society: the Senate; the equestrian order; the 'upright' (*integra*) elements of the populace including the clients and freedmen of the great houses; and finally the worse sort, the 'dirty plebs' (*plebs sordida*), addicted to games and theatre, including the worst slaves and bankrupts. Even after the initial thrill of Nero's death had faded, the Senate continued to bask in their pleasure: the new emperor was yet to arrive in Rome, and they had the enjoyment of their freedom. The leading men of the equestrian class were almost as glad. The better sort of people, dependants of those who had been condemned or exiled, began to hope. The worse sort, who had come

[17] The political triptych of senate, urban plebs, and army is emphasized throughout Tacitus' history, perhaps because he believed that, after the emperor, they were the only entities with potential for political action. The importance of these groups in the ancient sources has often been noted; cf. lately Noreña (2011) 10. On the organization and detail of the passage see, e.g. Damon (2003) ad loc.

to rely on the handouts of the emperor, were 'despondent and greedy for rumours' (*maesti et rumorum avidi*). The praetorians (*miles urbanus*, 1.5), saturated in their 'long-standing oath of allegiance to the Julio-Claudian dynasty' (*longo Caesarum sacramento imbutus*, 1.5), had only been brought to desert Nero by trickery. Disappointed of the customary cash present (the 'donative') from the new emperor, despairing of their prospects, they 'inclined to revolution' (*pronus ad res novas*, 1.5).[18] They had also supported the imperial aspirations of their commander, C. Nymphidius Sabinius; he had failed and paid the price, but the surviving cohorts remained cognizant of their own complicity with him (*manebat conscientia*, 1.5) and were consequently inclined to find fault with the new emperor. Furthermore, over fourteen years they had been schooled by Nero to love the vices of the emperor no less than they had been used to respect his virtues; and Galba preferred to recruit his soldiers rather than buy them.

The account of the attitudes of various groups within the city concludes with a remarkable description of reactions to Galba's entry into Rome with his army (1.6–7). The armies are again picked out for special attention. The new emperor's march to the city had been slow and gruesome. The slaughter of so many of their own comrades made even the victorious armies fear for themselves. The city was full of forces recruited by Nero from the various provincial legions for special military projects. In short, the soldiers in the city were like a pile of kindling, 'inclined to no one in particular, but ready with their backing for anyone who dared take it' (*non in unum aliquem prono favore ita audenti parata*, 1.6). After his bloody coronation, people were disposed to despise the new emperor for everything he later did. 'Even Galba's age was reason for mockery and contempt among those accustomed to Nero's youth, who contrasted the emperors as the common sort will, according to the beauty and stateliness of their physiques' (*ipsa aetas Galbae inrisui ac fastidio erat adsuetis iuventae Neronis et imperatores forma ac decore corporis*, 1.7).

'This then was the disposition of attitudes at Rome, (various), as (is to be expected) in so large a population' (*et hic quidem Romae,*

[18] The majority of translators render *res novae* as 'revolution', though they should have some reservations about the baggage the modern word brings along with it: see, e.g. Finley (1986) and Romano (2006).

tamquam in tanta multitudine, habitus animorum, 1.8). The ensuing discussion of sentiments in the provinces (1.8–11) is more precisely devoted to the feelings of the provincial armies and their commanders. Many of these armies met the death of Nero with complacency, whether because of the character of their commander or because of benefits recently received or because of distance or preoccupation with local wars. The notable exceptions were the armies associated with Germany and its commander, which were 'worried and angry' (*solliciti et irati*, 1.8). They had been late to abandon Nero, and had not declared promptly for Galba. They reportedly had even offered the throne to their own commander, L. Verginius Rufus, the distinguished patriot and writer—years later Tacitus himself would deliver the man's funeral oration. Verginius may or may not have declined their support, but he was soon recalled to Italy and prosecuted—an event the soldiers took as an indictment of themselves (1.8–9). Some of the legions in Illyricum had been summoned to Italy by Nero before his death, and these too had approached Verginius with their support (1.9).

'This then was the condition of Roman affairs' when Galba took office (1.11). It bears underlining how limited Tacitus' view of the elements of Roman society is. His account of the communities within the city of Rome is socially diverse enough, including groups from the Senate down to the meanest wastrels; but even here he gives far more emphasis to the attitudes of the soldiery than to those of the civilian bodies. And in the provinces he restricts himself entirely to the armies: not a word about the sentiments of the inhabitants of the provinces and municipalities, only of their warders.

In his account of the 'false Nero', Tacitus emphasizes that the roots of the mirage are to be sought with the army: this pretender is above all a soldier's fantasy. If we are to follow Tacitus' cue and regard his appearance as something other than a random episode, then we need to seek for the causes in the predispositions of the soldiery. The motives Tacitus attributes to the followers of the false Nero echo the attitudes of the military that he repeatedly emphasizes in his opening retrospective. Soldiers are stimulated to join the 'false Nero' by their 'desire for revolution' (*rerum novarum cupidine*) and by 'hatred of their present situation' (*odio praesentium*). Tacitus also may intimate that the 'widespread fear' (*late terror*) and 'swelling fame' (*gliscentem famam*) of the impostor exceeded the ranks of the armies. A remark from his retrospective digression

may be compared: that the urban dregs were ready for gossip, 'despairing and greedy for rumours' (*maesti et rumorum avidi*).

THE ROMAN EMPEROR OF THE MIND

The Roman state made no coordinated effort to cultivate a common 'Roman culture' and 'identity' among the inhabitants of the Empire, as do modern nations. Agents of the state did, however, actively encourage widespread allegiance to the reigning emperor and his family: the emperor served in important respects as the emblem of the state and its power. Knowledge and loyalty was propagated through a conventional repertoire of representations and practices, some promoted by political authorities, some flourishing through dispersed and more-or-less spontaneous and voluntary local interactions. The mechanisms are many and have been frequently and well explored—sculptures and coins, oaths and invocations, post-mortem condemnation or divinization.[19]

Dissemination of an 'imperial ideology' was, by modern standards, limited and uncoordinated. A pre-industrial state, Rome was an agrarian society: the substantial majority of its population lived dispersed in the countryside.[20] Certainly it was not possible for the state to reach out and touch people individually, in their homes, as political regimes that have access to modern technologies of mass communication can.[21] The ideals of the Roman state had to be spread through groups, where they assembled—in towns and army bases for example. And it is indeed in such centres that manifestations of the ideals of the state are best attested. To a lesser degree monumental transportation routes—roads and aqueducts, for example—served the same ends: they were themselves spectacular emblems of Roman

[19] For discussion and bibliography see now Noreña (2011).

[20] An uncontroversial point: see, e.g. Finley (1999). In mitigation, however, it might be argued that the majority of the rural population likely lived within a day's commute of some urban centre.

[21] Some might counter that mass-produced Roman coinage could have approximated the function of the modern mass media. Noreña (2011) goes some way down this road when he suggests that coins could 'saturate the Roman world with specific, topical messages transmitted by the central state' (193), though he qualifies the point elsewhere in the book.

power and governance and they assembled an audience by channelling traffic. There is no reason to imagine that the state had the practical ability to disseminate imperial ideals and communicate news of events, such as the death of one emperor and the accession of another, to the rustics who lived removed from such centres and rural thoroughfares.[22]

For obvious reasons, Roman emperors lavished particular attention on promoting their images among the armies. Tacitus emphasizes the point in his account of the 'false Nero', in his summary of the 'state of Roman affairs' after the death of Nero, and indeed throughout all of his historical writing. He specifies the ways in which the emperor secured the loyalty of the troops to his person: through the military oath, through their pay, and through personal contact.

Tacitus remarks that the death of Nero was difficult for the urban soldiers because they had been accustomed to loyalty to the house of the Julio-Claudians, because of their oath (*longo Caesarum sacramento imbutus*, 1.5). On enlistment soldiers swore an oath (*sacramentum*) to their nominal commander, the reigning emperor, promising to be loyal to him and to obey his orders. The practice went back to Republican times, when likewise soldiers swore loyalty and obedience to their commander. Neither in Republic or Empire, evidently, was it thought necessary to include mention of the state in this oath. Tacitus put great stock in the importance of the oath in determining the behaviour of the armies: in describing the interaction of the emperor and the armies he mentions it frequently in his writing. The *sacramentum* seems to have been supplemented by another, more general oath, an 'oath of allegiance', sworn by soldiers and citizens as well on the occasion of the accession (*dies imperii*) of a new emperor and renewed annually on the anniversary of the day. Unlike the military *sacramentum*, which committed loyalty only to the specific commander or emperor, this 'oath of allegiance' also regularly required an affirmation of loyalty not only to the emperor but also to his family.[23]

[22] To take a modern example, Mao Tse-Tung lived with his family in the village of Shaoshan in the Hunan Province, in the heart of China, when the emperor died in 1908. He did not learn of the event until two years later, in 1910, when he left the village: Snow (1973) 138.

[23] See generally Campbell (1984), and particularly ch. 2.

An inducement to loyalty among the Roman armies was the money they received from the emperor. Soldiers not only received regular wages, but also a bonus (donative) at the accession of a new emperor. Tacitus mentions that at the death of Nero soldiers felt cheated because they had not received the donative from Galba. The armies also relied on the emperor to provide them with a cash payment upon retirement. It was carefully emphasized to the soldiers that the money they received came directly from the emperor: the coins with which the soldiers were paid bore his image, and often alluded to a special connection between him and their particular legion. Much of the output of the Roman imperial mints went to paying the armies; the chief means of putting coinage into circulation in the Roman world seems to have been through military pay. In fact, it is arguable that the Roman state minted money in the first instance to pay its soldiers.[24]

The connection between the emperor and army was reinforced in other ways as well, including through worship. Portraits of the emperor and his close families might be affixed to legionary standards, which were themselves revered in a sanctuary in the army's camp. Here too were kept statues of emperors and their families. As we learn from the famous fragment of a military calendar from Dura Europus, days of observance were, from the time of Augustus, set aside by armies to honour emperors, present and past.[25]

Prudent and responsible emperors reinforced these practices by visiting at least some of their armies in person. Hadrian, for example, famously toured the Empire, stopping to visit armies, observe their drills, and give addresses of appreciation and affectionate criticism.[26] But even comparative slackers like Gaius and Claudius visited the legions and might even lead campaigns. Such visits gave palpable evidence of the emperor's love for the armies, as well as allowing him the opportunity to play the brave fellow soldier, to wear the uniform of competence and fortitude. Emperors made a point of identifying themselves with soldiers by addressing them as *commilitones*, 'comrades'. Favoured legions might be allowed to take on his name: e.g. *Augusta* or *Flavia*.

[24] Cf. Campbell (1984) 36; Noreña (2011) 194.
[25] Fishwick (1988).
[26] Cf. the speeches he gave to the African army at Lambaesis: Speidel (2006).

Given such attention soldiers might well identify with their emperor. Ideally the identification resulted in loyalty and dutiful obedience. These feelings might collide. As Tacitus remarks, the armies had loved Nero for his youthful beauty, his open-handedness, and permissiveness. They disliked his successor, Galba, because of his inflexible discipline and his age and stinginess. Perhaps Nero was too permissive: his behaviour encouraged insubordination. But Galba's old-style no-nonsense discipline lacked the common touch. The contrast was exacerbated by the army's ingrained expectations of the imperial person. A general should look the part of the soldier: be youthful—vigorous and physically imposing—not a doddering old man.

The relationship of emperor and army, then, was carefully cultivated. Tacitus' description of the army as 'saturated' (*imbutus*) in their allegiance to the imperial house is nothing less than accurate. As he remarks in his account of Piso's plotting after the death of Germanicus, pretenders could not rely on the support of the army, even after the death of the commander: 'The fresh memory of their general and the internally fixed love for the house of the Caesars took precedence' (*recens imperatoris sui memoria et penitus infixus in Caesares amor praevaleret*, *Ann.* 2.76). For such reasons, at the death of Nero the armies were 'angry about the present and ready for revolution', susceptible and even eager to recognize their emperor in anyone willing to step into the role.

MEMORY AND EMOTIONAL INVESTMENT

In his narrative of the episode of the 'false Nero', Tacitus emphasizes the correlation between soldiers' willingness to be deceived and their general emotional predisposition. His account of their emotions echoes his general summary of the state of Roman affairs in 69 and the various, broadly based responses that greeted the news of the death of Nero. As the historian remarks, for outcomes to make any sense, it is necessary to consider people's dispositions (*Hist.* 1.4). But his account suggests that there is a further and more profound connection between perception itself and emotional attitudes: the proclivity to fantasize (and by extension to remember) is linked to certain affective dispositions. What people thought they knew of

Nero after his death was not simply a matter of objective or accurate information, or of effective communication. As Tacitus says, the news of the 'false Nero' delighted some and terrified others (2.8). The baser sort loved Nero; they longed for him, and so were greedy for every rumour. The armies, despairing of the future and dissatisfied with the present, were 'predisposed' (*pronus*) to believe, to find the emperor wherever they could. The better kind—the senatorial class, the equites, and their dependants—had hated and feared the man; his death was a relief and a cause for optimism and contentment (1.4). These were doubtless ready to consign Nero to the past and memory.

As I have observed above, memory is by definition not just the knowledge of past; it is the knowledge of the past implicated with consciousness. Consciousness is often defined in thumbnail fashion as 'self-awareness'—not a helpful criterion if we want to see it manifest in memory. Whatever we may regard as the essence of the idea of consciousness, perhaps it can be agreed that it is in fundamental ways implicated with life—with the vital impulses that trigger initiative and action, with self-interest and desire and fear; and such attitudes do manifest themselves in cognition, in action, and in expression. From this perspective, the attitudes attributed by Tacitus to various Roman social groups do not just determine how they know or remember Nero. Emotions do not pervert knowledge; they are an essential part of knowing at all, as they are a part of every kind of human action.[27]

The point raises a set of related questions. Did Tacitus believe that certain kinds of emotions—say, appetitive ones, such as desire—encouraged a propensity to view the world from the perspective of fantasy? Did other emotional dispositions support a more 'memorious' outlook? Or did he think that memory flourished only when emotional engagement was attenuated?[28] How, precisely, might Romans have successfully negotiated the transition from a sense of present experience to the sense of a past memory? Why did Nero not become a memory at his death?

[27] Many have written on the association of emotions with reason: see generally, e.g. Damasio (1994); Solomon (1995); Konstan (2007).

[28] The nature of the relationship between memory and the emotions was pioneered by Freud in a number of brilliantly intuitive studies, e.g. in the famous 1914 essay on 'Mourning and Melancholy'. Out of the vast recent literature I have found the work of Elizabeth Loftus illuminating: cf., e.g. Loftus and Ketcham (1994). Recent and general access to the topic is provided by various entries in Pethes and Ruchatz (2001): so D. Hartmann and W. Zitterbarth, 'Emotion', 139–40; M. Eggers, 'Trauma', 602–4.

Tacitus' remarks on his own historical practice may be relevant to the problem of the relationship between the emotions and knowledge: traditional history is, after all, chiefly the work of remembering and calling the past to mind for others. 'Those who claim integrity', Tacitus says, 'must tell of people without love or hatred' (*sed incorruptam fidem professis neque amore quisquam et sine odio dicendus est*, *Hist.* 1.1). For him, repudiation of such emotions requires an active effort: with the distance of time it has become possible for him to view the past 'without anger and zeal; the motives for which I keep at a distance' (*sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo*, *Ann.* 1; cf. also *Agr.* 1). It may be true, as Tacitus says, that emotional distance is required for those who profess honourable impartiality; but it may also be intrinsic to the ability to regard a thing as 'past' at all. The sense of distance or separation is a hallmark of both impartiality (or 'objectivity') and memory.[29]

THE IMPERIAL SUCCESSION AND THE GENERATION OF MEMORY

The events following the death of Nero revealed that 'one could become emperor elsewhere than at Rome' (*posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri*, *Hist.* 1.4). Obviously, since the time of Augustus emperors had been made at Rome, though Tacitus does not explain why that should have been, or why anyone should have been surprised that, with the help of an army, anyone anywhere could aspire to the imperial purple. How, exactly, had emperors traditionally been 'made' at Rome? And maybe more to the point, how was an old emperor to be unmade? A new emperor cannot take the throne until the seat has been vacated. The problem that we encounter in Tacitus' story of the false Nero, the failure of a dead emperor to navigate the route from contemporary to memory in the minds of his subjects, is far from an aberration in the history of the imperial succession.

Given the premium put on producing wide knowledge and loyalty to the ruling house, it was important at death to manage the passage of these imperial personages in the public mind from the expansive

[29] Cf. Luce (1989).

world of the living to the circumscribed territory of memory. So for instance Suetonius remarks that after the death of Gaius (Caligula) many feared that he was really alive, feigning death to gauge the reaction (*Calig.* 60). Or again, Tacitus mentions that after the death of Germanicus rumours circulated that he yet lived and acted: Tiberius did nothing to put an end to the rumours or to produce a broadly based sense of Germanicus as a memory, Tacitus says, but allowed them to wither and perish through time and distance (*Ann.* 2.82).

It was difficult to make a memory of the Roman emperor because so much care and energy had been lavished on creating the position as a contemporary presence, especially with the armies, and because many groups had invested so deeply and emotionally in the persona of the emperor. Political successions have always and everywhere been a tricky business, and from the first it was clear to those involved that special attention was required if an emperor was to die successfully. Doubtless the most famous example is the first, Tacitus' account of Tiberius' accession at the death of Augustus, though I could make the point with any of the Julio-Claudian succession stories. Tiberius and his mother Livia covered up the death of Augustus while they secured the oaths of the army. They encouraged the people to imagine and believe that the emperor lived until they could straighten the path for Tiberius to the throne, and for Augustus into memory (*Ann.* 1.5). The story is almost precisely paralleled by Tacitus' account of Nero's accession. The future emperor Nero and his mother Agrippina covered up the death of Claudius, encouraging the troops and people to hope, while they waited for the moment pronounced propitious by the astrologers to announce the death (*Ann.* 12.68–9). Tacitus emphasizes the parallels by ending each episode with the same notorious transitional reference to the 'first crime of the new regime' (*Ann.* 1.6; 13.1).

Early in the reign of Tiberius Tacitus tells the story of yet another pretend heir of the Caesars. A 'false Agrippa Postumus' surfaced and plotted to undermine the allegiance of the armies of Germany. He was captured and brought to the emperor. When Tiberius asked him how he had managed to become Agrippa Postumus, the impostor answered, 'the same way you became Caesar' (*quo modo tu Caesar*, *Ann.* 2.39–40).

The point of such stories is that Roman emperors, like other public figures, ancient or for that matter modern, are to be regarded by the nature of the positions as impostors. If we can trust Suetonius' *Lives*,

the emperors themselves were aware of the point. And even if the historical accuracy of the *Lives* cannot be trusted, Suetonius at least shows that some Romans understood that the emperor's public face was a contrivance. So when Augustus died, he is said to have asked those attending his bedside whether he had acted his part in the mime well, closing with quote from a Greek play: 'if the play has been good, applaud' (Suet. *Aug.* 99). The story of Nero's final scene furnishes yet another example of how he was conceived as a pendant to Augustus. As he prepared to submit himself to the blade, Nero wept and repeated over and over his immortal envoi, 'What an artist dies in me!' (*Qualis artifex pereo!*, Suet. *Ner.* 49). The translation of *artifex* as 'artist' may be misleadingly general: the word was used to describe various kinds of craftsmen and performers in antiquity, including actors (*OLD*, s.v.). On reflection it may be, as Shakespeare has Jaques pessimistically put it, that 'all the world's a stage' and we are all of us, humble or high, in some existential sense only impersonators of ourselves; but the point is literally and unmistakably true of public figures, who must self-consciously put on the mask every morning along with their suit and tie. Nero was notorious for his love of the stage; but he would not have needed to be an actor to appreciate the point any more than Augustus did. To his subjects, and perhaps even to himself, Nero was a persona, not a person.

For me, the most striking example of the sensitivity and difficulty of the transition of a ruler into memory is provided by Tacitus' account of the succession of Gaius Caligula. The old emperor, lying in a bedroom on the bay of Naples, seemed to have expired; the arrangements for the succession had been made in haste. Gaius screwed the great ring off Tiberius' bloated finger and ran out to claim the world. But while he basked in the admiration of a throng of admirers, the old man unexpectedly revived. At the news the crowd gasped and scattered. Only the praetorian prefect, Macro, kept his head. After a deliberative breath, he had Tiberius smothered in his bedclothes (Tac. *Ann.* 6.50; with Suet. *Tib.* 73 and Cass. Dio 58.28).

The moral of the story is that an emperor can never die without careful preparation. The death must be managed with the same care and ceremony that went into creating him in life. It is necessary, metaphorically speaking, to hold the old figurehead down on a bed, put a pillow to its face, and suffocate it; otherwise you can never be sure whether it will not come staggering like a zombie out of the bedroom. After a period of planning, a corpse, unmarked and

composed, can be presented to the world; then the emperor can at last be dead, to be disparaged or worshipped, mourned, and remembered.

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Part III

Roman Honorific Statues

Memory or Just Honour?

6

In the Web of (Hi-)Stories

Memoria, Monuments, and Their Myth-Historical 'Interconnectedness'

Karl-J. Hölkeskamp

PROLOGUE: AN ANECDOTE AND ITS EXPLANATORY POTENTIAL

On 4 January 43 BCE, Cicero gave a speech in the public assembly, known to us as the *Sixth Philippic*.[1] This time it was not only about his nemesis Mark Antony and his criminal plots as an enemy of the state, but also—in a kind of sarcastic dig—about his 'little brother' Lucius, who had gained notoriety the year before as an active plebeian tribune and chair of the commission for the distribution of *ager publicus* to veterans and needy citizens. However, the focus of Cicero's attack was Lucius' conspicuously opulent honours in the form of statues.[2] Cicero mentions no fewer than four such statues and also cites—with a combination of pleasure, condescension, and venom—inscriptions in which the sponsors refer to the young man as their *patronus*: the *equites equo publico*; the *tribuni militum*, who had served twice in Caesar's army; the moneyed men of the *Ianus medius*, the 'stock exchange' at the

[1] The basic discussion now is that of Manuwald (2007) ii. 736–44, with further references (commentaries, translations, literature). Cf. on the occasion and context of this speech also Steel (2008).

[2] Cic. *Phil.* 6.12–15 with the detailed commentary by Manuwald (2007) ii. 784–803; further Steel (2008) 260–3. Cf. on the role of L. Antonius in 44 BCE (Cass. Dio 45.9.1–2 etc.) Roddaz (1988) 326–33.

Forum; and especially, at the very outset, the thirty-five *tribus*. Thus Cicero, striking a pose of heightened indignation, exclaims that this 'gangster' attempted to have himself celebrated as *patronus* of the whole *populus Romanus*, the 'conqueror and master of all nations' (*Phil.* 6.12).[3] We can almost see the orator pointing towards this monument with a theatrical gesture and using evocative, sensational rhetoric, the full range of which he was known to have mastered perfectly, and shouting to the audience: 'Look at this equestrian statue'—moreover, a 'golden' one—right there 'on the left side'. And then again: 'In the Forum, we see the statue of Lucius Antonius, just like that of Q. Marcius Tremulus, who defeated the Hernici, in front of the Temple of Castor. What incredible impudence!' (*Phil.* 6.13).[4]

This anecdote provides a kind of keyhole—it is one of the (not very many) instances which enable us to decipher and decode the complex network of monuments, architecture, and other visual signs; rituals and festivals; rhetoric and other media of discourse in the broadest sense of the concept as well as the 'web' of 'intermediality' in the shape of cross-references, interconnections, or 'intersignifications',[5] which constituted the specific Roman Republican memorial culture. By carefully making use of the approaches and methods of modern studies on (collective, 'social', or 'cultural') memory,[6] which are

[3] Cf. Cic. *Phil.* 7.16; Manuwald (2007) ii. 874–6. See also Lahusen (1983) 57, 91–2, 94; Bergemann (1990) 160 (L23), though Antonius' functions are misdated; E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 225, s.v. Equus: L. Antonius; Kardos (1997) 225–6; Sehlmeyer (1999) 245–7; Tanner (2000) 34; for the concrete background Nicolet (1985) 816–28 and *passim*; Roddaz (1988) 331–2. Cf. on this and other typical strategies of 'contional' rhetoric Hölkeskamp (1995/2004); Morstein-Marx (2004); and again Hölkeskamp (2011), (2013a), and (2013b).

[4] Cf. on this monument Hölscher (1978) 339–40; Lahusen (1983) 19, 47, 57–8, 69; Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 172; Richardson (1992) 145–6, s.v. Equus Tremuli; E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 229–30, s.v. Equus Q. Marci Tremuli; Sehlmeyer (1999) 57–60; Papini (2004) 186–8.

[5] The concept 'intersignification' was coined by Roller (2013), in order to conceptualize the 'dynamics of reference, inclusion, modification, and appropriation that mark this competition via monumental forms' (*sc.* the 'intense competition' between aristocrats who 'commemorated successes, especially as magistrates and generals, by paying for and erecting temples, porticoes, honorific statues, arches, and so on': 119). In particular, 'the relationship of intersignification . . . between the older and newer monuments produces, in each case, an implicit narrative that carries moral and political weight' (120)—the Equus Tremuli and its topographical and monumental context will be shown to be such a case.

[6] Apart from the fundamental and highly influential studies by Assmann (1988a), (2000/2006), and (1992/2011) on the concept of 'cultural memory' in the tradition of

focused on the culture-specific range of media and messages, frameworks of appropriation and interpretation, and in particular the interconnectedness of multilayered and multidimensional memorial practices, this seemingly trivial little story allows us a rare insight into the myth-historical depths of the permanent construction of the particular Roman-style collective *memoria*. Not only does this anecdote allow us to study the implicit rules of arguing with historical allusions in political rhetoric, we also get the invaluable chance of exploring the character and contents of Roman Republican 'monumental memory'[7] or 'reliquary knowledge', its 'advantages and defects',[8] and the particular interconnections between relics and memory, history and (hi)stories. We can even go a step further and try to reconstruct the underlying culture-specific kind of 'monu-mentality',[9] based on and fuelled by a specific, as it were, 'monument-' as well as 'performance-focused' sort of intermediality.[10] At last, this strategy should enable us better to understand and analyse in detail the particular kind of background knowledge about myth and history as well as of views of past and present, self and other which must have been shared, and

Maurice Halbwachs, there are several detailed analyses of the intellectual roots and history from Aby Warburg to Pierre Nora (and beyond), different theoretical and methodological approaches with full documentation and (critical) evaluation of relevant literature: Hutton (1988); Confino (1997); Olick and Robbins (1998); Klein (2000); and Cubitt (2007). Cf. also Reichardt (1996) and Wischermann (1996), who discuss the complex relation between *Erinnerung*, *Gedächtnis*, and 'history'; the lexicon-style reference work by Pethes and Ruchatz (2001); the more recent comprehensive surveys of theories, methods, and models by Kansteiner (2004), Sandl (2005), Bergenthum (2005), Erll (2005), and (2008); and the other relevant contributions in Wischermann, ed. (1996), Oesterle, ed. (2005), Erll and Nünning, eds (2008), all with ample bibliography.

7 Cf. Assmann (1988b) and now Morstein-Marx (2004) 92–107 etc.; Miano (2011), ch. 2 and *passim*.

8 Lowenthal (1985) 249–55; cf. 193–255 *passim*.

9 This (basically self-explaining) concept was coined by Hölscher (2014). Cf. on the theoretical basis, conceptual framework, and empirical applications of memory studies in Classics now Galinsky (2014) and his Introduction to this volume; Dally, Hölscher, Muth, and Schneider (2014); and Hölkeskamp (2014b). Cf. also the studies by Edwards (1996) 27–43 (on Rome as 'city of memories') and *passim*; Walter (2004) *passim* (on memory, different media of 'memorial culture', and historiography); Gowing (2005) 1–27 (on ancient concepts of *memoria/historia* etc.) and *passim*; Gallia (2012) 1–11 and *passim* (on the Republic in the 'memorial culture' of the Empire), with my review in *Gnomon* 85 (2013) 137–43; Flower (2006) 1–13, 51–5, and *passim* (on memory, oblivion, and 'memory sanctions').

10 Cf. on the concept of 'intermediality', e.g. Emich (2005) 35–40 and *passim*; Rajewsky (2002) 6–27 and (2005) 43–50; Dickhaut (2005).

continuously reinterpreted and renegotiated, between orators and representatives of the political elite and the notoriously elusive 'man in the Roman street' in the audience of a *contio*, who (to put it in Nicholas Horsfall's admirably pointed phrase) must have looked 'rather further than bread and circuses, bed, booze, and bawdy'.[11]

STATU(E)S MANIA: MONUMENTAL CONTEXT(S)

At the time of Cicero's speech, the raising of equestrian statues[12] had become an almost inflated form of honour and recognition, especially in the more valuable and conspicuous gilded variant set up in highly prominent places, regardless of whether they were commissioned by senatorial or public decree or simply by some important figure's personal initiative. The equestrian statue of the dictator Sulla—gilded and positioned intentionally at the most prominent place near the Rostra—was and remained a political issue.[13] In 48 BCE, after Caesar's victory at Pharsalus, it was removed as was the statue of Pompey. Then, in 44 BCE, it was set up again. For Cicero, it was this type of honour, especially the combination of gold-plating and provocatively prominent location, that was a symbol of the loss of *maiorum continentia* and the beginning of *huius saeculi insolentia* (*Phil.* 9.13).[14] Even the notorious Verres had commissioned such a monument in his honour near the Temple of Vulcan on the Campus Martius, another provocation that Cicero castigated as particularly audacious (Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.150, 154).[15]

Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio, consul in 52 BCE, likewise had a whole group of gilded equestrian statues set up on the Capitoline Hill that represented his natural ancestors, the Cornelii Scipiones.

[11] Horsfall (1996) 117; cf. also, in more detail, Horsfall (2003); Morstein-Marx (2004), ch. 3, as well as the important contributions on media and contents of 'popular memory' by Wiseman (1998) and now (2014), with my rejoinder Hölkeskamp (2014b).

[12] Cf. Lahusen (1983) 56–61; Bergemann (1990) *passim*.

[13] Cf. the detailed study by Stein-Hölkeskamp, Ch. 7 in this volume.

[14] Cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.97; Vell. Pat. 2.61.3; Suet. *Iul.* 75.4; Cass. Dio 42.18.2; 43.49.1. Cf. Richardson (1992) 371, s.v. Statuae Sullae; E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 227–8, s.v. Equus: L. Cornelius Sulla; Sehlmeyer (1999) 204–9,; 231–4, with further references, to which add Till (2003) 158–64, 173–5; Hölscher (2004) 93–4.

[15] Cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.145; 167–8; Sehlmeyer (1999) 213–15, with further references.

This undoubtedly splendid and ostentatious monument set yet another accent: this *turma inauratarum equestrium* plainly alluded to the famous equestrian group, commissioned by Alexander himself from Lysippus. It consisted of no fewer than twenty-four of Alexander's *hetairoi* killed in combat at the battle of the Granicus, with Alexander standing in their midst. Q. Caecilius Metellus 'Macedonicus', who was Metellus Scipio's paternal great-uncle as well as, through his grandmother Metella, his great-grandfather, had brought this monument as spoils to Rome to be installed as a *maximum ornamentum* in the Porticus Metelli on the southern Campus Martius (Vell. Pat. 1.11.3–4; Plin. *HN* 34.64).[16] As was known at least to insiders, there were problems with the Scipiones' complicated genealogy: the statue of their illustrious ancestor P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, known as the younger Africanus, in the Capitoline group appears to have been erected on a pedestal which carried an inscription referring to Scipio Nasica Serapio and his *cursus honorum* and containing some incorrect data to boot. As a result, Cicero, a *novus homo* without any presentable pedigree, could mock this famous noble's lack of knowledge of family history with a typical mixture of envy and condescension (*Att.* 6.1.17–18).[17] Not long after, statues of the dictator Caesar were positioned almost everywhere throughout public places: in the old Forum near the Rostra, on the Capitoline Hill, in the new Forum Julium, and in a number of temples (Plin. *HN* 34.18; Vell. Pat. 2.61.3; Cass. Dio 43.45.3–4).[18] Further, and most recently, at the beginning of January 43 BCE, the Senate had decreed an equestrian statue for Octavian, who was not even 20 years old. Of course it was gilded—by now that had become a tradition. The decree was moved by the young man's stepfather L. Marcius Philippus, who will have been keenly aware of the traditional importance of such an honour for reasons to which I will return (Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.15.7; Vell. Pat. 2.61.3; App. *B Civ.* 3.51).[19]

[16] Cf. Plut. *Alex.* 16.15–16; Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.4; van Ooteghem (1967) 60–2; Kardos (1997) 201–3; Schmuhl (2008) 104–5.

[17] Cf. E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 230, s.v. Equus: Metelli (turma equestrium); Sehlmeyer (1999) 222–4.

[18] Cf. Weinstock (1971) 40–2, 169, 186–8; Lahusen (1983) 15, 19, 22, 35, 51–2, 56–7, 94, etc.; E. Papi, *LTUR* iv (1999) 362, s.v. Statua: C. Iulius Caesaris; J. Aronen, *LTUR* iv (1999) 362–3, s.v. Statua loricata divi Iulii; Sehlmeyer (1999) 227–31; Till (2003) 165–72.

[19] Cf. Bergemann (1990) 161–3 (L25); E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 230–1, s.v. Equus: Octavianus; Sehlmeyer (1999) 249–51, all with further references.

All of this, of course, Cicero knew well enough, and his audience also had all of these monuments literally before their eyes, especially during speeches right there in the Forum. Yet, he does not mention these statues, which were of a similar type, and he prudently even omits that he himself had recently petitioned, successfully, in the Senate for the same honour for M. Aemilius Lepidus. It turned out to be a rather premature initiative, however, as a few months later the future triumvir Lepidus broke with the Senate, came over to Antony's side, and was declared *hostis publicus*—an act that led to the removal of the statue, ironically again at the request of Cicero (Cic. *Phil.* 5.40–1 and 13.9 on the one hand; Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.15.9 and Cass. Dio 46.51.4 on the other).[20]

The reason Cicero did not want to engage with references or comparisons to these honours was not just the quasi-inflationary surge of equestrian statues of the younger 'generation', which effectively relativized the import of each individual monument. That would have been true of the statue of the young Antonius, too, and Cicero's dramatic and indignant condemnation of such honours as unprecedented arrogance would therefore have missed the desired effect. Nor is Cicero's silence due to the fact that the erection of statues of men like Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar repeatedly became politically controversial for various reasons during these turbulent times when the constellations of power changed rapidly. The excessive and provocative claims that were highlighted by such honours certainly could have been an argument to be made against Antonius and his equestrian statue. In general, the strategies of self-representation and self-aggrandizement by these latter-day dynasts and their wilful penchant for 'provocation and transgression'[21] were a touchy and controversial issue. Their most palpable manifestation yet was the dictator Caesar's radical and comprehensive interventions in the traditional configuration of the public spaces of the Forum Romanum and the Comitium.[22]

Cicero did not need to articulate this background: these politics of symbolism, the meaning and message of erecting equestrian (and

[20] Cf. E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 224, s.v. Equus: M. Aemilius Lepidus.

[21] Cf. for this *habitus* and the problematic relation of personal service and accomplishment on the one hand and (claims to) acknowledgement, ambition, and power on the other ('sensible Balance von Verdienst und Macht') now Hölscher (2004) and (2009).

[22] Cf. Kolb (2002) 261–4 and, most recently, Freyberger (2009) 55–7.

other honorific) statues and systematically positioning them in highly prominent places was immediately and universally understood.[23] Their erection, and the almost ritual removal of them,[24] was part and parcel of current and public background knowledge, shared by the orator and common man in the audience alike. Not only was this *plebs* the addressee of this policy, but it was also the *plebs* that had now and then literally pushed monuments off their bases—like those of Sulla and Pompey, mentioned above (Suet. *Iul.* 75.4; Cass. Dio 42.18.2).

THE STATUE OF TREMULUS: LOCATION, MEMORY, AND MORE MONUMENTAL CONTEXT(S)

Against this backdrop it was obviously much more effective to cite a monument that was of similar type, but by virtue of its age was not tainted by the present and its excesses of unbridled ambition and arrogance. At the same time this ancient equestrian statue refers back to a glorious story that had the advantage of being removed from current controversies. The victory over the Hernici, which Cicero mentions only briefly, dated back hundreds of years. The Marcius Tremulus who had defeated the Hernici and had therefore been honoured with a triumph and his famous monument, had achieved all this during his first consulship in 306 BCE.[25] Cicero—and that was important for him in this concrete context—touches upon a venerable and therefore memorable episode as a milestone on the long road of the *populus Romanus* towards becoming master of all peoples, a *populus* as whose patron young Lucius Antonius thought he could appoint himself, even though he did not have any comparable achievement for this *populus* and the *res publica* to his credit. It was this *populus Romanus* that was addressed as *Quirites* by the orator, who thus rhetorically evoked a unique 'imagined community' of all

[23] On these different sites and spaces for putting up monuments see Lahusen (1983) 12–13 and 14–18 (Comitium and Rostra); 18–22 (Forum); 7–12 (Capitoline Hill), as well as Tanner (2000) 25–30; Miano (2011); Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 158–63; (2006) 488–90 for the 'hierarchy' of the prominence.

[24] On such practices, see, e.g. Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.158–64.

[25] He was consul II in 288 BCE: Broughton (1951–2) i. 165-6; 185; F. Münzer, *RE* 14/2 (1930) 1596–7, s.v. Marcius 106 (Tremulus).

Romans, with its *gloria* and *maiestas* implicitly invoked as the undisputed foundation of its collective identity,[26] and the common man was supposed to feel full membership in this community privileged by fate and the gods.

An additional aspect comes into play that has a central role in the physical context of the communicative situation at a *contio* in the Forum and in the rhetorical construction of an extensive consensus between the orator and the audience on the basis of their shared 'Romanness':[27] the statue of Tremulus, which stood in front of the Temple of Castor and Pollux (i.e. directly in the Forum), was highly visible in every respect, and the participants in this *contio* were certainly able to see it. From the orator's perspective, the monument stood about 120 metres away, in fact almost on a central axis towards the other end of the assembly place, so that Cicero could theatrically point to it. We should bear in mind that he was giving his speech from the new Rostra Caesaris, which had been constructed the year before and by now had replaced the traditional Rostra at the Comitium as the main speaking platform. By the way, it is also significant that the location of the new Rostra is where the equestrian statues of Sulla and Pompey had possibly been reinstalled (Cass. Dio 43.49.1).[28]

This position of Tremulus' monument—*in foro, ante (templum) Castoris*—therefore, was no less prominent than the *oculatissimus locus* of the (old and new) Rostra (Plin. *HN* 34.24).[29] In addition, the Temple of Castor was regarded as *celeberrimus clarissimusque locus* because *in oculis cotidianoque aspectu populi Romani positum est* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.129,).[30] It is worth noting that this location, given prominence by its immediate visibility, was not only emphasized by Cicero within this specific context of a *contio*, but was also repeated in all later references and discussions. Prominent examples are Livy's description of the historical occasion of its construction and Pliny's

[26] On the concept and content of the 'imagined community' cf. Dugan (2009) 180–1, following Habinek (1998) 44–5. Cf. now Gildenhard (2011) 126–40; Hölkeskamp (1995/2004) 242–54 and (2013b).

[27] Cf. the important study by Morstein-Marx (2004), ch. 6 and *passim*, and now Hölkeskamp (2013a) and (2013b).

[28] Cf. Coarelli (1985b) 237–9; 310–11, further Richardson (1992) 336–7, s.v. Rostra Caesaris; Kolb (2002) 262–3.

[29] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.87.3; Cic. *Sest.* 83. Cf. for the function and the symbolic meaning of the (Republican) Rostra now Morstein-Marx (2004) 43–57.

[30] Cf. Cic. *Sest.* 83 with Kardos (1997) 216–19.

list of honorary statues of every kind that had been raised in public and were still known to him.[31] The Temple of the Dioscuri was one of the oldest temples in the Forum. At least since 117 BCE, the year of its generous renovation by L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus, this temple was one of the most impressive buildings of its kind due to its high podium.[32] Senate meetings had taken place in the temple, and a law of the late second century BCE stipulated that all important office holders were required to take their oath of office from the podium, 'in the light of day and facing the forum'.[33] As such, the steps served as an orator's platform and almost as 'second Rostra' in public assemblies as well, which on occasion could be quite lively in times of political conflicts in the late Republic.[34] In addition, the *equites* in their ritual review paraded past the censors, who, from their chairs on the platform of the temple, used to carry out this part of their official duties. This custom was renewed by Augustus and is another part of the web of the (hi)stories that still needs to be disentangled (Suet. *Aug*. 38.3).[35]

On the basis of this central position alone, the monument was embedded in the complex symbolic web of the politico-religious topography of the *urbs Roma*, which, at the same time, served as a 'landscape of memory' and was meant to preserve the mythical and historical foundation of the collective identity of the *gens togata* through *lieux de gloire*,[36] honorific statues, and memorials of all kinds. Using the concepts of Clifford Geertz, one could speak of a 'web of significance' that was woven with particular density in the area of the Forum

[31] Livy 9.43.23 explicitly states that this *statua equestris in foro* and *ante templum Castoris posita est*. In Plin. *HN* 34.23, the location is equally emphasized: *et ante aedem Castorum fuit Q. Marci Tremuli equestris togata*.

[32] Cf. Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) 88–90, with the previous literature; Nielsen (1992) with full discussion of archaeological data; Richardson (1992) 74–5, s.v. Castor Aedes; Kolb (2002) 247; Morstein-Marx (2004) 58, and recently von Hesberg (2005) 80–5; Stamper (2005) 37–8, 56–7.

[33] Senate meetings: Cic. *Verr*. 2.1.129, cf. Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) 28–9, 82–3 etc.; oath: *Lex Latina tabulae Bantinae*, l. 17:—*pro ae]de Castoris palam luci in forum versus* etc. (J. S. Richardson in Crawford (1996), no. 7, pp. 193–208); Livy 31.50.7. Cf. generally Kolb (2002) 207–8; Morstein-Marx (2004) 57–9.

[34] See, e.g. Cic. *Sest*. 34, 79; *Pis*. 23; *Mil*. 91; *Phil*. 3.27; 5.21; Plut. *Sulla* 8.3; 33.4; Fest. 362L, s.v. Requeapse; App. *B Civ*. 3.41–2. Cf. I. Nielsen, *LTUR* i (1993) 242–5, s.v. Castor, aedes, templum, esp. 242, with further references; Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) 83–4; 194 etc.

[35] Cf. S. Weinstock, *RE* 6A/2 (1937) 2178–87, s.v. transvectio equitum, esp. 2182–4; Scullard (1981) 164–5; 232–3, cf. 66–7; Sihvola (1989) 88–90.

[36] Kardos (1997) pt 3 (163–296); Miano (2011) *passim*.



Figure 6.1 The Forum Romanum in 44 BCE.
Patterson (1992) 191, fig. 1 (modified); by permission of Cambridge University Press.

Romanum.[37] Neither was it a coincidence that this was the location of an important section of the traditional triumphal route (see Figure 7.1 in this volume), as well as the *transvectio equitum*. Before the reconfiguration of the Forum Romanum by Augustus, the course of the Via Sacra originally followed the Forum's central axis, starting at the south-east entrance at the Regia, continuing to the temples of Vesta and the Dioscuri across the esplanade, turning diagonally to the *oculatissimus locus* near the old Rostra (see Figure 6.1), to the Comitium and the Curia Hostilia (which had disappeared in 43 BCE) and to the beginning of the Clivus Capitolinus at the north-west corner of the Forum.[38]

[37] The term according to Geertz (1973) 5. Cf. the fundamental contributions by Hölscher (1978), (1980), (1984), (1990), (2001), and (2014). See also, e.g. Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 157–66, 170–3, and *passim*; Vasaly (1993) 60–75 etc.; Flower (1996) 70–9; Hölkeskamp (1996/2004) 173–6, and (2001/2004), (2005), and (2006); Kardos (1997) 215–64; Morstein-Marx (2004) 92–107.

[38] See now the 'reading' of the Forum topography by Muth (2009) 343–4 and (2012) and (2014).

The ending of this axis itself was marked by similar 'memorial' functions due to the particular density of monuments of similar kind and antiquity: near the (older) Rostra, the equestrian statues of the consuls of 338 BCE and the victors in the Latin war, L. Furius Camillus and C. Maenius, had been standing for centuries. The latter had the captured prows affixed to the platform—hence the name Rostra—and the Columna Maenia nearby had also been named after him.[39] Needless to say, the clearly visible *columna rostrata* for the consul Duilius, who in 260 BCE had won the naval battle against the Carthaginians and, therefore, been honoured with the first *triumphus navalis*, was decorated with similarly evocative pieces of booty (Plin. *HN* 34.20).[40] A few years later, another monument of this particular genre appeared on the Capitol: the *columna rostrata* of M. Aemilius Paullus, consul 255 BCE (Plin. *HN* 34.20 and Livy 42.20.1).[41] At the east end of the Forum, the Via Sacra was spanned by the Fornix Fabianus (built in 121 BCE), an arch that anticipated the triumphal arches of a later time and stood in relation, as a sort of counterpoint, to an existing monument, namely the spectacular *fornix* of Scipio Africanus, which had been erected in 190 BCE at the end of the Clivus Capitolinus (and the triumphal route) (Livy 37.3.7).[42] One can read this spectacular monument—for no fewer than seven gilded statues (perhaps portraits of Africanus and his ancestors), two gilded horse statues, and two basins in marble belonged to it—as a powerful response to Ennius' rhetorical question in his panegyric for Scipio: 'How great a statue will the *populus Romanus* set up? How great a column that might speak of your deeds?' (*quantam statuam statuet populus Romanus* | *quantam*

[39] Livy 8.13.9 (with Oakley (1998) 533–5); Plin. *HN* 34.20; Eutr. 2.7.3. Cf. Hölscher (1978) 338–40; (1990) 74–6; Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 171–2; Bergemann (1990) 156 (L9); E. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 229, s.v. Equus: C. Maenius; F. Coarelli, *LTUR* iv (1999) 212–14, s.v. Rostra (età repubblicana); Sehlmeyer (1999) 48–57; Schmuhl (2008) 74–8. Cf. on the Columna Maenia (*in vicinia fori et iuxta comitium*: Schol.Bob. *Sest.* 124 (p. 137 Stangl); Cic. *Sest.* 124) Hölscher (1978) 338–9, cf. however Schmuhl (2008) 77–8.

[40] Cf. L. Chioffi, *LTUR* i (1993) 309, s.v. Columna rostrata C. Duillii (Forum); Sehlmeyer (1999) 117–19; Kondratieff (2004); Schmuhl (2008) 84–7.

[41] Cf. D. Palombi, *LTUR* i (1993) 307–8, s.v. Columna rostrata M. Aemilii Paulli; Sehlmeyer (1999) 117–20; Kondratieff (2004); Schmuhl (2008) 87–8.

[42] Cf. L. Chioffi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 264–6, s.v. Fornix Fabianus; F. Coarelli, *LTUR* ii (1995) 266–7, s.v. Fornix Scipionis; Coarelli (1972/1996) 208; Hölscher (1990) 80; Schmuhl (2008) 110–13.

columnam quae res tuas gestas loquatur?)[43] The wording of this passages suggests outright that Ennius had monuments such as the Columna Maenia or even equestrian statues like the Equus Tremuli in his mind, if not literally before his eyes. Against this background, one can also speculate whether or not more statues of the great Africanus could have been set up at this time—or maybe a little later—in the *oculatissimi loci* mentioned earlier, namely *in comitio*, *in rostris*, *in curia*, *in Capitolio*, and, not least, *in cella Iovis* (Livy 38.56.12).[44]

On all of these monuments the honoured men must have been explicitly mentioned by name and thus identified. This is not only true for the Columna Duilia, but also for the many statues of *togati* and, of course, for the equestrian statues as well.[45] The bases of these monuments carried *tituli*: these inscriptions at least mentioned rank and *res gestae* of the person represented, his *honores* and triumphs—in both the specific and the general sense of the concepts. Sometimes, the *tituli* were extensive, as the inscription on the *columna rostrata* of Duilius.[46] However, normally only the basic facts were given, namely magistracies, priesthoods, and triumphs. Still, even if there was no detail and, especially, 'nothing anecdotal' that was being conveyed, sufficient details were regularly given that could serve as a springboard for storytelling and memory.[47] A particularly interesting example is the *tituli* on the Fornix Fabianus, which included the statues of L. Aemilius Paullus and P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus: *L. Aem[il]ius L.f. Paullus/co[s. II] cens. augur/tr[i]umphavit ter* and *P. Cornelius Paulli f. Scipio/Africanus cos. II cens./augur triumphavit II*.[48] The former had presented a son for adoption into the *gens*

[43] *Op. inc*. 3–4 Skutsch (with commentary p. 753) = *Var*. 1–2 Vahlen. Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 161–2; Tanner (2000) 28–9.

[44] Cf. Val. Max. 8.15.1–2; App. *Hisp*. 89. Thereafter, an *imago* (*in cella Iovis optimi maximi posita*) has been shown in the *pompae funebres Cornelii*, and for purposes of its 'collection', even the usual route of the procession ought to have been modified: cf. Flower (1996) 48–52; Weinstock (1971) 35–6, 40–1.

[45] Cf. Witzmann (2000) 68–77, but also Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 157–8. See generally, also for the following, Flower (1996) 159–84.

[46] *CIL* $i^2$2, 25 = vi 1300 (cf. vi 8, 3, 1300 Add.) = *ILLRP* 319 etc. The preserved text is a modernized version of the original inscription, which probably dates back to the Augustan Age; cf. Sehlmeyer (1999) 117–19; Witzmann (2000) 70–1; Kondratieff (2004) 10–12.

[47] Witzmann (2000) 72.

[48] *CIL* $i^2$2, 763 = *ILLRP* 392b and c. Cf. Coarelli (1972/1996) 208, with further references.

Fabia, namely the brother of Scipio Aemilianus, Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, consul 145 BCE and dedicator of the *fornix*.

Such a *titulus* must also have been on the base of the statue of Tremulus, perhaps stating the grounds for the tribute to the man 'who conquered the Samnites twice and, after the conquest of Anagnia, liberated the people from the tribute' (*qui bis Samnites devicerat captaque Anagnia populum stipendio liberaverat*, Plin. *HN* 34.23).[49] This phrasing does not only have the ring of a simple quotation of a *titulus*, but is also reminiscent of the famous *elogia* in the tomb of the Cornelii Scipiones at the Porta Capena. In the earliest of them, L. Cornelius Cn. f. Scipio Barbatus, consul in 298 BCE, is recalled as one 'who was consul, censor, aedile with you, [who] captured Taurasia, Cisauna in Samnium, [and who] subdued all of Lucania and marched off hostages' (*consol censor aidilis quei fuit apud vos | Taurasia Cisauna Samnio cepit | subigit omne Loucana opsidesque abdoucit*). The other *elogium* refers to his son, consul in 259 and censor in 258 BCE, who was also 'consul, censor, and aedile . . . here with you'. Moreover, 'he captured Corsica and the town Aleria and justly donated a temple to the Tempestates' (*consol censor aidilis hic fuet a[pud vos | hec cepit Corsica Aleriaque urbe | dedet Tempestatebus aide mereto*).[50] Certainly, the demonstrative expression *apud vos*, which not only addresses a fictive public, namely the *populus Romanus* at large, who had conferred these *honores* upon father and son, but also suggests that the wording derives from the *tituli honorarii* on statues that were probably erected in the public space.

MEMORY UPDATED—OR, THE USES OF RITUAL AND RHETORIC

In this domain, a reservoir of memory was always available and could be continuously updated through a truly 'commemorative ceremony', which could be just as spectacular as the increasingly opulent

[49] Cf. Oakley (2005) 567 (ad Livy 9.43.22).

[50] Kruschwitz (2002) nos. 2 and 3 (pp. 33–57 and 58–70, with references and detailed commentary). Cf. on the context Coarelli (1972/1996).

triumphs: the *pompa funebris*.[51] Every time members of the great *gentes*, such as the Cornelii, Fabii, and Caecilii Metelli, were carried to their graves, their family's entire symbolic capital (in these cases accumulated over generations) would regularly be made visual and thus renewed in the form of a long parade of ancestors, symbolically made present by persons carrying their *imagines* and dressed in the garb of the highest *honos* which they had achieved in life. Those ancestors who had celebrated triumphs must have attracted particular attention because the persons representing them would wear the purple and embroidered *toga picta*. At the height of such a carefully choreographed ceremony, the *honores*, actions, and virtues not only of the deceased himself, but also of all the ancestors symbolically present in the procession were evoked in the *laudatio funebris*, a formal speech significantly delivered from the Rostra. Polybius aptly described this scenery and its meanings (6.54.1–2):

> When the orator has finished speaking about the deceased, he recounts the successes and exploits of the rest whose images are present, beginning from the most ancient. By this means, by the constant renewal of the good report of virtuous men, the celebrity of those who performed noble deeds is rendered immortal, while at the same time the fame of those who did great service to their fatherland becomes known to the people and a heritage for future generations.[52]

One can imagine how extravagant and complex a recital the *laudatio funebris* for Scipio Aemilianus in 129 BCE must have been, because in that ceremony, the accumulated symbolic capital of his natural ancestors, the Aemilii Paulli, was combined with that of his even more prominent adoptive family, the Cornelii Scipiones.[53]

There was also another occasion, which was almost equally suitable for the rhetorical activation of this store of memories: the speech usually given by the newly elected consul in the first *contio* after taking office. In that speech, the consul both gave thanks for the *honos maximus* bestowed upon him through the *beneficium* of the

[51] Flower (1996) 91–127; Flaig (2003) 49–68, as well as recently Hölkeskamp (2008) 104–7, 109–10, 112–20, all with further references. Cf. Connerton (1989), ch. 2 and *passim*, on the concept of 'commemorative ceremonies' as a basis of 'social memory'; Cubitt (2007) 216–22.

[52] Trans. W. Paton, rev. F. W. Walbank, C. Habicht, modified. Cf. Flower (1996) 128–58, and recently Montanari (2009); Hölkeskamp (1995/2004) 219–20, 224–5, 237–9 and (2011) 22–6; Covino (2011).

[53] Malcovati, *ORF*[4] 20 frg 22–3 and 49.

populus Romanus and drew attention—in the very same manner as in the *laudatio funebris*—to the fame and glory which his family had achieved through the exploits of famous ancestors.[54] Imagine again what the Metellus Scipio mentioned above might have made of this opportunity when, in the second half of the turbulent year of 52 BCE, he was finally able to take second place next to (or rather under) his son-in-law Pompey.[55]

As for the Marcii, they also were able to mobilize a rich tradition on such occasions by the time of the late Republic. In this respect it was of little importance how distantly (and whether at all) the famous branches of the Marcii Rutili and Censorini, Philippi, Figuli, and Reges were related to each other, or who was descended from whom ages ago or whether or not they could trace their line directly to Tremulus (see Figure 6.2).[56] It would not have mattered to the prospective orator that their symbolic capital came from events, achievements, and honours which were separated by long periods of relative unimportance. Nevertheless, due to their seventeen consuls, seven censors, one Rex Sacrorum, and a variety of positions in the most important religious colleges, the Marcii could claim to be ranked in the highest echelon, even if they could not list more than three triumphs in the somewhat distant past: in 306, 281, and 117 BCE. Therefore, they depended all the more on making the most of their available resources, and Tremulus' triumph and honour were undoubtedly included.

Consequently, the *laudationes funebres* and the inaugural speeches of the Marcii will regularly have referred to Marcius Tremulus, and in particular to his *res gestae*, his triumph, and, of course, his special honour of an equestrian statue. Further, their enumeration was probably not limited to the *laudationes* for the descendants of the Philippi whose line could be traced back to the consul of 306 and 288 BCE, but also to those of the Censorini and the Reges.[57] What mattered for such a pedigree and was vital within the meritocratic

[54] Cf. Morstein-Marx (2004) 81 on Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2, 1; Flower (1996) 18–19, 154–7, 276; Hölkeskamp (2011) 17–22.

[55] See on his family background and career until 52 van Ooteghem (1967) 298–307.

[56] F. Münzer, *RE* 14/2 (1930) 1535–7, s.v. Marcius; 1539 (stemma), differently Itgenshorst 2005, stemma 34: Marcii Tremuli/Philippi/Reges.

[57] The first man bearing the *cognomen*—Q. Marcius Q.f. Q.n. Philippus, Consul 281 and probably Censor 269 (Broughton (1951–2) i. 190, 199)—probably was the son of Q. Marcius Q.f. Q.n. Tremulus: van Ooteghem (1961) 41 (stemma); 45–7; F. Münzer, *RE* 14/2 (1930) 1572–3, s.v. Marcius 78.



Figure 6.2a–c The different branches of the Marcii (family relations partly hypothetical): (a) Marcii Censorini; (b) Marcii Philippi and Figuli; (c) Marcii Reges.
By the author.

hierarchy of the senatorial aristocracy was not just the claim to mythical forebears, but the countable symbolic capital in the form of consulships, triumphs, and censorships. Against this background, it is by no means unlikely that, in the *laudatio funebris* for his aunt Julia, Caesar with some pride observed that, on the one hand, her (and his) family 'on her father's side was akin to the immortal gods' (the Iulii claimed descent from Aphrodite/Venus) and, on the other hand, 'descended on her mother's side from the kings, and because the Marcii Reges were descended from Ancus Marcius, by which family name her mother was known'.[58] Of necessity, he had to go

[58] Malcovati, *ORF*[4] 121 frg. 28–9; Suet. *Iul.* 6.1; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 5.



Figure 6.2a–c Continued

out of his way to dwell on the legendary genealogies, because the recent record of the Iulii was less than impressive, and for the very same reason, he may also have gone on to recite the 'Republican' record of her (and his) cognatic forebears, namely the Marcii (not only Reges, but also Philippi and Censorini).

At the same time, if the Marcii Philippi and Censorini could equally trace themselves to the legendary fourth king, then it was important for the Marcii Reges to incorporate Tremulus into their 'Republican' family tree because of his *res gestae* and the honours he had received. After all, he was an undoubtedly Republican respectable ancestor of consular rank and triumphal laurels, and therefore, with respect to his relative 'value' for the collective familial symbolic capital, particularly worthy and important—even more so as his statue in a prominent place not only made him permanently present and visible, but could also be directly referred to in the *laudationes* of the Marcii (as well as their agnatic and cognatic kin), delivered from the Rostra on the opposite side of the Forum.

In many more or less prominent families, it was a popular and largely accepted practice to take some liberties when it came to playing up memories. In the eyes of the *novus homo* Cicero, who could not afford to do such a thing, this had gone overboard, especially in the *laudationes mortuorum*. For the great *gentes* that ceremony had a single objective: *ad illustrandam nobilitatem suam*. Cicero, therefore, considered the practice to be responsible for the distortion of Rome's history. For it was inundated with *falsi triumphi*, *plures consulatus*, and *genera falsa*, including fictitious *transitiones ad plebem*. Overall, it was a potent mix of what is known in current memory scholarship as 'invented traditions'[59] and 'intentional history' or perhaps rather '(hi)stories', construed to underpin claims to superiority and high status, respect and reverence, and thus (often indirectly) to the legitimate right to exert authority and power.[60] By those means, even men of less distinguished or even obscure descent could, as it were, adopt ancient patrician ancestors for themselves, just as if Cicero would have claimed to be descended from Manius

[59] Hobsbawm (1983). Cf. also the empirical application of this concept in the case studies in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) (1983).

[60] Gehrke (1994), (2001), and (2004). Cf. also the contributions in Melville and Rehberg (eds) (2004) and Hölkeskamp (2009) 1–2, 23–36, on political, 'charter', and other foundation myths as (hi)stories, with further references.

Tullius, 'who was a patrician and consul in the tenth year after the banishment of the kings' (*Brut*. 62).[61] According to Livy, the same (mal)practice was true for the *tituli* of *imagines*, the ancestors' masks, which were kept in the atriums of the houses of the elite and were carried along in each *pompa funebris* in the procession of the symbolically present ancestors. In doing so, the families claimed—*fallente mendacio*, as it is called– the 'fame of *res gestae* and *honores*', and this practice was regarded as a main cause of confusion, not only 'with respect to the actions of single men', but also regarding the 'public monuments to the events' (Livy 8.40.4).[62] In another context, this judgement is confirmed indirectly by the already-mentioned *elogium* of Scipio Barbatus, whose deeds 'in Samnium' probably were not as spectacular as they are made out to be.[63] In addition, the previously quoted *titulus* beneath the portrait statue of Aemilius Paullus on the Fornix Fabianus credits the victor of Pydna with a third triumph even though he most probably celebrated only two.[64]

In the more widely-spread medium of coinage, even greater liberties were taken, and the multilayered ambiguous images and complex combinations of motifs and symbols in the coinage of the late Republic document this trend.[65] It was common practice for the *tresviri monetales* in charge of issuing coinage, mostly young men at the beginning of their careers, not only to adopt familial, symbolic capital in a strict sense, but also to include well-known achievements of their ancestors from other branches of their *gens* in their own account and even to suggest bold, even fantastical genealogical combinations, which did not have any place in the Republican family tree (e.g. not in the official *imagines* of the ancestors in the atrium and *mutatis mutandis* in the *pompa funebris*), such as the descent of the *gens* from mythical characters, gods, demigods, and heroes of the sort that

[61] Cf. on legendary genealogies Wiseman (1974/1987) and Hölkeskamp (1999/2004).

[62] Cf. Oakley (1997) 28–32.

[63] Cf., e.g. Salmon (1967) 260–1 with n. 5 (260).

[64] Cf. Witzmann (2000) 72 with n. 45. Cf. Broughton (1951–2) i. 362 (on the proconsulate of Aemilius Paullus in 189 BCE, with references): the tradition that knows of a triumph is 'at best doubtful': Itgenshorst (2005) no.177a.

[65] Hölscher (1980), (1982), and (1984) and already Alföldi (1956); Morstein-Marx (2004) 82–91, as well as the evidence in Hollstein (1993). See for the linking of coinage with other media of *memoria* also Meadows and Williams (2001) 40–9 and *passim*; Boschung (2008) 189–96.

Figure 6.3. Denarius of L. Marcius Censorinus, 82 BCE: reverse.
RRC i, no. 363/1a–d; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

young Caesar chose to expand on. The Marcii also subscribed to several, almost exotic legends of this kind,[66] which, as it were, supplemented and framed their (by no means unimpressive) Republican record including Tremulus and his statue. This particular myth-historical mix was reflected in the designs which the *monetales* from the family chose for their coinage.

In such a manner, (at least) the branch of Censorini traced themselves back to that Marsyas, who in Rome and throughout Italy was known as Phrygian Silenus and as challenger of Apollo (this contest appears on a denarius of L. Marcius Censorinus from the year 82 BCE; see Figure 6.3).

Marsyas was also considered as a king well versed in the art of divination whose emissaries had brought the *disciplina auguralis* to Italy.[67] Moreover, a relationship, and a genealogical one in particular, could easily be construed with the *fratres Marcii*, who were *nobili loco nati* and authorities on *divinatio*, and also with the predictions of the so-called *carmina Marciana*, on whose agency the *ludi Apollinares* were founded in the Second Punic War (Cic. *Div*. 1.89; Livy

[66] Cf. Wiseman (1974/1987) 208–9; Hölkeskamp (1999/2004) 207–8; and now Farney (2007) 22–5, 115–21 with further literature.

[67] Cn. Gellius, *FRH* 10 F 6 (= frg. 7 Peter = *FRHist.* 14 F 14, with commentary); Serv. *Aen*. 3.359; A. Burckhardt, *RE* 14/2 (1986–95), s.v. Marsyas.

Figure 6.4. Denarius of C. Marcius Censorinus, 88 BCE, obverse and reverse. *RRC* i, no. 346/1; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

25.12.2–15).[68] This connection could be suggested, once more, by the designs on the coins (though more or less indirectly): the head of Apollo on the obverse and visual references to the horse races, which were a typical part of these games, on the reverse are to be read as a cross-reference (see Figure 6.4).[69]

The reference to the ambivalent Marsyas may have been created much earlier. It is quite possible that the erection of the statue of Marsyas (again unequivocally as Silenus with wineskin) on the Comitium near the Rostra goes back to the Marcius (Censorinus) who was consul in 310 BCE and twice censor thereafter (294 and 265).[70]

Primarily, however, all branches of the Marcii (and certainly not only the Reges) clearly, and in a matter-of-fact way, traced themselves back to the legendary king Ancus Marcius, who himself was considered a grandson of the pious Numa Pompilius. Both kings appear on a denarius of C. Marcius Censorinus from the year 88 BCE in the form of a highly suggestive double portrait (see Figure 6.5).[71]

Several decades later, in 56 BCE, on the obverse of the coinage of a certain Philippus, one finds Ancus Marcius again, alone this time, wearing a crown and with a *lituus* behind him. In this way, the moneyer, who can probably be identified as L. Marcius Philippus, son of the consul of the same name in that year and himself *consul suffectus* in 38 BCE, alludes to the augurate of his like-named

[68] Cf. Cic. *Div*. 1.115; 2.113; Macrob. *Sat*. 1.17.25, 27–9; van Ooteghem (1961) 35–9.

[69] Cf. Böhm (1997) 135–6, 139.

[70] F. Coarelli, *LTUR* iv (1999) 364–5, s.v. Statua: Marsyas; Richardson (1992) 370–1, s.v. Statua Marsyae, and now the detailed study by Miano (2011), ch. 5.

[71] Cf. *RRC* i, no. 346; F. Münzer, *RE* 14/2 (1930) 1543, s.v. Marcius (9) Ancus Marcius; van Ooteghem (1961) 7–11; Papini (2004) 157–9; Farney (2007) 264.

Figure 6.5. Denarius of C. Marcius Censorinus, 88 BCE, obverse.
RRC i, no. 346/1a-i; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

Figure 6.6. Denarius of (L. Marcius) Philippus, 56 BCE, obverse and reverse.
RRC i, no. 425/1; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

grandfather, who was consul in 91 BCE and censor in 86 BCE (see Figure 6.6).[72]

Apart from the general reference to the long family history of the Marcii this is only one element of a combination of allusions to totally unconnected *res gestae* of various kinds and from widely separated periods of time. The reverse of the same coin depicts an aqueduct with its typical arches and an unmistakable identification in the inscription AQVA M(A)R(CIA). This famous project was built in the late 140s, though by a Marcius from another family, namely Q. Marcius Rex, *praetor urbanus* in 144 BCE. As if this were not enough, atop the aqueduct sits an equestrian statue, which can be safely assumed to represent a Marcius. And as he is not dressed in military garb but in a *toga*, and as this characteristic was explicitly

[72] *RRC* i, no.425/1 (p. 449); Farney (2007) 272. Cf. also Ov. *Fast*. 6.801–4, where this descent is clearly attributed to his daughter Marcia (*sacrifico deductum nomen ab Anco*). Cf. also Krumme (1995) 82, 85, 173, 174, 252 (14/1), and 253–4 (17/1), with further references; Boschung (2008) 193–5.

attested for the statue of Tremulus, it is more than likely that this image was meant to represent the well-known monument of Tremulus in front of the Temple of Castor (Plin. *HN* 34.23).[73] The man and the signal honour which he had received in the shape of the statue were thus embedded in both the mythical and the Republican dimensions of the symbolical capital of the Marcii.

SUMMONING UP REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST—STRATEGIES AND VARIANTS

We arrive, therefore, at the central question: given that the equestrian statue in front of the Temple of Castor had been so present and prominent in such disparate media as coins, *tituli*, and *laudationes*, what kind of 'history' had been associated with it and was recalled by it? Secondly, if this monument, because of its multimedial presence, was so famous that Cicero could call it to the audience's mind at the *contio* with only a brief allusion, he must obviously have been confident that such a short reference alone sufficed to evoke enough of a *memoria*, whether a legend, a story, an anecdote, or just some vague association. Robert Morstein-Marx has defined this phenomenon more precisely, stating, 'a reference such as this suggests that a much wider and deeper stratum of historical and civic knowledge is likely to lie hidden or half-submerged beneath the surface of the oft-cursory explicit allusions in our texts'.[74] This conclusion is further supported by the very fact that Cicero on other, comparable occasions, felt obliged to go into details about the historical background of similar honours. Furthermore, since the ostentatious and theatrical gesturing towards striking, suggestive, and highly symbolic places, buildings, and other monuments in the immediate vicinity was part of the rhetorical repertoire in the political culture of immediate

[73] Cf. Sehlmeyer (1999) 57–60, following F. Münzer, *RE* 14/2 (1930) 1582–3, s.v. Marcius (90) Rex; Münzer (2000) 275–6; Lahusen (1983) 47, 57–8; Bergemann (1990) 156 (L10); Hollstein (1993) 266–72; Schmuhl (2008) 78–9. Cf., however, Morstein-Marx 2004 81 with nn. 64, 66, and 87, *pace RRC* i, nos. 293/1 (pp. 307–8) and 425/1 (pp. 448–9); Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 172; Papini (2004) 187–8, and Itgenshorst (2005), catalogue no. 84.

[74] Morstein-Marx (2004) 82 (referring to David (1980) 72–3). Cf. Hölkeskamp (1996/2004) 174, and now Hölkeskamp (2013a) *pace* Walter (2004) 133.

interaction, visibility and visuality, physical presence and performance,[75] the evidence and suggestiveness conveyed by such references must have been as obvious and self-evident as they were impressive and effective.

The following examples illustrate that this strategy could be applied in completely different situations for completely different purposes. When, on the evening of 3 December 63 BCE, Cicero appeared before the assembled people to provide a highly dramatic, emotional, and evocative account of the discovery of the Catilinarian conspiracy, he pointed to a statue of Jupiter on the Capitoline, exclaiming 'you see it there' on high (*Cat.* 3.20).[76] Theatrically, emphatically, and in detail he expanded on the specific occasion for its vow, even though it had taken place a mere two years earlier, 'in the consulship of Cotta and Torquatus'. That occasion had been preceded by most alarming signs: struck by lightning, statues of the gods and of men of old were toppled from their pedestals and the bronze tablets of the law were melted. Even the gilded image of the city's founder, Romulus as an infant, 'who stretched towards the teat of the she-wolf', was struck, 'as you recall'. Haruspices 'throughout Etruria' pronounced these signs as a warning of impending 'murder and arson, casting off of laws, civil war and the collapse of the entire city and state', a warning that necessitated a 'reconciliation with the gods' through a number of measures, which the speaker went out of his way to enumerate at length, among them a statue of Jupiter that was to be put up. It had to be even greater than the old image, was to be placed on a higher pedestal (e.g. a column), and should now face east, looking to 'the sunrise, and the Forum and Curia'. For all this is, of course, an essential part of the history that preceded nefarious 'secret plots against the welfare of the city and power', which had now luckily been foiled by the vigilance and energy of the consul. All this happened on the very day that finally, after a long delay, that statue of Jupiter could be raised and look 'to you and to the Senate'. It was this convergence that clearly manifested the 'agency of Jupiter Optimus Maximus'. Since the dedication of the statue took place on the very

[75] Cf. Pöschl (1975) and Aldrete (1999) 18–34 on this rhetorical practice; Vasaly (1993) 34–9 etc. Cf. on the character of this political culture Hölkeskamp (2009) 44–8, and (2014a), following the fundamental studies by T. Hölscher, with further references.

[76] Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3.19–21; *Div.* 1.19–21; 2.45–7; Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.42; Cass. Dio 37.9.1–2 and 34.34; cf. Engels (2007) 607–9, with further evidence.

day Cicero gave his speech and since it was used by him as an *exemplum* of divine assistance, he would of course go into the emotional and laborious detail of the history of the statue, even if his listeners were familiar with it. In short, the occasion obviously called for more than a short reference.

Let us look at another example to illustrate the strategies of summoning up remembrance of things past by referring to visual and actually visible 'memorial markers' in the immediate topographical vicinity of the venue of an assembly. In 54 BCE, when Cicero defended M. Aemilius Scaurus in a trial for extortion, he presented, on his client's behalf, perspectives, images, and messages of different kinds, which did not just come 'to his mind', but also were in reality standing 'before his eyes' right there (*Scaur*. 46–8). He immediately proceeded to remind the addressees in his summary of what could be seen *in vestro conspectu*, *iudices*, and what was attesting to the glory and grandeur of the defendant's ancestors, especially on his maternal side. Cicero, however, does not simply stop at theatrically pointing to *illa curia* as a 'witness' for the *gravissimus principatus fortissimusque* of the father, who, as *princeps senatus*, had been famous for his influence (and notorious for his intrigues): he was said to have 'almost controlled the whole earth by his nod'.[77] Nor is he content with a rather general invocation of *munificentia* and *liberalitas*, which are manifested by the *amplissima dona* made by this famous father as well as by the accused himself in favour of the Capitoline triad and, *ipso facto*, should refute any suspicion of *avaritia* and *cupiditas*. In particular, he points at the temple, which was in full view of everyone, that the defendant's maternal grandfather L. Metellus had built for the Dioscuri, who, as they had done before for many burdened suppliants, should now come to the grandson's aid, too. Lastly, Cicero points to the nearby Temple of Vesta in order to be able to conjure up another, much older Metellus for his client's defence—namely that *pontifex maximus* who, according to an undoubtedly well-known legend, had saved that *pignus nostrae salutis atque imperii*, the sacred Palladium, from the flames of the burning temple at extreme danger to life and limb.[78]

[77] Cf. Cic. *Font*. 24.

[78] Cf. on this legend F. Münzer, *RE* 3/1 (1897) 1203–4, s.v. Caecilius 72; van Ooteghem (1967) 15–20, both with references.

When, a few years later, Cicero proposed an honorary statue of Servius Sulpicius Rufus, who had died as an envoy of the Senate on the way to Antony, he again went into some detail about former *exempla* of such honours for envoys who had died while in service to the *res publica* and for whom 'our *maiores*' in this way, as it is said, 'bestowed everlasting *memoria* for a short life' (*pro brevi vita diuturnam memoriam reddiderunt*). On that occasion he recalled not only the statues, standing *in rostris*, of the four envoys murdered in Fidenae, but he also named the envoys by name. Then he referred to the statue of Cn. Octavius, which was standing in the same prominent place, and continued to explain in detail the reason for this honour and the special qualities of the honorand, calling him a *clarus vir*, who lived in the good old days when no one looked down on his *novitas* and no one denied the *honos* appropriate for *virtus*, when he first had brought the consulate into a family that later produced more *viri fortissimi* (Cic. *Phil.* 9.4–5).[79]

SUMMONING UP REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST—THE FEATS OF TREMULUS IN THE WEB OF HISTORIES

It is quite clear, then, that Cicero would have been able to come up with the allusions, references, contextual clues, and interconnections—or, at any rate, similar explanations and clarifications in similar forms and formulas—for Tremulus, an individual who, on the surface, seems somehow uninteresting and colourless. When he did not do so, and did not need to, the question arises: what was actually being remembered here? In the first instance, there is—so to speak, a *memoria* 'of the first order'—the commonly accepted occasion for the distinction, a victory over the Hernici and their most important centre, Anagnia.[80] This town is said to have been instrumental in the Hernicans' desertion from Rome to the Samnites, which was triggered off by the latter's

[79] Cf. Manuwald (2007) ii. 1055–62, with references; Sehlmeyer (1999) 252–3; Bücher (2006) 194. Significantly, Pliny mentions these statues in the same context as that of Tremulus (*HN* 34.23–4, where he confuses the specific cause of the embassy of Octavius): cf. also Sehlmeyer (1999) 63–6.

[80] Coarelli (1985a) 179–83; E. Salmon, T. Potter, *OCD*[3] 80, s.v. Anagnia.

initially successful offensive. In fact, according to Livy, this alarming turn of events and the interruption of the alliance with the Hernicans, created a panic in Rome.[81] From an objective point of view, this is not altogether implausible, as Anagnia was not even 40 miles away from Rome. However, in a sort of blitzkrieg, Tremulus is said to have defeated the Hernici with surprising ease and to have compelled them into *deditio* so that he could at once turn to the other war theatre. According to tradition, he joined his army with that of his colleague, P. Cornelius Arvina, and together they inflicted a severe defeat on the Samnites in a great battle, in which an incredible number of enemies (no less than 30,000) was said to have been slain (Livy 9.43.1–21).[82] As usual with the notoriously unreliable 'annalistic' tradition, the authenticity, the chronology, the strategy and tactics of these operations are difficult to assess.[83] Yet, that is not a question in this context. What counts in the first instance is that the core of the account which we find in Livy must have been the (hi)story that enabled Cicero to speak of Tremulus' victory over the Hernici. Further, it explains why Pliny (possibly on the basis of the inscription) claimed to know about a double victory over the Samnites and the capture of Anagnia, and why a triumph *de Anagnineis Herniceisque* was listed in the *fasti triumphales*.[84]

Now we have to ask whether such episodes (especially the victory over a small tribe about which we hardly hear anything because it seems to have subsequently merged almost completely into the restructured Latium, i.e. into the expanding *ager Romanus* along with its language and territory[85]) are actually sufficient adequately to explain the presence and prominence of the monument of Tremulus in the collective memory of a late Republican present across such a substantial time interval. We must further ask whether the prominent and precise position of the monument *in foro* and exactly *ante*

[81] Livy 9.43.3–4 and 42.11 on the role of Anagnia; cf., however, Diod. Sic. 20.80.1–4. See the detailed discussion in Oakley (2005) 555–68 ad Livy 9.42.10–43.24; van Ooteghem (1961) 41–4, and on the topography etc. Mazzolani (1969).

[82] Cf. also Livy 9.43.23–4 on the suspension of the Hernicans' independence and their imposed reception into the *civitas sine suffragio*.

[83] Cf. Salmon (1967) 248–9; Hölkeskamp (1987/2011) 122 with n. 65; T. Cornell, *CAH*[2] vii/2 (1989) 374–7.

[84] Cic. *Phil.* 6.13; Plin. *HN* 34.23; Livy 9.43.22: *de Hernicis*; *FTr* (Degrassi, *Inscr. Ital.* 13, 1, 71, and 542 on 306 BCE); van Ooteghem (1961) 44; Itgenshorst (2005) No. 84.

[85] Cf. E. Salmon, T. Potter, *OCD*[3] 693, s.v. Hernici; Salmon (1967) 55–6; Clemente (1990) 24, 28–9.

templum Castoris could also have generated a particular historical 'sense' and relevance. With regard, first, to the unique and purposeful interconnectedness of monuments and other media, rhetoric, rituals, and performative practices both of images and messages and of familial and collective *memoriae* mentioned above and, second, to their dense concentration in the space of the Forum Romanum, one can suspect that the embeddedness of this monument in the accumulated and complex memorial topography of this particular space may have been able to generate a range of additional, multiple—and even heterogeneous—associations and, quite possibly, a surplus of meanings and symbolic messages.[86]

Such a type of *memoria*, as it were, 'of the second order' results from a mutually confirming and intensifying network of the *explicit* 'history' directly associated with the monument and, further, an *implicit* amplification and heightening of its historical and symbolic meaning due to the visible spatial interconnection of the statue with other monuments in its immediate vicinity. In each specific case, the explicit and implicit levels intersect in the shared background knowledge of the audience present in the Forum—a knowledge which for us becomes concrete only in its historiographically shaped literary form as the elaborate 'master narrative' about the rise of Rome and the unification of Italy under its leadership as it is developed in Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Everywhere in these sources the Hernici appear in close community with the Latini (i.e. the old league of the Latin towns).[87] Indeed, in the subsequent tradition at least, the Hernici are considered almost a kind of fixed (junior) partner of a 'triple alliance' because the famous *foedus Cassianum* between Rome and the Latini, supposedly ratified in 493 BCE,[88] is said to have been extended to the Hernicans on equal terms a few years later by the very

[86] Cf. Hölkeskamp (2014a).

[87] Livy 2.53.1 and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.34.3 (war against Veii, 475 BCE); Livy 2.53–5 and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.35.6; Livy 3.5.8; 7.4; 22.2–7; 57.7; 4.26.12; 29.4; 51.7–8; 56.6; 5.19.5; etc.; cf. Ogilvie (1965) 400–1 (ad Livy 3.4.10); Alföldi (1965) 107–10, with further references.

[88] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.95; Livy 2.33.4; Fest. 166L, s.v. nancitor etc. and further Ogilvie (1965) 317–18. The controversies about the authenticity, dating, and interpretation need not be discussed here—see Petzold (1972) 382–411; Ampolo (1990) 121–6, both with further references. Cf. esp. De Sanctis (1960) 85–98, who explicitly postulated a 'triplice alleanza'; cf. also Salmon (1967) 40; carefully Mazzolani (1969) 15–16; T. Cornell, *CAH*^{2} vii/2 (1989) 274–8, 281, etc.; Cornell (1995) 299–301; Oakley (1997) 331–44.

same Sp. Cassius.[89] According to Livy, it lasted for almost one hundred years until the Hernici deserted Rome together with the Latini in 386 BCE and, afterwards, repeatedly revolted against the rising hegemony of Rome until their final capitulation in 306 BCE.[90] This chequered history of alliance and allegiance, defection and treason on the part of the Latini and Hernici is—along with the wars against the Aequi and Volsci, Veii and Samnites—an essential strand of this master narrative and, hence, of the *memoria* of the humble beginnings of, and the long rise to, later imperial power. Such power, of course, had already been inherent in these beginnings, but first had to be 'earned' in a double sense, namely both through Roman steadfastness in adverse circumstances and through *virtus* and *fortitudo* when faced with a world of enemies and weak, fickle allies. The turning point emphasized by Livy in this history coincides with another turning point, namely the 'second founding' of Rome after the Gallic sack of the city. On this very occasion Livy looks back on a earlier juncture: until their disloyal defection during difficult times, the Latins (and Hernici) are said to have kept the *amicitia populi Romani* 'with faith never to be doubted'[91] since the legendary battle of Lake Regillus, an occasion which plays an important role in this master narrative.[92]

[89] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.68.3–69.2; 71.5–6; 77.3–4; Livy 2.40.14–41.1 and further Ogilvie (1965) 339–40 ad Livy 2.41.1; Oakley (1997) 337–8 and 405 ad Livy 6.2.3. Cf. T. Cornell, *CAH*^{2} vii/2 (1989) 276–7; Cornell (1995) 300–1.

[90] Livy 6.2.3; 11.9; 12.6; 13.7; 7.6.7–9; 7.1–9.1; 15.9 and Oakley (1997) 345, 348, 353–60; Oakley (1998) 3–5, with further references, as well as 102–11 ad Livy 7.6.7–8, 7 and 111–12 ad 9.1–2; Alföldi (1965) 403–5; 407; Mazzolani (1969) 16–17. See on the renewal of the *foedus Cassianum* in 358 BCE (Livy 7.12.7) T. Cornell, *CAH*^{2} vii/2 (1989) 320.

[91] Livy 6.2.3 (on the year 389 BCE): *Novus . . . terror accesserat defectione Latinorum Hernicorumque, qui post pugnam ad lacum Regillum factam per annos prope centum numquam ambigua fide in amicitia populi Romani fuerant*; see Oakley (1997) 405 ad loc. Cf. also Livy 6.10.6: *Eodem anno* (sc. 386 BCE) *ab Latinis Hernicisque res repetitae quaesitumque, cur per eos annos militem ex instituto non dedissent*. Cf. T. Cornell, *CAH*^{2} vii/2 (1989) 317–18.

[92] Livy 2.19.3–20.13 and Ogilvie (1965) 283–9; 2.21.3–4 (on the year 496 BCE), as well as on an epic scale Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.2–17; cf. Fabius Pictor, *FRH* 1 F 20 in Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.71.2 (= frg. 16 Peter = *FRHist.* 1 F 15, with commemtary); Calpurnius Piso, *FRH* 7 F 23 (= frg. 21 Peter = *FRHist.* 9 F 23) and also the later *elogium Inscr. Ital.* 13.3, no. 10. Cf. for further references Broughton (1951–2) i. 10–11 (on the year 499 BCE); T. Cornell in *CAH*^{2} vii/2 (1989) 263–4; Sihvola (1989) 78–82, with further references; Walter (2004) 146–8.

Against this background, the placement of the statue of Tremulus in front of the Temple of Castor indeed turns out to be extraordinarily suggestive in a visual and spatial as well as historical and metaphorical way:[93] according to a myth that was as pious as it was popular, the deities worshipped in the temple, the divine twins and patrons of the cavalry Castor and Pollux, had appeared to the Romans in the heat of battle and had helped them to prevail over the seditious Latini. After that, a second miracle happened. That same evening, the twins were seen as messengers of this victory at Lake Regillus in far-off Rome, and, in fact, in the middle of the Forum Romanum, as they watered their horses in the sacred spring of another deity, Iuturna. In due course, the Lacus Iuturnae later became yet another numinous place with a small shrine. Legend has it that, only a few years after the battle, this very temple in honour of the Dioscuri, whose building the Roman dictator had already vowed in the thick of the battle, was built directly beside the *lacus*.[94] All this was present even hundreds of years later: the battle and the victory, the subsequent treaties with Latini and Hernici, and above all the *foedus Cassianum*, whose text could still be read on a bronze column behind the Rostra in Cicero's lifetime (Cic. *Balb*. 53).[95]

Connected with it was a memory (however simplified and/or vague, but nevertheless cherished and cultivated) of the hard-won beginnings of the Roman supremacy over Latium and the whole of central Italy. It was the memory of an 'original' hegemony, which was jeopardized repeatedly by the treason of the once-loyal confederates until the great war against the Latins which ended with the victories of the consuls Maenius and Furius Camillus and subsequently, a few decades later, led to the final establishment of Rome's dominance,

[93] See Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 155–6, as well as tentatively Sihvola (1989) 85–6; Walter (2004) 148, but sceptically Morstein-Marx (2004) 80–1 with n. 65.

[94] Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.6; 3.11; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.13.1–4; Livy 2.20.12; Ov. *Fast.* 1.705–9; Flor. 1.11.4; [Aur. Vict.] *De vir. ill.* 16.3. Cf. E. M. Steinby, *LTUR* iii (1996) 168–70, s.v. Lacus Iuturnae; I. Nielsen, *LTUR* i (1993) 242–5, s.v. Castor, aedes, templum; Engels (2007) 347–50, each with further references and literature. Cf. on the cult and sanctuary of Iuturna as well as on her connection with the Dioscuri Aronen (1989); Sihvola (1989); and the other articles in Steinby (ed.) (1989). Cf. Poulsen (1992) with details and sources.

[95] Cf. Livy 2.33.9; 33.4; and 41.1 (on the contract with the Hernici) and Ogilvie (1965) ad loc. See further Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.69.2; Livy 6.2.3; 12.6; 13.8 and Oakley (1997) ad loc.; Humbert (1978) 73, 92–3, 101–2 (on the inclusion of the Hernici).

which was marked by the successful campaign of Tremulus. It is hardly a coincidence, therefore, that the latter was accorded the same honour in the form of an equestrian statue as were the two consuls of the year 338 BCE.[96] Likewise, it is probably not a coincidence either that the permanent restructuring of the conditions in Latium and the final reordering of the status of the Hernican towns, and of Rome's relations with them, by Tremulus seem to have been very similar in detail. Whether or not the tradition which refers to the measures implemented in 338 and 306 BCE respectively is authentic, cannot be ascertained. Once again, that is not necessary for the present purpose. On the contrary: even if this striking parallelism should be due merely to a 'chain of associations' construed later, it could be seen as interesting evidence for the dynamic process of interconnecting names, figures and subjects, motives and strands of a *memoria* that continued to be cultivated and shaped into a coherent ensemble.[97]

Such a *memoria* and the myth of the divine twins' intervention on behalf of Rome could be combined and compressed to a '*memoria* of the second order'.[98] One reason is that this myth remained very much alive into the second and first centuries.[99] In addition, the splendid procession of *equites* mentioned above is said to have been introduced by the censor Q. Fabius Maximus in 304 BCE—that is, significantly, immediately after the victory, triumph, and monumental honour of Tremulus. This ritual referred in multiple and (inter) connected respects to the intervention of the twins in the heat of battle and their miraculous appearance in Rome and thereby to the establishment of the hegemony of Rome. For the *transvectio equitum* originally (and for a long time) took place every year on the Ides of Quintilis (15 July), the very date of the battle and the day sacred to the Dioscuri. The route of the procession started at a temple of Mars or

96 Cf. Sehlmeyer (2000) 275–7.

97 Livy 8.14.2–12 with Oakley (1998) 538–71, and Livy 9.43.23–4 and 45.5–8. Cf. Alföldi (1965) 417; Humbert (1978) 176–95; 212–16; Hantos (1983) 53–71, 171 etc. (who in 114 n. 72 assumes a constructed 'chain of associations'). See further Hölkeskamp (1987/2011) 171–4; T. Cornell, *CAH*^{2} vii/2 (1989) 362–8 and 375–6; Cornell (1995) 347–52.

98 Cf. on the concept of the myth and the (commemorative and related) functions of this 'figure' or 'figuration of discourse' Hölkeskamp (2009).

99 Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.28, where there is talk of the vivid *fama* and *celebritas* der *Tyndaridae fratres*, *qui non modo adiutores in proeliis victoriae populi Romani, sed etiam nuntii fuisse perhibentur*; *Nat. D.* 3.11–13. Cf. Sironen (1989).

the Temple of Honos and Virtus at the Porta Capena and proceeded through various parts of the city—and, as mentioned above, it always passed by the Temple of the Dioscuri in the Forum on its way to the Capitol. Finally, the *equites* were organized by centuries into battlelines; apparently, they rode on white horses, wore their purple *trabeae*, and were crowned with olive branches, in the fashion of both the garb of the Dioscuri and the traditional attire of the triumph.[100] The presence of the myth manifested itself repeatedly in another equally significant way: after Aemilius Paullus' decisive victory over Macedonia and King Perseus at Pydna in 168 BCE, the Dioscuri were reported to have been seen on the Roman side (in two senses of the word), and then again during the war against the Cimbri at the end of the century.[101] On that occasion, too, the twins appeared in Rome when they washed themselves and their white horses in the Lacus Iuturnae. Their adjacent temple was found wide open, though the doors had not been unlocked by the hand of man.[102]

Moreover, a T. Quinctius Flamininus who was *monetalis* in 126 BCE, appropriated the often-used motif for a direct allusion to the great victory of an ancestor, who, with an opulent votive offering at the Temple of Delphi, had gratefully highlighted his connection to the 'sons of Zeus', 'from the tribe of Tyndareus', 'with which they liked to go hunting on spirited horses', as the inscription read on the silver shields (see Figure 6.7). The picture of a Macedonian shield and its placement under the horses of the riding Dioscuri, of course, plays on the famous victory of the commander of the same name over Philip V at Cynoscephalae.[103] Shortly thereafter, in the 90s BCE, the image of the Dioscuri appeared, with their typical caps and the stars

[100] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.14.4–5 (to 496); Livy 9.46.15; [Aur. Vict.] *De vir. ill.* (on 304BCR); cf. Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.6; 3, 11; Plin. *HN* 15.19; Val. Max. 1.8.1; 2.2.9; Plut. *Coriol.* 3.5–6; Flor. 1.11.4. Cf. on the complicated source material: Oakley (2005) 642–5 ad loc. Cf. also Wissowa (1912, repr. 1971) 268–71; S. Weinstock, *RE* 6A/2 (1937) 2178–87, s.v. transvectio equitum; Latte (1960) 173–5; Scullard (1981) 164–5, 232–3; Rebecchi (1999) 191–200.

[101] Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.6; Val. Max. 1.8.1 and Plin. *HN* 7.86; Flor. 1.28 (2, 12), 14–15 respectively. See further Sironen (1989) 98–100, 104–6; Engels (2007) 525, resp. 566–7, both with further references.

[102] Val. Max. 1.8.1b–c; Flor. 1.38 (3, 3), 19–20; Min. Fel. 7.3; cf. also Plut. *Aem.* 24.4–25.4, with variations of the motif.

[103] Plut. *Flam.* 12.6; *RRC*, i, no. 267/1 (126 BCE), with commentary. cf. Välimaa (1989) 114, 125; Boschung (2008) 190–2.

Figure 6.7. Denarius of T. Quinctius Flamininus (126 BCE), obverse and reverse.

RRC i, no. 267/1; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

Figure 6.8. Denarius of A. Postumius Albinus (96 BCE), obverse and reverse.

RRC i, no. 335/10a; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

above their heads, on the coins of the moneyer A. Postumius Albinus, 'reclaim[ing] one of the most celebrated moments of the past for his family'[104] in a clear and catchy manner (see Figure 6.8).

Neither the motive nor the motif was original. On the contrary: in one fashion or the other, the image of the Dioscuri had served as an emblem on coins since the early third century. Even in the nineties the image of the two riders watering their horses at a basin might have been 'read' and understood all the more intuitively. The place on the Forum was in everyone's view, and many might also have known that the dictator, commander-in-chief, and *triumphator* over the Latini had been named A. Postumius Albus and received the honorific title Regillensis.[105]

[104] Hölscher (1984) 13; cf. Boschung (2008) 192–3.

[105] This cognomen of the Postumii is attested frequently: *FTr.* (*Inscr. Ital.* 13, 1, 67 and 536 on 496 BCE [or 499]); Livy 4.49.7; 6.22.5; etc.; F. Münzer, *RE* 22/1 (1953) 891–3, s.v. Postumius; 932–4, s.v. Postumius 50–52b. Cf. on the coinage Välimaa (1989) 120–1, 125; Krumme (1995) 71–3, 169, 250 (12/1a), with further references.

ROMAN MEMORIAL CULTURE: MULTIMEDIALITY, INTERMEDIALITY, AND INTERSIGNIFICATION

Such a web of (hi)stories can be disentangled only by a so-called 'circumstantial evidence' alone. In the context of the current discussion, this term is appropriate in its various meanings. The example of the *equus Tremuli in foro ante templum Castoris* makes clear the culture-specific, Roman manner of an invisible, implicit, and symbolically suggestive network of images and messages, of history and histories, of milestones and myths of the rise from modest beginnings to imperial greatness.[106] In this process, this network is established first through the often intentionally explicit—and, in a double sense, 'visible'—spatial association of images, buildings, and monuments in (and through) the central public spaces. Therefore, one could almost speak of a culture of allusion, of citing, and 'answering' to, existing monuments, which is illustrated by monuments of varying kinds: the *columna rostrata* of Duilius, the equestrian statues of Maenius and Camillus, and the group of statues later erected by Metellus Scipio, the Fornix Scipionis and the Fornix Fabianus. Because of such configurations, the city itself becomes a 'landscape of memory' or 'memory-scape' that guarantees a continued 'presence of the past in the present',[107] thereby functioning as a substantial basis for the identity of the *populus Romanus* and serving as a confirmation of current ideologies, values, and orientations.[108]

In turn, this function is reinforced by the very fact that the densely occupied spaces within this landscape of memory were perceived as especially prominent. The Forum Romanum with Comitium and Curia, the Capitol, and the Campus Martius were the most important multifunctional centres within the political and religious topography and as such could be permanently seen and experienced. It was here that the *populus Romanus* took its concrete, even visible, institutional shape by coming together in the Comitia and *contiones*, as was the case at the time of Cicero's speech in January 43 BCE. Further, the

[106] Cf. on the complex web of the relations and cross-references (although with partly different emphasis on the various media) Hölscher (1984) 12–19 and (2001); cf. for a different position Walter (2001) and (2004). Cf. also Hölkeskamp (1996/2004), (2001/2004), and (2005); Tanner (2000); Meadows and Williams (2001) 40–9.

[107] This phrase follows Bloch (1977). Cf. on the complex web of 'intersignification' of Duilius' monuments now Roller (2013) 120–6.

[108] Hölscher (2001); Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 142–63 and *passim*.

most important civic rituals, which served as affirmative reproduction and renewal of an existing order and of its values and hierarchies, were not just embedded in these spaces, but also derived an essential part of their symbolical meaning from the massing of the monuments there: triumphs, *pompae funebres*, and also the *transvectio equitum* carried on a kind of implicit dialogue.

Moreover, the example of the Equus Tremuli impressively attests to the multimediality and complex intersignification of this integrated network, which has been the central and recurrent theme of my argument: its permanent, visual presence as a suggestive memorial monument *in foro ante templum Castoris* was complemented by an inscription that safeguarded the story 'told' by the monument. The monument not only disambiguated its concrete reference to a historical person and his achievement, but also pointed to other, similar attestations through its 'inscription' (in the double sense of this term) into the coordinate system of the then current 'epigraphic habit', which invited the passer-by to compare and interconnect similar texts and their messages (indeed just what Cicero does in his own way, when he sarcastically quoted the inscriptions of Lucius Antonius' statues). Beyond that, the monument undergoes an ongoing contextualization—evocative, symbolic, spatial, and ritual—through the *transvectio*, its (re)appearance on coins and, probably, in *laudationes*, as well as, at least on the occasion mentioned at the outset, through its ad hoc theatrical utilization for the purposes of polemicizing in political rhetoric.

More precisely, in the concrete context, the manner and the occasion in which Cicero was able literally to 'call up' the Equus Tremuli, another facet of the interconnectedness we have observed becomes apparent: as a result of its multifunctionality in the context of the politico-religious topography of the *urbs Roma*, the Forum Romanum, as a landscape of memory, was in no way a museum-like, static space for non-quotidian and reverent reflection. The same was true for history, which was kept present and alive in the form of many stories that were 'narrated' and constantly kept alive by the monuments, images, and rituals, a process that kept them from becoming a self-contained, canonized, and even fossilized repertoire. What used to be called 'collective', 'social', or 'cultural memory' is an 'ensemble of texts', in which each 'text' is an 'ensemble' in and by itself,[109] with a

[109] These terms were coined by Geertz (1973) 452.

logic of its own: the dynamic re-*present*-ation in and through spaces; in and through buildings, images of every kind, with their respective medium-specific coded and contextualized messages; in and through rituals and other performative modes of renewal; and, finally, in and through literarily formed histories, stories, and their unique and purposeful 'readability'. Cultural memory is therefore always more than (and something different from) the mere collection of the constituent ensembles—the surplus of meanings and messages being generated by their interconnectness, 'intermediality', and 'intersignification' (as defined and described in the 'Prologue'). Moreover, by its very nature as well as the nature of its constituent ensembles, this sort of *memoria* is never able to reach a 'finished', static form, but must necessarily remain in a state of permanent flux.[110]

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7

Marius, Sulla, and the War over Monumental Memory and Public Space

Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp

SULLA CONSTRUCTS HIS MEMORY

At the beginning of 79 BC, L. Cornelius Sulla unexpectedly left the political stage. Only nine years earlier, he had been the first Roman to provoke a bloody civil war by marching on the capital with his army. Tens of thousands of Romans had died, among them dozens of senators and hundreds of *equites*. Now, after only three years, he was giving up his unlimited power as dictator. He returned it to the hands of precisely those citizens whom he had recently terrorized—a move that seemed so contradictory to his contemporaries and later historians that it appeared unbelievable. On the other hand, even at this last moment of his public career Sulla did not refrain from one of the well-calculated artful acts of self-representation with which he had frequently put himself into the public spotlight: He appeared in the Forum and declared, in a final speech before the people, that he was willing to give an account of his actions to anyone who desired it. Then he discharged his lictors with their *fasces*—the symbols of power over life and death—and mingled with the crowd as a *privatus*, accompanied by only a few friends. Shortly thereafter, he left Rome and retreated to his villa near Puteoli on the Gulf of Naples, where he died in 78 (Plut. *Sull.* 34).[1]

Even after his spectacular departure, Sulla remained highly present in Rome, since as dictator he had done everything possible to ensure

[1] Cf. Hölkeskamp (2000) 199–200.

his place in the specifically Roman variant of 'cultural' or 'social memory',[2] which formed the basis of, and permanently fuelled, the collective identity of the *populus Romanus* as an 'imagined community'.[3] He had applied the full scale of strategies by using all the media that he and his peers had at their disposal to conserve the memory of their glorious deeds in the service of the *res publica* and the *maiestas* of the *gens togata* for future generations and for eternity[4]—these strategies, their complementarity, and Sulla's revolutionary new use of them are the topic of the following discussion.

For example, it was said that Sulla was feverishly working on his autobiography up until two days before his death. Following the traditions of his class, he presented his life as an uninterrupted sequence of spectacular achievements performed in the service, and for the well-being and benefit, of the *res publica*. Furthermore, from what we know from the surviving fragments, he systematically belittled his opponents' achievements in order to make his own image appear even more magnificent to future generations. Unsurprisingly, C. Marius is said to have been presented in a particularly bad light, as we will see below.[5]

With memoirs of the sort that Sulla and his contemporaries wrote, one could only reach a small and exclusive circle of recipients. Such works were first and foremost meant to address social peers, hence were of comparatively limited commemorative power. When it came to influencing the public, narrative texts were far surpassed by

[2] On these concepts see Galinsky's Introduction to this volume. For 'cultural memory' in particular, cf. Assmann (1988), (1992/2011), and (2000); and for 'social memory' Connerton (1989). See also Erll (2005) and the relevant contributions in Pethes and Ruchatz (2001) and Erll and Nünning (2008).

[3] Cf. Habinek (1998) 44–5, followed by Dugan (2009) 180–1. See also Gildenhard (2011) 126–40, and Hölkeskamp (2013a) and (2013b).

[4] Cf. on the specific character of Roman 'memorial culture' Hölscher (2001); Walter (2004); Hölkeskamp (2001/2004), (2005), (2006b), and (2014); and now Galinsky (2014) and his Introduction to this volume, all with further bibliography.

[5] For a new edition and critical commentary of the fragments, cf. Scholz and Walter (2013) 80–135. On Sulla's autobiography, cf. Plut. *Sull.* 6 and 37; Suet. *Gram.* 12. See Ramage (1991) 93–121; Behr (1993) 9–21; Hölkeskamp (2000) 201–2; Flower (2006) 96–7; and the detailed study by Scholz (2003). This kind of self-presentation was quite common—cf. the example of Q. Lutatius Catulus, who, according to Cicero (*Ad Brut.* 132–3), wrote a book on his achievements in his consulship 'in the style of Xenophon' and dedicated it to his friend, the poet Aulus Furius Antias, cf. Grüner (2004) 24–8. On the emergence of autobiographical writing in Republican Rome in general, cf. Flower (2014).

honorific and victory monuments—Varro had already highlighted the intricate interconnectedness of *memoria* and *monimenta* (*Ling.* 6.49). Monuments were located everywhere in civic space—in the Forum, the Comitium, the Campus Martius, or in innumerable temples and sanctuaries—and must therefore have been highly visible. Thus inscribed in the complex topography of Rome as 'city of memories' and endowed with a particular and forceful 'communicative power',[6] they reminded all viewers—educated members of the leading classes as well as the notoriously elusive 'man in the Roman street'—of the 'memorable' deeds, in the full sense of the term, of individual *nobiles*. Here, too, Sulla proved a master of effective self-representation. A Roman citizen or a visitor from the provinces who happened to be in Rome in 79 to witness Sulla's spectacular departure and who decided—still under the spell of this powerful man's parting words—to take a walk through the city,[7] was confronted at every turn by Sulla as dictator and general. Even after Sulla's departure and death this would not immediately change.

For example, our imaginary visitor would only have to look around after Sulla's last speech (to the *populus*) to admire the general's equestrian statue which stood directly in front of the Rostra. This larger-than-life gilded statue with the inscription *Cornelius Sulla Felix Imperator* had been erected in 82, after Sulla's triumphal return from his victory in the civil war. He was shown seated on a horse, dressed in tunic and toga, raising his right hand—an iconographic motif that referred to the authoritative gesture of an orator demanding his audience's undivided attention (App. *B Civ.* 1.451–452; Cic. *Phil.* 9.13; Vell. Pat. 2.61.3; Cass. Dio 42.18.2; 43.49.1; Suet. *Iul.* 75.4).[8]

[6] Cf. Edwards (1996) 27–43 (on Rome as 'city of memories'); Hölscher (2001) and (2006b) 487–90; Miano (2011) ch. 2 (on *loci memoriae*). Cf. Sehlmeyer (2000) *passim* (on the concept of 'communicative power'). Cf. also Hölkeskamp (1996/2004) and (2001/2004).

[7] I follow Favro (1996) 24–41 and 252–80, who—as far as I know—was the first scholar to construe walks of a fictional citizen 'through Republican Rome, 52 BC' and 'through Augustan Rome, AD 14', in order to describe in graphic detail the 'urban image' of the city, its central public spaces and monuments.

[8] Cf. Ramage (1991) 110–11; Behr (1993) 121–3; Sehlmeyer (1999) 204–9; Schmuhl (2008) 123–5, 209. Cf. on the debate on the exact wording of the inscription Mackay (2000) 182–3, who argues that an inscription in the nominative could not be an honorific inscription *stricto sensu*—in this case, the honorand was 'in no way subordinated syntactically to a dedicator just as in the real world he was not subject to anyone else's control'.

This statue's location, genre, and iconography also show that Sulla understood how to represent his sweeping claim to power in the realm of monumental self-representation, and to do so unambiguously and unmistakably. It was no coincidence that the statue was placed in the Comitium on the north side of the Forum, in front of the Rostra and between the place for public assembly and the senate house. This relatively small area had long counted as an especially prestigious space for commemoration. As Cicero would point out some decades later (*Deiot.* 34), there was no location for a statue more prominent than a place directly before the Rostra.[9] On the one hand, monuments placed here were in the direct line of sight of the crowds attending the regular popular assemblies. The visibility of these monuments and their 'mnemonic energy' or, as Aby Warburg has phrased it, their *Erinnerungsveranlassungskapazität*—literally their 'capacity to generate and stimulate remembrance'—was immense, thanks simply to their location.[10] At the same time, and enhancing this capacity, these monuments kept notably honourable company, as their location included several numinous places with especially sacral auras. Great significance was given, for example, to the so-called Lapis Niger with the tomb of the mythical founder of the city, Romulus. Also nearby was the Ficus Ruminalis, the sacred tree under which the she-wolf had found and nursed the twins Romulus and Remus and which, for the sake of the Empire's eternal well-being, was never supposed to wither (Plin. *HN* 15.77; Tac. *Ann.* 13.58; Livy 10.23.12).[11]

GENERATING MEMORY BY ASSOCIATION

Within sight of these sacred places, dedicated to the memory of the pre-Republican mythic roots of the city, a number of Republican

[9] Plin. *HN* 34.24 calls the Rostra the *oculatissimus locus*. Cf. on the development and functions of the Comitium, Coarelli, *LTUR* i (1993) 309–14, s.v. Comitium; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 158–63 and (2005) 257–60.

[10] Cf. on these concepts Assmann (1988) 12 and *passim*; Borsdorf and Grütter (1999) 5; Korff (2002) 142–6. See also Hölscher (1992) 465 and 470 and Erll (2005) 19–22, on Warburg.

[11] Cf. Coarelli, *LTUR* ii (1995) 248–9, s.v. Ficus Navia, Ficus Ruminalis; Papi, *LTUR* v (1999) 290–1, s.v. Statua: Lupa, Romulus et Remus, with further evidence; Sehlmeyer (1999) 105; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 158–60. Cf. Hölscher (2001) 200, who carefully differentiates the classes of monuments and their 'memorial' functions.

monuments could also be found, already centuries old in Sulla's time. All of them pointed to the heroic deeds of men who had served the emerging Republic in ancient times. For example, there was a statue of Horatius Cocles who allegedly had faced the troops of the Etruscan king Porsenna all by himself. Later it was believed that through this selfless act he had saved the city from being taken by the enemy (Livy 2.10.12–13; Plin. *HN* 34.21–22; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.25.1–2; Plut. *Popl.* 16.9).[12] Not far from Cocles' statue stood the Columna Duilia, dedicated after the naval battle of Mylai in 260 in order to honour the commander-in-chief and consul C. Duilius. His statue stood high up on a tall column whose shaft was decorated with the prows of captured Carthaginian ships. According to Pliny the Elder (*HN* 34.11), the point of such a *columna rostrata* was to elevate the honoured man visibly over his peers.[13] A monument very similar to the Columna Duilia had already been erected decades earlier: the Columna Maenia commemorated the deeds of C. Maenius, consul in 338 and censor in 318.[14] Furthermore, it was for this same C. Maenius and for L. Furius Camillus, his fellow consul, that equestrian statues had been erected near the Rostra to honour their achievements in bringing the Latins under Roman domination. It appears that these monuments were erected by senatorial decree. They were still visible in the Comitium in Cicero's day, and therefore must have been excluded from the famous censorial edict of 158, which ordered that all statues not sanctioned by the people or the Senate be removed from that area. This measure was apparently taken in response to an inflationary increase in unauthorized self-glorification.[15]

[12] Cf. Sehlmeyer (1999) 92–6; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 160.

[13] Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 1.12.17. Cf. Chioffi, *LTUR* i (1993) 309, s.v. Columna rostrata C. Duilii; Hölscher (1978) 322–3; Sehlmeyer (1999) 117–19; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 152; Schmuhl (2008) 84–7. The inscription found in the vicinity of the Clivus Capitolinus, which commemorates the *res gestae* of C. Duilius (*CIL* vi. 31591), dates to Augustan times.

[14] See Sehlmeyer (1999) 53–7; Hölscher (1978) 338–9, who also discusses the vexed question as to whether the statue was placed on top of this *columna*. See now Hölkeskamp (2012).

[15] On the equestrian statues, see Livy 8.13.9; Plin. *HN* 34.20; Eutr. 2.7. Cf. Sehlmeyer (1999) 48–52; Schmuhl (2008) 77–8; Hölscher (2001) 192. On the 'purge' of 158 BC: Plin. *HN* 34.30–1. Some of these statues, among them that of the would-be tyrant Sp. Cassius, were not only removed, but melted down. Cf. now Roller (2010) 151, and also Sehlmeyer (2000) 281–2 and (1999) 152–9; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 152 with n. 46.

As far as we know, the old monuments of Maenius and Camillus were the only equestrian statues near the Comitium and the Rostra at the beginning of the first century BC. Consequently, when Sulla had his statue erected there in 82, this was an act of ostentation in every respect. He not only chose the most dignified commemorative place, he also opted for a gilded equestrian statue—a particularly prestigious category of monuments with which nobody had been honoured in more than 200 years. Cicero, summarizing conventional wisdom some decades later, said that gilded statues in this area had always counted as the highest honour possible. They were granted, if at all, only to individuals 'who had already gained the greatest merit on behalf of the *res publica*' and on whose 'capability, influence, and luck' high hopes for the future were placed. However, virtuous Republicans for whom the *mores* of the *maiores* were still binding would voluntarily refuse the honour of such a statue. They would rather choose an 'iron monument', and in fact 'one without a horse', as Cicero stresses elsewhere, in order to emphasize the inherent ambiguity of such an honour. Cicero explicitly refers here to the dictator Sulla and uses him more or less as a negative *exemplum*, because he was the first to abandon the laudable modesty of the ancestors (*Phil.* 5.41 and 9.13).[16]

SULLA'S DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT

Thus, even in the perception of his contemporaries, Sulla opened a new chapter in the history of self-representation when he had his gilded statue positioned next to the Comitium. On the one hand, Sulla followed a centuries-old tradition by which countless generations of aristocrats had inscribed their deeds and their claim to recognition in the public realm. He placed his statue visibly—indeed, it was impossible to overlook—and demonstratively right next to the monuments of mythical and Republican figures who had, each in their own way, contributed to the completion of that divinely willed process at whose end the Romans would be 'the masters of the world', as Vergil would phrase it a few decades later (*Aen.* 1.257–96). In this way, Sulla

[16] Cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.97; Vell. Pat. 2.61. 3; Cass. Dio 42.18.2; 43.49.1. Cf. Papi, *LTUR* ii (1995) 227–8, s.v. Equus: L. Cornelius Sulla; Sehlmeyer (1999) 204–9, 231–4, with further evidence.

unmistakably registered his intention to take as prominent a place in the collective memory of future generations of the *populus Romanus* as these heroes had. On the other hand, however, the dictator broke with that tradition: by setting up a gilded statue he made it clear that the unwritten rules which had regulated the interaction between an individual *nobilis* and the senatorial elite as a group had no validity for him—rules which had, above all, put clear limits upon individual demonstrations of status.

By erecting his gilded equestrian statue in the Comitium, Sulla defied the state's ancient monopoly over public commemoration in this particular area. He disregarded the regulation that had banned from this special zone any form of monumental self-portrayal not sanctioned by the political institutions via a consensual process. In fact, such self-representation was currently acceptable only on private land or in temples where the approval of the priests alone was necessary. Furthermore, the golden statue in the heart of political Rome put an end to the aristocratic competition that had been firmly established in this place. Precisely here, where the citizenry traditionally met for assemblies and trials, where orators announced their proposals and motions from the Rostra, and where they competed in fierce battles of words—in short, where the members of an eternally competitive aristocracy struggled for the favour of the *populus Romanus*, for offices and honour, for rank and reputation—here, Sulla's utterly unique monument made it clear that he now stood above all other *nobiles*, dead or alive. Moreover, it was a sort of giant leap forward, which would make it almost impossible to overtake the man and his status in memory in the future.

SULLA'S IMPRINT ON OTHER MEMORIAL LANDSCAPES

The placement of the gilded statue in the Comitium was simultaneously the high point and end point of a decade-long process in which Sulla systematically violated the inherited rules of monumental aristocratic self-representation. He had used monuments in a similarly provocative and polarizing way years earlier, at the beginning of his political career, and had even used them as weapons against his rivals.

A particular stir had been caused by the so-called Bocchus monument with which Sulla had eternalized himself and the memory of his achievements high up on the Capitoline Hill—I shall return to this shortly. In order to reach this sacred hill, which was the second most dignified place of commemoration in the centre of the *urbs*—the *caput mundi*, the fortress of the realm, the sacral centre of the *populus Romanus*, of the *res publica*, and of the Empire—our fictional visitor to late Republican Rome in 79 BC had to climb the Clivus Capitolinus. On the way, he had the opportunity to glance at some other monuments with which Sulla had inscribed his memory into the face of the city. Turning northwards from the Rostra, our visitor would first pass the senate house, the Curia. Sulla had renovated and enlarged this building significantly in order to accommodate the 300 senators he had added to the traditional number of 300 during his dictatorship. And to connect this measure and the associated restoration of senatorial rule permanently with his own name, he had renamed the building: it was now no longer called Curia Hostilia, but Curia Cornelia, using the *nomen gentile* of the dictator—a measure that seems to have had its intended effect but did not gain universal acceptance.[17] For Cicero, the new building and its successors lacked the special aura and 'capacity to stimulate remembrance' that had surrounded the old senate house of Hostilius in such a unique way. The view of the Curia Cornelia, Cicero complained, did not evoke the same emotions that the old building had always triggered. Sitting in the shadow of this new curia, it was no longer possible for him to think of his great models Scipio, Cato, and Laelius—men whose symbolic presence he had always felt near the old building. The Curia seemed to him 'smaller through its enlargement' (Cic. *Fin.* 5.2).[18]

Nevertheless, let us follow our visitor on his tour of late Republican Rome. After leaving the Curia behind and turning onto the Clivus Capitolinus, his gaze would most likely fall upon the huge construction site of the *tabularium* on the flank of the Capitoline Hill. This innovative multistorey building was completed and dedicated in 78 BC by Q. Lutatius Catulus, consul in that year and one of the most influential followers of Sulla. It later housed the Senate's 'memory' in the shape of its archive as well as the treasury. When our visitor arrived on the Capitoline Hill after the exhausting climb, he first saw

[17] On this building cf. Coarelli, *LTUR* i (1993) 331–2, s.v. Curia Hostilia.
[18] Cf. Walter (2004) 136–7.

the Fornix Scipionis—an immense arched monument that had been erected in 190 BC by P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, another prominent member of the *gens Cornelia*. As victor over Hannibal, he had eternalized his extraordinary deeds in the form of a monument that was adorned with seven gilded statues and two 'horses'—perhaps equestrian statues. And looking out from the two marble basins in front of the *fornix*, our visitor could cast a first glance at the Area Capitolina that in late Republican times was adorned with countless buildings—temples, colossal statues of gods and goddesses, victory monuments, and honorific statues.[19]

Usually, every visitor's attention would have been captured first by the enormous temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus that majestically dominated the entire area. According to tradition, this temple had been dedicated on 13 September 509 BC, in the first year of the Republic. At 60 metres long by 55 metres wide, it was the largest building of its kind in non-Greek Italy and could easily compete with the monumental archaic temples in Magna Graecia and Sicily. The temple was surrounded by columns on three sides, and in the vestibule the columns appeared to form a sort of forest. Inside the temple were three cellae of which the central one was dedicated to Jupiter, the left one to his wife Juno Regina, and the right one to his daughter Minerva: together they formed the Capitoline triad. Besides their cult statues, the interior of the building also housed countless votive gifts and trophies, which victorious generals had dedicated during the glorious history of the Republic.[20] In 79, however, one would encounter an entirely different, far less splendid scene: the old temple for Jupiter Optimus Maximus had burnt down four years earlier. It was completely destroyed when partisans in the civil war had fought with fire and sword in, and over, this sacred place. It was Sulla again who used that opportunity. He wasted no time after his triumphal return in arranging for the rebuilding of the temple on its original foundations and in the old grand style. No effort was spared when it came to the building materials, and the ancients were outdone in every possible way. As Cicero put it years later, 'one could almost think that a

[19] On the Fornix Scipionis (Livy 37.3.7) cf. Coarelli, *LTUR* ii (1995) 266–7, s.v. Fornix Scipionis; Sehlmeyer (1999) 123–5; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 155; Schmuhl (2008) 110–13 and 215; Hölkeskamp, Ch. 6 in this volume.

[20] Tagliamonte, *LTUR* iii (1996) 144–8, s.v. Iuppiter Optimus Maximus, with further evidence. Cf. Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 144–7.

divine plan had caused the fire', so as to provide gracious Jupiter with 'a bigger and even more magnificent building' (*Verr.* 2.4.126). The marble columns, for example, Sulla had ordered to be imported from the Olympieion in Athens. The roof was covered with gilded bronze tiles, commissioned by Q. Lutatius Catulus, the influential follower of Sulla previously mentioned (Plin. *HN* 36.45).

Catulus had been entrusted with continuing the reconstruction during his consulship in 78, as it had not been granted to Sulla to witness the completion of his largest, and possibly most prestigious, building project. Pliny the Elder would later write that the fortune of the man who called himself 'the fortunate' had not been complete for precisely that reason. So, when the temple was dedicated in 69 BC, it was Catulus' name that appeared on the front. He had his name affixed in large gilded letters—a conventional act of aristocratic self-representation that aimed to secure his place in the collective memory. Indeed the letters were still visible 138 years later, when the temple was again destroyed by fire during a bloody civil war in the wake of the fall of Nero and the Julio-Claudian house (Plin. *HN* 33.57 and 7.138).[21]

On the piazza in front of the temple there was much to be seen and admired in 79 BC. In this area, which had always been both the high point and the end point of every triumphal procession, almost every general who received a triumph had left behind a monument to his greatness. The number of monuments from all periods, which stood here thick on the ground, must have been impressive. Yet even in this densely packed realm of monumental memory, certain items stood out as being especially spectacular. This would have been the case for the triumphal monument of Spurius Carvilius, consul in 293, dedicated after his victory over the Samnites. It consisted of a gigantic statue of Jupiter, made out of cuirasses, greaves, and helmets taken from the enemy, as well as a considerably smaller statue of the dedicator himself at the feet of the god, made from leftover metal scraps. Here, war booty, divine image, and honorific statue were in a subtle way fused together into a single complex monument of high commemorative quality (Plin. *HN* 34.43).[22] In sum, the area of Jupiter

[21] On the history of this building see also Tac. *Hist.* 3.72.1–3 and Plut. *Popl.* 15.1.

[22] Cf. Hölscher (1978) 323–4 and (2001) 196–7; Sehlmeyer (1999) 113–16; Hölkeskamp (2001/2004) 152–3.



Figure 7.1 Forum, Comitium, and Capitol in the late Republic, with route of triumphs.
Courtesy Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich.

Capitolinus constituted an extraordinary landscape of memory (see Figure 7.1).

CONTESTED MEMORIES: SULLA VS. MARIUS

It was here, in the thick of these monuments, that the Bocchus monument mentioned earlier was erected—an early example of self-representation with which Sulla had, at the start of his career, seized a place in this dignified landscape of commemoration, in a way both spectacular and scandalous. The monument was completed in 91 BC and commemorated, from Sulla's perspective, the war (begun in 112) against Jugurtha, the pretender to (or usurper of) the throne of

Numidia. Several generals had already failed at the task when C. Marius took command in 107. A *homo novus* who did not come from an established family within the senatorial elite, Marius had been elected consul for that year after a turbulent electoral campaign. But even Marius, who would later prove his outstanding military competence in the traumatic wars against the Cimbri and Teutons, was not able to lead the Roman army to the quick victory he had promised. The war only ended when Sulla, who was a member of Marius' staff, managed to convince Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, to betray his son-in-law Jugurtha and hand him over to the Romans. Jugurtha was captured, paraded in chains in Marius' triumph of 104, and then executed.[23]

Marius' enjoyment, however, of the triumph turned out to be short-lived. Directly after the end of the African war a highly polemical debate broke out in Rome, regarding whether he alone was entitled to the glory of going down in history as victor over the Numidian king. His detractors—of whom, as a *homo novus*, he had many—provoked him over and over again, claiming that it had been Sulla who delivered the final blow (Plut. *Mar.* 10).[24] And Sulla himself—who (according to Plutarch) was naturally inclined to boast—did not contradict this, quite the opposite: he claimed publicly that the ending of the war was first and foremost due to him, and repeatedly gave this claim ostentatious expression. First—shortly after his return from Africa—he had a signet ring made which showed Bocchus turning Jugurtha over to him, and he used it to seal every possible document, to the great exasperation of Marius (Val. Max. 8.14.4; Plin. *HN* 37.9; Plut. *Sull.* 3 and *Mar.* 10).

Marius' animosity probably increased when the same scene appeared several years later on a monument that Bocchus donated, when he was recognized as an 'ally of the Roman people'. The gift with which the king commended himself to his new friends was probably set up on the Capitoline Hill, with senatorial approval, as a dedication to Jupiter Optimus Maximus. The overall iconographical conception of the monument, and especially the carefully planned arrangement of the people represented, can without doubt be

[23] On these events (Sall. *Iug.*; Vell. Pat. 2.11.1 and 12.1; Plut. *Sull.* 3 and *Mar.* 10) Hölkeskamp (2000) 202–3; Spannagel (2003) 325–6. On Marius' triumphs and the political conflicts over them cf. Livy, *Per.* 67–8; Plut. *Mar.* 12.

[24] On Marius' enemies in higher circles of the Senate, cf. Livy, *Per.* 68.

Figure 7.2 Denarius by Faustus Sulla, 56 BCE, reverse.
RRC i, no. 426/1; Numismatische Bilddatenbank Eichstätt.

attributed to Sulla's personal initiative, as it exclusively served his particular purposes. The overall appearance of the monument—four blocks from its base are extant and now part of the collection of the Centrale Montemartini in Rome—can be inferred from some images on coins minted by Sulla's son Faustus, a moneyer in 56 BC.

According to these coins, the group of gilded statues showed Sulla himself in the centre, seated on the *sella curulis*, turned frontally towards the viewer and hence dominating the scene. To his left, Bocchus was standing or kneeling, turned towards Sulla and handing him a laurel branch as a sign of his will to negotiate and make peace. And on the right one could see Jugurtha, subdued, kneeling, and in chains (see Figure 7.2). The scene was probably framed by two winged female figures of Victories, carrying booty and trophies.[25]

With this provocative iconographic demonstration of his personal role in capturing Jugurtha, Sulla broke in several ways with the unwritten rules of aristocratic display of status. By occupying such a privileged place in the memorial landscape of the city, he claimed for himself glory that, according to traditional rules, belonged to Marius. After all, Marius had waged the African war first as consul and then as

[25] *RRC* 426/1; Plut. *Sull.* 6 and *Mar.* 10 and 32. Of course we cannot expect Plutarch to say anything specifically about memory here—he does not have to, given the widely recognized function of *monumenta* of this kind as carriers of memory. Cf. Hölscher (1980) 357–8 and (2004) 89; Ramage (1991) 111–15; Behr (1993) 114–21; Sehlmeyer (1999) 194–7; Mackay (2000) 162–8; Hölkeskamp (2000) 203–4; Schmuhl (2008) 117–19. Hölscher convincingly argues that the blocks of dark stone with Victories and pieces of armour, found south of the Capitol near the S. Omobono area in 1937, were part of the Sullan monument. Cf. however Behr (1993) 126–7 and (1995), who rejects the identification of these remains with Sulla's monuments.

proconsul. The victory was won under his *imperium* and his *auspicia*, and therefore he alone had claim to *gloria*. Sulla, on the other hand, had only been quaestor, a lower office without *imperium*. For the negotiation with Bocchus he may have been given a propraetorian command, but only by Marius, who alone, as proconsul, was entitled to confer such powers. By boldly claiming this success for himself, Sulla disregarded the generally accepted hierarchies that were based on the strictly-regulated *cursus honorum*. Therefore, the Bocchus monument was a well-directed challenge to Marius, for it denied precisely his personal achievements and success, and thereby also contested his claim for special honours and for a corresponding place in the collective memory of the city.[26]

Viewers in 79 BC may have recalled this whole story when they saw the Bocchus monument—the long war in Africa, the spectacular display of Jugurtha in Marius' triumph, and the scandal that the Bocchus monument had caused. Marius had by no means simply accepted Sulla's well-aimed provocation. On the contrary: according to Plutarch, he was beside himself with anger and jealousy and had demanded the immediate removal of the monument; the episode is further testimony to the power attributed to such monuments for shaping memory. But Sulla had taken countermeasures. It was only because of the outbreak of the social war that the dispute was not pursued to the bitter end (Plut. *Sull.* 6 and *Mar.* 32). In 79, these events were less than twenty years in the past and would have still been present in the 'communicative memory' of contemporaries—even if the intervening years were a nightmare for other reasons, which again Sulla, as a civil war leader, had to answer for.[27]

In the year 79, the recollection of two other monuments would have been just as vivid as the conflict surrounding the Bocchus monument. These monuments had been constructed by Marius around the year 100 in order to memorialize his victories over Jugurtha as well as the Cimbri and Teutons. This *homo novus*, true to the rules of the social class into which he had risen, had pursued 'a laborious and danger-filled life', because he was driven by the hope for renown in posterity. In the crises of the *res publica*, he too, as

[26] Hölscher (1980) 357–8; Behr (1993) 28–9; Mackay (2000) 163–4.

[27] Cf. on the differentiation of 'collective' versus 'communicative memory', Assmann (1988) 10–16; (1992) 48–66; (2000) 37–8; and (2008). Cf. the pertinent critique by Borsdorf and Grütter (1999) 4–5. See also Welzer (2008).

Cicero puts it, had done his duty honourably as well as energetically, mainly because he hoped for eternal glory in the future, which in Rome could be secured first and foremost by setting up a monument in a prominent spot (Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 29). According to Plutarch, at least one of Marius' two monuments was placed in the Area Capitolina. It is said to have been 'a gilded image' of the general, 'worked with the greatest artistry', and flanked by two Victories bearing trophies. In this respect it was not unlike the Bocchus monument, which therefore may have angered Marius for the further reason that—on top of everything else—it so blatantly referred to his own victory monument, set up only a few years earlier, and so brazenly copied its iconographic repertoire (Plut. *Mar.* 32.4 and *Caes.* 6).[28]

However, our visitor of 79 had no chance of finishing his walk around the Capitol at this particular Marian monument or of recalling all those exciting, partly glorious, partly tragic stories connected to its donor, the man who had been Sulla's most important opponent during his lifetime. There were not only the wars against Jugurtha and the Cimbri and Teutons, the victories at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae which had gained Marius the honorary titles of *pater patriae* and 'refounder of the state' (Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 27; Plut. *Mar.* 27). The monument, rather, reminded the viewer of the terrible events of the final three years of Marius' life, when the ageing general played an important role in the bloody excesses of Cinna and other rivals and opponents of Sulla.

However, the memory of these events was now obliterated—at least from the monumental memory of the city: for Sulla as dictator had ordered the Marian monument on the Capitoline to be destroyed. It had simply disappeared from the densely-packed commemorative landscape of the area in front of the Temple of Jupiter. Together with it, all other monuments in the city that aimed to commemorate Marius' victories had probably been removed during Sulla's sweeping purge. That is certainly the case for the second victory monument of Marius, whose location is unknown to us today. And it was probably also true for various spoils from the Gallic wars that had been

[28] On the Marian monuments cf. also Val. Max. 4.4.8 and 6.9.14; Vell. Pat. 2.43.3; Suet. *Iul.* 11; Prop. 3.11.45. Cf. Hölscher (1980) 356–7; Sehlmeyer (1999) 192–4; Mackay (2000) 164–7; Spannagel (2003) 327–36, with further evidence; Hölscher (2004) 89; Schmuhl (2008) 113–15.

distributed all over the city.[29] A visitor to the Forum may even have lost the chance to see the Cimbric shield from Marius' booty that had been affixed to the wall of a *taberna* near the Rostra. The said visitor may have particularly regretted this loss, since this shield—depicting, in rough outline, an incredibly ugly and deformed Gaul shamelessly sticking out his tongue at the viewer—had been a source of amusement at public assemblies and trials. Orators at the nearby Rostra had regularly referred to the shield with eloquent gestures. They pointed in a theatrical way to the image and compared the physiognomy of their rivals for popular favour to that of the ugly Gaul. With this less-than-subtle but effective device, one could easily draw the laughs and votes of the assembly to one's own side—as Quintilian, generations later, taught in his handbook on rhetoric (Cic. *De or*. 2.266; Plin. *HN* 35.24–5; Quint. *Inst*. 6.3.37–8).[30] The salient point is that we are dealing not only with the physical destruction of monuments and statues, but also with the management, manipulation, and destruction of memory, because, as one Roman source (a commentator on Horace) put it succinctly, 'the name "monument" applies not only to burial places but to anything that attests memory' (*monumentum non sepulcrum tantum dicitur, sed omne quicquid memoriam testatur*, Porphyrio on Hor. *Carm*. 1.2.15).

CONCLUSION

Let us return to our imaginary visitor of 79 for one last time: On his stroll through Rome following Sulla's spectacular resignation, he did not encounter a single monument commemorating C. Marius, who had been consul seven times and celebrated three triumphs. He strolled through a city from which the monumental reminders of one of the greatest generals and leading politicians of the previous

[29] Suet. *Iul*. 11.2 explicitly states that Sulla personally ordered the destruction. According to Plut. *Caes*. 6.3, however, this measure was taken on the basis of 'laws and decisions', i.e. probably initiated by Sulla and agreed by Senate and assembly. Cf. Spannagel (2003) 340–4, who emphasizes the fact that this was not a spontaneous act of destruction of the same sort that also happened. Mackay (2000) 165–6, following Plut., suggests that the monument was buried, because complete destruction of such a dedication to the gods would have been a sacrilege.

[30] Cf. Hölscher (1990) 82 with n. 79; Spannagel (2003) 331–2.

generation had been systematically removed and totally eradicated. What he did see, on the one hand, were the ancient numinous places and statues of mythical figures by which the legendary age of foundation was kept alive and visibly present and thus directly connected to his own contemporary world. What he also saw, on the other, was the impressive line-up of victory monuments and honorific statues with which the achievements of Republican generals were inscribed for ever into the collective memory of the city. In a process continuing over centuries, those achievements had turned the small town by the Tiber into the ruler of the world. This series of monuments extended back to the beginnings of the Republic, and its end point was now occupied by Sulla—a prominent member of the ancient *gens Cornelia*, victor over Jugurtha and the allies revolting in Italy, over Rome's mighty foe in the East, Mithridates, and finally over his opponents in the civil war. Sulla had added his deeds on behalf of the *res publica* to the accumulated symbolic capital of his class—a sort of capital that took concrete form in the thick crowd of monuments from countless generations in the urban profile of the city.

However, only at first sight does Sulla's self-representation through monuments seem conservative and traditional. By destroying his opponent Marius' monuments and thus attempting to erase his enemy's remembrance from the 'communicative memory' (as defined above) of his contemporaries, he equally radically rewrote the rules for the continuation of historical recollection. Moreover, he directed the fight for a place in the collective memory of the city in a totally new direction, and added a degree of fierceness that was not previously known. Up until then, members of this ruling class had competed for the most prestigious places in the memory of future generations, and in the final reckoning accepted that any of their competitors for eternal glory had a legitimate opportunity to leave his own mark in the commemorative landscape—this had been part of the consensus in which, for centuries, the never-ending competition among individual members of this collective had been embedded.[31] Sulla, however, took away from his peers and future generations the right to decide who would enter history as the victor over Jugurtha and as the greatest Roman of his generation, by pursuing—in a completely new and radical manner—the total elimination of his

[31] Cf. Hölkeskamp (2006a).

rival's memorial presence. Thus he rescinded the traditional consensus. There is even more to this: Sulla was the first to put forward an unprecedented absolute claim for dominance over the public realm and monumental memory—and that was much more than a merely symbolic act. This claim, and the manner of its enforcement, marked at least the beginning of the end of equality within the aristocracy and hence of the fundamental precondition for its collective rule. Some decades would pass before this collective rule finally did end, when Augustus not only established a new monarchic regime over Rome and her Empire, but also—and in the very same process—monopolized for good the power of images as well as absolute control over the hallowed public space of the Eternal City.[32]

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[32] Cf. Spannagel (1999) 326–44; (2003) 353. An earlier German version of this chapter appeared in *Klio* 95 (2013) 429–46. The present text is a substantially revised and updated version. Special thanks are due to Elisabeth Schwinge, Matthew Roller (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore), and Karl Galinsky for valuable help with the production of an acceptable English text as well as for stimulating comments. I am also grateful to Karl-J. Hölkeskamp who, as always, read the text and discussed it with me at length and in detail.

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8

Monuments, Memory, and Status Recognition in Roman Asia Minor

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The attractiveness of memory studies across disciplines, from clinical sciences to the humanities, is obvious: almost everyone possesses the capacity for memory, and memories have been accepted as conditioning the way in which people and groups interact with themselves, others, and the events happening around them. Its relevance is wide ranging and has been generally assumed by scholars of Roman art. But is this assumption warranted? In this essay I review some of the important literature in social and cultural memory studies and consider examples of its application to the study of public honorific portraits and sculptural programmes in Asia Minor. My analysis addresses two critical questions: Does our modern sense of a monument or memorial actually reflect the ancient expectations for these objects? Or has memory scholarship been applied too loosely in the study of these genres of Roman art?

THEORIES OF MEMORY IN ROMAN STUDIES

In the study of Roman art, memory is approached from different angles and used in different ways. That the Greeks and especially the Romans were highly concerned with memory as a human faculty is no secret; hardly any work on classical memory is without a reference to Quintilian's advice for students of rhetoric to locate their memories in their minds as though in the parts of a house

(*Inst.* 11.2.20–1),[1] or Cicero's description of Simonides' banquet disaster in *De Oratore* (2.352–4.).[2] These recommendations and anecdotes are deeply connected to textual culture,[3] but scholarly appreciation of ancient mnemotechnics has led to innovative ways of approaching Roman art, such as Bettina Bergmann's (1994) 'The Roman House as Memory Theater: The House of the Tragic Poet in Pompeii', which argued for a kinetic viewing of domestic wall-painting assemblages and the understanding of these painted images as stimuli for contemplations of Greek mythology and literary and dramatic arts.[4] Other research, such as Michael Koortbojian's (2005) 'Mimesis or Phantasia? Two Representational Modes in Roman Commemorative Art', that draws upon ancient theories of memory and related concepts such as imagination, has resulted in important observations on the participatory and emotional ancient viewing of funerary monuments.[5]

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MEMORY

As useful as classical memory theory is, it is instead the scholarship on social and cultural memory that has begun to be adopted by scholars of Roman archaeology and art history. Since the major

[1] The arrangement of memories as images within mental spaces such as houses is also described in *Rhet. Her.* 3.16–20. Small (1997) 95–7 points out that visualizing memory, as elements within an imagined architectural space, with the concept of *loci* is a particularly Roman development. Small (1997) 109–11 not only describes Quintilian's memory house but also notes his criticism that mnemotechnics can be counteractive because the multiple demands on an orator's memory can impede a smooth recitation.

[2] This incident is also described in Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.11–17. See also Farrell (1997) 376–8; Small (1997) 82–3. Small (1997) 10 also discusses the ancient perception of the difference between memory in the mind of an individual and external vehicles, such as writing and the book, for recording content so as to facilitate exact repetition and to perpetuate knowledge of the content. In addition, Small (1997) 56–7 also notes that the readability of public inscriptions was often secondary to the creation of a visible monument. Writing and its public display, therefore, seem to have functions similar to those of the public portrait, at least in scholarly perception, which will be discussed below.

[3] Small (1997) 3–9, 83 contextualizes the ancient mnemotechnics as arising from 'the concept of a fixed text that must be repeated word for word'.

[4] Bergmann (1994) 226, 249, 254.

[5] Koortbojian (2005) 288–91, 293–5. See also Koortbojian (1996).

scholars and concepts of memory studies have already been presented in the Introduction to this volume, a short summary of the principal guiding ideas and the way they have been incorporated (or not) into the relevant classical scholarship will serve as an introduction to my putting some of the resulting assumptions to the test.

Maurice Halbwachs—the progenitor of collective memory—situated individuals' memories of the past within constantly evolving social frameworks.[6] Collective feedback and validation osmotically extend the capacity of memory from the person to the society composed of many, and give meaning to reconstructions of the past according to the contingencies of the present.[7] As Halbwachs sums up simply, 'society, in each period, rearranges its recollections in such a way as to adjust them to the variable conditions of its equilibrium'[8] and '[i]n each period society in fact foregrounds those activities that are of greatest interest and importance to it'.[9] Halbwachs's work is the basis for other models of collective memory, such as Pierre Nora's influential *lieux de mémoire*, or sites of memory. The Introduction has already highlighted the flexibility and wide applicability of this concept and the explicit connection between the *lieux de mémoire*, historical awareness, and national identity that lies at the core of Nora's approach.[10] To designate a monument as a site of memory allows one, then, to understand it as both maker and manifestation of the national ethos. Such an understanding of the relationship between art, memory, and identity intersects with Jan Assmann's model of 'cultural memory', a complex refinement of Halbwachs's original concepts.[11] In contrast to *lieux de mémoire*, which can arise informally, cultural memory is 'intensely formalized and institutionalized' in how ritual and monuments, but especially written language—controlled by 'specialist' classes and privileged subgroups—allow ethnicities to define

[6] Halbwachs (1925), (1941), (1950), (1980), (1992). His role as the progenitor of social memory studies is widely acknowledged; see, e.g. Olick and Robbins (1998) 109–11, who like other authors place Halbwachs at the beginning of their historical survey of the field; Cubitt (2007); Irwin-Zarecka (1994); Rossington and Whitehead (2007); Erll and Nünning (2010).

[7] Halbwachs (1992) 124, 129, 132, 136–7, 171, 183, 188; (1980) 48.

[8] Halbwachs (1992) 183.

[9] Halbwachs (1992) 136.

[10] Nora (1989) 19–23.

[11] Assmann (1992; published in English trans. 2011); (1988; published in English trans. 1995); (2010); for the Near Eastern and Egyptian cultural contexts for cultural memory, see Assmann (2011) 2, 6, 36–69, 112–23; 21–33 esp. on Halbwachs.

their identities through representations of their seminal events, figures, and ideas.[12]

These theoretical approaches to memory are countered by what has been called a historical functionalism and presentism,[13] associated with Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger's (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*. Hobsbawm explores the creation of traditions via visual media and ceremony that claimed—truthfully or not—continuity with the past for various purposes that were political and social in nature.[14] The case studies in Hobsbawm and Ranger's edited volume, as works of targeted historical analysis, eschew terminologies of memory, personal or collective; nevertheless, though arising from different disciplinary and ideological roots, the emphasis on the present using the past to promote group identity and social cohesion[15] is shared by *The Invention of Tradition*, Maurice Halbwachs's collective memory, Nora's *lieux de mémoire*, and Assmann's cultural memory.[16]

Susan Alcock, in her (2002) *Archaeologies of the Greek Past*, was among the first scholars in Roman archaeology to promote active engagement with social memory scholarship.[17] In this and other works, Alcock uses social memory as a way to examine Greek provinces, cities, and peoples under the Roman Empire at moments of profound change.[18] In her analysis, these different groups engaged selectively with their past so as to construct identities that were useful and relevant for their contemporary situations. What is important about this work is Alcock's strong belief in the 'materiality of memory', which was first

[12] Assmann (2010) 112, 113; (2011) 37–8, 42–4; for fuller discussion of specialization, see Assmann (2011) 39, 79–80.

[13] Winter (2010) 63; Olick (2007) 8. Olick and Robbins (1998) 114, 117–18, and 128 which also refines the presentism of Hobsbawm and Ranger's work further into an instrumentalist approach.

[14] Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) 2, 9.

[15] Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) 9.

[16] For overviews of cultural memory scholarship, see Olick and Robbins (1998), which provides, in a short form, a thorough review of the development of social memory scholarship, including discussion of the crucial connection between memory and identity, ideological uses of cultural memory, and responses to problems with concepts of social and cultural memory; Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011); Cubitt (2007); Nelson and Olin (2003); Boyer and Wertsch (2009); Wertsch (2002); Irwin-Zarecka (1994); Rossington and Whitehead (2007).

[17] See also Small and Tatum (1995) for discussion of the uses of both social and cognitive memory scholarship in classical philology.

[18] See, e.g. Alcock (2001).

noted by Halbwachs,[19] as this helped to open up avenues of research in Classical studies in which material and visual culture have become closely intertwined with questions of collective memory. Since Alcock's work popularized the concepts and vocabulary of collective memory in the field, non-archaeologists have also taken advantage of this scholarship. For instance, Harriet Flower's examinations, drawn primarily from ancient literary and historical evidence, of the Roman conception of *memoria* as 'designed precisely in opposition to the vast oblivion' that was the assumed 'normal state',[20] have added to our understanding of the sanction of images and the Roman construction of historical narratives.

As *Archaeologies of the Greek Past* and its conceptual predecessor, Alcock's (2001) 'The Reconfiguration of Memory in the Greek East', were explicitly focused on the Second Sophistic, it should come as no surprise that in the years since their publication, many studies of the Second Sophistic have used social memory, loosely defined, to examine the marked cultural antiquarianism of the period.[21] Marco Galli's introduction to his and Orietta Cordovana's (2007) edited volume, *Arte e memoria culturale nell'età della Seconda Sofistica*, takes care to define what he means by cultural memory, as a 'concept applicable to each type of knowledge shared by a group or a collective, which leads to action and experience in a specific social space', while it 'always remains the case that the individual possesses the memory or memories'.[22] In setting the parameters of the volume, Galli refers often to collective and cultural memory scholarship; however, with the contributors of the essays, the type and level of engagement varies.[23]

[19] Alcock (2002) 27; Halbwachs (1941) and (1980) 129–57. Connerton, influenced by Halbwachs's construct of social memory, presents an important nuance on the 'materiality of memory'. He finds social memory manifesting itself not only in objects such as clothing and costume, but also in the very 'bodily practices' of the individual: Connerton (1989) 33, 72–104. By performing prescribed and controlled movements reiteratively in rituals, Connerton (1989) 25–6, 57–71 argues that the individual and, by extension and mass association, society's motor mechanism becomes habituated to commemoration and conditioned to sustaining specific identities and memories.

[20] Flower (2006) 2, 3. Flower's study depends on the interpretative framework of cultural and collective memory, though the discourse on these concepts is not central in her presentation and argument.

[21] For important early work on the Second Sophistic, see Bowie (1970); Bowersock (1974); Anderson (1993). More recent works include Goldhill (2001); Borg (2004); Konstan and Saïd (2006); Scott and Webster (2003); Swain, Harrison, and Elsner (2007); Yegül (2000).

[22] Galli (2007) 8; English trans. of Italian original by author.

[23] Galli (2007) 8.

While Francesco De Angelis takes a critical stance towards the application of popular memory models such as the *lieux de mémoire* to Pausanias' Greek travelogue,[24] Fabrizio Slavazzi bypasses cultural memory concepts altogether in his discussions of the importance of foundation legends and their representation in the revived early Classical style in second-century Asia Minor.[25]

PUBLIC HONORIFIC PORTRAITS AS CARRIERS OF MEMORY

In works on Roman portrait statues, social memory has evinced another permutation. Most of the scholarship considers the public portrait statue as a carrier of social memory within much broader analyses of the Roman portrait's typologies and cultural importance. Some scholars emphasize the personal memories of the portrait subject as well as the recognition of his or her place in the community,[26] and others suggest that these portraits begin as personal monuments that become part of a city's collective memory of its history.[27] These discussions of how memory is relevant to this type of public art are at once crucial to our understanding of its place in Roman society and strangely vague in the consideration of its workings. It often seems that once the word 'memory' is used, further discussion is unnecessary, because the reader should understand

[24] De Angelis (2007) 49, which does not find Nora's concept or, indeed, other modern heuristic models of memory suitable in understanding Pausanias' particular way of simultaneous historical recollection and moral commentary at Greek cultic and civic landmarks.

[25] Slavazzi (2007) 123–36. Slavazzi argues that major patrons in Asia Minor used the Severe style to articulate their Greek *paideia*, and to express their loyalty to Hadrian, who had spearheaded the resurgence of the Classical style in Rome. Furthermore, the patrons' penchant towards depictions of heroic founders are seen by Slavazzi as a way to cast themselves as new founders in their cities.

[26] See, e.g. Stewart (2008) 102–3 and (2003) 136–49; Tanner (2000); Platt (2007) 264; Eck (1984) 131–2; Smith (2006) 19–28.

[27] Fejfer (2008) 69, 435; (2002) 254–5. Along similar lines, the discussion of Roman architecture also often presents a view, for example, advocated in Thomas (2007) 169–78, that public buildings were understood as permanent fixtures in the landscape and as having a 'monumental' quality that was commemorative and ideological. Cf. Chapter 6 by Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp and Chapter 7 by Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp in this volume.

immediately not just that these statues and buildings relate to the past and commemorate people in a certain way, but also how exactly those processes occur. Yet, this state of affairs must surely be unsatisfactory, as the way that these statues functioned as memorial objects is unexplained and taken for granted, and their contributions to a collective memory that is left undefined do not serve to elucidate what is meant when the term is applied.[28] Clearly, when one refers to the honorific portrait as an object of collective memory, one is not talking about the same kind of memory that is activated with statues of heroic city founders and Severe-style models. Are such examples of public art indeed carriers of memory? Is collective or cultural memory relevant in the study of Roman honorific portraits?

MEMORY AND HONOUR IN DIO CHRYSOSTOM'S ORATIONS ON STATUE HONOURS

It can and should more often be noted that public honorific portrait statues were actually not very effective memorials for their elite subjects.[29] In the orations of Dio Chrysostom—especially the *Rhodian Oration*, which has been used as a source for understanding the importance of the honorific statue in the Greek East—it is clear that statues were seen as things to be recycled and reused, so that the city of Rhodes could vote statue honours for more (Roman) people and do it more cheaply (*Or.* 31.9).[30] The names of the statue subjects

[28] This is not to cast aspersions on these admirable works on the Roman portrait. The author is aware that memory is a small consideration in these pieces of scholarship, but is here advocating for greater discretion in using the terminology of collective/cultural memory. Hölkeskamp (2014), on the other hand, presents the case for the use of different memory models and terminologies in the study of Roman culture.

[29] Likewise, there is an abundance of textual evidence, such as that presented by Wiseman (2014) and Jenkyns (2014), that clearly indicates a preference for new architecture and the continual modernization of the urban landscape over the preservation of old structures simply as monuments of antiquity.

[30] Dio's *Orations* are considered a reliable source despite their obviously rhetorical nature. See Stewart (2003), (2008), and (2007) 27–42; Fejfer (2008); Salmeri (2000) 82; Galinsky (2008) 8; Platt (2007), which focuses on the rhetorical and semiotic disjunction produced by the reinscription practice. See also Jones (1978) 26–35 for a political analysis of this oration.

were erased so that the statue could be given to a new honorand, causing Dio and others in his position—the position to be honoured with a statue—considerable anguish. Though Dio does say that elite benefactors found the statue honours to be attractive because they would preserve their memories (*Or.* 31.16 and 25),[31] his main objections to the reuse of honorific statues are not that the recipients are deprived of their memory, but rather, firstly, that they are deprived of their honour, and secondly, that the Rhodian assembly refuses to uphold the social bargain implied by the statues, which was to recognize and affirm the elites' status in the community (*Or.* 31.37, 58, 16, 29, 10).[32] 'For what', asks Dio as he argues for the need to respect the honorific statues as they were dedicated, 'is more sacred than honour or gratitude?' (*Or.* 31.37 and 58).[33] That Dio perceived that the honorific statue's primary function was not to prolong memory but to display public recognition can be detected in his listing of statues as one of several prestigious honours such as crowns, seats of honour, and acclamations (*Or.* 31.16 and 29).[34] Indeed, Dio tells the Rhodians that to be given the seat of honour at their theatre just once would be a greater honour than to be given a statue in another city (*Or.* 31.110). But these other kinds of honours do not, in modern scholarship, carry the burden of commemoration in the same way that the portrait statue does.

The limitations of the public honorific portrait to perpetuate memory are further shown when Dio introduces a hypothetical objection that the practice of reinscribing statue bases does no harm because 'the practice is not followed in the case of any person who is well known' (*Or.* 31.72–4). That objection in itself implies that it would be ridiculous to pass off a portrait of a famous person as someone else because the community already has strong awareness of the person that was not bound to the statue. Furthermore, Dio warns that even fame is not eternal and certainly not guaranteed by a statue, saying, 'it is not due to their humble birth or any baseness that we do not know [the identities of the statue subjects], seeing that they have received the same honours as the most famous men, but our ignorance has

[31] Cic. *Att.* 6.1.26 also refers to the reinscription of names on statue bases.

[32] See also Tanner (2000) 25–6, and n. 27 above; Jones (1978) 20, 28–9; Bekker-Nielsen (2008) 165–7, 171–3; Smith (2006) 18–21.

[33] Trans. J. W. Cohoon and H. L. Crosby, Loeb Classical Library (1940).

[34] See also Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 150–4 for the Greek honorific system; also Gauthier (1985); Veyne (1990).

come through lapse of time' (*Or.* 31.74). Later in the oration, Dio reiterates this point, thereby drawing attention again to how commonly it happens that identities even of exceedingly famous persons or demigods could be lost, despite the fact that 'it was believed that, on account of the surpassing glory then attaching to these men, their names would remain for all future time' (*Or.* 31.91).

Moreover, if the erasure of an honorific inscription and the reuse of the statue could be justified on the grounds that many of the reinscribed statues were for people with no surviving relatives and 'the kinsmen [of the portrait subject] would surely put a stop to [the statue's being recycled]' (*Or.* 31.72–3, 99), doubtless this is because it was only relatives and friends and not the wider citizenry who saw the statue as a carrier of personal memories. Dio, in one of his arguments against statue recycling, appeals to the Rhodians' sense of decency to spare the feelings of the family of the portrait subject: 'And then if children or kinsmen of the great man should happen to appear, what floods of tears do you think they will shed when someone begins to obliterate the name?' (*Or.* 31.71). He then presents the hypothetical counterargument, that 'many of them are persons who have no surviving relative' (*Or.* 31.72), which again strongly suggests that memory lay with the private circle of the honorand rather than with the community at large.[35] The personal, rather than public, commemorative function of honorific statues is supported by several anecdotes. Pliny the Younger relates in a letter how it would please him to be able to pass by and look at the posthumous honorific statue of a young man whom he had greatly loved in life, and how the statue would be a reminder of his form and his virtue (*Ep.* 2.6–7). On the part of strangers, however, Pliny sees the statue as inspiring emulation in virtue, rather than stimulating memories of the deceased (*Ep.* 2.5). Similarly the fourth-century poet Rutilius Namantianus describes his reaction to the honorific statue of his father—so intensely personal it 'made [him] weep: tears of a saddened joy wet [his] cheeks with their flow' (Rut. Namat. 1.577–8)[36]—as it evoked the son's memories of his father's happy relationship with the people of Pisa.[37] At the same time,

[35] That friends and family of the subject were the ones truly susceptible to evocations of memory by the image, in a funerary context, is made explicit in Koortbojian (2005) 288–91, 293–5.

[36] Trans. J. W. Duff and A. M. Duff, Loeb Classical Library (1934).

[37] Stewart (2008) 103; see Stewart (2007) 38 for statue as a 'perpetual memorial' that aided in 'cementing [dedicators and recipients'] mutual affection'.

Namantianus also relates that the memory of his father's tenure as a beloved governor is passed on not by the statue, but because 'old men who can remember him make [his qualities as governor] known to their sons', in a line of personal transmission that one generation later already seems to be tenuous (Rut. Namat. 1.589–90). In addition, the task of sustaining the relevance of a statue, of preserving the memory of the subject, was the responsibility of heirs charged with its maintenance, and was often accomplished through rituals near the statue such as dispersals of money or the decoration of the statue.[38]

Throughout the lengthy *Rhodian Oration*, the wrong that Dio repeatedly alleges is the deprivation of honour, not memory. Honour refers to public acknowledgement of an individual, but the recycling of the statue exposes the fact that this recognition is momentary rather than permanent, and that it is subject to withdrawal. The recycling of honorific statues highlights the insecurity of elite status within the community by calling attention to the short attention span of the public. The benefactor who had earned his public's admiration with a significant gift, or even with a lifetime of contributions, could not count on that sentiment to endure for long (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.33, 41, 77). For the importance of the public honorific portrait statue was not to preserve an individual's memory for posterity, but to establish and reaffirm social relationships and status at the time of its creation.[39] The statues given by Prusa to Dio's mother marked her out as a woman of high social standing in her city, but those statues and whatever memory they may have carried of her as a generous patron did her son no good when Dio was embroiled in hostile civic politics (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 46.8–11).[40] Even Dio himself, upon returning to Prusa after his exile, was offered statues by the assembly, and they were given as signs of their welcome and good wishes. Dio refused these statues, preferring, so he claimed, only the genuine words of love from his peers (*Or.* 44.4, 2; 46.2–5).[41] None of this affection, which had compelled the offering of an honorific portrait, seems to

[38] Fejfer mentions many of these rituals, such as the placing of wreaths and the disbursal of moneys on birthdays: (2008) 63–70 and (2002) 250–4; *IAph2007* 11.110.

[39] Stewart (2008) 102, 104; (2007) 38; Platt (2007) 250; Rose (1997) 3.

[40] See Salmeri (2000) 64; Martin (1996) 67 on fickleness of public sentiment.

[41] See Salmeri (2000) 66; Jones (1978) 105.

have endured when Dio was charged with financial incompetence and the failure to keep his promise to complete building projects (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 43, 45–7; Plin. *Ep.* 10.81 and 82).[42]

Dio's other point of contention in the *Rhodian Oration* regarding statue recycling is the refusal of civic bodies to stick to assumed agreements. This type of behaviour, in Dio's view, is the manifestation of a defect in the body politic, and he uses strong words in condemnation of such actions:

> [the city] does not even permit those who have received anything to keep what they have justly acquired, or actually gives what the giver asserts he is giving to those who have been considered worthy of the same reward, but deprives the one class of their gift and deceives and hoodwinks the other.... doing anything whatever with deceit and trickery and the extreme of niggardliness amounts to the same thing;...such conduct when done by men to one another is called injustice. (*Or.* 31.12–13)

Dio emphasizes not the destruction of the memory of a person with the reuse of a statue, but the corruption of a system of government and public morality. Again and again, Dio claims that reinscribing statue bases is 'injustice', 'deceit', 'subterfuge', and 'pretence'; these harsh words are aimed at the citizens of cities who would shake hands on a deal with fingers crossed behind their backs. The way in which Dio frames his discussion of the honorific statues, and specifically their bases, is similar to a discussion of currency, in which the circulation of counterfeit money serves to undermine the trust in the issuer and to sow seeds of doubt about the real value of the currency. Once the currency, the statue, has been debased, the entire system is shown to be worthless, and elites would refuse to be bothered by the cities at all (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.29; 38).[43] The perpetuation of memory on either the individual or collective levels was

[42] Salmeri (2000) 67; Jones (1978) 100–3, 111–14; Bekker-Nielsen (2008) 126–7, 133–6.

[43] See Højte (2002) 62; Kinney (1997) 135. For the tensions between dedicators and recipients of statues, see Salmeri (2000) 70; Tanner (2000) 31–3 on asymmetry of this relationship; Ma (2000) 119, 121 on the pressure of the public on elites; and Ma (2007) 213–19 on this pressure in the Hellenistic period. Ma (2013) recapitulates these discussions in greater detail, giving more emphasis to competitive pressures brought on elites by members of their own class, and further embeds Hellenistic public portraits in a complex matrix of public and semi-private relationships, physicality, and time that governed civic culture and social interaction.

not Dio's primary or even secondary concern. In addition to the information gleaned from Dio, it is known that honorific statues were moved, or cleared away from congested spaces, that faces were recarved, and that statues had to be actively maintained over time.[44] All of this calls into question the idea that the public honorific portrait was universally understood in antiquity as something that served, in and of itself, as a memorial whose relevance extended beyond the moment of its dedication.[45]

PUBLIC SCULPTURAL PROGRAMMES AS EXPRESSIONS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Given the instability of the stand-alone honorific portrait as a memory object, one should then consider if private portraits—that is, non-honorific portraits of elites—situated within a larger public sculptural programme could have enjoyed greater commemorative force. Public sculptural programmes in Asia Minor have been a popular topic of scholarship, and indeed they are the subject of numerous essays, including Slavazzi (2007) and various books, essays, and dissertations.[46] Adorning the public monuments in the cities of Asia Minor

[44] See, e.g. Plin. *NH* 34.14.1–2; Livy, 40.51.3; Cass. Dio 60.25.2–3; Stewart (2003) 119, 129, 133–6, 279–80; Shear (2007); Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 163; *IAph2007* 4.308; 8.86; Roueché (2011) 95; Pollini (1984); Varner (2004); Smith (2006) 33. The recutting of portraits, especially imperial portraits, has obvious relevance to memory. Often, this practice is examined as a manifestation of *damnatio memoriae*, but Galinsky (2008) 4–5, 13–15, 17, 21–2 observes that the resculpting of portraits does not always have a negative connotation, and can indeed be ideologically neutral and arise from practical considerations such as cost. Furthermore, comparative dynamics created by the juxtaposition of the images of the old and new subjects required recognition and knowledge of the original subject, which in the case of warehoused portraits that were reworked and recirculated, did not always occur. See also Smith (2007) on reinstallation of second-century statues in later contexts.

[45] Indeed, Ma (2013) 291 proposes that, in the Hellenistic civic context, but also beyond that in the Greek cities of the Roman period, honorific portraits' significance depended not on their representation of any personal identity, but on their embodiment of 'the enacting of relationality' between communities, elites, and other stakeholders.

[46] See, e.g. the various essays in D'Andria and Romeo (2011); Longfellow (2011); Ng (2007); Newby (2003); Atik (2003); Chi (2002).

were often portraits of elite citizens set up alongside representations of legendary city founders.[47] Such is the case with the portraits of T. Claudius Aristion and his wife, which were part of the sculptural programme at the Nymphaeum of Trajan at Ephesus, which featured, of course, a colossal portrait of Trajan, but also a statue of Androklos, the Athenian prince who founded Ephesus.[48] Traces of Androklos appear in the material culture of Ephesus in different periods, from the heroon from the Hellenistic period dedicated to him, to a statue from the fountain in the early second century AD, to coins also from the same time, to the fourth-century frieze from the so-called Temple of Hadrian.[49] Cults to this hero existed in the city, and annual offerings were made in his honour in the gymnasia of the city,[50] such as the bath-gymnasium of Vedius, dating to the Antonine period, which has yet another statue of Androklos, set alongside portraits of the building's donor and his family in the 'marble hall' or *kaisersaal*.[51]

In Ephesus, the past in the form of Androklos seems to have been referenced continuously throughout the city's history from the Hellenistic period onwards, in a behaviour or mode of action that may be close to memory, in that a person and his exploits existed and took place, were then recalled at intervals, and were thus perpetuated in the consciousness of the people in a community. Androklos was significant at an early point in the life of the city, and continued to be important centuries after the event with which he is associated. His pursuit of the boar that led to the spot where Ephesus would be founded was celebrated in different types of media; he became the recipient of offerings, of acknowledgement, that came in spaced

[47] Slavazzi (2007) 123 specifically finds that in general, public sculptural programmes from Roman Asia Minor tend to include depictions of the emperor, a city's patron deity, its founder, and the monument's donor, with other elements in combination.

[48] Along with statues of Dionysus, Aphrodite, and a young satyr. See Dorl-Klingenschmid (2001) 189; the field reports by Miltner (1959a) and (1959b); analysis of the statues and the private portraits from the fountain can be found in Fleischer (1982) 123–9; Longfellow (2011) 77–94; Chi (2002) 52–8, 62; Ng (2007) 201–9.

[49] Thür (1995) 82ff; and (2004) 160; Wörrle (1973) 470–7; Brenk (1968); Knibbe (1999) 163–72; Ng (2007) 192–9.

[50] Thür (1995) 74.

[51] Auinger (2011) 117–29; Ng (2007) 209–18; Slavazzi (2007) 127–30; Chi (2002) 84–104; Scherrer (2001) 57–95; Keil (1929a) 24–9 and (1929b) 25–6; the *kaisersaal* is also discussed by Yegül (1982) 7–31; Aurenhammer (1990) 127–8; Manderscheid (1981) 90, no. 185; Dillon (1996) 261–74.

intervals. This sort of collective and cultural memory must serve a contemporary purpose,[52] and one could find the purpose for Androklos' remembrance in the creation and promotion of a unique civic identity for Ephesus, in which the city, through the deeds of this Athenian prince, was distinguished as a Hellenic rather than Asiatic centre from its beginning. Though other cities in Roman Asia also had very real historical connections to the Greek mainland, the exploits of Androklos were unique to Ephesus, and provided that city with its own particular slice of Ionian history while simultaneously emphasizing the antiquity of the community. This civic identity then aided Ephesus in competitions for honours and privileges in the fierce intercity rivalries of the imperial period.[53]

EPHESIAN FOUNDERS: METAPHOR OVER MEMORY

Very close to statues of Androklos stood the portraits of emperors and of elite benefactors. These local elites were not only in physical proximity to the hero, but also sometimes carried the title of founder—*ktístēs*.[54] Greek cities were in the habit of declaring great patrons founders,[55] and thus seem to be living in an environment in which different phases of history easily slipped across each other, in which people living in the present could assume a role that only made sense in the past.[56] Did these sculptural programmes allow the donors whose portraits they carried to be inserted into a 'collective memory' of Ephesus? One could argue that each time the founder Androklos was recalled by viewers standing in front of the Nymphaeum of Trajan or in the baths of Vedius, they would note the presence of the elite citizens and include them in their remembrance of their legendary founder. But then, what exactly would be remembered about these citizens, or what would these citizens want to be remembered about themselves? The mere fact that they existed? Surely then, the presence of an imperial portrait next to the private portrait would

[52] See 'Social and Cultural Memory'; see also Winter (1995) 30, 50–3, 82–5, 97–8, 115.

[53] Ng (2007) 183–233.

[54] *I.Eph.* 727, 2065, 3075.

[55] Strubbe (1984–6).

[56] Slavazzi (2007) 134–6.

be more effective in establishing that Vedius or Aristion was alive at the time of the emperor, be it Antoninus Pius or Trajan, and enjoyed, in many cases, a real relationship with him.[57] The contemporary imperial portrait would serve as the chronological touchstone of a genuine historical moment, and would lend credibility to the status and social claims made by the elite whose portrait was placed nearby. For an Ephesian of the second century, the ties between the local elite and the emperor from whom money and privileges flowed would have had real potential for creating improvements in civic or personal welfare in his or her lifetime. In contrast, Androklos stood at a great chronological remove from the second-century elites, who had no impact on actions before their lifetimes, just as Androklos himself had no direct bearing on the actions of these particular wealthy men and women.

Consequently, the question arises: how did Androklos relate to these Ephesian elites of the Roman period? Clearly, the presence of Androklos is significant because of the comparison that was being made between this founder and the second-century benefactors by the city and by the elites themselves. Vedius was like Androklos in his gifts to the city and his investment in Ephesus. Aristion and his wife were like Androklos because they built up and sustained the Ephesian community. The exploits of Androklos and his relationship with Ephesus were the relevant matters in these specific comparisons, not the fact of his past-ness. To be sure, Androklos figured largely in the Ephesians' understanding of their history. The same, however, does not necessarily apply to those whose actions and relationship to Ephesus were like Androklos'. That Androklos continued to be an effective object of comparison does not mean that a historical continuum was being created by those who compared themselves to him. The metaphorical value of Androklos as the original benefactor of Ephesus contextualized the juxtaposition of images in the same way that the word *ktístēs*, a true description of Androklos in the eleventh century BC, was appropriate as an adjectival honour for men like Aristion in the second century AD.

That these honorary *ktísteis* had no actual place in the cultural memory of Ephesus—as anchored by the founder Androklos—was not missed in antiquity. The separation between articulations of elite

[57] Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* 6.31; *I.Eph.* 1491, 1492, 1493; Kalinowski (2002).

identity and the Ephesians' recollection of their past is demonstrated in the elaborate spectacle founded by C. Vibius Salutaris in 104 CE. This spectacle, occurring possibly as often as every two weeks[58] consisted of a procession from one end of Ephesus to the other, with a stop in the theatre in the middle, and is described in a lengthy inscription, copies of which were kept at the theatre and at the extramural temple of Artemis.[59] Salutaris founded this procession along with an annual lottery of money to the civic bodies and tribes of the city, the latter to take place on the birthday of the city's patron goddess Artemis. During this procession along the main avenues of the city, thirty-one silver and gilded images[60] were carried by the Ephesian ephebes. The images included numerous depictions of Artemis; a portrait of Lysimachos, the Hellenistic king who refounded the city in the second century BC; a depiction of Androklos; images of the emperor Trajan and his wife; and personifications of local and Roman civic bodies such as the demos, boule, and senate.[61] When these images came to their stop in the theatre, they were set up in groups on bases in the cavea of the theatre, according to the seating locations dedicated to each tribe and civic body.[62] After whatever business in the theatre was concluded, the statues were picked up once again by the ephebes and carried back to their storage place at the Artemision.[63]

This procession is noteworthy in many respects, but in the context of this essay, it is especially interesting in that, firstly, it presents a much more thorough narrative of Ephesian history than do the public sculptural programmes with their visual comparisons between contemporary benefactors and mythical founder. The great lacuna

[58] Rogers (1991) 83. Rogers's estimate of frequency cannot be verified, and has been doubted by scholars, but the inscription does at the very least specify that the procession should occur on the occasion of 'every regular assembly' each month, during all athletic games, and on any other days that the demos and the boule found appropriate. The frequency of this civic ritual would arguably move it into the category of iterative bodily performance, which Connerton argues would help to condition the social memory of Ephesian society.

[59] *I.Eph.* 27; German trans. by Merkelbach in Wankel (1979) 208–16, with further epigraphic fragments on 205–7; Rogers (1991); Ng (2007) 163–7, 218–27; Gebhard (1996) 123.

[60] Thirty-nine pledged images were supplemented by two additional gilded and silver images in a subsequent benefaction by Salutaris.

[61] For the number of statues, *I.Eph.* 27.22–5, 465–6, 470–2; for the entities represented, *I.Eph.* 27.22–31, 148–298.

[62] *I.Eph.* 27.202–7; Rogers (1992) 224–8.

[63] *I.Eph.* 27.207–10.

between Androklos and someone alive at the time of Trajan is, in this moving statuary assemblage, filled in by—importantly—other figures with prominent roles in the historical development of the city, not by various wealthy persons who donated a fountain here or a gate there. The entities worth celebrating in this recurring procession were the ones who really inaugurated new chapters in the history of Ephesus. Secondly, and consequently, there was no visual representation of the generous patron Salutaris carried during this procession; only the inscriptions at the theatre and the Artemision emphasized his role in the creation of this grand spectacle and monetary distribution. Though it is obvious that the long and detailed text reflected great credit on Salutaris, it is just as plain that the benefactor was not seen as someone who should be *remembered collectively* alongside Androklos or Lysimachos.

THE SOUTH CITY GATE AT PERGE: MEMORY OF A FICTIVE PAST?

The difficulty in this analysis, of course, is that we cannot know how second-century Ephesians understood the relationship between Androklos, elite patrons, and their own history; there is little to indicate how this complex network of associations played out in real life. It is useful, then, to look to other examples, other cities in which such networks between ancient founders and much later patrons were set up, for clues about how such metaphors were received and how they held up over time. The Pamphylian city Perge offers an elucidating comparison. The civic life of Perge in the first quarter of the second century CE seems to have been dominated by Plancia Magna, a woman whose generosity to her city defines Perge's landscape to this day. Among other gifts to her city, around 122 CE Plancia Magna renovated the Hellenistic South City Gate, creating a horseshoe-shaped complex in which statues of gods, heroes, and elites were set in the interior niches.[64] Among this number were statues of

[64] Bravi (2011) 304–10; Slavazzi (2007) 124–7; Ng (2007) 47–57; Mansel (1956) 34–120; Abbasoğlu (2001) 172–88; Lauter (1972) 1–11; Chi (2002) 130, 164–77; Newby (2003) 192–213; Boatwright (1991) and (1993) 189–204; Şahin (1999a); Trimble (1999) 150–4.

Figure 8.1 Statue base of Rhixos, Ephesus.
Photograph by the author.

at least seven heroic founders, including textually attested figures such as Mopsos and Machaon, but also ones like Rhixos (see Figure 8.1) and Labos, so obscure that they are found nowhere else. Their bases proclaim them each to be a *ktístēs*, and this title is also found on bases of two private portraits at the gate, those of Planica Magna's father and brother.[65] Interestingly, no recovered texts mention Perge being founded by any hero in particular; at best, Mopsos was thought to have founded a number of unnamed cities in Pamphylia, so that at one point the region was called Mopsopeia (Strabo 14.4.3; Paus. 3.26.9–10; 7.3.1–5; Plin. *NH* 5.26).

[65] *I.Perge* 101–9 for statue bases from the South City Gate; Bravi (2011) 307; Şahin (1999a) 107–16; Ng (2007) 49. A statue of Machaon might also have appeared at the North Nymphaeum at Perge, up the main colonnaded street towards the city's acropolis. The North Nymphaeum is roughly contemporary with the South City Gate, and may have been another gift of Plancia Magna to the city, though there are no inscriptions to tell us anything about its circumstances of patronage. For more on the North Nymphaeum, Bravi (2011) 310–15; Mansel (1975) 367–72; Dorl-Klingenschmid (2001) 228; Longfellow (2011) 154–61.

In a way that is similar to what occurs at the Nymphaeum of Trajan and the baths of Vedius in Ephesus, private portraits of elite citizens are placed with statues of legendary founders, whose exploits were believed to have taken place just after the Trojan War (Herodotus, *Histories* 7.91). One could suppose that Plancia Magna was trying to insert the Plancii into Perge's collective memory. It is more likely, however, that as at Ephesus, it is the force of comparison rather than the force of memory which has the upper hand at the South City Gate, and that the presence of the heroes helped to burnish the virtues of Plancia Magna's family as benefactors. Nor does it appear that Plancia Magna was successfully inventing a tradition of heroic beginnings for her city, per Hobsbawm and Ranger, because there is scant evidence that the connection between these legendary founders and the city was enforced by periodic ritual or an enveloping media environment as Androklos' connection to Ephesus had been. Though the inscribed base of Machaon at the city gate refers to a temple of Zeus Machaonios on the acropolis which might have played a big part in prompting Pergaians to recall this founder, no temple or other signs of this cult has yet been found.[66] A single third-century inscription honouring a victor in the Labeia festival is likewise the only attestation of ongoing celebrations related to any of these mythical heroes.[67] The otherwise marked absence of these legendary founders from the current archaeological, textual, numismatic, and epigraphic records from Perge suggests strongly that its citizens, unlike their counterparts at Ephesus, did not repeatedly celebrate—did not

[66] Abbasoğlu (2001); Abbasoğlu and Martini (2003).

[67] *I.Perge* 315 honours a wrestler for his victories in an unnamed enneateric ancestral festival—which Şahin (1999b) 35–6 believes refers to the eponymous festival of M. Plancius Varus, father of Plancia Magna—and in the Labeia in its ninth iteration. It is solely on the basis of this text that Şahin restores the earlier South City Gate statue base of Labos to read 'after whom, the La[beia]' (1999a) 136–7. Consequently, Şahin (1999a) 142–3 suggests that Labos was strongly associated with M. Plancius Varus and that both were considered especially important *ktísteis* at the South City Gate, a view that is closely followed by Bravi (2011) 309–10. Prior to the publication of *I.Perge* 315, Scheer (1993) 197 only posits that there was perhaps a local feature in Perge named for the hero, and Weiss (1992) 175 notes that there are no other representations of Labos in coins or other media. There are also no other inscriptions related to Labos from Perge, which implies that, even if the Labeia were celebrated into the third century, it is more noteworthy for its pairing with the Varian games (and the metaphorical relationship between the mythical founder and the historical benefactor as argued above) than as part of the valorization of the South City Gate legendary founders as a touchstone of Pergaian collective memory.

remember—the exploits of these heroes, who seem to have been important only in the years during which Plancia Magna was busy lavishing gifts on Perge. Thus, even to assume that these founders occupied a place in the 'cultural memory' of Perge seems far-fetched. The relationship between patrons and heroes at the South City Gate can most securely be considered a statement about the importance of the Plancii family as patrons, physically rejuvenating Perge as though they were founders.[68]

CONCLUSION

There is no question that Roman studies' engagement with memory scholarship has been thought-provoking and fruitful. Nevertheless, even though archaeologists and art historians are increasingly comfortable in using the basic theoretical terminology and concepts of memory, some caution is still well advised. If the nuances of social memory are glossed over in the haste to apply labels such as 'cultural memory' or 'collective memory' to widely divergent types of evidence, if one is quick to see the 'perpetuation of memory' in all durable representations, there is a risk of missing questions that are waiting to be asked. Though representations of ancient pasts are in abundance, though many elite men and women had their images and names carved into stone, one should not rely on a default of collective memory to explain the workings of such artefacts in their societies, for it can lead to assumptions about how these objects were understood by their viewers. It is useful to step away from social memory, even for a moment, in order to consider that what might appear to modern eyes as 'the past in the past'[69] or a bid for eternal commemoration might not have been meant that way, and that what seem to be permanent legacies for posterity might have been instead expensive tokens of ephemeral relationships.[70]

[68] I am aware that my arguments pertaining to Perge depend on the current state of the evidence; future archaeological developments and research might prompt a reassessment.

[69] Alcock (2002) 23.

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Part IV

Memory in Roman Religion and Early Christianity

9

The Crafting of Memory in Late Roman Mortuary Spaces

Nicola Denzey Lewis

INTRODUCTION: ROME'S 'LAST PAGANS'?

Fourth-century Rome represents a particularly poignant and rich era for investigation. Constantine's accession to the imperial seat and his subsequent 'conversion'—whether authentic or self-serving—initiated a range of social responses from the Roman elite, measurable in a series of public documents and monuments. In this era when the landscape of the city of Rome was altered forever, the classical past became merely a memory, no longer a continuously enacted and re-enacted present. Mnemosyne (Memory), of course, is the mother of all the Muses. Memory stands at the beginning, as the matrix of invention for all human arts and all human making, including the making of images and monuments. Just as the writing of history in a grand or literary sense demands the creation and recreation of events for the sake of public memory, so did the reality of death provide citizens of late antique Rome with the opportunity to craft and mediate memory traditions into specific and enduring *memoriae*. In this atmosphere of profound social transformation, in an environment where new pagan monuments could not be made, nor books openly circulated, tombs (by virtue of being private sites) become important vehicles of memory. My work investigates the impact of Christianization, particularly as it instigates a set of responses from recalcitrant non-Christians. My working premise is that a palpable link exists between the political and cultural reality that was the end of empire and the choice of subjects in privately

commissioned non-Christian funerary art. The art of Rome's last pagans, I argue, reflects both a nostalgia for things changing and lost, and a new responsibility to preserve a collective cultural memory of their Greek and Roman past.

The diminishing public role of what I will call here 'paganism' (with substantial reservations) in the late Roman Empire—specifically in the city of Rome—brought about a remarkable visual shift for the Roman viewer.[1] As the landscape only very gradually Christianized, however, older forms, styles, and images from classical Rome continued to be the subject of public exegesis. I am interested here, however, primarily in private, visual art within domestic architecture (often, in late antiquity, the site of religious ritual) and funerary monuments. In the city of Rome, examples of fourth-century non-Christian art provide abundant fodder for investigation. We might think of the monumental wall fresco featuring a lively aquatic scene and, perhaps, a splendid reclining Proserpina from the fourth-century villa beneath the current church of SS Giovanni e Paolo,[2] or the dazzling recreation of Egyptian rites in *opus sectile* from the basilica of the consul Junius Bassus,[3] or the bucolic wall paintings of Diana the huntress surrounded by deer and birds from the arch above an immersion pool in the fourth-century Hypogeum of Via Livenza.[4] These are only a few of the more spectacular examples of pagan art created in an increasingly Christian empire, and they remain to be fully investigated in their full cultural context.

There are also numerous examples of late Roman pagans creating elaborate figural or mythological funerary art. Above the grave of young Trebius Justus, for example, we see an image of him as a child standing upon a stool, while spread out before him on a richly decorated cloth held by his parents are various precious objects, including goblets and plates. In the family vault of Vibia, who was married to a priest of Jupiter Sabazius and buried on the other side of a wall from the Christian catacombs of Praetextatus off the Via Appia, Vibia had herself depicted being led to a happy afterlife by Agathodaimon, where her husband waves enthusiastically at her from his

[1] On this shift and a watershed attempt to cultivate the perspective of an ancient Roman viewer, see Elsner (1995) and, more to the point, (1998). For a similar viewer-centred approach to Roman art before the fourth century, see also Clarke (1991).

[2] The most impressive photographic reproduction is Della Portella (1999) 200.

[3] Elsner (1998) fig. 129, with a detailed image on p. 52.

[4] Della Portella (1999) 206–11.

banqueting table.[5] Whether the proximity of their hypogeum to known Christian burials next door bothered either them or their Christian neighbours, we do not know—although at the time of the tomb's discovery, it caused a minor scandal among Catholic proponents of 'sacred archaeology'.[6]

In a sense, my focus in this essay is the 'flip side' of work done on Christianization; I suggest we might look not at what changes with the advent of Christianity, but what remained the same. As Christians developed a new private funerary artistic vernacular, with new scripturally-based images on wall paintings and sarcophagi, what did the city's pagans choose to image and imagine? What lay behind their visual recreations and recollections of the classical world? Was it nostalgia? A sense of responsibility as cultural conservators? Could the deployment of scenes from classical myth, for instance, be seen as an act of political and religious resistance?

ENGAGING MEMORY THEORY, AND THE WORK OF MEMORY, IN LATE ANTIQUE ROME

The present essay incorporates recent theoretical approaches to memory in three distinct ways. I have found it useful to 'think with' the concept of collective memory—a term that has its proponents and its detractors.[7] My sense is that we may profitably engage the concept of 'collective memory' in the late Roman world. In fact, I argue that the construction and role of collective memory—its evocation, manipulation, power to preserve and persuade—can and should be a key 'frame' for reading late Roman monuments. I draw broadly upon, therefore, the work of Paul Connerton and others on collective memory and its intersection with individual memory.[8] As Maurice Halbwachs insisted in his classic work *On Collective Memory*, theoretical work on 'how societies remember' must be parsed through the

[5] Ferrua (1971). For inscriptions, see *CIL* vi.142 = *ILS* 3961; Spera (1999) 174–5, 400–1.

[6] The story is recounted by MacMullen (2009) 74–5.

[7] For others who have found it useful to 'think with' the concept of 'collective memory', see Pennebaker, Paez, and Rime (1997); Assmann (2005). As a critique: Gedi and Elam (1996) 30–50.

[8] Connerton (1989); I have also found Rowlands (1993) useful.

problem of who in society takes on the responsibility of cultural memory, and how that choice is inflected by complicating issues such as class and gender.[9] My task, as a social historian of the Roman Empire who works primarily with visual and material culture, is to continue that work for late Rome.

A second-level engagement with memory studies here explores the concept of the 'memory theatre'. I have been inspired by the work of the medieval historian Mary Carruthers, whose landmark studies *The Book of Memory* and its sequel, *The Craft of Thought*, have similarly challenged us to rethink the history of human thought in the West.[10] Memory in ancient Rome did not consist of sentimental, Proustian musings on the past. Rather, it was deliberately constructed following formal principles, canons, and techniques. It involved elements such as image construction—here, mental images, not paintings—and also intentional forgetting, in order to create something new. This kind of memory, Carruthers notes, 'recognizes the essential roles of emotion, imagination and cogitation within the activity of recollection'.[11] Carruthers argues that medieval culture was fundamentally memorial, whereas our modern culture is fundamentally documentary. Thus, for us, a book is a way to make text, whereas in the Middle Ages, a book was a way of *remembering*. All the more so for ancient tombs, I would add: they were not merely pragmatic storage to contain a corpse, they were for the very purpose of remembering.

We might usefully extend Carruthers's scope of inquiry to classical or late antique images. This has been the approach adopted by Bettina Bergmann in her study of the House of the Tragic Poet at Pompeii. Emphasizing the constructedness and formality of memory in classical antiquity, Bergmann invokes the work of Cicero (*De Oratore*) and Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria*) on the sort of memory work done by the Roman *rhetor*.[12] To guide and discipline habits of memory, Quintilian would visualize a house, then deliberately order the ideas, words, and images that he wished to remember, placing the first thing to be recalled in the vestibule of the imagined house, the second in the atrium, the third in the impluvium, and so on. Quintilian's rhetorical exercise in visualization and mnemonic construction indicates, if

[9] Halbwachs (1992). [10] Carruthers (2008, orig. 1990) and (1998).

[11] Carruthers (1998) 2.

[12] Bergmann (1994). Bergman builds on the work of Yates (1966), who first described 'memory palaces' or 'Roman room' techniques in Roman rhetorical sources.

anything, that the placement of images—whether in a house or in an elaborately decorated tomb—offered Roman viewers an exercise in memory and connection-building. Ancient memory systems were spatial and material because, as Bergmann notes, 'for a largely illiterate society, the visual process played a powerful role in receiving and retaining information'.[13] I argue here that it may be particularly profitable to think of late Roman tombs as 'memory theatres'—space deliberately constructed in order to provoke, organize, broadcast, and sow memories in the minds of visitors.

Finally, I explore the complex interplay between individual agency, individual memory, the act of (private) commemoration, and the work of collective memory. In essence, I engage Halbwachs's question of *who remembers* within society, and note that in the case study I will explore, issues of class and gender are paramount. I look at the memory constructions of a middle-class, non-Christian Roman woman and how she tells a well-known story in a world where that story was in danger of being lost. She does this through art, which presents its own set of interpretative challenges. We have in catacomb art not written text but visual narratives that, as the art historian Richard Brilliant notes, 'may be thought to have three narrators: the first is the artist, the second is the protagonist of the story presented in a series of images, and the third is the viewer'.[14] All three 'narrators', in a sense, craft memory—in some senses working together, but in ways that are intertextual or intermural. Meaning is not absolute but shifts, as each narrator aims to tell an 'objective' story while placing themselves in the centre of the frame.

Equally, the question of *what* is being remembered (and not just who) is complex: in the tomb chamber I discuss, both the life of the individual and the broader culture that has been lost are being actively commemorated. Each viewer to the tomb likely continued this act of commemoration on dual levels: remembering the individual entombed there, on the one hand, but also remembering a discrete set of cultural figures, customs, myths, and rituals that had, within a short time, been short-circuited by the growth of Christianity. To add still another layer of complexity, I discuss what I have chosen to call not 'remembering' the classical past, but acts of 'disremembering'

[13] Bergmann (1994) 225; see also Small (1997).

[14] Brilliant (1984) 164, writing primarily about figurations of Greek myth on Roman sarcophagi.

going on in this tomb's elaborate narrative cycle.[15] Either the artist or the commissioner of that art chose to depart from standard funerary imagery to retell a story in subtle ways that must have evoked different things to different viewers, but which interwove 'collective memory' with individual idealized memorialization.

THE CATACOMBS OF VIA LATINA: A MEMORY THEATRE?

For the purposes of this contribution, I will focus on only one particular case study: a tomb created during a pivotal moment in the transformation of classical Rome into *Roma Christiana*. Its completion lies within a decade or so of the Altar of Victory dispute and Theodosius I's reiteration of Constantine's ban on sacrifice. Within twenty years of its creation, monks had demolished the Serapeum; the sacred fire in the Temple of Vesta was extinguished, and Theodosius issued his decree *Nemo se hostiis polluat*: 'No one is to go to the sanctuaries, walk through the temples, or raise his eyes to statues created by human hands' (*Cod. Theod.* 16.10.10). In this atmosphere of forced oblivion, I argue, pagan funerary art emerged more vividly than ever as an aide-memoire. As I have noted elsewhere, a Roman hypogeum was not a vault to be sealed up and forgotten. It was a space set on the margins between ordinary life and another realm. The powerful combination of portraits, likenesses, scriptural, and mythological scenes enlivened by the soft light of flickering oil lamps not only rekindled a longing for one's beloveds, it also confirmed their place in a sacred history. It gave new voices, shapes, and form to a collective memory of the past.

The Hypogeum of Via Latina—now formally known as the Catacombs of Via Dino Compagni so as not to confuse it with other known tomb sites on the Via Latina—was rediscovered fortuitously in 1955 during a period of the city's suburban expansion.[16] The site had

[15] While the term 'disremembering' is my own, see significant studies on the social power of forgetting: Ricoeur (2004) esp. 412–56; Esposito (2010) 180–90; Weinrich (2011) 388–93.

[16] The classic presentation of the site is Ferrua (1990), published in English as Ferrua (1991).

been carefully dug following a logical and elegant plan of long vaulted galleries with thirteen individual family cubicula stemming off the galleries, containing perhaps 400 burials in total.[17] At the further ends of the complex—the parts dug between 350 and 370 CE—these galleries give way into interconnected cubicula following a plan of considerable geometrical beauty and order.[18] I will consider here the hypogeum's penultimate chamber, Cubiculum N, which forms a visual and spatial unit with Cubiculum O, the final chamber to be built.[19] This section was particularly exclusive, containing the bodies of perhaps as few as five adults of considerable wealth and discerning tastes. We have no surviving record of their names, their ages, and their relation to one another.[20] We can infer, from the artwork they chose on their tombs, that they were a 'mixed' family of Christians (or, more properly, a single Christian) and several non-Christians. What particularly interests me, and bears directly on our focus on Roman memory, is the manner in which these late fourth-century pagans chose to display and thus 'remember' the classical past.

The construction of any family vault reflected that family's status—or if we choose to be cynical, the status to which it aspired.[21] There is clear evidence that the individual cubicula in Via Latina were commissioned by affluent people of late Rome's freedmen class—in other words, not the top-drawer nobility, but people deeply concerned with displaying their wealth, discerning tastes, and erudition. Unable to afford the top-drawer expense of real marble columns and costly

[17] For site plans, see Camiruaga et al. (1994), which replaces the older and more rectilinear one in Ferrua (1960).

[18] I follow the chronology of Tronzo (1986) 10–17, which is later than that of Ferrua. Tronzo's work supports the claims of Simon (1964) 327. The dating is also supported by Grabar (1967) 231.

[19] The theme of Cubiculum N is an Alcestis cycle; Cubiculum O contains Christian imagery (predominantly scriptural scenes such as the Parting of the Red Sea and the Raising of Lazarus) although the transitional space between the rooms and the ceiling depicts images of Ceres and Proserpina. For the scriptural programme of O and its commissioner, see Denzey (2007) ch. 2.

[20] The extant epigraphic record is preserved in *Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae*, NS 6 (1975) 38–41. These inscriptions, however, derive only from the meagre gallery loculi burials and not from the cubicula.

[21] Tronzo (1986) 21, has suggested that the Via Latina catacomb contains the burials not of Rome's top-drawer nobility, but rather of upwardly mobile *liberti*. Indeed, freedpeople had by the fourth century a long history of ostentatious funerary monuments in Rome, many of which still stand, such as the monumental tomb built by Eurysaces the baker for his wife directly outside the Porta Maggiore.

mosaic, whoever commissioned Cubicula N and O ordered diggers, plasterers, and painters to enhance the chambers with modest marble architectural features. To the columns hewn out of soft volcanic tuff were added Ionic capitals and bases in fine marble imported from Greece. Both N and O were subsequently frescoed by the same two artists—one who specialized in figures, and one in ornament.[22] Some of the ornament was styled after one of the most costly and precious mausolea in Rome: the Mausoleum of Santa Costanza on the Via Nomentana.[23] William Tronzo, whose work on Via Latina is the most extensive and the most highly-regarded art-historical treatment, argues that Cubicula N and O were commissioned by a Christian of a sort of bourgeois or 'new' kind.[24] Jaś Elsner similarly assumes that N and O's patron was a Christian man.[25]

Cubiculum N has intrigued art historians because, although Cubicula M and O that surround or 'frame' it are filled with Christian imagery, it contains not a single Christian image. Rather, we find on its walls four scenes featuring Hercules and two more—these sited directly over the room's two graves—depicting scenes of the Greek drama *Alcestis* (see Figure 9.1). Given that N forms a visual unit with O, many art historians who have worked on the provocative juxtaposition of pagan and Christian imagery have assumed that the Christian ones were dominant; that is to say that the person who commissioned this art was himself Christian, with the pagan images used in only an ancillary or superficial manner. E. R. Goodenough, for instance, remarks that the presence of Hercules in Cubiculum N is a 'powerful block of evidence that Christians could use Hercules in this sense to symbolize their own hopes of salvation in Christ'.[26] Hercules was not to be seen as Hercules at all, but as Christ simply looking exactly like Hercules—either a case of Christian appropriation of pagan imagery, or, more bluntly, an aggressive Christian supersessionism that displaced the way one god was seen by overlaying a Christian meaning.[27] As for Alcestis (inasmuch as these scholars took

[22] On this chamber as a 'special order', see Berg (1994) 221.
[23] Tronzo (1986) figs. 27, 28. [24] Tronzo (1986) 69.
[25] Elsner (1995) 271–80. [26] Goodenough (1962) 133.
[27] Such is the argument of Bargebuhr (1991), esp. 69. Bargebuhr saw the entire catacomb as belonging to a syncretizing Christian 'brotherhood'. Others have agreed that the pagan images in the catacomb must be interpreted as 'Christian' or 'Christianizing', properly read as allegories and types of Christ. See here Fink (1978) 29–34, 94–8. For a very different interpretation, see Engemann (1983).



Figure 9.1 Hypogeum of Via Latina/Catacombs of Via Dino Compagni; detail of paintings in Cubiculum N (left) and Cubiculum O (right).
Image courtesy of G. Snyder.

any notice of her presence at all), she appears because Alcestis often 'stands for' the dutiful wife in funerary iconography.[28] Thus the mortuary context combined with the modern scholarly assumption that Christian iconography and interpretation was dominant drove the meaning of these images in a way that most scholars found self-evident and barely worth questioning deeply. Either the Christian patron of this tomb asked his painter to paint Hercules but imagined him to actually be Christ, or, as Tronzo argues, he drew on pagan imagery because of his fondness for archaic traditions—purely a kind of antiquarian interest.[29] Elsner argues something similar for Cubiculum O, where he claims that the Christian patron executed a sort of visual exegesis of the chamber's Christian images—since these images had typological, pedagogical, and exegetical meaning—but the pagan ones had no such set of meanings.[30]

Whether or not Cubiculum N can be thought of constructively as a 'memory theatre' depends, in large part, on whether we concede that the images on its walls had inherent meaning and, further, were associatively linked in such a way as to evoke specific memories

[28] For Alcestis in funerary art: Blome (1978) 441–5, 435–57; Wood (1978).
[29] Tronzo (1986) 69. [30] Elsner (1995) 271–80.

from viewers at the tomb. In this case, as with other private or semi-private (i.e. collectively owned) tombs, visitors would have been restricted to family members, thus people of the same social class and, presumably, with the background to be able to read the encoded meanings of this particular memory theatre. These viewers would remember the dead, just as they also remembered the cultural materials encoded in the visual cycle on Cubiculum N's walls. I argue here that there was indeed a deliberate organization of visual material in such a way as to evoke not one but a series of memories for viewers. These would have been 'collective' in the sense that different viewers would have picked up on different elements of the tomb's overall narrative. While some might have remembered the individuals commemorated within, others might have remembered other cultural associations with Hercules and Alcestis, in a world where the attributed meanings of these figures were being lost or altered.

MEMORY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LEGACY OF CLASSICAL TRADITIONS

What happens when, rather than assuming that the patron's choice of art was essentially archaizing but incoherent, we consider Cubiculum N as a coherent whole, its images selected not through vanity or thoughtlessness, not merely a costly exercise in empty antiquarianism as Jaś Elsner and William Tronzo suggest? What if we begin with the assumption that these costly images—which clearly constituted a 'special order', not something randomly picked from a catacomb painter's flip-book—had *meaning* to their commissioner, just as we assume that the images in the Christian chambers had meaning to those who commissioned them? What if the person who commissioned this art was deliberately crafting a specific set of memories involving of the classical past? What then do we make of this 'turn to the past' in the image cycle we find in Cubiculum N, its portrayal of a drama by that time already over 800 years old, and its emphasis on Hercules and Alcestis in the environment of an increasingly politically and religiously divided Rome?

To penetrate the logic of this cubiculum's iconography, we have to be interested in at least three things: who commissioned the images,

where they were located, and how they might have been viewed in late antiquity. The first challenge—the patron's identity—was met by the classicist Beverly Berg, who in a remarkable 1994 article on Cubiculum N, challenged the assumption that the art was commissioned by a Christian man.[31] Rather, she argues, the chamber's iconography makes much more sense if we posit a wealthy pagan female patron as its commissioner, who hired her artists to create a tomb for her husband and for herself that highlighted not only her husband's premature death, but more significantly, her own uxorial devotion to him. Berg's point is to argue against a facile reading of the Christian and pagan images in this hypogeum as locked in a sort of visual contestation with one another; rather, she asserts, the religious overtones of a figure like Hercules should be subverted to the main ideological thrust of the chamber, which was to memorialize the virtues of one individual.

My argument pushes Berg's one step further. I argue that this anonymous female commissioner of Cubiculum N (the hypogeum had been robbed in antiquity and all epigraphic material removed, so her name is lost for ever) accomplished a remarkable series of tasks: she certainly had herself commemorated or memorialized as a dutiful wife by picturing herself, literally, as Alcestis. But there is more than this. As a custodian of cultural memory, she exploited the viewing and interpretative possibilities in the interface between death and theatre (here represented by the frescoes of the Greek play *Alcestis*); she transformed space by having created a cycle that preserved late Roman memory of classical antiquity; and she worked with her artist to craft that memory, such that what remains is no longer faithful to the mythic or artistic traditions of Alcestis and Hercules in Rome but intentionally disremembers them, creating from them new memory traditions.

The Alcestis and Hercules images of Cubiculum N do two different sorts of memory work. Put differently: they are there for different reasons, and because of this, I want to consider them separately. First, I want to consider for a moment what sort of memory work the Hypogeum of Via Latina accomplishes as a whole. I have argued already that in order to understand the motivation of our unnamed patroness in her choice of iconography, it is useful to think of the Via Latina catacombs as a type of memory theatre. Despite oft-made

[31] Berg (1994).

claims that a hypogeum constituted closed space—too unpleasant to linger—its elaborate and finished architecture, permanent light fixtures, and whitewashed walls that reflect light all presuppose visitors. The catacomb's rich decoration and numerous frescoes call for a more attentive consideration of the ancient viewer and her experience.[32] She would be attentive to the framing of views between doorways and columns. Indeed, the orientation or floor plan of a villa lay slightly off-centre (the 'public axis' visible to the passer-by on the street) so as, on the one hand, to maintain privacy by preventing an unobstructed view into a private house, but, on the other, to produce deliberate and pleasing visual frames. Via Latina is laid out in a similar fashion, so that long-range viewing is carefully protected and controlled.

The Via Latina catacombs form the visual counterpart to the rhetorical, imaginative exercise of deliberate memory construction. The images within can be overheard speaking directly to each other on facing walls, should we listen carefully (see Figure 9.1). Predominantly, the hypogeum complex encodes individual memories of individuals' lives, which would have been collectively evoked during frequent commemorative visits to the tombs. But there is a clear sense of relationship between the paintings, both within separate chambers and in relation to the complex as a whole. Images are, for instance, reduplicated in the same order in different rooms (C and O), as are decorative themes; other images play with a sort of architectural *trompe l'œil* effect as one moves through space.

A visitor commemorating the lives of those buried in the furthest reaches of the catacomb would have travelled along a long subterranean gallery, passing various tomb chambers of other families along both sides. Within a few minutes, she would have reached Cubiculum N. There we find two scenes from Euripides' *Alcestis* in the lunettes over the two prominent *bisomus* graves in the room. In one scene, Admetus lies on his deathbed, attended by a group of mourners (Figure 9.2). One woman leans solicitously over the bed. A sole female mourner, slightly oversized so as to draw the eye, stands at the foot of the bed to the far left of the image, her arms upraised, her veil pulled up over her head. Given that Romans had a predilection for figuring themselves as heroes and heroines from Greek myth in funerary art,

[32] Such is the approach of Snyder (2005). I am grateful to Greg for his insights and for our many wonderful hours thinking on this hypogeum together.



Figure 9.2 Admetus reclines on his deathbed, while Alcestis leans over him; grave lunette from Cubiculum N.

Archivio Fotografico, Pontificia Commissione di Archeologia Sacra, Din F 11.

there can be no doubt that the *patrona* and her artist meant the viewer to see in this scene an only loosely-disguised allusion to her own ministrations and devotion at her husband's deathbed.[33]

On the opposite side of the room, the patron selected, to stand directly over the second arcosolium grave in the room, an image of Alcestis being led to Admetus in Hades (Figure 9.3). Admetus sits at the right of the painting; his slumped figure, passive and mute, exudes grief. To his right—although Admetus has not yet seen them—Hercules approaches, flanked by the fierce many-headed dog Cerberus. He gently leads Alcestis out of the dark cave of the shades. The scene is at once allegorical and metonymous; although it deliberately recalls a myth and a drama, it also points forward to a life moment, and to the female patron and her travails. We are best not to take it literally—that is, that she went to death's door or beyond to

[33] Berg (1994) 222: 'the patron here commemorates her own loyalty during her husband's illness—she too would have sacrificed life itself to save him'. It was a commonplace within the funerary art of freedpeople to depict themselves as deities or characters from drama; see, e.g. Kleiner (1978).



Figure 9.3 Hercules leads Alcestis to Admetus; grave lunette from Cubiculum N.

Archivio Fotografico, Pontificia Commissione di Archeologia Sacra, Din F 3.

'redeem' her husband. The point is that she considered herself fully capable of such selfless devotion.[34]

For Romans, as for Greeks, the figure of Alcestis conveyed the theme of untimely death.[35] And there could be no better story to celebrate an idealized Roman marriage, which outlasted death itself. Alcestis herself was, in the symbolic universe of fourth-century Rome, the paragon of a dutiful wife, selfless and devoted. It is unsurprising that we find Alcestis here; late antique citizens, after all, could see themselves as 'custodians of an ancient literature', as Ramsay MacMullen reminds us.[36] As custodians, they borrowed memories, making them their own.

But from what, precisely, did our patron borrow? What was it that she remembered, or called upon her viewers to remember? Was it the

[34] Berg argues, cogently, that there is no battle between Christianity and paganism in these chambers: 'The decoration of the tomb chamber was chosen to celebrate the devotion of a wife to her spouse and to display the painter's artistry, rather than to make a statement about the divinity, Christian or pagan' (Berg 1994, 220).

[35] 'Alcestis', in *LIMC* i/1.533–44, i./2, 3–66.

[36] MacMullen (1964) 437.

Alcestis of Greek myth, drawn from the cultural repertoire all educated Romans might have known? Or was she recalling actual stagings of Euripides' play—no longer performed, apparently, in the final quarter of the fourth century? Or did she simply ask her artist to paint Alcestis for her, since Alcestis was a stock figure in Roman mortuary art, drawing as she did on the trope of the dutiful and self-sacrificing wife? Which narrator does the remembering for us?

Strikingly, our patron invokes *Alcestis*, but if she was drawing on Alcestis imagery in mortuary art, she *disremembers* it. Let me cite two examples of what I call here 'disremembering'. On all other extant examples of Roman Alcestis sarcophagi, it is Alcestis who reclines in her bed, not Admetus.[37] On, for example, an Alcestis sarcophagus dated to 170–89 CE now at the Château de Saint-Aignan in France, the key scene features a recumbent Alcestis.[38] Five figures complete the scene: gathered around Alcestis, two children play, a couple bend in solicitously, and a lone female figure stands in mourning. On another famous Alcestis sarcophagus now in the Vatican Museum, we once again find Alcestis on her deathbed.[39] The very standardness of the scene on sarcophagi makes us realize that the Via Latina artist has made a deliberate alteration to an otherwise conventional image. In the Via Latina scene, strikingly, Alcestis is one of seven figures who stand behind a reclining figure—but here, the figure in the bed is male, and meant to be Admetus.

The same intentional 'disremembering' happens in the facing wall painting. On the Vatican Alcestis sarcophagus, we find another scene from the play *Alcestis*: Hercules leads a heavily veiled Alcestis out of the world of the shadows to her husband. As the art historian Susan Wood has observed, Alcestis here resembles a ghost, but also a Roman bride who came to her husband heavily veiled, demure.[40]

[37] Andreae (1963) 35–7, for sixteen depictions of the reunion of Alcestis and Admetus in Roman art, including Via Latina. For studies beyond those explicitly discussed here, see Erdélyi (1961); Kastelic (1999).

[38] For details and plates, see Mucznik (1996).

[39] Sarcophagus of Junius Euhodus and Metilia Acte, a priestess of Magna Mater, from Ostia. Museo Chiaramonti, Vatican Museums, inv. 1195. For plates, see Robert (1952) 31, #26; Wood (1978) 499–502. The sarcophagus' inscription is catalogued: *CIL* xiv.371.

[40] Wood (1978) 504: 'such a reference would have been highly effective in stressing Alcestis's and Admetus's roles as devoted wife and husband, while expressing the joy of their reunion by analogy with the happiness of their original wedding'. See too, Diana Kleiner on the second-century CE Velletri Sarcophagus, which held the remains

The image may hark back to early Greek variants of the myth, where Alcestis meets her death on her wedding day. In fact, Wood observes that almost every figure in Alcestis' return on Metilia Acte's sarcophagus finds a parallel in a typical Roman wedding scene. By contrast, in Cubiculum N, as Hercules leads Alcestis out of the underworld, he turns back to face her, gently guiding her towards her husband. But here, this is no scene of happy reunion, of a marriage, of partners coming together in a moment of celebration. There is only a slumped and half-naked husband on one side, and facing him, the wife and her new partner, the brave and virile Hercules who has rescued her from the jaws of death.[41] One wonders what our *patrona* meant by it all, really.

To add further visual comment to this curious alteration, the scene on the opposite wall of Admetus in his deathbed is 'framed' so as to form a triptych with two other Hercules images. The first depicts Hercules standing, club in hand, over an unnamed enemy. I believe Berg interprets the foe correctly when she says that he is Death, the one enemy whom Hercules cannot slay, for one cannot slay death.[42] The scene thus depicts Hercules' pact with Death to save Alcestis, and also directly alludes to *Alcestis* the play; in it, as he presents Alcestis to her husband, Hercules explains that he ambushed Death, beside Alcestis' tomb, throttling him with his bare hands. As for the second of the two Hercules images, here we find directly opposite Hercules and Death, Hercules standing in *iunctio dextrarum* with Minerva. It is another curious act of disremembering, since Minerva is not present in the play *Alcestis*, nor even in Alcestis myths or iconography associated with her. The *iunctio dextrarum* signifying the marital bond between a couple, which has a visual resonance on the opposite panel where Hercules grasps death by the hand, is also curious, since

of seven adults and two children. It probably features a scene of Alcestis, but it might be the myth of Protesilaus, hero of the Trojan War who was mourned by his wife Laodamia so bitterly that the gods returned him to her for three hours. But, as Kleiner notes, the precise identification of the myth is less important than the values both convey: 'both stories emphasize earthly death and heavenly reunion. In other words, a married couple parted by death will be reunited in the afterlife' (Kleiner 1992, 259).

[41] The depiction of Admetus is equally unique; for standard depictions, see Dyson (1988).

[42] The interpretation is contested, but since the scene is unique, there is no image history to follow. For Hercules on funerary monuments, see Bayet (1921–2). For Hellenism in late antiquity more generally, see Bowersock (1990).

Hercules and Minerva were never married.[43] It is a curious gesture for them and a clear sign that the identity of the figures was less important than the symbolism of the pose. A virtually identical scene of Hercules and Minerva in *iunctio dextrarum* is found on a Roman gold glass piece of the fourth century, which from its inscription clearly commemorates the marriage of the couple who commissioned it.[44] One way of reading the Cubiculum N scene, therefore, is to highlight the importance of marriage, signified doubly by the alliance Alcestis–Admetus and Hercules–Minerva. However, the lunette scene highlights Alcestis–Hercules rather than Alcestis–Admetus, shifting the conventional *iunctio dextrarum* of Alcestis–Admetus featured on Alcestis sarcophagi visually to Hercules–Minerva.[45]

At this point we begin to realize that something rather curious is going on in this room—and we certainly can no longer agree that the images convey merely an empty antiquarianism with no consistent or independent meaning. The images are both very right and not quite right at all. The scenes are complex enough to recall stagings of *Alcestis* rather than merely the symbolic, mythic character Alcestis.[46] But *Alcestis* is remembered here in complicated ways. For example: who is Alcestis' true partner—Admetus or Hercules? And who has the 'upper hand' here—the men or the women?

While I argue that Alcestis and Hercules do different sorts of memory work in this hypogeum, they share a specific function of evoking the classical past. More to the point, this unnamed patron moves beyond simple analogy and association with the classical past—that she can be likened to the mythological Alcestis through the theme of uxorial devotion—by invoking particular complex scenes which call upon stagings of the play *Alcestis*. She thus displays

[43] Davies (1985). For Minerva and Hercules in the *iunctio dextrarum* in late antique art, see Huskinson (1974) 68–97, and Quacquarelli (1985).

[44] For the gold glass, see Morey (1959).

[45] Bargebuhr (1991) 56 argues, convincingly, that the *iunctio dextrarum* between Minerva and Hercules is meant to signify not marital union but the reception of Hercules into paradise, a scene that appears as early in Rome as the *acroteria* of San Omobono. This is likely the correct meaning of the scene, and accounts for its presence in funerary art. If this is the meaning of the scene at Via Latina, then again, the attention is shifted away from Admetus in favour of Hercules, the true 'hero' of the cubiculum cycle.

[46] On stagings of Euripides' *Alcestis* in Rome, C. P. Jones reveals that Athenian tragedy remained alive and well in the Roman Empire, both in productions of the classics and in new productions by Greek playwrights. See Jones (1993).

her sophisticated erudition, and simultaneously acts to present her own life in grandly symbolic mythological terms while also acting as a cultural preserver and continuator.

Let us return to Halbwachs's question: who in society remembers? It is striking that, in this case, it is a woman who remembers, and she does so within dual frames of reference: what it means to be a good wife following patterns of uxorial behaviour centuries old, and what it means to maintain classical myth and culture in a society where new paradigms were moving the old into oblivion. This figuring and refiguring of the past also creates and asserts new memories, as visual commentaries on myth.

The degree to which our female patron sought to comment on the new popularity of Christianity in the late fourth century remains impossible to discern. Beverly Berg remains agnostic: 'The decoration of the tomb chamber was chosen to celebrate the devotion of a wife to her spouse and to display the painter's artistry, rather than to make a statement about the divinity, Christian or pagan.'[47] But I am not so sure. Christianity centres itself around the sacrificial death, the *descensus ad infernum*, of Christ into death and back into life to redeem humanity. The Alcestis story follows a different pattern but genders it differently. Given the curious mix of Christian and non-Christian imagery in Via Latina, it is intriguing to ponder whether the figure of Alcestis might have been deliberately chosen by a pagan woman to stand against Christianity's main redeemer figure. Any triumphalism here would involve a complicated set of implicit statements about the relative antiquity of Alcestis to Christ; the notion of love, sacrifice, and duty; and the capability of women to act as redemptive figures.

But this brings us to Hercules, who is less present in funerary art than Alcestis. In Cubiculum N, even late in the fourth century, he remains the dominant figure, the hero of the piece. In the fourth century—as earlier in Rome—Hercules was interpreted in a variety of ways. On one level, as the first art historians of the Hypogeum of Via Latina recognized, he stood as a pagan 'answer' to Christ—he too could save his followers from death. The patron might, then, have been making a pointed allusion to the richness and continued potency of Graeco-Roman intellectual and spiritual traditions in an environment where these were losing significant ground to

[47] Berg (1994) 220.

Christianity. But it seems to me that she does something else. As Richard Brilliant notes, certain images require 'prior knowledge or preunderstanding' (*Vorverständnis*) to be effective.[48] Part of this *Vorverständnis* entails recognizing Hercules as an ironic hero or—even further—as a buffoon. In Rome, the number of serious dramas featuring Hercules was a mere trickle compared to the 'torrent' of satyr plays, farces, and comedies in which he entertained his audiences with a delight which, to borrow Karl Galinsky's words, seemed not to have known a saturation point.[49] Even in the play *Alcestis*, Hercules chastises those who take life too seriously, for 'this is no life at all, but rather, a botched job' (Eur. *Alc.* 800). Such a cavalier attitude has Hercules that he shows up at Admetus' household, gets blind drunk, and sings boisterously, out of tune.[50] Indeed, there are indications that *Alcestis* itself was not understood to be a tragedy but, rather, a farce or satyr-play.

In his excellent viewer-centred analysis of Cubiculum N, Gregory Snyder observes,

> Read by itself, isolated in Room N. the Hercules imagery is simply part of a drama that captures an instant of extraordinary marital sacrifice, of loss and restoration. However, framed by an underground environment that features Christian images on both sides and squeezed by an increasingly Christian society above ground, Hercules is no longer quite what he was when viewed in isolation.[51]

'Framed' or 'quoted' in this way, the Hercules imagery provides not a simple pagan answer to Christ, but something else entirely: a meaning that is 'qualified, inverted, parodied'.[52] This contextualization of Hercules required the invocation of collective memory. Hercules was not a simple answer to Christ, but a figure that elicited multiple recollections, particularly for non-Christian viewers to Cubiculum N.

In his introduction to his collected essays on applied memory studies, archaeologist Norman Yoffee expresses the work of social memory:

> The construction of social memory in the past existed just as it does in the present. It involved creating links to ancestors and antiquity and

[48] Brilliant (1984) 133. [49] Galinsky (1972) 81.

[50] For the implicit social critiques involved in Hercules' behaviour, see Bieber (1961); Dupont (1985); Reynolds (1943).

[51] Snyder (2005) 379. [52] Snyder (2005) 379.

> often (re-) interpretations of monuments and landscapes. Especially in instances of social change, individuals, who belonged to multiple and overlapping social groups, had to negotiate their economic and social status to the extent possible, exploiting the ambiguities of inherited forms, evaluating their options, borrowing ideas from other groups, and creating new identities to answer to changing circumstances.[53]

His words speak presciently to the arguments that I have made here: Cubiculum N, as a memory theatre, created links to ancestors and antiquity, reinterpreting not monuments and landscapes, but precious cultural forms. In an atmosphere of intense social change, the woman who commissioned an artist to paint the walls of her tomb worked to honour the memories of her family (not all of whom were pagan) and convey for posterity the value and beauty of her religious and cultural inheritance. Within the 'ambiguities' of those cultural forms, her acts of remembering and disremembering sowed memories that evoked nostalgia, humour, and sense of loss. In the end, she created a new identity for herself: not merely a grieving wife, but a collector of memory.

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[53] Yoffee (2007) 4.

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10

Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus

John S. Kloppenborg

Michael Frayn's play *Copenhagen* (2000) revisits a famous incident in September 1941 when Werner Heisenberg, at that time the *Wehrmacht*'s leading theoretical physicist, travelled to Copenhagen with a Gestapo escort, to meet his erstwhile teacher and friend, Niels Bohr and his wife, Margrethe Bohr. Set in the afterlife the three ghosts repeatedly ask a single question: 'Why did you come to Copenhagen?' Did Heisenberg want to determine from Bohr whether the Allies were building a bomb? Did Heisenberg want Bohr to persuade the Allies to drag their heels in the production of a bomb, as he intended to drag his heels? Did he tell Bohr that he was only building a reactor, not a bomb? And if so, did Bohr believe this? Or did he think that Heisenberg was boasting about the progress he had made towards a bomb? Was Heisenberg lying about his real intentions? And did Heisenberg know that the amount of fissionable material needed was far less than the 1,000 kilograms he had told the *Wehrmacht*?

Each ghost proposes several answers to the question, 'Why did you come to Copenhagen?' But the ensuing discussion shows that none of the answers is cogent. For each ghost's explanation, the veracity of the proposal depends on events that in fact did not take place, conclusions that the principals had not yet drawn, and mathematical calculations which had not yet been made. By the end of the play it becomes clear that even from the privileged vantage of the afterlife, the three are not able to decide what was said, what was intended, and what the others inferred.

Although based on Heisenberg's memoirs and on Thomas Powers's *Heisenberg's War*[1] and Robert Jungk's *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns*,[2] Frayn's fictionalized account does not qualify as a controlled examination of memory. But it does dramatize the profound differences between recollective or reproductive memory and constructive memory.

Appeal to human memory as a major and generally reliable factor in the transmission of the 'Jesus tradition'—sayings and stories about Jesus—has re-entered academic discussion with the publication of James Dunn's *Jesus Remembered* (2003) and Richard Bauckham's *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses* (2006). Both have stressed not only human memory and its role in the transmission of the Jesus tradition, but also its general reliability in preserving essential details. Dunn, for example, claims that

> we can get back to the earliest impact made by Jesus, made by the events and teaching preserved in the Jesus tradition . . . because the impact translated itself into community tradition from the first; the tradition not only bears witness to the impact made by Jesus but is *itself part of the effect Jesus had on those he called to discipleship.* And the oral character of the traditioning (transmission) process means that in and through the performative variations of the tradition still evident in the Synoptic tradition we are still able to hear the stories first told about Jesus and the teaching of Jesus which first drew the tradents into discipleship and sustained the churches in the early hears of their common life of discipleship.[3]

This very optimistic assessment of the reliability of human memory, as it pertains to both individual human subjects and subjects in the context of larger social groupings, deserves careful scrutiny.

MEMORY AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT

Since the pioneering studies on memory by Frederic Bartlett, psychologists have recognized that memory is not a recording of the past

[1] Powers (1993). [2] Jungk (1958).
[3] Dunn (2003) 329, emphasis original.

that can simply be replayed, but is constructive both at the level of brain function and, as I shall note below, at the level of social performance. Bartlett concludes:

> The first notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative, or reproductive. In a world of constantly changing environment, literal recall is extraordinarily unimportant. . . . In the many thousands of cases of remembering which I collected, a considerable number of which I have recorded here, literal recall was very rare. . . . In fact if we consider evidence rather than presupposition, remembering appears to be far more decisively an affair of construction rather than one of mere reproduction.[4]

[4] Bartlett (1995, orig. 1932) 204–5. Bartlett's conclusions are: '1. It again appears that accuracy of reproduction, in a literal sense, is the rare exception and not the rule. 2. In a chain of reproductions obtained from a single individual, the general form, or outline, is remarkably persistent, once the first version has been given. 3. At the same time, style, rhythm, precise modes of construction, while they are apt to be immediately reacted to, as very rarely faithfully reproduced. 4. With frequent reproduction the form and items of remembered detail very quickly become stereotyped and thereafter suffer little change. 5. With infrequent reproduction, omission of detail, simplification of events and structure, and transformation of items into more familiar detail, may go on almost indefinitely, or so long as unaided recall is possible. 6. At the same time, in long-distance remembering, elaboration becomes rather more common in some cases; and there may be increasing importation, or invention, aided . . . by the use of visual images. 7. Long-distance remembering is of two types at least: (a) The general setting, as expressed mainly through the subject's attitude to the material, continues to function, as also does the outstanding detail. The actual memory process is strongly and evidently constructive, and there is much use of inference. (b) All that appears to function are one or two isolate but striking details. 8. Detail is outstanding when it fits in with a subject's pre-formed interests and tendencies. It is then remembered, though often transformed, and it tends to take a progressively earlier place in successful reproductions. 9. There is some indication . . . that, in some cases, the influence of affective attitude may be intensified with the lapse of time. 10. In all successive remembering, rationalisation, the reduction of material to a form that can be easily and "satisfyingly" dealt with is very prominent. 11. It is this process, itself often based upon an affective attitude, which gives the whole dealt with that specific ground, frame, or setting, without which it will not be persistently remembered. 12. Or again, rationalisation may deal with details, explicitly linking the together and so rendering them apparently coherent, or linking given detail with other detail not actually present in the original setting. 13. . . . rationalisation has three main forms. (a) the given material is initially connected with something else—usually with some definitely formulated explanation—and treated as a symbol of that other material. . . . (b) The whole rationalising process is unwitting and involves no symbolisation. It then tends to possess characteristics peculiar to the work of the individual who effects it and due directly to his particular temperament and character. (c) Names, phrases and events are immediately changed so that they appear in forms current with the social group to which the subject belongs. 14. There is evidence of delay in manifest change,

More recent studies of brain function confirm Bartlett's conclusions. According to Daniel Schacter et al., the encoding of new experiences involves operations that are widely distributed across different parts of the brain, and that represent a range of functions:

> new experiences can be conceptualized as patterns of features, with different features representing different facets of experience: the outputs of perceptual modules that analyze specific physical attributes of incoming information, interpretation and evaluation of these physical attributes by conceptual or semantic modules, and actions undertaken in response to incoming information.[5]

The retrieval of memories therefore involves a process of what Schacter et al. call 'pattern completion', in which 'a subset of features comprising past experience [is] reactivated, and activation spreads to the rest of the constituent features of that experience'.[6] But this process can also activate stored memory features other than those sought-after—other bits of memory that have similar semantic or visual patterns, which then combine with the retrieved memory, resulting in memories that blend or conflate different experiences.[7] Not only are memories retrieved on the basis of the general similarity of 'gist information', but some experiments indicate that 'memory is adapted to retain information that is most likely to be needed in the environment in which it operates'.[8] This results in a reduction and schematizing of remembered features, which can result in turn in transfer and generalization across memories.

transformations being foreshadowed weeks, or perhaps months, before they actually appear' (Bartlett 1995, orig. 1932: 93–4).

5 Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal (1998) 290.

6 Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal (1998) 291.

7 Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal (1998) 294 relates experiments in which subjects studied lists of semantic associates which converged on a single 'theme' ('drowsy', 'tired', 'bed', 'pillow', 'rest', 'pajamas') and who then claimed (at a rate of 70 per cent) to have also studied the non-presented theme word 'sleep'. This procedure is now abbreviated as the DRM procedure, after the three researchers who published on the induction of false memories: Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995). High percentages of subjects reported that they had seen non-existent videos of prominent events (the assassination of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn or the crash of El Al flight 1862 in Amsterdam in 1992). This type of memory suggestibility is called 'crashing memories' after the original research study: Crombag, Wagenaar and Van Koppen (1996) and Smeets et al. (2009).

8 Schacter and Addis (2007) 778.

Schacter elaborates 'seven sins of memory' that result from the cognitive processes that comprise the constructive memory framework: transience (memories fading), absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence.[9] It is perhaps suggestibility and bias that may best help us think about the retrieval and transmission of the memories of the early Jesus movement. 'Suggestibility' refers to the tendency to incorporate into memories details that have been supplied by others,[10] but which were not a part of the originating experience. Through misattribution, post-event suggestions may be incorporated into the memory as if they had belonged to the original memory. This implies, for example, that the way in which a particular saying or experience had been interpreted by others might then become incorporated into memory and subsequently retrieved as part of the original memory. 'Bias' relates to the process by which memory encoding is influenced by pre-existing ideas, beliefs, and the emotional colouring experienced during the recollection of previous experiences. That is, current beliefs and attitudes have an effect on how past experiences related to those beliefs and attitudes are recalled. Moreover, in cases where stories or events remembered include features that the subject regards as anomalous or incongruent, memories can be adjusted to mitigate those anomalies.

A particularly interesting experiment involved relating to groups of participants several versions of the story of a dating couple, Bob and Margie. In one version (A), Bob did not want children and Margie was horrified to learn this. In a second version (B), Margie was thrilled, because having a family was incompatible with her career track. Two different conclusions were also supplied, one in which the couple married, and another in which they separated.

Participants who saw the separation as congruent with A and the marriage as congruent with B had little difficulty in remembering the general lines of the stories. But those who saw the outcomes as incongruent, showed a tendency to manufacture details that helped to render the stories intelligible: 'they separated but then realized that

[9] Schacter (1999).

[10] Schacter (1999) 192 reports that 'depending on experimental conditions, approximately 20–40% of participants came to describe some memory of the false event [supplied by suggestion] in later interviews'. See also Güntürkün et al., Ch. 13 in this volume.

their love mattered more'; 'they discussed the matter and decided to compromise with adoption'; 'they separated not because of their desire for children, but because of parental interference'.[11]

These findings indicate that memory is indeed not a recording of the past, but a complex construction from aspects of memory stored in different locations of the brain, sometimes blended with features of similar memories, overlaid with emotion and moral evaluative colouring, and supplemented with detailed manufactured to render anomalous features more intelligible.

Findings from neuropsychology help to account for the data collected by April DeConick, in her experiments with groups of college students given (orally or in writing) an aphorism, a parable, and a miracle story and then asked to recollect these items and record them either orally or in writing.[12] Some were allowed visual access to the source when they repeated the story. DeConick looked at both short-term memory (STM) and recollection after the period of a week (LTM). The results generally duplicate those obtained by Bartlett:[13] nearly one-quarter of the subjects were able to reproduce the twenty-one-word aphorism verbatim in STM and most (80 per cent) could reproduce it if they had visual contact with the written source. But no one reproduced the parable from memory and only 11 per cent reproduced it verbatim from visual contact. The miracle story was even more subject to memory failure: no subject reproduced it verbatim—even those with *visual* contact with the source. With LTM, the average verbatim repetition of the aphorism was three of the twenty-one words, five to seven of the seventy-six words for the miracle story, and the same for the sixty-six-word parable.[14] DeConick observed that some aspects of memory were reasonably stable: subjects exhibited a high recall of the keywords or the central images of the aphorism, parable, and miracle story, in both STM and LTM. But four types of alteration were in evidence: abbreviation, substitution of synonyms, paraphrase, and additions—including the addition of formulae employed in related genres, and details that rationalized or explained the parable or miracle story. This was the

[11] Schacter (1999) 194.

[12] DeConick (2008). These experiments continue and elaborate work done by McIver and Carroll (2002).

[13] See n. 4. [14] DeConick (2008) 145–51.

case even when the subject had visual contact with the source.[15] DeConick's conclusions bear repeating:

> In the oral traditioning process . . . Jesus traditions (including proverbs) were not expanded, except for an occasional new detail or brief interpretive clause. . . . Instead, the traditions in the oral environment suffered drastic condensation and remodeling until (a) they became fixed oral traditions that could easily be passed on intergenerationally with little variation, or (b) they entered liturgy or (c) they were copied as sacred texts. . . . The idea that verbatim words of Jesus, or any other 'originating' oral source, can be recovered must be tossed out. There is no experimental data that can support this search for 'the original,' unless we can envision a situation where the presented material was passed on immediately upon hearing from one person to the next, or where Jesus' words were scribed down as he spoke and then memorized. . . . The data also suggest that when the text in question shows a tendency to preserve words of Jesus more accurately than the surrounding narrative, the author likely had consulted a written source. . . . Other signs of literary dependence include verbatim strings of sixteen or more words and exact reproduction of sayings and narratives.[16]

These findings provide a strong caution against excessive claims about the infallibility of memory untutored by written documents and about the ability of members of the Jesus movement to preserve their stories faithfully. The rather startling results that even when a source text is visually present, the subject often deviates substantially from it should also provide a caution to the arguments of James Dunn and Terence Mournet to the effect that when Matthew and Luke display a low degree of verbatim agreement in the reproduction of Q materials, they are relying not on a written document but on 'oral tradition'.[17]

DeConick's data, by contrast, indicate that even when subjects have visual contact with source material, they are quite capable of departing from the wording of the source text.[18]

[15] DeConick (2008) 157–76. [16] DeConick (2008) 177–8.

[17] Dunn (2005); see also Mournet (2005).

[18] As I have argued, moreover, one cannot assume that a given author will adopt a consistent policy of verbatim repetition or paraphrase. On the contrary, examination of Diodorus' use of Ephorus shows that Diodorus sometimes copies Ephorus nearly verbatim, and at other places paraphrases freely. Hence, one cannot assume, as Mournet does, that Matthew and Luke would have had a consistent pattern of copying such that high-verbatim agreement sections are from a written document, and low-verbatim agreements signal reliance on the vagaries of oral tradition; see Kloppenborg (2007).

The combined findings from neuropsychology and DeConick's data on the one hand make the conclusion virtually unavoidable that Matthew and Luke had contact with a written source for their double-tradition material, since it is only by this means that one can account for the significant number of strings of verbatim agreements in excess of sixteen words.[19] And even where Matthew and Luke register fewer verbatim agreements, DeConick's findings indicate that access to a written source is hardly excluded—after all, only one of the two synoptic authors had to vary his source to produce a verbal disagreement.

The cognitive processes that contribute to the constructive memory framework help to account, on the one hand, for the basic words and images that are remembered ('gist memory') and, on the other, the wide variation in performative memory.

Lest it be imagined, as it was widely in the past, that preliterate persons compensated for the absence of literate information storage by developing enhanced semantic memory skills, it is now clear from empirical studies of literate versus illiterate persons that there are differences in the ways in which memory is activated and in the kinds of things that are most easily remembered. Literate and illiterate persons perform equivalently in understanding and remembering objects and words that belong to immediate sensory experience, but illiterate persons exhibit difficulty in understanding or remembering objects that could only be known through text storage. For example, studies of illiterate and literate persons in Portugal show that illiterate persons had difficulty in understanding dinosaurs and kangaroos or in understanding and remembering pseudo-words. This suggests that

> Learning to read reinforces certain fundamental abilities, such as verbal and visual memory, phonological awareness, executive functioning, and visuospatial and visuomotor skills.[20]

[19] Compare the results of Hunter (1985) 210 who observes that 'L[engthy] V[erbatim] R[ecall] occurs only in cultures where text exists and is used . . . When LVR occurs on a large scale, the social and biographical setting is one which places value on textual materials as a subject matter in its own right, e.g. sacred scripture, socially-valued literature, textual scholarship . . . [and] where text is unknown or unimportant it its own right, LVR does not occur. The units of language which do recur verbatim are short (e.g. set phrase, proverbial expressions) and, as in everyday speech, these short units are not bonded together in LVR.' I owe this reference to Alan Kirk.

[20] Ardila et al. (2010) 692.

Memory studies, perhaps surprisingly, have shown that illiterate persons are in fact *worse* at various aspects of semantic memory:

> Illiterates generally perform more poorly than schooled literates on conventional neuropsychological memory measures such as wordlist learning and recall . . . , story learning and recall . . . , verbal paired associates, digits backwards, number-months . . . , and complex figure drawing. . . . However, the performance of illiterates seems to approach that of literates on object memory.[21]

This seems to indicate that while memory transmission in oral and literate cultures functions, in many cases assisted by mnemonic devices, the nature of recall differs. 'Accurate memory' may mean the preservation of 'gist information' in the case of purely oral (non-literate) transmission; verbatim recall, however, is more likely a matter of memory that has been schooled by literacy.[22]

ETHNOGRAPHY AND MEMORY: THE SUBJECT IN SOCIAL SPACE

Most of the memory experiments described above are performed on individuals, not persons in groups and do not measure memory replication when group constraints are present. It is true, however, that Bartlett did consider the phenomenon of memories recalled in groups. He observed that

> Any story, or any series of incidents, recalled in the presence, and for the hearing, of other members of the same group will tend to display certain characteristics. The comic, the pathetic, and the dramatic, for example, will tend to spring into prominence. There is social control from the auditors to the narrator. . . . The commonest of all methods of producing the humorous, the pathetic and the dramatic is by exaggeration. . . . Change the audience to an alien group, and the manner of recall again alters.[23]

[21] Ardila et al. (2010) 700.
[22] Ong (1982) 57–8; Minchin (1996) 8–9.
[23] Bartlett (1995, orig. 1932) 266.

He also noted that the recollection of an episode changed, depending on whether the speaker enjoyed a superior or inferior status vis-à-vis his audience.

Much of the work done on memory transmission in social settings has been done by anthropologists and ethnographers, and it is here that the social constraints on memory can be explored. In *How We Think They Think*, Maurice Bloch relates the account of his journey to a remote village in Madagascar to visit the family that had hosted him in the past. When he arrived, his host family took him into the house, closed the doors and, while helping him to get settled, asked him of the details of his trip. After this, the doors were opened and curious villagers came by to seek information on the new arrival. To each set of villagers Bloch related his account, but was repeatedly interrupted and his story taken over by a senior member of the family:

> At every repetition what I could say and could not say became clearer and clearer, when I could answer or when I had to leave other senior members of the household answer for me became fixed. Rapidly we became experts at this performance and everything went extremely smoothly.[24]

The elements of Bloch's journey that were simply happenstance and accident were quickly incorporated into 'an apparently inevitable and morally appropriate sequence'; the narrative became information-poor but 'very strong on the reestablishment of order. . . . by making [his] journey predictable it made the account acceptable'.[25] Bloch's story was quickly assimilated to dozens of other stories of members of the village, all likewise information-poor but rich in moralizing. Although Bloch's own memory of his journey was perhaps not affected by the constraints of his hosts, it is fair to conclude that their memory of his arrival had been manipulated to accordance with local expectations of what made an appropriate story.

Bloch relates another interesting detail, of the villagers' divergent account of events that occurred in their village during the 1947 anti-colonialist revolt. The version of the account recited on solemn occasions bore the same hallmarks as the story of Bloch's journey:

> It reduces the arbitrariness of specific events in time to a well honed cultural pattern where the cultural institutions of the village, whether

[24] Bloch (1998) 104.

[25] Bloch (1998) 105. Vansina (1985) 20 records a similar phenomenon of a happenstance occurrence being converted into a predestined event.

> linguistic, material . . . or social . . . are used to reorder the events of the past so that they accord with timeless values and beliefs.[26]

Yet Bloch was told another account by the same villagers about the same events, organized in a completely different manner, not moralistic at all, highly detailed, and organized now by topography. It would be wrong, he insists, to ask which of the two is the true account, or even to see the two as contradictory. What differentiated the two accounts was the performative context for which they are intended.

Bloch's two stories illustrate both how collective norms and group identity control what can and cannot be said (or remembered), and how the performative context in which memory is actualized has an important bearing on what is remembered. And lest we imagine that social control of discourse is a long-term process of slowly assimilating stories to group expectations, it is well to recall that Bloch's first story was conformed to community standards within hours, not years or decades.

If we imagine a similarly complex situation of ancient first-hand accounts, the collectivization of memory effected not after decades but after one or two recitations, and the existence of multiple disparate accounts of the same events told in different performative contexts, Richard Bauckham's conjecture that gospel writers 'would not be content to record the traditions as transmitted in [collective memory]' but would seek a source closer to the events (i.e. eyewitness reports),[27] assumes more than we can expect. It presupposes that the gospel writers were able to distinguish between first-hand testimony and collective memories, and even if they were, that they would naturally choose the former over the latter. And it assumes that the earliest reporting of events had not immediately been conformed to collective standards. None of these suppositions is either inevitable or likely.

Intergenerational transmission of memories is even more subject to alteration. Jack Goody and Ian Watt's study of orality in West Africa noted that even as formalized an oral communication as a genealogy was subject to change in the course of transmission:

> the social element in remembering results in genealogies being transmuted in the course of being transmitted; and a similar process takes place with regard to other cultural elements as well, to myths, for

[26] Bloch (1998) 107. [27] Bauckham (2006) 292.

> example, and to sacred lore in general. Deities and other supernatural agencies which have served their purpose can be quietly dropped from the contemporary pantheon; and as the society changes, myths too are forgotten, attributed to other personages, or transformed in their meaning.[28]

Variability in oral transmission, according to Goody, is the result of the fact that the individual perceives the past in terms of the present and is therefore able to adjust the tradition to present realities. While Goody's notion of a homeostatic balance determining the relationship between past and present has been subject to criticism,[29] few anthropologists doubt that change—substantial change—occurs in the course of oral transmission. When after twenty years Goody visited the communities in Ghana whose recitations he had earlier recorded, he was able to confirm substantial changes in what he had once thought to be a standardized oral form:

> The differences are many and profound, especially in the more speculative, 'mythical' Black Bagre. But variants occur at a number of other levels. Individuals will even correct versions of the formal, opening invocation of some twenty lines as if it were fixed, yet that short, repeated section turns out to have almost as many variants as speakers,

[28] Goody and Watt (1963) 310.

[29] e.g. Vansina (1971) 457 argues that Goody has exaggerated the role of the present, pointing to the presence in oral accounts of 'archaisms, obscure passages, and above all traditions which exhibit a conflict of interests born from changes in the society'. Nevertheless, Vansina also notes that 'official traditions, which are obviously most tampered with for social reasons, are best preserved, but there are few variants to check on the state of preservation; popular traditions, though not so much tampered with for official reasons, are often transmitted in a slipshod fashion and can be altered profoundly for aesthetic reasons, as is evident from the multiple variants' (1971, 448). Kirk (2005) 13 is also critical of social reconstructionists who take the view that 'tradition can be understood in all important respects as a symbolic creation of the past' and argues instead that the past (diachronically) may shape and constrain the dispositions of the present. The past is not completely open to manipulation by present interests. On this, see, e.g. Olick and Levy (1997), who argue that 'collective memory *is* this negotiation, rather than pure constraint by, or contemporary strategic manipulation of, the past' (1997, 934, emphasis original). See, more recently, Rodriguez (2010) 41–80, esp. 50–64, who distinguishes between 'strong' and 'weak' forms of distortion of the past in the interests of the present. He resists the 'presentist' view that the past is indefinitely open to manipulation, but also maintains that, in spite of a certain stability and persistence of an image of the past, this should not be confused with objective history (2010, 63).

> a stark contrast to the fixity of the Lord's Prayer or the College Grace, both embodied in a written text and read or learnt 'by heart.'[30]

It is certainly a legitimate question whether the content of Jesus tradition is sufficiently comparable to the genealogies and myths examined by Goody, and whether the largely preliterate social contexts of Ghana (for Goody and Watt) and Madagascar (for Bloch) are sufficiently close to the social situation of the eastern Mediterranean in antiquity for the models of Bloch and Goody to be salient.[31] It might be noted, however, that Loveday Alexander's discussion of Xenophon's *Apomnemoneumata* observes the same kind of accommodation of personal memory to communal expectations that Maurice Bloch's more recent ethnography reported. Xenophon could claim personal knowledge of Socrates,

> But a glance at Xenophon's work makes it clear from the outset that even within one generation, memory, however personal in origin, is already molded by the literary forms and expectations of the larger society. Xenophon's work combines apologetic (echoing the trial format of Plato's Apology and forged in the head of the reputation wars that broke out over Socrates' memory after his death) with anecdotes (e.g. 3.14) and more extended dialogues of the Platonic type.[32]

[30] Goody (1986) 9.

[31] Gerhardsson (2005) 6–7, for example, has objected to the use of models of transmission drawn from cross-cultural analysis. 'It is incontestable that a historical study of Jesus and the early Christians must respect the fact that they were active as Jews in Hellenistic times in Palestine. To interpret them as examples of phenomena that are supposed to exist here, there, and everywhere in the world is to sacrifice their anchoring in their concrete historical milieu and instead advance by drawing on conditions in other parts of the world. . . . The sayings in the gospels are, with regard to content, serious religious and ethical teaching, inspired by zeal for "the kingdom of God and his righteousness," and bound to a single charismatic teacher figure. It is simple and natural from a geographical and cultural point of view to compare this material with Jewish teaching of wisdom, prophetic, and legal types. But it seems to me rather farfetched to compare it instead with secular folk stories from ancient Greece, from Yugoslavia, or wherever.'

[32] Alexander (2009) 121. McIver (2011) 108–9 believes that 'collective memories appear to be largely free of actual confabulation' but 'are susceptible to shaping by present circumstances and there are some conditions in which false perceptions of reality become entrenched in collective memory'. Despite the fact that McIver cites examples of outright confabulation, he concludes that 'it can almost be guaranteed that these community gatherings would have repeated stories about Jesus and sayings attributed to him. The nature of collective memory means that the traditions preserved in [Jesus] groups would need to correspond in some significant manner to Jesus himself and what he said and did' (2011, 121), citing in a credulous manner the

Prior to the appearance of Alexander's essay, however, several scholars promoted the model of oral transmission proposed by Kenneth Bailey as having greater salience, since it (allegedly) was based on the transmission of traditions in the (modern) Middle East.

BAILEY AND WEEDEN ON MEDITERRANEAN MEMORY

Bailey, as is well known, was neither an ethnographer nor an anthropologist, but lived in the Middle East for a considerable period. He posited a model of 'informal controlled' transmission of oral tradition, distinguished on the one hand from the formal, rabbinic model proposed by Birger Gerhardsson,[33] and on the other from the uncontrolled model of transmission adopted by form critics such as Bultmann. Bailey's model resembles in certain respects the observations of Bloch and Goody, but only to the extent that it recognizes the social control exercised over memory. Bailey's model, in contrast to those of Bloch and Goody, however, assumes that social control functions to preserve rather than to shape what is transmitted. Bailey distinguishes three types of discourse: proverbs and poems, which if misremembered in the course of recitation may be subject to immediate correction by others; parables and historical anecdotes, in which 'the central threads of the story cannot be changed, but flexibility in detail is allowed';[34] and jokes and casual news, where there is total flexibility in retelling of the story.

Bailey is most interested in the second type of transmission, which he characterizes as

work of Bailey (on which see below). McIver's rather vague formulation concerning 'correspondence' and 'non-confabulation' is indebted to the work of Baumeister and Hastings (1997) who, however, are careful to distinguish the invention of entire episodes in collective memory from the more common phenomena of selective omission, exaggeration and embellishment, linking/detaching of ostensibly related episodes, blaming the enemy, blaming circumstances, and contextual framing, all of which contribute to 'group memories [as] systematically distorted in a variety of ways to maintain a positive image of the group' (1997, 292).

33 Gerhardsson (1961).

34 Bailey (1995a) 7.

> continuity and flexibility. Not continuity and change. The distinction is important. Continuity and change could mean that the story-teller could change, say, 15 per cent of the story—any 15 per cent. Thus after seven transmissions of the story theoretically all of the story could be changed. But continuity and flexibility mean that the main lines of the story cannot be changed at all. The story can endure a hundred transmissions through a chain of a hundred and one different people and the inner core of the story remains intact.[35]

This type of transmission is typical, Bailey argues, in cases where the material is central to the identity claims of the tradents. Stories that are important to group identity will be subject to a greater degree of collective control in their transmission than other kinds of information. Bailey's model is focused on preservation. He does not (with one exception) consider the possibility, documented by Goody and Bloch, that initial reports might be already conformed to collective expectations prior to any transmission. That is, collective control for Bailey is essentially conservative rather than constructive. Bailey's claim that the collective control ensures the faithful transmission of tradition also conflicts with Goody's report, which suggests that diachronic changes in group interest account for significant modification of stories over the course of their transmission.

Bailey relied for his conclusion on stories that he had heard in the 1950s concerning John Hogg, a Scottish missionary who worked in Egypt between 1854 and 1886, whose daughter had also published a biography of her father in 1914. Bailey reports that in the village churches that Hogg had founded a century before, he heard 'the same stories [as were contained in the daughter's biography] intact with roughly ninety per cent of the same words'.[36] That would indeed be an impressive statistic and throw into doubt the ethnographic models of Bloch and Goody.

Theodore Weeden has recently revisited Bailey's argument, comparing carefully Bailey's reports of several incidents with the text of Hogg's biography.[37] One concerns urine being poured on Hogg while he was preaching. Contrary to Bailey's claim, Weeden found that not

[35] Bailey (1995a) 7–8.

[36] Bailey (1995b) 366, emphasis added. In the *Themelios* version of the paper, Bailey drops the numeric estimate and substitutes 'the same stories told in almost the same way' (1995a, 9, emphasis added).

[37] Weeden (2009).

only did the two accounts of Hogg differ in many important respects, but that the 'punchline', which Bailey claimed to be the element least subject to variation, was entirely different. Bailey's version has the instigator of the urine incident being ashamed, converting, and eventually becoming a church leader; Hogg's account says nothing of this conversion. Weeden concludes:

> Based upon these significant differences between Bailey's and Rena Hogg's account, the modus operandi practiced in transmitting this particular story was not informal controlled oral tradition but rather, contra Bailey, appears to have been informal uncontrolled oral tradition.[38]

Yet more damaging to Bailey's theory was a second account of Hogg's encounter with robbers. Bailey claimed that he had heard the story told orally and independently of Rena Hogg's written account but that comparison with the biography showed that it was told 'in almost the same way'.[39] But contrary to Bailey's claim, there were two other versions of the story, one told by a patriarch that Hogg rehearsed in her biography, and Hogg's own account. The latter, which Bailey failed to report, treated the story of the robbers as 'a romantic tale' and related an entirely different version of the story that did not involve robbers at all.[40] Again Weeden concludes:

> what constitutes the historically original, fundamental, unalterable components of that story . . . as Bailey defines it, have been radically altered. Not only have the central thrust and basic flow of the story and its basic scenes been changed, not only has the conclusion been changed, not only does the story as told by the patriarch [Hogg's informant] and Bailey end with a radically different punch line from the original story, and not only are the names no longer the same in the patriarch's and Bailey's account, as was the case in the original story reported by Rena Hogg, but the story also has clearly undergone a radical evolution—all of which represent violations of the fundamental canons of Bailey's theory.[41]

Fatally for Bailey's theory of the informal controlled oral tradition, Rena Hogg in fact asserts that the stories told about her father, by her own time (a generation after his death), had become a 'tangled mass

[38] Weeden (2009) 12. [39] Bailey (1995a) 9.
[40] Weeden (2009) 16–18. [41] Weeden (2009) 18–19.

of fact and fiction'.[42] With this the entire notion of faithful preservation of historical anecdotes is crippled.

Another tale related by Bailey in fact illustrates the point made by Bloch, that a story may be transformed quickly and conformed to a community's perspective on how the story should be told. This is Bailey's account of an accidental shooting at a wedding, where the groom was killed.[43] Within a few days, the story had been altered for the benefit of the police; it was now claimed that a camel had stepped on the hapless groom. As Weeden rightly notes, this is an instance of 'informal controlled tradition'; but in this case control was exerted not so much to preserve an original story as to assimilate the story to communal needs—to obviate the need for a blood feud to avenge the death of the groom.[44] Contrary to Bailey, his data, when analysed carefully, demonstrate precisely the contrary of his view that communal control ensures the accurate transmission of tradition.

It is thus rather surprising that Bailey's theory has gained so much attention when it is founded on consistent misreporting of the relevant data and on inadequate ethnographic methods. James Dunn, who embraced Bailey's model in *Jesus Remembered*, attempted a defence of Bailey in his response to Weeden. The response is rather puzzling, for although it is true, as Dunn points out, that Bailey tells an entire story of the urination episode while Hogg only refers generally to the episode,[45] Dunn avoids the key point that Bailey had claimed that the account he reported and Hogg's account were practically identical. They were not. Dunn argues that Weeden missed the fact that 'in an oral culture the same episode can be narrated or referred to in different ways without any implication that one is more authentic/accurate than the others'.[46] But that was neither Bailey's argument nor Weeden's main point. The point was that Bailey's claim that the stories had not changed over at least forty years of transmission was untrue: the versions were significantly different and even the conclusion to the stories differed. Similarly, in respect to the 'robber story', Dunn claims that Weeden

> seems to be falling into the trap of assuming that there can be only one 'original,' 'historically authentic' and 'faithfully transmitted' version of

[42] Weeden (2009) 19.
[43] Bailey (1995a) 9.
[44] Weeden (2009) 33.
[45] Dunn (2009) 50–1.
[46] Dunn (2009) 51.

> any story or episode. He thereby shows that he has not even begun to appreciate the character of oral tradition with its defining character as 'the same yet different'.[47]

But that was not Weeden's main point, in spite of the fact that Weeden had referred to Bailey's assessment of the 'historically original, fundamental, unalterable components of that story'. Contrary to Bailey's claim that he had encountered 'the same stories told in almost the same way [as were recorded in Hogg's biography]' and that 'the tradition will last in those villages as long as the community he founded survives or until they acquire electricity and television',[48] Weeden simply compared Bailey's and Hogg's versions to show that the two were not told in 'almost the same way'. Contrary to Bailey's model, the main lines of the story were changed. Bailey misreported Hogg's account. And the point about the authenticity or originality of the story was not Weeden's, but Hogg's daughter's: she treated the stories of her father as a 'tangled mass of fact and fiction'.[49]

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Bailey's model of informal controlled tradition, founded on unreliable reporting, has collapsed as a credible model. It is troubling, then, that scholars such as Dunn and Terence Mournet[50] still prefer Bailey's model to models of oral transmission advanced by anthropologists and ethnographers and by Weeden himself, who has shown that Bailey's data in fact demonstrates the significant flexibility of oral tradition and not its ability to preserve the substance of stories intact.[51]

47 Dunn (2009) 52. 48 Bailey (1995a) 9. 49 Weeden (2009) 19.

50 Mournet (2009) 39–61, 217–23.

51 There appears to have been a shift in Dunn's appropriation (and understanding) of the significance of Bailey's work. In *Jesus Remembered*, Dunn's description of Bailey's 'informal controlled tradition' focused on its alleged preservation of tradition: this form of transmission preserves unchanged the 'central thrust of the story'; Hogg's story was retold 'in almost the same way'; in the case of the wedding story, 'each retelling [of the story including] different details, but the climax of the story was almost word for word'; and 'the element in the story regarded as its core or key to its meaning would be its most firmly fixed element' (2003, 207–9). In the wake of Weeden's critique, Dunn now has dropped the claims to significant verbal identity, except in the case of aphorisms, but nonetheless maintains that Bailey's model 'helps explain, and explain better than an exclusively literary model, the enduring character of the Synoptic Jesus tradition—again and again the same event being narrated, the same teaching being passed on, but with diverse detail and differing emphases, in different groupings, sometimes compressed, sometimes extended' (2009, 62, emphasis added). It is, however, no longer clear how Bailey's (adjusted) model better accounts for the synoptic tradition than literary models.

SOCIAL CONTROLS ON INTERPRETATION

The degree of variation permitted in the case of oral transmission suggests that DeConick is correct that when we encounter two versions of parables, tales, and historical anecdotes where there is a moderate-to-high verbatim agreement, one must suspect a direct or indirect *literary* relationship, especially when the materials have travelled from one cultural or social setting to another.[52]

It is usual to assume that aphorisms and proverbs could be transmitted orally in a somewhat more stable form, although Vansina even finds variability in proverb collections.[53] But even if the wording of aphorisms might be preserved in the course of transmission, social control nevertheless intruded in the performance of the aphorism in significant ways. In order to illustrate the significance of social control of discourse, I select an aphorism that has proved to be remarkably stable in its wording as it has moved from one social location to another. In some of its instances, we must assume a literary relationship between the sources in which the aphorism is embedded; in other instances, it may be that the aphorism was transmitted orally, and that the symmetrical construction of the aphorism contributed to its general stability. Despite its remarkable lexical stability, however, I will show that the aphorism was performed with very different results, and thus the aphorism, despite its lexical stability, *has a different meaning* in each of several discursive locations. This is intended as a major qualification of claims to the effect that the 'impact' of Jesus somehow guaranteed the stable transmission of sayings ascribed to him. And a fortiori, when rhyme, symmetrical constructions, balanced cola, memorable wordplays, and other mnemonic devices are absent and, hence, the transmission of a saying or story is even more exposed to the 'sins' of memory and to the pressures exerted by social interests, the form and meaning of sayings

[52] See the influential essay of Whittaker (1989) who argued that in citations of philosophical works that differ from the original text, one should suspect intentional literary manipulation of the text in the service of commentary and interpretation rather than appeal to the vagaries of memory or textual corruption.

[53] See Vansina (1971) 27: 'any formulation that sharpens the punchline is readily appreciated. Large scale collections of proverbs and sayings bear the variability in wording out. As to famous words—usually famous last words—they sum up programs or persons and are mostly apocryphal.'

and stories are even more malleable. The historical Jesus disappears in the fog of memory.

The stable aphorism I have in mind is the measure-for-measure aphorism, extant in five versions.

Q 6:36–8: [*γίν*]*εσθε οἰκτίρμονες ὡς..ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν. . . . μὴ κρίνετε, . . . μὴ κριθῆτε·* [ ][54] *ἐν γὰρ ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.*

Be merciful as your father is merciful . . . do not judge lest you be judged; for by the measuring vessel with which you measure (out), it will be measured (back) to you.

Matt. 7:1–2: *μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.*

Do not judge, lest you be judged; for with the judgement that you judge, you will be judged, and by the measuring vessel with which you measure (out), it will be measured (back) to you.

Luke 6:37–8: . . . *καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ κριθῆτε· καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθῆτε. ἀπολύετε, καὶ ἀπολυθήσεσθε·* (38) *δίδοτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· μέτρον καλὸν πεπιεσμένον σεσαλευμένον ὑπερ-εκχυννόμενον δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ὑμῶν· ᾧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε ἀντι-μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.*

. . . and do not judge, and you will not be judged; and do not condemn and you will not be condemned. Forgive and you will be forgiven; give and it will be given to you, they will put a favourable measure, compacted, shaken, running over on your lap; for by the measuring vessel with which you measure (out), it will be measured (back) to you.

Mark 4:24: *καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς, βλέπετε τί ἀκούετε. ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν καὶ προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν.*

[54] The International Q Project (IQP) constructed Q 6:37–8 with the Matthaean clause [*ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε, καὶ*] with a {C} rating (signalling considerable uncertainty); see Robinson, Hoffmann, and Kloppenborg (2000) 74. On further consideration, I think that it is a Matthaean addition. Dupont (1969, orig. 1958) 166–7 may be correct in arguing, 'On a l'impression que Matthieu a voulu concentrer davantage la pensée sur l'interdiction de juger, évitant les synonymes qui pourrait disperser l'attention; mais son texte devient nettement moins satisfaisant que celui de Luc. Il semble qu'on peut donc conclure au caractère secondaire de la structure du logion chez Matthieu.' Verheyden (2011) ad loc. argues, 'The association of *κρίμα-κρίνα* and *μέτρον-μετρέω* is not otherwise attested in Q, but it is evoked by Matthew in 23:32–3, who hereby drastically changes and adds to the text of Q 11:47–8. Moreover, by removing Q 6:39, 40, Matt 7:2b stands out most prominently as the sole phrase in between 7:1, 2b–5 that has no counterpart. This may have led Matthew to expand upon Q 6:38c and add 7:2a.'

And he was saying to them, 'Pay attention to what you hear. By the measuring vessel with which you measure (out), it will be measured (back) to you and (even more) will be added to you.'

1 Clem. 13:2: *οὕτως γὰρ εἶπεν· ἐλεᾶτε, ἵνα ἐλεηθῆτε· ἀφίετε, ἵνα ἀφεθῇ ὑμῖν· ὡς ποιεῖτε, οὕτω ποιηθήσεται ὑμῖν· ὡς δίδοτε, οὕτως δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ὡς κρίνετε, οὕτως κριθήσεσθε· ὡς χρηστεύεσθε, οὕτως χρηστευθήσεται ὑμῖν· ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, ἐν αὐτῷ μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.*[55]

For thus he said, 'Have mercy so that mercy be shown you; forgive that you be forgiven; as you do, it will be done to you; as you give, it will be given to you; as you judge, you will be judged; as you show kindness, kindness will be shown to you; by the measuring vessel with which you measure (out), by the same (vessel) it will be measured (back) to you.'

The relative stability of the wording of this aphorism is surely a function of the symmetrical construction of the saying and the assonance between *μέτρον* and the verbs *μετρεῖτε* and *μετρηθήσεται*. And as will be noted below, the saying was likely memorable because it functioned on a parody of the way in which *μετρεῖν* normally functioned in the language of loan documents. There are, nevertheless, a number of noteworthy variations:

1. Matthew's aphorism is doubled, by the addition of *ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε* which then requires the placement of *γάρ* in the first clause and a *καί* supplied to introduce the second clause.
2. Luke, in addition to dramatically expanding the string of imperatives for which the measure-for-measure aphorism provides the buttressing statement, employs the compound verb *ἀντιμετρηθήσεται*.[56]

[55] A sixth version of the saying is found in Polycarp, Phil. 2.3 (*μνημονεύοντες δὲ ὧν εἶπεν ὁ κύριος διδάσκων· μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε· ἀφίετε, καὶ ἀφεθήσεται ὑμῖν· ἐλεᾶτε, ἵνα ἐλεηθῆτε· ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, ἀντιμετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν· καὶ ὅτι μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ οἱ διωκόμενοι ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*). Polycarp's version of the saying, however, is so close to Clement's that it seems likely that Polycarp is dependent upon 1 Clement, perhaps with some influence of Matthew's (or Q's) *μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε*. Holmes (2005) 191–2 considered various possibilities—direct dependent of Polycarp on 1 Clement; dependence on 1 Clement corrected against Matthew or Luke; citation of 1 Clement from memory with the influence of Matthew and/or Luke; dependence on a catechism influenced by Matthew and which formed a source for 1 Clement; use of Q or a similar document; and dependence on oral tradition—but concludes that there is insufficient grounds for deciding.

[56] On Luke's preference for compound verbs, see Cadbury (1969, orig. 1920) 160.

3. Mark has added καὶ προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν, an element that is dissonant with the expression of equivalent exchange in the first part of the aphorism.
4. 1 Clement not only has a different set of verbs as the opening imperatives (ἐλεᾶτε, ἀφίετε), but also supplies a set of intermediate motive clauses (ὡς ποιεῖτε, οὕτω ποιηθήσεται ὑμῖν· ὡς δίδοτε, οὕτως δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ὡς κρίνετε, οὕτως κριθήσεσθε· ὡς χρηστεύεσθε, οὕτως χρηστευθήσεται ὑμῖν). The measure-for-measure aphorism now supplies the logic for all of the intermediate motive clauses.

The strong resemblance between some of these versions is no doubt due to the *literary relationship* that existed between Q and its two successor documents, Matthew and Luke. By *literary relationship*, however, I do not mean to imply that the relationship is necessarily one of mechanical copying. As Alan Kirk has helpfully noted, the production of written texts in a manuscript culture frequently involved the *oralization* of the text to be copied or edited and this process of oralization engaged oral/aural aspects of the text rather than simply its visual aspects.[57]

> In effect, scribal memory was the interfacial zone where writing and oral-traditional practices converged and interacted. The text was restored to oral utterance primarily out of memory, just as through its conversion to aural and oral utterance in ruminative reading or recitation it came to be inscribed upon memory. Hence it was in memory that manuscript tradition was opened up to oral phenomenology in its utilization and transmission and accordingly led its cultural existence as an 'oral-performative tradition.'[58]

Thus, even if Matthew and Luke used Q as a written text (as I think likely here), there was an oral-memory component in their use of Q. Q became oral again in order to be incorporated into the later gospels.

The relationship between the Q-derived performances and those found in Mark and 1 Clement is not so clear but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mark's version is not dependent on Q (as Fleddermann has urged[59]) and that, following Andrew Gregory,

[57] Kirk (2008) 215–34, 271–2.
[58] Kirk (2008) 219, citing Jaffee (2001) 141.
[59] Fleddermann (1995) 85–7.

Clement 'refers [in 1 Clem. 13:2] to a collection of sayings that is independent of and earlier than the broadly similar sayings of Jesus that are preserved also in Matthew and/or Luke'.[60]

THE APHORISM IN Q

As I have argued elsewhere,[61] the aphorism in Q should not in the first place be understood as articulating an abstract *lex talionis* principle, but instead as engaging a set of practices that involve measuring and measures. *Μέτρον* in the first instance means 'measuring vessel' or 'measuring scoop', as Bernard Couroyer recognized over forty years ago.[62] The immediate context in Q also invokes the economic realities of loans (Q 6:29) and debt forgiveness (Q 6:29; cf. 11:3). If one loses sight of the fact that Q 6:38c begins as a *metaphor* that invokes an ordinary practice of exchange, the rhetorical force of the saying is lost.[63]

The specific type of exchange invoked by Q is the practice of repaying an agricultural loan *with the same measuring scoop with which it was first measured out*. This practice is illustrated in a number of papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt, including *P.Oxy.* VI.910 (Oxyrhynchus, 197 CE), a standard lease of agricultural land in which the lessor also advances seed grain to the tenant. The lease is framed as a third-person declaration (lines 13–22):

[60] Gregory (2005) 134, referring to Carlyle (1905) 59–61 and Hagner (1973) 151.

[61] Kloppenborg (2010).

[62] Couroyer (1970) pointed out that grain loans from Ptolemaic and early Roman Egypt regularly use a formula which required the borrower to repay the loan using the same measuring vessel (*μέτρον*) that had been used to dispense the loan in the first place.

[63] From a slightly later period, the metaphorical use of 'measure' and 'to measure' is attested in *M. Sota* 1:7 which cites the principle 'in the measure with which a man measures, they measure it to him' (ממדה שאדם מודד בה מודדין לו). It is used in the context of a discussion of the particular punishments appropriate to an adulteress, e.g. Tg. Neophyti I to Gen 38:25, and in Gen. Rab. 9:11: 'R. Simon said in R. Simeon b. Abba's name: All measures have ceased, yet the rule of measure for measure (מדה כנגד מדה) has not ceased. R. Huna said in R. Jose's name: From the very beginning of the world's creation the Holy One, blessed be He, foresaw that man will receive measure for measure (מדה כנגד מדה); therefore Scripture said, AND, BEHOLD, IT WAS VERY GOOD, meaning, behold, there is a fitting dispensation.'

ὁμο-
[λογεῖ δὲ] ὁ {[·]} μεμισθωμένος αὐτόθι
[ἐσχηκέναι] καὶ παραμεμετρῆσθαι παρὰ
[τοῦ γεο]ύχου ἐν πρ[ο]χρείᾳ, εἰς σπέρμα
[ὑπὲρ τῆ]ς γῆς μόνου τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος ἔτους
[πυροῦ ἀρ]τάβας ἑπτά, ὧν τὰς ἴσας ἐπά-
[ναγκο]ν. ἀποδώσει αὐτῷ, ἅμα τοῖς τῆς
[γῆς ἐκ]φορίοις τῷ, Παῦνι μηνὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
[ἐνεστ]ῶτος ἔτου[ς] μέτρῳ ᾧ παρείληφεν
[ἀκίνδ]υνα πάντα [π]αντὸς κινδύνου

> The lessee acknowledges that he has received and has had measured out (to him) here by the farmer, as an advance payment for seed grain, for the land of the single current year, seven artabae of wheat,[64] the same amount which he (the lessee) shall necessarily pay back to him together with the rent of the land, in the mouth of Pauni of the same current year, *by the measuring vessel with which he received it*, free of all risks.

The final clause, with the details of the rental payment, is then elaborated (lines 34–6):

μέτρῳ, τετραχοινίκῳ, παραλημ-
πτικῷ τοῦ γεούχου, τῆς μετρήσεως
γ[ε]ινομένης ὑπ[ὸ τῶν] παρ᾽αὐτοῦ

> by the 4 choinix measure[65] brought by the farmer, with the measuring being done by his agents.

Of the many documents using μετρεῖν with μέτρον, it is Graeco-Egyptian agricultural loans that offer the closest conceptual and verbal parallels to the measure-for-measure aphorism. These are normally framed as first- or third-person *homologiae* in which the borrower acknowledges that s/he has had grain measured out and that s/he will measure it back, using a particular μέτρον (doubtless in order to ensure equivalence in borrowing and repayment).[66]

[64] i.e. 211 kg, or 7.79 bushels.

[65] Between 3.0 and 4.17 kg of wheat.

[66] See, e.g. *P.Mert.* I.14 (Oxyrhynchus, 103 CE): 'I acknowledge that I have received and have had measured out (to me) (παραμεμετρῆσθαι) by you one hundred and seventy artabae of wheat, making 170, which I shall measure (back) (μετρήσω) to your account to the public granary and will deliver this to you on deposit, free of all expenses in the month of Pauni of the present 7th year of Trajan, Caesar and Lord, without any excuse; but if I should not measure out (μετρήσω) (this grain) I shall pay in addition the added half, and you shall have the right of execution on both me and all my possessions, as if by a judicial judgment'; *P.Berl.Möller* 4 (13 CE) 'paying it back

The key terms of the measure-for-measure aphorism—*μεμετρῆσθαι*, *μετρήσω*, and *μέτρῳ*—reflect the scribal vocabulary typical of loan and lease documents. That is, the aphorism has transformed the scribal formula, 'I have had measured out to me . . . , and will measure back, using the same *metron*', into an aphoristic principle. Kirk has elsewhere noted other instances of the interface between the oral and the written media, where oral communication mimics scribal formulae.[67]

There is, nevertheless, a crucial difference between the formulation of these loan documents and Q 6:38*c*. The loan documents are typically framed as the *homologiae* of the borrower—'I have (he has) had *x* measured out to me (him), and I (he) will measure it back.' Likewise Hesiod's advice to repay a neighbour fairly and so ensure that he will be willing to lend again is also framed from the point of view of the borrower.[68] The measure-for-measure aphorism, by contrast, is framed with the *lender* in view—the one who 'measures out' (*μετρεῖτε*) and to whom the loan is 'measured back' (*μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν*). Had the aphorism wished to take the perspective of the borrower, one would expect the formulation *ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ εἰλήφατε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέτρῳ μετρήσον*, 'by the measuring vessel that you have *received*, with the same measure, measure (it) back'.

The reformulation of an administrative formula, now from the standpoint of the lender, illustrates the playful manipulation of stereotypical scribal language. By taking the perspective of the lender, the aphorism assumes the place of the one who is in a position to make or refuse a loan. Languages abound with such manipulative

(*ἀποδιδούς*) in new unadulterated barley of the brand of Hermophantos, measuring (*μετρήσει*) it out to the representative of Herakles, by the fourth measure of the merchants, with fair measure and strickle, at the village granary, paying the granary fee himself'; *P.Mich*. XII.634.12–15 (25/26 CE): paying back 'the entire forty artabae of wheat measured by the four-choinix measure (*μέτρον*) of the granary of Julia Augusta and the children of Germanicus Caesar'.

[67] Kirk (2004) 2 observes that 'writing practices, as a projection of elite power into illiterate population groups, exert effects upon oral practices. More precisely, the experience of imperial domination, and the written genres associated with that domination, will have a signal effect upon the content and forms of oral tradition that originates among illiterate villagers.'

[68] *εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι/αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, καὶ λώιον, αἴ κε δύνηαι,/ὡς ἂν χρηίζων καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἄρκιον εὕρῃς* (Hes., *Op*. 349–51): 'Take fair measure from your neighbor, and pay him back fully | by the same measure, or more, if you are able; | so that when you are in need you will find him someone to rely on' (trans. West 1978: 244).

inversions of stock formula, employed for comic or critical effect. A teacher of mine once reviewed a poorly written monograph, commenting that its exorbitant price 'only added injury to insult'. Groucho Marx quipped, 'I don't care to belong to a club that accepts people like me as members.' Q's measure-for-measure maxim achieves not a comic, but a critical effect. When the aphorism is coordinated with Q's double imperative, γίν]εσθε οἰκτίρμονες . . . μὴ κρίνετε, it constructs an argument in which those who are in a position to show or withhold mercy and to offer or withhold judgement are, by the very logic of their own principle of economic exchange, guaranteed an equivalent reward, depending on their choice of actions. The argument capitalizes on the knowledge that the measure-for-measure principle of exchange, which is designed to guarantee that the lender suffer no loss of income or profit, is harnessed to a moral admonition: if those in a position to act proactively do so, this will redound to their benefit by their own principle of exchange.[69]

Q's appeal to the logic of agrarian economic exchange here is completely in keeping with its use of agrarian language and metaphors elsewhere. In a rural Galilean or Palestinian setting,[70] it is hardly surprising that Q's language and argument, whether we think of it as oral performance or textual storage, is held fast in a network of agrarian concerns and interests.

MEASURE FOR MEASURE IN MATTHEW

While Matthew's performance takes over the aphorism verbatim from Q, the social and discursive context is quite different, which in turn implies that it has a different meaning. Matthew's editing of Q—again, I acknowledge the interface between text and oral memory in the process of editing—introduced two important changes: first, he recasts Q 6:36 not as the introduction to the argumentative complex that runs from Q 6:36 to Q 6:38, but uses it as a conclusion to

[69] This argument is structurally similar to that seen in Q 6:27–35 by Kirk (2003), which likewise appeals to a principle of reciprocity (Q 6:31) to buttress the admonition to love enemies.

[70] On the rural setting of Q, see Kloppenborg (2008) ch. 2.

Matthew 5:44–8: *ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν*. This in turn provokes his asyndetic introduction to 7:1. Second, the relocation of Q 6:39–40 to later in the gospel has the effect of bringing the unit on judging one's brother into juxtaposition with Matthew 7:1–2.

The effect of these two transformations is that instead of buttressing an admonition to show mercy (Q 6:36), the aphorism is focused exclusively on judgement. Matthew's doubling of the aphorism through the addition of *ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε* makes the forensic aspect of the aphorism prominent and reduces the measure-for-measure aspect to almost an afterthought.[71] The immediate juxtaposition of 7:1–2 with the admonitions about not correcting or reprimanding a 'brother' (7:3–5) also reinforces the forensic and disciplinary tone that Matthew gives to the unit.

The result of this editing is that an aphorism which in Q had its 'home' in the domain of agrarian exchange has been assimilated to the *lex talionis* and turned into a legal principle. This context certainly accords with other aspects of Matthew's sermon, which includes a thick fabric of appeals and allusions to judgement (Matt. 5:21–2, 25–6;[72] 6:2, 4, 6) and concludes with a judgement scene (7:21–7).[73] The sermon also includes Matthew 5:19a and 6:14–15, which, like Matthew 7:1-2, propose a verbal symmetry between action and judgement.

Although we have access to Matthew's audience only via his gospel, the frequent appeals to judgement—both judgement of the world in general and judgement of those within the Matthaean group—suggest that forensic language and the expectation of judgement are integral to the discursive patterns of the Matthaean group. In such a context, it is hardly surprising that Q's measure-for-measure complex was literally 're-membered' in a way that conformed it to the forensic idiom of the group.

[71] Cf. Rom. 2:1 (*διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις, τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων*); see also James 4:11–12 (*μὴ καταλαλεῖτε ἀλλήλων, ἀδελφοί· ὁ καταλαλῶν ἀδελφοῦ ἢ κρίνων τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ καταλαλεῖ νόμου καὶ κρίνει νόμον· εἰ δὲ νόμον κρίνεις, οὐκ εἶ ποιητὴς νόμου ἀλλὰ κριτής. εἷς ἐστιν* [*ὁ*] *νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής*); and Sent. Sextus 183 (*ὁ κρίνων τὸν ἄνθρωπον κρίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*).

[72] Rollens (2010), esp. 450–3.

[73] Betz (1981).

MEASURE FOR MEASURE IN LUKE

In contrast with Matthew's performance of the aphorism, Luke's version preserves the wording of Q faithfully apart from the substitution of the compound verb *ἀντιμετρεῖν* for Q's *μετρεῖν*. But he dramatically expands the string of imperatives and elaborates the buttressing statement. Although Luke expands the prohibition of judgement (*καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθῆτε*), he also introduces forgiveness (*ἀπολύετε, καὶ ἀπολυθήσεσθε*) and benefaction (*δίδοτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν*) and thus ends the imperatives with positive actions which, in accordance with the measure-for-measure aphorism, will redound to the agent's benefit.

Luke's performance has, however, lost full sight of the agrarian principle, which emphasized the equivalence of exchange. It is true that Luke begins his elaboration of the motive clause by promising the addressee a *μέτρον καλόν*, probably the equivalent of the phrases *μέτρῳ δικαίῳ*, 'with a just measure'[74] and 'with fair strickle' (*σκυτάλῃ δικαίᾳ*);[75] encountered with great regularity in loan documents, both phrases are employed to underscore the strict equivalence of loan and

[74] *BGU* VI 1268.16 (3rd cent. BCE): *μέτρωι δικαίωι μετρή[σει δικαίαι*; *BGU* X 1951.4 (221–203 BCE): *μέτρωι [δικαίωι μετρήσει δικαίαι*; *P.Amh.* II 43.9 (173 BCE): *μέτρωι δικαίωι τῶι πρὸς τὸ βασιλικὸν χαλκοῦν μετρήσει*; *P.Lille* I 24 Fr. 4.9 (3rd cent. BCE): *μέτρωι δικαίωι καὶ σκυ[τάληι δικαίαι*; *P.Tebt.* III/1 824.16 (171 BCE): *[μέ]τρω δικαίωι κ[αὶ σκυ]|[τάληι δικαίαι*; *P.Yale* I 51 B.23 (184 BCE): *μέτρωι δικαίωι μετρήσει δικαίαι*, etc. In rabbinic texts the 'perfect and just measure' appears in the context of a discussion of the regulation of shopkeepers: b. B.B. 88b, 89a: 'A perfect and just measure [you shall have],' citing Deut. 25:15, *στάθμιον ἀληθινὸν καὶ δίκαιον ἔσται σοι, καὶ μέτρον ἀληθινὸν καὶ δίκαιον ἔσται σοι, ἵνα πολυήμερος γένῃ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἧς Κύριος ὁ Θεός σου δίδωσί σοι ἐν κλήρῳ*. The terms 'good measure' and 'bad measure' appear in Deut. Rab. 11.9 in a complaint against the divine: 'In all your acts [one sees] measure for measure; [then why do you repay me] a bad measure for a good measure, a short measure for a full measure, a grudging measure for an ample measure?'

[75] e.g. *BGU* IV 1142.7 (25/24 BCE); *BGU* VI 1271.6 (180–145 BCE); *BGU* VIII 1742.12 (64/63 BCE); *BGU* XIV 2390.33 (160/59 BCE), 2391.9 (250 BCE), 2392.7 (250 BCE); *P.Amh.* II 43.10 (173 BCE); *P.Dion.* 17.24 (108 BCE), 19.18 (105 BCE), 20.20 (105 BCE); *P.Freib.* III 34.37 (174/3 BCE); *P.Heid.* VI 369.15 (197 BCE); *P.Hib.* I 98.19 (252 BCE); *P.Lille* I 21.26 (155–144 BCE), 23.25 (155–144 BCE), 24.iv.9 (3rd cent. BCE); *P.Tebt.* 3/1 815.iii.2.13 (228–221 BCE), 823.25 (185 BCE), 824.16 (171 BCE); *SB* V 8754.12 (49/48 BCE). See also *P.Cair.Isid.* 32.5–7 (279 CE): *ἐμετρ(ήθησαν) ἡμῖν ἐν θησ(αυρῷ) κώ(μης) Πτολ(εμαΐδος) Νέας μέτρῳ δη(μοσίῳ) ξυστῷ σκυτάλης ἐπικειμ(ένης) ὑπὲρ γενή(ματος)* (= 'They measured out to us at the village granary of Ptolemais Neas, by the raked off public measuring vessel, the strickle having been laid across the produce'). The phrase *μέτρῳ δημοσίῳ ξυστῷ* also appears, e.g. in *BGU* XI 2025.7 (144 BCE); XV 2556.15 (202 CE); *P.Amh.* II 120.14 (204 CE); *P.Fay.* 84.7 (163 CE), etc.

repayment. The reference to produce being 'pressed down and shaken' recalls the frequent provisions in loan agreements, where the grain to be repaid is to be returned with 'new, unadulterated and sifted grain',[76] a provision that guaranteed the lender full repayment. (It might be noted that the provision for such care being taken when repaying a loan is not matched by similar care when the loan is made in the first place, a symptom of the fact that economic exchange, even when it ostensibly aimed at equity, nonetheless favoured the lender and creditor.) But then Luke adds *ὑπερεκχυννόμενον δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ὑμῶν*, and thus completely violates the principle of equivalence of exchange enunciated in 6:38*c*.

The point, for Luke, is not the equivalence of exchange but rather the surplus that the benefactor may expect as a reward for benefaction. In the logic of gift exchange, the benefactor expressed his or her social superiority by benefiting social inferiors. There was a clear expectation not only that benefaction would be recognized by reciprocal acts of gratitude and loyalty, but also that the benefactor's position would in the process be enhanced, thus confirming the benefactor's superior station. As Donlan remarks:

> The upward spiral of goods, personal services, special awards, and perquisites given to a leader by his people is a manifestation of his superiority over them.[77]

Luke's use of the measure-for-measure aphorism, then, moves it into a domain distinct from the agricultural context of strictly equivalent agrarian exchange, and into the social context of benefaction and the honours that are acquired by benefactors for their largesse. Although Luke alters the wording of the aphorism only slightly, the additional context he supplies for it moves it far from Q's performative context.

The transformation of the meaning of the measure-for-measure aphorism seen in Luke is certainly a function of the fact that the social context in which Luke's material is performed is not that of persons in an agrarian setting concerned with subsistence, but of urban dwellers who are fully familiar with the culture of patronage and who are in a position to use their resources to benefit others (and, of course,

[76] *πυροῦ νέου ἀδόλου κεκοσκινευμένου*, 'new grain, free from contamination, sifted', see *BGU* IV 1742.10 (64–63 BCE); XI 2048.6 (217 CE); *P.Flor.* I 85.12 (91 CE); *P.Fouad* 43.43 (190-1 CE); *P.Heid.* VI 368.10 (212 BCE) and 369.11 (197 BCE), etc.

[77] Donlan (1989) 3–4.

themselves).[78] Luke's gospel elsewhere gives special prominence to the praiseworthy actions of such benefactors as the centurion at Capernaum (Luke 7), women of the Herodian household (Luke 8:3), Zaccheus (Luke 19:1–10), and Cornelius (Acts 10). In such a culture, it is not enough to speak of equivalent exchange, since the benefactor already knows that *at least* equivalency in exchange is fundamental to the mechanism of benefaction. In the competitive environment of the urban elite and subelite, the benefactor expects that acts of largesse will not only be reciprocated by the client, but also that they will in fact enhance his or her position vis-à-vis peers.[79] The client's gratitude is not simply directed to the benefactor, but is broadcast so that the benefactor's reputation as *philotimos* and *eunoios*—munificent and well intentioned—is enhanced.[80] Hence, Luke's performance of the measure-for-measure unit responds to the culture of competitive outlay, where the benefactor expects euergetism to result in an escalation of honour.

1 CLEMENT

The context for Clement's usage of the measure-for-measure aphorism is a long exhortation to concord and obedience and the saying is introduced with a memory formula exhorting patience:

> . . . μάλιστα μεμνημένοι τῶν λόγων τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ, οὓς ἐλάλησεν διδάσκων ἐπιείκειαν καὶ μακροθυμίαν (13:1)
>
> . . . especially remembering the sayings of the Lord Jesus, which he was saying when he was teaching equity and patience.

1 Clement's only change to the aphorism itself is the addition of ἐν αὐτῷ—'by the same (measure)'—which seems just a performance variant, but one which underscores the motif of equivalence of exchange. His strings of imperatives are all positive, in contrast to Q's prohibition (μὴ κρίνετε). And although κρίνετε appears in the string, the focus is more generally on the reward to be obtained for

78 See Domeris (1993); Robbins (1991); Kloppenborg (2003).

79 Likewise, in the meal scene in Luke 14, Luke understands the competitive dimension of honour: τότε ἔσται σοι δόξα ἐνώπιον πάντων τῶν συνανακειμένων σοι.

80 Whitehead (1993).

various kinds of behaviours—expressions of mercy, forgiveness, generosity, formulating judgements and kindness.

The structure of Clement's unit is worth considering. The specific appeals to mercy and forgiveness—the first two imperatives—are buttressed by a general quid pro quo aphorism, *ὡς ποιεῖτε, οὕτω ποιηθήσεται ὑμῖν*. Then, using the *ὡς . . . οὕτως* form of this aphorism, three more specific appeals are made—to generosity, careful judgement, and kindness—now buttressed by the measure-for-measure aphorism.

α. ἐλεᾶτε, ἵνα ἐλεηθῆτε·	Specific admonitions
β. ἀφίετε, ἵνα ἀφεθῇ ὑμῖν·	
γ. ὡς ποιεῖτε, οὕτω ποιηθήσεται ὑμῖν·	Reciprocity principle
δ. ὡς δίδοτε, οὕτως δοθήσεται ὑμῖν·	Specific admonitions
ε. ὡς κρίνετε, οὕτως κριθήσεσθε·	
ζ. ὡς χρηστεύεσθε, οὕτως χρηστευθήσεται ὑμῖν·	
η. ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, ἐν αὐτῷ μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν	Reciprocity principle

As with Q 6:36–8, there is a strong appeal to self-interest. 1 Clem. 13:2 is not framed by a general admonition to imitate the divine, but the logic of the two expressions of general reciprocity (*γ*, *η*) implies a 'guarantee' that expressions of mercy, generosity, and kindness will be reciprocated. The unit thus encourages proactive rather than reactive behaviour, and might even allow one to imagine an escalating practice of benefaction and kindness.

It is striking that both Q and 1 Clement deploy the measure-for-measure maxim to help the auditor imagine how generosity, kindness, forgiveness, and mercy could be instantiated as a social practice. The social vision of Q 6:36–8 and 1 Clem. 13:2 (and Q 6:27–35)[81] is not unlike that articulated by other sayings regularly ascribed to Jesus, such as Q 11:4, 'remit us our debts *as we remit the debts of those who owe us*', and Q 14:14–26, the parable of the Great Supper, where the host abandons the norms of balanced reciprocity to pay those who could not repay him. All of these sayings focus on how agency that ventures to move beyond conventional modes of exchange will in the end benefit. One might even endorse the interesting suggestion of Douglas Oakman that these sayings, which focus on agency of the lender, the lessor, and the host, reflect Jesus' appeal to retainers such as tax collectors and the middling wealthy to imagine an alternate social

[81] See Kirk (2003).

praxis aimed at overall debt reduction, a praxis which, on Q's logic, would also redound to the honour of those agents.[82]

1 Clement's use of the measure-for-measure aphorism has not moved much beyond Q's context of agrarian exchange—I am not suggesting that 1 Clement used Q, of course. Strict equivalence is still what is stressed, and there is nothing to suggest something akin to Luke's appeal to increase and surplus, still less Matthew's forensic interests.

THE APHORISM IN MARK

The differences between the usage of the aphorism in Q and its successors and that in Mark are immediately obvious. While all of the Q-derived performances attach the aphorism to an imperative, in Mark the aphorism occurs in a string of aphorisms, the first two (4:21, 22) employing the tropes of light, visibility, and coming-to-light.[83] In the context of Mark 4 and its contrast between the hiddenness of Jesus' parabolic speech and his disclosures to this disciples, Mark's aphoristic cluster can only concern the revelation of a divine message and the results of that revelation.[84]

This helps to explain not only the development of Mark's version of the aphorism, which added *καὶ προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν*, thus destroying the notion of equivalent exchange, but also 4:25, which declares that those who have will gain more and those who do not will lose all. Mark 4:25 enunciates the fantasy of dramatically escalating fortunes and the horror of declining prospects—no doubt an economic reality in the Graeco-Roman world. But Mark 4:24–5 is not a commentary on the material fortunes of the Markan Jesus group, but rather a comment on knowledge. As Collins observes:

> Those who have the mystery of the kingdom will proclaim it and thus receive a greater reward, whereas those who do not have it, will not

[82] Oakman (2008) 280–97. [83] See Marcus (2000–9) 315.

[84] Marcus (2000–9) 318: 'But if the lamp [in 4:21] is a symbol for God's word, what the Markan Jesus says at the beginning of our passage is a significant qualification of the statement about the parable purpose in 4:11–12: even if in the short term God intends 'those outside' to misunderstand his parabolic word, the lamp/word does not come to be hidden forever, but to be put on a lampstand, i.e. to be publicly manifested (4:21).'

> understand the parables and thus lost their opportunity to participate in the kingdom of God.[85]

Once the aphorism is moved from the domain of agrarian exchange to the domain of knowledge, the notions of surplus and accumulation replace the principle of equity in exchange. For Mark equality in economic exchange is irrelevant; rather, it is 'poverty' and 'wealth' in respect of revelation that interests him and, hence, he can celebrate the *incommensurability* of initial investment and final outcome. Mark thus relocates the measure-for-measure aphorism into another discursive realm, where it appeals not to reciprocity but to *acquisitiveness*, at least as far as revelation and knowledge are concerned. An aphorism that in Q served to encourage those with resources (moral and material) to dispense them on the calculable promise of equivalent return has now become focused on the fantasy of unforeseen gain.[86]

CONCLUSION

My points in this survey of the deployments of the measure-for-measure aphorism are several:

First, although we have no direct access to oral tradition and therefore are not in a position to assess the reliability of memory, both the observations from cognitive neuroscience and the experimental data recorded by DeConick should lead us to acknowledge the fallibility and constructive nature of memory and to expect that the Jesus tradition was condensed, schematized, paraphrased, and occasionally elaborated in the course of transmission.

Second, multiple independent performances of units of the Jesus tradition are likely to have modified the tradition *in different ways*, with the result that it is impossible to trace the various performances back to a common 'original' version.

[85] Collins (2007) 253; similarly, see Pesch (1976–7) i. 254.

[86] A similar shift in the social register of discourse can be seen in Mark's treatment of the parable of the Tenants (Mark 12:1–12; *Gos. Thom.* 65–6), where Mark's editing and apocalypticizing of the parable has made it much more compatible with dominant class interests than is the case with Thomas's version. See Kloppenborg (2006), chs. 1–2, 9.

Third, the social control of discourse is not obviously or necessarily conservative in the sense that it tended to maintain tradition as received—contrary to Bailey and Dunn. On the contrary, social expectations and patterns control what can be said and how it is said and, therefore, what was remembered and performed.

Fourth, as tradition moves from one social domain to another, we should expect not only alterations due to the vagaries of memory, but also alterations that are due to the varying social registers in which the tradition is performed. This last point has been illustrated by considering an aphorism whose verbal aspect was relatively stable (probably due to its brevity and the alliterative elements). Despite the stability of its wording, the aphorism functions in five quite distinct performative contexts—so distinct, in fact, that it would be quite misleading were one to insist that the aphorism remains the same.[87]

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11

Sweet Memory

Archaeological Evidence of Jesus in Jerusalem

Jodi Magness

THE FOURTH GOSPEL AND LOCAL SITES

In discussions of the historical Jesus, the Fourth Evangelist has been the odd man out. John is the latest of the canonical Gospels, having been composed or finalized around 100 CE. Although John's location is debated, tradition places him outside Palestine, perhaps in Ephesus.[1] This means that the author of the Fourth Gospel was relatively distant in time and space from the events he describes. Furthermore, the Fourth Gospel is coloured by the author's Christological agenda.[2] For these reasons, many scholars have discounted the Gospel of John as a source of reliable information about the historical Jesus and his setting, in contrast to the Synoptics (which, of course, have their own theological agendas).[3] Nevertheless, in recent years a number of scholars have noted that the Fourth Gospel contains many specific details which suggest historical accuracy or authenticity. Raymond Brown observed that the historical, social, and geographic details peculiar to John indicate that 'the Fourth Gospel reflects a knowledge of Palestine as it was before its destruction in AD 70, when

[1] For John's location and date see Brown (1966) pp. lxxx–lxxxvi, ciii.

[2] See Smith (1995) 65: 'The Gospel of John, however, presents Jesus speaking to christological issues, and to them almost exclusively.' Also see Anderson (1996).

[3] For a summary of this problem with references see Anderson (2006) 587–9. Also see Smith (1995) 65.

some of these landmarks perished'.[4] Brown, D. Moody Smith, and others have concluded that John was not dependent on the Synoptics, but drew on an independent source of Jesus traditions.[5]

Scholars have noted that John's Palestinian material includes many more references to Jerusalem, and specific sites in and around Jerusalem than the Synoptics. John also places Jesus in Jerusalem on more occasions and for longer periods than the Synoptics. The Jerusalem episodes that are unique to John include the healing at the Sheep's Pool (5:2–47); Jesus on pilgrimage and teaching at the Temple during the Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkot) (7:1–39); the healing at the Pool of Siloam (9:1–41); the raising of Lazarus (11:1–14); and the anointing of Jesus in Bethany (12:1–8) (the last two episodes are interconnected and set the stage for Jesus' death and resurrection). Furthermore, John adds details to episodes described in the Synoptic accounts, as, for example, his reference to the Lithostratos pavement as the place where Pontius Pilate sentenced Jesus to death, and his description of Jesus' tunic as seamless.[6]

In this chapter I will discuss some of the details that John provides in light of archaeological evidence, focusing on Jerusalem before 70 CE. I hope to demonstrate that although these details might correlate with sites or artefacts known from archaeology, this does not prove they were associated with the historical Jesus or derive from traditions that go back to the time of Jesus. Generally, it is impossible to distinguish between historical details that were theologized by John, and invented details that John inserted to serve theological purposes. From the perspective of memory studies, John's endeavour (which is not unique to him) was to create memories, and often palpable ones, of Jesus' activities in Jerusalem. It is impossible to determine whether these are 'invented traditions'[7] or in some way reflect earlier memory traditions and, if the latter, to what extent they were modified by John. What stands out is that John often provides a specific place for such episodes, a procedure that enhances memory, as expressed by the term *lieux de mémoire*, even if that term is often used metaphorically rather than limited to topography.[8] Decades ago,

[4] Brown (1966) p. xlii. [5] For a survey see Smith (2001).

[6] For a summary of information that is unique to John among the canonical Gospels, see Anderson (2006).

[7] See the classic study of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).

[8] As exemplified by Nora (1984–92). For the importance of sites for memory, see, e.g. the first section of Erll and Nünning (2010) 19–73; G. Wolf (2001) 582–4.

Maurice Halbwachs addressed himself to this phenomenon in his treatise (which has never been translated in full into English) *La Topoghraphie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte: Étude de mémoire collective* (1941).[9] I shall consider these sites and other material entities in the Fourth Gospel in terms of the archaeological evidence and in light of Halbwachs's observations.

THE SHEEP'S POOL

Let us consider first Jesus' miraculous healings. In John 5:2–9, Jesus heals an invalid at the Sheep's Pool while in Jerusalem for a festival:

> Now in Jerusalem by the Sheep Gate there is a pool, called in Hebrew Beth-zatha, which has five porticoes. In these lay many invalids—blind, lame, and paralyzed. One man was there who had been ill for thirty-eight years. When Jesus saw him lying there and knew that he had been there a long time, he said to him, 'Do you want to be made well?' The sick man answered him, 'Sir, I have no one to put me into the pool when the water is stirred up; and while I am making my way, someone else steps down ahead of me.' Jesus said to him, 'Stand up, take your mat and walk.' At once the man was made well; and he took up his mat and began to walk.[10]

The Sheep's Pool (or Bethesda Pools or Bezetha Pools) belonged to a series of open-air reservoirs that protected Jerusalem's vulnerable northern flank during the Herodian period (late first century BCE to 70 CE). The other reservoirs were Birket Isr'il (the Pool of Israel) at the north-east corner of the Temple Mount and the Struthion Pool outside the Antonia Fortress (at the north-west corner of the Temple Mount).[11]

Birket Isr'il (the Pool of Israel) and the Sheep's Pool served the needs of the Temple cult, supplying water for the multitudes of pilgrims and water required for the sacrifices, including washing the

[9] Re-edition in 2008 by Presses universitaires de France with a valuable introduction by several authors discussing various contexts of this work. The substantial conclusion of Halbwachs's book has been translated by L. Coser in Halbwachs (1992) 192–235.

[10] All translations are from the NRSV unless otherwise stated.

[11] For these pools see Geva (1993) 746; Levine (2002) 214–15.

sacrificial animals. In a recent study of the Sheep's Pool, Shimon Gibson demonstrates that the southern basin is an enormous *miqveh* (Jewish ritual bath), as indicated by the massive hewn steps descending along its western side.[12] Presumably, it accommodated the masses of pilgrims who needed to purify themselves before visiting the Temple. Gibson suggests that a channel through the barrier wall separating the northern and southern basin, which could be opened by a sluice gate to allow water through, may have caused the stirring of the water mentioned in John's account.[13] Gibson concludes that 'those precluded from admission to the Temple, owing to disabilities and bodily defects, would have sought miraculous healing at these pools and this is the background for the healing accounts in the Gospel of John'.[14]

Gibson's conclusion is possible but speculative. The Torah requires immersion in water for purification from certain types of impurity. A state of purity was required to enter God's presence, which most Jews of the late Second Temple period believed dwelled in the Jerusalem temple (the Qumran sect conceived of themselves as the desert sanctuary with God's presence in their midst). According to biblical law, the main causes of impurity are certain types of skin diseases (including on clothing and walls), certain types of bodily emissions (such as nocturnal emissions for men and menstruation for women, but not urine), and contact with certain categories of living things and corpses. The same categories are discussed by the rabbis, who display a concern with the role played by liquids in the transmission of impurity.[15] However, there is no indication in any of our sources—literary or archaeological—that Jews immersed in *miqva'ot* for purposes other than purification, such as seeking miraculous healings. Neither of the men healed by Jesus suffered from a condition or affliction that required ritual purification. This does not mean that Jews never immersed in a *miqveh* for the purpose of miraculous healing, only that this practice is unattested outside John's account.

Although John's testimony might provide evidence of this practice, there is another possibility. After 70, the Sheep's Pool was the site of a

[12] Gibson (2005) 270–93. [13] Gibson (2005) 287.

[14] Gibson (2005) 271.

[15] For recent discussions and bibliography relating to biblical purity laws, including rabbinic legislation, see Harrington (2000) 724–8; Klawans (2006). Basic studies include Milgrom (1991); Neusner (1973); Douglas (1966).

healing sanctuary dedicated to Serapis (usually described in scholarly literature as an Asclepeion).[16] Ancient sources describe Asclepius and Serapis as healing patients through a combination of bathing in water and dreaming during incubation.[17] John's description of the Sheep's Pool—surrounded by invalids lying on mats—sounds more like the incubator of an Asclepeion than pools used for ritual purification as prescribed by biblical law. John refers to the invalid's bed as a *krabbatos*, which Brown notes is the koine word for the pallet or mattress used as bedding by the poor.[18] John's story better fits a post-70 than pre-70 reality in Jerusalem, and a scene of invalids sleeping on mats by a pool hoping for a miraculous healing would have made more sense to a Gentile than a Jewish audience. In other words, although it is possible that some Jews sought healing at the Sheep's Pool (and therefore the tradition associating Jesus with healing at this site antedates 70), it is just as likely that this tradition post-dates 70.

THE POOL AT SILOAM

John's account of Jesus' healing of a blind man at the Pool of Siloam is different:

> As he [Jesus] walked along, he saw a man blind from birth. . . . When he had said this, he spat on the ground and made mud with the saliva and spread the mud on the man's eyes, saying to him, 'Go, wash in the pool of Siloam' (which means Sent). Then he went and washed and came back able to see. (9:1, 6–7)

Unlike the episode at the Sheep's Pool, there is no indication of a setting recalling a healing sanctuary, only a single, random blind man. Indeed, the episode refers to the Pool of Siloam but does not take place at the pool. It is impossible to determine whether Jesus and other Jews utilized the water (and mud) of the Pool of Siloam for healing purposes and not just ritual purification. Interestingly, unlike Jerusalem's other large reservoirs, the Pool of Siloam and Sheep's

16 See Duprez (1970); Belayche (1970) 160–7.
17 See Hart (2000) 53–5, 81–3; Edelstein and Edelstein (1945).
18 Brown (1966) 207–8.

Pool were used as *miqva'ot*—that is, Jesus' miraculous healings reportedly occurred at pools in which Jews bathed.[19]

Yaakov Meshorer suggested that after 70, a sanctuary of Hygieia was associated with the Pool of Siloam, based on a series of city coins depicting the goddess sitting on a rock (which he believed must be the source of a spring) and feeding a snake.[20] Nicole Belayche rejects this proposal on the grounds that there is no supporting archaeological or literary evidence.[21] Either way, John's account does not imply that the Pool of Siloam was used as a healing sanctuary. John may have presented it as the setting for Jesus' performance of a miracle because of Isaiah 8:6, in which the waters of Shiloah symbolize the Davidic dynasty.[22]

MIRACLES IN SEARCH OF PLACES

John presents the Sheep's Pool and the Pool of Siloam as settings for Jesus' miraculous healings with no connection to Jewish purification rites. Even when John mentions purification rites—as, for example, in the Cana story—it is to illustrate Jesus' performance of miracles rather than his concern with the observance of purity:

> Now standing there were six stone water jars for the Jewish rites of purification, each holding twenty or thirty gallons. Jesus said to them, 'Fill the jars with water.' And they filled them up to the brim. He said to them, 'Now draw some out, and take it to the chief steward.' So they took it. When the steward tasted the water that had become wine . . . Jesus did this, the first of his signs, in Cana of Galilee, and revealed his glory; and his disciples believed in him. (2:6–11)

As Morton Smith noted, the performance of miracles plays an especially important role in John, who uses them to prove Jesus' divine or supernatural status.[23] This is not to deny the possibility that these details have some basis in traditions associated with the historical Jesus. In fact, Smith argued that traditions about Jesus' performance

[19] For the recent discovery of the late Second Temple period Pool of Siloam, see Shanks (2005) 16–23; Reich and Shukrun (2004) 137–40.

[20] Meshorer (1989) 56–7.

[21] Belayche (1970) 168–9.

[22] See Brown (1966) 372.

[23] Smith (1978) 13.

of miracles likely antedate traditions depicting him as a legal expert debating Halachic points with his opponents.[24]

Of course, all four canonical Gospels contain stories about Jesus' performance of miraculous healings. As Smith concluded, 'Whatever their individual historicity, they [the original narratives] prove that Jesus was remembered as a miracle worker in the earliest Palestinian churches.'[25] However, the Fourth Gospel lacks most of the Halachic disputes found in the Synoptics. Instead, John's Jesus debates theology with his Jewish/Pharisaic/scribal opponents. Gone are the Halachic disputes about picking grain on the Sabbath, washing hands before eating, and dining with tax collectors and sinners. John seems to eliminate anything suggesting that Jesus observed biblical law. For example, in contrast to the Synoptics, John never refers to Jesus wearing *tzitzit*. John's Jesus is legitimized over and against the Jews not by citing his interpretation of scripture to win Halachic debates, but by performing miracles that have precedents in or fulfil biblical prophecy. When John describes Jesus' miraculous healings on the Sabbath, the debates with his opponents are couched in theological terms. For example, in John 5:18 'the Jews' are angered not only because Jesus broke the Sabbath, but also because he called God his Father and thereby made himself equivalent to God. Because Jesus' divine or supernatural status would have placed him above the law, Halachic disputes might be absent from the Fourth Gospel because they were irrelevant for John's purposes.[26]

What was more relevant for his purposes, and connected with this emphasis, was to provide the miracle stories with a specific location. Halbwachs commented generally on this process as follows: 'Sacred places thus commemorate not facts certified by contemporary witnesses but rather beliefs . . . These beliefs focus most frequently on facts of a supernatural kind . . . if a truth is to be settled in the memory of a group it needs to be presented in the concrete form of an event, of personality, or of a locality'.[27] John incorporated all three of these aspects in the miracle stories I have discussed. This sets him apart from the Synoptics because, as Halbwachs notes, while 'localizations are important for the events . . . this was not the case for the parables, the discourses, and the miracles'.[28] The miracles seem to fall in a

[24] Smith (1978) 14, 146. [25] Smith (1978) 14. [26] Smith (1978) 144.
[27] My citation is from Coser's edition, Halbwachs (1992) 199–200.
[28] My citation is from Coser's edition, Halbwachs (1992) 211.

category different from the former (on whose memory aspects see Kloppenborg, Chapter 10 in this volume) because they are instances of the supernatural and as such were increasingly localized in the tradition starting with John.

THE PRAETORIUM

John 18:28 relates that the Jews who took Jesus from Caiaphas to Pilate 'did not enter the praetorium, so as to avoid ritual defilement and not be able to eat the Passover'. This incident is unique among the Gospel accounts to John, who also differs in placing Jesus' death at the beginning of Passover.[29] Some scholars have assumed that contact with Gentiles was the source of impurity in John's account. However, contact with Gentiles was not considered a source of impurity in the late Second Temple period (except perhaps by members of the Qumran sect).[30] Gentiles were even allowed on to Jerusalem's Temple Mount.[31] Jonathan Klawans has proposed that the Jews mentioned by John would have refused to enter the praetorium because of concerns about corpse impurity, as this was a place where people were beaten and died.[32] This suggestion brings to mind Numbers 9:6, in which Israelites who could not keep the Passover because they were corpse-impure are commanded to observe the festival a month later.[33] It is also possible that John's account was influenced by the notion of Gentile impurity which became common after 70.[34] In other words, this is another example of a tradition in John that could either antedate or post-date 70.

[29] See Brown (1970) 859–60.

[30] Brown (1970) 845–6; Hayes (2002) 47–9, 64.

[31] Although Gentiles were denied access to the Temple; for a discussion see Hayes (2002) 59–61.

[32] Klawans (1995) 301 n. 81; also see Hayes (2002) 50.

[33] See Brown (1994) 745–6, who also suggested that the Jews were concerned with contracting corpse-impurity.

[34] See, in general, Hayes (2002).

MATERIAL DETAILS AND HOW SOCIETIES REMEMBER: JESUS' TUNIC

Whereas all four canonical Gospels mention the Roman soldiers dividing Jesus' clothes among themselves after he was nailed to the cross, only John elaborates:

> When the solders had crucified Jesus, they took his clothes and divided them into four parts, one for each soldier. They also took his tunic; now the tunic was seamless, woven in one piece from the top. So they said to one another, 'Let us not tear it, but cast lots for it to see who will get it.' This was to fulfill what the scripture says, 'They divided my clothes among themselves, and for my clothing they cast lots.' [Ps 22:18] And that is what the soldiers did. (19:23–5)

Could John's reference to Jesus' seamless tunic reflect a tradition associated with the historical Jesus that is not preserved in the Synoptic accounts? Tunics and mantles were the standard articles of clothing worn by men and women throughout the Roman East. The mantle—a type of cloak worn over the tunic—consisted of a large rectangular sheet (Greek *himation*; Latin *pallium*; Hebrew *tallit* or *me'il*).[35] In contrast, the Roman toga had a curved hem and was a ceremonial garment restricted to male citizens.[36] The tunic (Greek *chiton*; Hebrew *haluq*) was a rectangular piece of cloth with two parallel bands or stripes (*clavi*) of a different colour that descended from the shoulder and indicated the wearer's rank.[37]

Tunics were manufactured in different ways. One method involved weaving a large rectangle of cloth, which was folded in half vertically and attached along the shoulders. A very wide loom was required to weave such a large piece of cloth. Another method was to use a narrower loom to weave a narrow piece of cloth for a sleeveless tunic, which was sewn along the long side instead of the short side. Yet another method of manufacture involved weaving two separate pieces of cloth, which were attached at the top and along the sides.[38]

Although no clothing has survived from Roman Galilee and the Golan, examples of tunics and mantles have been found in Judaea, mostly at Masada and in the Cave of Letters in Nahal Hever (occupied at the time of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt, 132–5 CE). All of these garments

[35] Croom (2000) 50; Roussin (2001) 183–4.
[36] Croom (2000) 40–4.
[37] Croom (2000) 30; Roussin (2001) 183.
[38] Croom (2000) 30.

are made of wool, with the exception of a linen child's shirt from the Cave of Letters.[39] The child's shirt and an adult linen tunic from a Bar-Kokhba cave in Wadi Murabbat have *clavi* (self-stripes) created by using a different weave rather than a different colour.[40] Yigael Yadin suggested that this was done because linen is difficult to dye, but the biblical prohibition against mixing linen and wool (*shaatnez*) meant that coloured (dyed) woollen bands could not be added to a linen garment.[41]

The Judaean tunics and the child's shirt were made of two separate pieces of cloth joined along the top and sides. Two-piece tunics were easier and cheaper to manufacture than tunics made out of a single piece of cloth, as Yadin observed:

> This method of sewing a tunic from two pieces stems from the technical difficulty of weaving a band of the necessary length, for the bands could be made more easily by the weft in a tapestry weave; the width of the weft was, of course, limited by the width of the loom. Although it was possible to weave a tunic in one piece, in the manner of the complete tunic found at Dura-Europos, this demanded a loom much wider than those available to the weavers of our textiles.[42]

Two-piece tunics were also more practical, because if one side was torn or damaged it could be replaced instead of discarding the entire garment. Yadin connected the apparent preference for two-piece tunics to the observance of purity laws, as one side of the garment could be replaced if it became ritually impure. Yadin even suggested that the Mishnaic term for tunic—*haluq*—derived from the use of two pieces of cloth.[43]

We do not know how purity laws relating to clothing were interpreted and observed by the majority of the population in Roman Galilee. Presumably, two-piece tunics were worn by some Jews without any concern for purity laws. For our purposes, the relevant point is that two-piece tunics appear to have been in widespread use among the local Jewish population. This is true even of the more affluent families that took refuge in the Cave of Letters. The reason probably was practical: most looms were not wide enough to produce a tunic made from a single piece of cloth.

[39] For Masada see Sheffer and Granger-Taylor (1994) 153–244; for the Cave of Letters see Yadin (1963) 169–269. For an overview of textiles from various sites in the Judaean Desert, see Sheffer (2000) 938–42.

[40] See Yadin (1963) 211, 254, 257; Benoit, Milik, and de Vaux (1961) 59, no. 78.

[41] Yadin (1963) 211, 257.

[42] Yadin (1963) 204.

[43] Yadin (1963) 204–5, 209.

It is possible that John preserves the memory of a detail distinctive to Jesus: a seamless tunic woven in one piece. However, archaeological evidence suggests that a lower-class Jew like Jesus wore a tunic made of two pieces of cloth joined together. Either way, John seems to single out this detail for theological reasons. John himself presents this episode as a fulfilment of Psalm 22:18 (MT): 'they divide my clothes among themselves (יְחַלְּקוּ בְגָדַי לָהֶם), and for my clothing they cast lots'. However, the Psalm citation does not explain John's reference to a *seamless* tunic, which is not specified in the Synoptic accounts. Some scholars have suggested that John intended to evoke the ankle-length tunic worn by the Jewish high priests, which, according to Josephus, was seamless: 'But this tunic is not composed of two pieces, to be stitched at the shoulders and at the sides: It is one long woven cloth, with a slit for the neck, parted not crosswise but lengthwise from the breast to a point in the middle of the back' (*AJ* 3.161; Loeb translation). If this is the case, John's intention was to present Jesus in the guise of a priest.[44] Other scholars understand John's reference to the soldiers' decision not to divide Jesus' tunic as alluding to the unity of Jesus and his followers.[45]

John's elaboration on the nature of Jesus' garment can be considered in light of Paul Connerton's landmark work on memory (1989). Connerton focuses on non-literary practices and elements that are instrumental in the transmission of memory. Clothes are among them because of the 'decodable messages' they convey and their effect on, and divergence from, 'implicit expectations'.[46] The detail that John added and the various options of decoding it ensured it a place in the memory tradition of Jesus.

JESUS' BURIAL: BODILY DETAILS

John's account of Jesus' death and burial (19:40–1) differs from the Synoptics in other details:

> They took the body of Jesus and wrapped it with the spices in linen cloths, according to the burial custom of the Jews. Now there was a

[44] Brown (1970) 920–1. [45] Brown (1970) 921–2.
[46] Connerton (1989) 11–13, 32–4.

> garden in the place where he was crucified, and in the garden there was a new tomb in which no one had been laid. (NRSV)
>
> So they took Jesus' body; and, in accordance with Jewish burial custom, they bound it up in cloth wrappings with aromatic oils. Now in the place where Jesus had been crucified there was a garden, and in the garden a new tomb in which no one had ever been buried. (Brown's 1970 translation)
>
> (40.) *ἔλαβον οὖν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ καὶ ἔδησαν αὐτὸ ὀθονίοις μετὰ τῶν ἀρωμάτων, καθὼς ἔθος ἐστὶν τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ἐνταφιάζειν.* (41.) *ἦν δὲ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ὅπου ἐσταυρώθη κῆπος, καὶ ἐν τῷ κήπῳ μνημεῖον καινὸν ἐν ᾧ οὐδέπω οὐδεὶς ἦν τεθειμένος·*

John describes the treatment of Jesus' body—wrapping it in cloth (or cloths) with aromatic spices or oils—as a Jewish burial custom. Brown commented, 'In burying, the Jews did not eviscerate the cadaver, as did the Egyptians in mummification. Rather the Jews simply washed the body, anointed it with oil, and clothed it.'[47] Only Luke (23:56) and John refer to spices and oils in connection with Jesus' burial, and John alone says that these were applied *before* his body was laid in the tomb. In my opinion, it is unlikely that there was enough time to anoint Jesus' body before it was placed in the tomb, considering the rush to bury him before the beginning of the Sabbath.[48] Because anointing has obvious royal and messianic connotations, the historicity of this detail is suspicious (although it is not demonstrably false).

Even if the detail about the anointing is historical, John's characterization of this burial custom as 'Jewish' is puzzling. Brown's comparison with mummification is irrelevant unless we assume that John was from Egypt and therefore had this in mind.[49] Although cremation was the prevailing burial rite in the city of Rome in the first century CE, inhumation was practised widely in Italy and elsewhere around the empire, including in Asia Minor.[50] In fact, burial customs in Asia Minor resembled those in Judaea: the wealthier classes were interred in rock-cut tombs with arcosolia or benches, with small stone containers for cremated remains (*cineraria*) or bones (*ostothecai*),

[47] Brown (1970) 000.

[48] For the time constraints on Jesus' burial, see Magness (2011) 165.

[49] Brown (1970) 941.

[50] See Graham (2006) 31–2; Toynbee (1971) 39–41; also see the papers in Pearce, Millett, and Struck (2000).

while the rest of the population practised a mixture of rites including inhumation in trench graves.[51] Even in cremations, it was customary to wash and anoint the corpse before dressing or wrapping it. For example, in Virgil's *Aeneid* (6.219) we read: *corpusque lavant frigentis et unguent* ('they wash and anoint the body of the man gone cold').[52]

I wonder whether John's use of the term *Ioudaiois* was meant to denote a Judaean rather than a Jewish burial custom. Brown noted that in one stratum of Johannine material the term *Ioudaioi* refers to Judaeans.[53] Perhaps John wished to emphasize Jesus' Judaean heritage in death as well as in life. Although John contains no birth narrative, he was well aware that Judaean lineage was a prerequisite for legitimate messianic status: 'Surely the Messiah does not come from Galilee, does he? Has not the scripture said that the Messiah is descended from David and comes from Bethlehem, the village where David lived?' (7:41–2).

While the issue cannot be resolved on the material and documentary level, John's elaborations accord well with his endeavour to create a strong memory of Jesus' burial. The detail of the anointing provides Jesus with another messianic attribute and it is evident that burials of great figures call for being styled memorably. There was no public burial of Jesus with an impressive ceremony, hence other features had to compensate. The additional and poignant element in John's account is the attention to what can be accommodated, with some extension, within what Connerton classifies as 'bodily practices'.[54] These are part of the non-textual memory repertoire: 'Bodily practices of a culturally specific kind entail a combination of cognitive and habit memory.' Whether or not it occurred, the anointing is a culture-specific detail that provides an effective marker of memory.

ANOTHER *LIEU DE MÉMOIRE*: THE GARDEN

The setting of the tomb in a garden (*kēpos*) is also unique to John among the canonical Gospels (although it occurs in the apocryphal

[51] For Judaea see Magness (2011) 145–80; for Asia Minor see Spanu (2000) 168–77.

[52] See Toynbee (1971) 44.

[53] Brown (1966) p. lxxi.

[54] Connerton (1989) 72–104; the quotation is from p. 88.

Gospel of Peter 6:24).[55] Many scholars have linked Josephus' reference (*BJ* 5.146) to a gate in Jerusalem's north wall called the Gennath Gate (Garden Gate) with John's tradition, by assuming that this gate's name must reflect the presence of gardens nearby and identifying it as the gate through which Jesus was led to be crucified.[56] In excavations conducted from 1970 to 1974 under the Church of the Redeemer (adjacent to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre), Ute Lux and Karel Vriezen found remains of an ancient quarry overlaid by a 2-metre-thick accumulation of earth and debris which contained substantial quantities of Hellenistic and Roman pottery. They interpreted these accumulations as belonging to a garden of the first century BCE and first century CE. The accumulations were sealed by a stone wall(s) and associated occupation layer, covered by a 5.5–8-metre-thick fill of earth which the excavators associated with the establishment of Hadrian's western forum in Aelia Capitolina.[57]

In a 1995 review, I questioned the excavators' chronology and interpretation, noting that their identification of the accumulations above bedrock as belonging to a garden from the time of Jesus clearly was influenced by the Johannine account. Because some of the Roman ceramic types published by Vriezen date as late as the second to fourth centuries CE, I suggested that the accumulations above bedrock date to the time of Aelia Capitolina and are associated with Hadrian's western forum. The wall and associated layer that seal these accumulations seem to date to the Byzantine or early Islamic period (based on the pottery), while the thick layer of fill above contained a small percentage of medieval pottery.[58]

Therefore, archaeology has not demonstrated that there was a garden in the vicinity of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in the time of Jesus. This does not mean a garden did not exist nor does it disprove John's testimony—it only means that there is no positive evidence in support. Indeed, funerary gardens were common in the Roman world. J. M. C. Toynbee describes

> a widespread interest in the Roman world in the endowing of funerary gardens consecrated to the dead as holy and inviolable domains. The texts

55 See Brown (1994) 1269; (1970) 943.

56 See Brown (1970) 943. For possible archaeological remains of this gate, see Avigad (1983) 50, fig. 30; 67–9; Geva and Avigad (2000) 233–4.

57 See Vriezen (1994) with a summary of their conclusions on 291–5.

58 Magness (1995) 87–9.

> make it clear that these gardens were enclosed by walls, planted with a great variety of trees and flowers, equipped with wells, pools, and so forth for watering the plants and refreshing visitors, and furnished with buildings such as dining rooms and species of summer-houses in which meals in commemoration of the departed could be eaten by the survivors.'[59]

In Petronius' *Satyricon* (71), Trimalchio refers to his future tomb as having an orchard and vineyard: 'For I wish to have all kinds of fruit trees growing around my ashes and plenty of vines.'[60] Funerary gardens were especially common in the Roman East, where they were referred to as a *kēpotaphion* or *kēpotaphon*. Strabo describes the district west of Alexandria as containing *kēpoi te polloi kai taphai*.[61] It is not unlikely that the Judaean elite emulated this practice and surrounded their tombs with funerary gardens, just as they emulated other Hellenistic and Roman fashions such as the adoption of small stone urns (ossuaries) to contain the remains of the dead.[62]

Some scholars believe that John's reference to a garden is an allusion to the Garden of Eden, while others reject this association on the grounds that he uses the term *kēpos* instead of *paradeisos*.[63] I wish to suggest that this might represent another example of John incorporating a detail that legitimizes Jesus' royal and messianic credentials through allusion to Jewish scripture. It is unclear whether this detail derives from a pre-70 tradition that might be associated with the historical Jesus or is a later invention. Either way, John apparently used this detail to serve his theological purposes.

According to 2 Kings, Manasseh and his son Amon were buried in a garden:

> Manasseh slept with his ancestors, and was buried in the garden of his house, in the garden of Uzza. (2 Kings 21:18)
>
> He [Amon] was buried in his tomb in the garden of Uzza. (2 Kings 21:26)

Francesca Stavrakopoulou has noted the divine and royal connotations of gardens in the ancient Near East, where gardens symbolized cultivated fertility, divine power, and order, in contrast to the uncultivated chaos of the wilderness. Gardens played an important role in royal propaganda, with palatial gardens symbolizing the king's control and

[59] Toynbee (1971) 94. [60] Toynbee (1971) 94–5.
[61] Toynbee (1971) 95. [62] See Magness (2011) 151–6.
[63] For a review of these theories, see Brown (1970) 943 and (1994) 1270; for an argument in favour of the Garden of Eden imagery, see Wyatt (1990) 21–38.

power. Whether or not Manasseh and Amon actually were buried in a garden, the image evoked by the biblical account is clear.[64]

If John had 2 Kings in mind when he mentioned a tomb in a garden, it is puzzling that he would draw a parallel with two Judaean kings—Manasseh and Amon—who were vilified by the biblical writers. True, Manasseh's image was rehabilitated in 2 Chronicles, but the Chronicler omitted the reference to a garden: 'So Manasseh slept with his ancestors, and they buried him in his house' (2 Chronicles 33:20). Amon was not rehabilitated by the author of 2 Chronicles and his burial is not described at all.

Could it be that not all ancient Jewish traditions about Manasseh and Amon were negative? 2 Kings and 2 Chronicles present contrasting images of Manasseh, while some of the fragments of 1 and 2 Kings from Qumran diverge from the Masoretic Text (although the passages relevant to our discussion are not preserved).[65] Or, perhaps John's intention was to situate Jesus' burial within the Judaean royal line in general instead of connecting him specifically with Manasseh and Amon. In fact, Brown noted that the LXX of Nehemiah 3:16 indicates that David's tomb was in a garden.[66] This evidence supports the possibility that John's reference to a garden in connection with Jesus' burial is a biblical allusion to the Judaean royal line. However, even if this is correct, it is impossible to determine whether Jesus really was laid in a garden tomb—and this detail was incorporated by John for theological purposes—or this detail was added by John or his source for theological purposes. Either way, these motives would coincide with the endeavour to provide specific localizations in order to strengthen memory.

[64] Stavrakopoulou (2006) 1–21.

[65] See Barrera (2000) 467, who notes that whereas the fragments of 1 and 2 Kings from Caves 4 and 5 agree largely with the MT, the text of 2 Kings 7:20–8:5 from Cave 6 is 'sometimes shorter than the Masoretic Text'. Ulrich (1999) 27 cautions against drawing broad conclusions because of the small number and fragmentary nature of the surviving copies.

[66] See Brown (1970) 960: 'The mention of a garden may point in the same direction, for the OT references to burial in a garden concern the entombment of the kings of Judah (II Kings xxi 18, 26). From the LXX of Neh iii 16 we learn that the popular tomb of David (see Acts ii 29) was in a garden. Obviously the evidence is far from probative, and we confess uncertainty about its value; but the theme that Jesus was buried as a king would fittingly conclude a Passion Narrative wherein Jesus is crowned and hailed as king during his trial and enthroned and publicly proclaimed as king on the cross.' Also see Brown (1994) 1270; Smith (1995) 89.

CONCLUSION

To conclude: it seems to me that the Fourth Gospel tells us much more about the author's context and agenda (and those of his sources) than it does about the historical Jesus. Even if some of John's details are accurate (for example, there *was* a pool in Jerusalem called the Sheep's Pool) or derive from traditions which antedate 70, it is generally impossible to ascertain whether they shed any light on the historical Jesus. As Smith put it, 'The lines between inventions, exaggerations, misunderstandings, and true reports can rarely be drawn with complete assurance.'[67] Furthermore, some of John's information could reflect a post-70 rather than a pre-70 reality. My conclusions are consistent with Maurice Halbwachs's observations about how collective memory shaped especially the topographical interpretations of the Gospel accounts after Jesus' death. He noted that doctrinal and dogmatic concerns led to the veneration of certain sacred sites which may or may not have been associated with the life and death of Christ.[68] These sites became 'part of divinely charged space, prime bearers of Christian memory'.[69] Halbwachs also remarked on the biblical (Old Testament) associations of these sites, which may reflect traditions that were shared by the local Jews and earliest Christians, or are a result of the Christian appropriation of biblical Jewish traditions.[70] He concluded, 'Sacred places thus commemorate not facts certified by contemporary witnesses but rather beliefs born perhaps not far from these places and strengthened by taking root in this environment.'[71] Even if some of the details reported in the Fourth Gospel are historical, they have been shaped and theologized beyond verification in John's sweet memory of Jesus in Jerusalem. In this case, John's treatment anticipated and perhaps even became a model for traditions that became the norm after his death.[72]

[67] M. Smith (1978) 149.
[68] Halbwachs (1992) 199, 201.
[69] Halbwachs (1992) 223.
[70] Halbwachs (1992) 212–13.
[71] Halbwachs (1992) 199.
[72] I am grateful to Arthur Shipee, Lori Baron, and Jason Staples for their comments on this paper, which has benefited also from Karl Galinsky's helpful advice on memory studies. I alone am responsible for the contents.

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12

Moving Peter to Rome

Social Memory and Ritualized Space After 70 CE

Milton Moreland

For some early Christians, the destruction and forced abandonment of the Temple in 70 CE, and the fact that Hadrian established a colony on the former site of Jerusalem after the failed Bar Kokhba Revolt (*c.*135 CE) meant that they had to imagine their aetiologies in ways that explained why the Temple had to be destroyed and why Jerusalem was not a central site for ritualized veneration of the deity, the *Christos*, and the apostles. Although the cult city of Jerusalem loomed large in the social memory of many early Christians, actual memorialized space in Jerusalem would have to wait two centuries until the time of Constantine. For second-century Christian groups, the destruction and intentional erasure of Jerusalem from Roman geography led to an intense period of aetiological activity, in which narrativized 'apostles' (a concept made popular by 'Luke' in the Acts of the Apostles) were moved all around the Mediterranean world in rapid succession. This 'traumatic period'[1] stimulated a great deal of intentional memory work that made it possible for some early Christians to tell a story that explained how they came from Judaea, yet also explained why it was that their Judaean heritage was no longer meaningful in the actual setting of the notorious homeland. The canonical Acts of the Apostles, for example, was an early second-century literary attempt to reframe the collective memory by claiming

[1] On the social construction of cultural trauma and the resultant cultural memorials, see Alexander (2004).

the Judaean epic traditions without the need for physical memorialization in the city of Jerusalem. The author of Acts was already well attuned to the need to situate the memory of Christian origins in other urban settings since Jerusalem was no longer available.[2] By the end of the second century and consistently throughout the third century, Christians produced stories that helped establish social memories of apostles living and dying in places like Rome, Asia Minor, Edessa, Egypt, and India. Over the course of two centuries, Jerusalem became an idealized space, a *wonderland* that captured the imagination in the aetiologies of Christian groups that linked themselves to the ancestral traditions of the ancient Hebrew people. But without the possibility of ritual commemoration of martyrdom and pilgrimage sites in Jerusalem, localized cult veneration soon materialized in dozens of other places around the Empire.

My primary interest in this essay is to provide a short summary of the social memory processes that were at work among some second-century Christian groups that were developing new aetiologies and ritualized commemorations. In particular, I will argue that the second-century Peter stories helped form Christian group identities by constructing aetiologies that linked the community members to preternatural origins, provided explanations for and expansion of ritualized activities, masked the rupture between Jerusalem and Rome, and began the process of legitimating new authority figures in the face of the increasingly contentious leadership struggles of the mid-second century.[3] The development of stories and rituals that told of and commemorated Peter's travels to Rome, followed by his martyrdom and burial in the imperial capital, was part of a social memory process that, in part, attempted to define identity through spatial connections. The relocation of Peter to Rome in the late second century is best understood as a social memory process that reinscribed the landscape in order to account for the location and ideological conditions of early Christian groups in Rome several generations after the death of the historical Peter.

The fact that Peter became a focus of memorialization in Rome has been a scholarly and ecclesiastical obsession and conundrum for the

[2] Moreland (2013).

[3] Although I approach this topic with a different theoretical lens and arrive at different conclusions, this essay raises similar issues to those put forward by Goulder (2004).

past century. Although this ideological 'datum site' of myth-making and social memory appears inevitable within modern, popular reconstructions of Christian origins, the memorialization of Peter in Rome in the second century still needs to be explained by scholars if we are to better understand the social logic and group formation processes that led to the rise of Christianity in the imperial capital. As noted above, I place the current project within the theoretical framework of scholars who for the past century (most intensely in the past thirty years) have been exploring 'collective', 'social', and 'cultural memory'. Scholars working on social memory (the term that I prefer) stress the active and constant role that individuals within groups must play in the formation of memory. Drawing on the work of the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, there is now a long line of scholars whose work has described the necessarily social nature of all memory construction.[4] Social memory can be understood as inclusive of a wide range of memory processes that naturally occur in personal and group identity formations (literary, oral, ideological/symbolic, spatial/monumental, ritual/commemorative, etc.). Within this theoretical framework, scholars are better able to ask questions that move beyond the inevitably positivist, historical-critical question, 'What really happened?' Thus, this essay is interested in questions about how and why individuals and groups remember: What is the function of social memory? How does social memory relate to group and individual identity formation? What is the relationship between orality and literary production and social memory? What is the role of ritual and commemoration in social memory and group identity formation? What is the importance of 'space' in group identity and the shaping of memory?

One area of Halbwachs's work that will be particularly relevant to this project is his interest in the spatial dimension of the social memory process.[5] In his 1941 treatise, *La topophraphie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte*, he established a foundation on which to build an understanding of the relationship between memorials and social memory.[6] Through an examination of the practice by which Christians in the fourth century and later established memorials to

[4] See most recently, Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011) 3–62.

[5] For a more expansive exploration of Halbwachs's original thesis and the subsequent development of cultural memory, with a focus on the benefits for scholars of early Christianity, see Castelli (2004).

[6] Halbwachs (1992) 192–235.

Jesus in Jerusalem, he supplied three key points that are relevant to the discussion of Peter in Rome: (1) memory is impossible without agents who relate memories to their current interests; (2) memories must be embodied or 'presented in the concrete form of an event, of a personality, or of a locality';[7] and (3) for early Christians, as stories or social memories about Jesus and the apostles evolved in the communities of believers, they were conveyed and 'developed in an enlarged collective memory', in which 'Christian recollection became focused on consecrated places that favored the emergence of a cult'.[8] Early Christian memorials were especially concerned with the themes of death and martyrdom that grew out of the stories of Jesus and the apostles.[9]

For our present interests, the conclusion to Halbwachs's essay is particularly pertinent. His study of the development of the holy sites in Jerusalem revealed 'that in each period the collective Christian memory adapts its recollections of the details of Christ's life and of the places where they occurred to the contemporary exigencies of Christianity, to its needs and aspirations'.[10] As stories about Jesus developed, they 'left their imprint on the consecrated sites and introduced new localizations that were entirely imaginary'.[11] Halbwachs concludes, 'Whatever epoch is examined, attention is not directed toward the first event, or perhaps the origin of these events, but rather toward the group of believers and toward their commemorative work.'[12] As we examine the stories and sites related to Peter in Rome, the idea that social memory grows out of current group interests and is manifested in related sites of commemoration will be particularly apt.

Growing out of Halbwachs's thesis, J. Olick's focus on mnemonic products and practices as a dynamic process that is simultaneously individual and social is a further useful framework for the present project:

> collective memory really refers to a wide variety of *mnemonic products and practices*, often quite different from one another. The former

[7] Halbwachs (1992) 200. P. Connerton's (1989) important contribution to the role of ritual in social memory expands on this aspect of Halbwachs's work. As will be discussed later in this essay, ritualized or performative memory should be understood both as a response to narrativized (oral and literary) memories and as a stimulant for new social memories.

[8] Halbwachs (1992) 201. This focus on the 'materiality of memory' has been taken up by recent archaeologists and used to better explain the relationship between sites and cultural ideas. See Alcock (2002) 27.

[9] Halbwachs (1992) 228–9.

[10] Halbwachs (1992) 234.

[11] Halbwachs (1992) 234.

[12] Halbwachs (1992) 234–5.

> (products) include stories, rituals, books, statues, presentations, speeches, images, pictures, records, historical studies, surveys, etc.; the latter (practices) include reminiscence, recall, representation, commemoration, celebration, regret, renunciations, disavowal, denial, rationalization, excuse, acknowledgement, and many others. Mnemonic practices—though occurring in an infinity of contexts and through a shifting multiplicity of media—are always simultaneously individual and social. And no matter how concrete mnemonic products may be, they gain their reality only by being used, interpreted, and reproduced or changed. To focus on collective memory as *a variety of products and practices* is thus to reframe the antagonism between individualist and collectivist approaches to memory more productively as a matter of moments in a dynamic process.[13]

As a mnemonic product and practice, Peter in Rome was (and is) in a social and individual process of being made and remade, embodied, ritualized, and narrativized. In this brief survey of the Peter stories, we catch a few glimpses of the memory process, although our reconstruction is almost completely devoid of the actual agents who did the memory work.

The social memories of Peter, as diverse and convoluted as they might appear, were not haphazard. Of course, they also were not simply 'what actually happened'. Rather, to better understand the processes by which Peter became both a malleable and a foundational character in early Christian social memory, we have to explain the never-ending social function and agency of individuals within communities who develop stories of the past as they attempt to make sense of their present. Collective memory encompasses myth-making and historiography—the oral and written traditions clearly play a role in social memory development—while it also helps us account for the spatial dimension of ritualized memorialization. The extant Peter stories and the scant evidence we have for early Christian spatial memorialization of Peter in Rome (via Eusebius' reference to Gaius' statement, *Hist. eccl.* 2.25.7) provide intriguing case studies for researching the social process of memory formation. Rather than thinking of the Peter stories either as personal memories passed down through oral transmission or as inaccurate or irrational legends about the apostle, social memory studies help us focus on the intentional, synchronic, and diachronic thought-processes that clarify how

[13] Olick (2010) 158 (italics original).

and why a memory was developed at any given moment. What was the current interest of the individual or group that constructed the memory, and why did that memory persist? Like many detailed studies of social memory, the current project will seek to clarify how the second-century memories of Peter reveal something about the social and literary settings of the people who thought, told, and acted upon the stories.

SUMMARIZING PETER TRADITIONS

The ideas about Peter in early Christian literature are convoluted, confusing, and hopelessly devoid of what we moderns typically think of as 'historically valid information'. From Paul's first reference to Peter in his letter to the Galatians, to the modern Protestant and Catholic apologists who are even now writing about and debating the validity of the martyrdom of Peter in Rome and his founding of the Papacy there, the character of Peter remains a contentious one who is nothing less than a goldmine for the study of social memory. For scholars interested in how early Christian identities and memories were shaped, the Peter stories are certainly 'good to think with'. They are messy, theologically charged tales that have to be understood within reconstructions of the history of Christianity that stress the entrenched diversity of the *Christos* movements from their inceptions. The Peter stories allow for no orderly and straight pathways or trajectories back into the first and second centuries of Christian origins; rather, they demand that we take seriously the conflicting traditions that grew out of the first century without reverting to simplistic and more satisfying reconstructions that are based on the stories that were later told by Irenaeus, Eusebius, and Tertullian (among other authors who were—and still are—involved in the process of cleaning up the story of Christian origins).[14]

[14] Although I find the recent work of M. Bockmuehl on the Peter traditions to be informative, his overarching thesis that later Peter traditions can be used to reconstruct the 'historical' Peter is very different from my project. He assumes that there is a difference between 'living personal memory' or 'personal recollection' and 'cultural

In light of the unquestionably diverse nature of earliest Christianity, it is impossible to deny that, generally speaking, F. C. Baur and his so-called Tübingen hypothesis were on the right track. But Baur's famous construct—in which Paul represented Gentile Christianity in opposition to Peter's Jewish Christianity, with a later synthesis of the two—is now untenable for many reasons. While there were major disagreements between early Christian groups, and there were several significant attempts to bring a synthesis to these diverse approaches (including the syncretistic attempts of the canonical Acts of the Apostles[15]), the details that Baur and his school developed are overly simplistic. For our present purposes it is important to note that the character of Peter was claimed in the aetiologies of many different types of Christianity, as was James, and Paul.[16] Thus it is impossible to delineate a Paul versus Peter conflict when, in fact, by the end of the first century these characters did not represent any single position or community. Peter could be claimed as a founding figure by a Gentile group in Asia Minor or Rome as easily as he could play a prominent role in the community of *Christos*-believing Jews that was responsible for the Gospel of Matthew (most likely in the region of Syria). The construct or 'memory' of Paul as a missionary to Gentiles, James (the brother of Jesus) as a representative of Palestinian-Jewish Christianity, and Peter as a mixture of the two are useful examples of Christian social memories that so effectively and simplistically framed the story of Christian origins, which is still used by modern scholars.[17] The appeal of this basic social memory of the early Christian leaders is undeniable, regardless of the fact that the simple apostolic pattern

memory'. He claims, 'for all its delicacy and malleability, early Christian living memory can never be simply reduced to a social construction in the service of an ever-fluctuating present' (2010, 123). Bockmuehl's idea that 'living personal memory' is not social is unsupported by modern memory theorists. His desire to downplay the diversity and conflicts in earliest Christianities is also unsubstantiated in light of both the extant literary evidence and the inherent complexity of the social formation process. For a similar attempt to make much of Peter's role as a peacemaker, see Dunn (2002).

[15] On the syncretistic goals of Acts, see Tyson (2006).

[16] Eastman (2011).

[17] See, e.g. Dunn (2002) 577: 'For Peter was probably in fact and effect the bridgeman (pontifex maximus!) who did more than any other to hold together the diversity of first-century Christianity. James the brother of Jesus, and Paul of Tarsus, the two other most prominent leading figures in first-century Christianity, were too much identified with their respective "brands" of Christianity, at least in the eyes of Christians at the opposite ends of this particular spectrum.'

nearly annihilates the agency of the women and men who actually initiated and joined Christian groups in the first centuries after the death of Jesus. The work of social memory studies is to consider why and how these characters came to be so vital to Christian memories, and in the process, determine the historic interests of the people who constructed the memories, and the current interests of the scholars who maintain them.

The manner in which Peter was characterized by the authors of the canonical books of Matthew, John, and Luke–Acts determined his fate as an apostle worthy of further aetiological elaboration. One might say that the late first-century Gospel stories planted a mustard seed that would begin to bloom by around 150 CE. He was famously described in these Gospel texts (especially Matthew 16 and John 21) as the apostle who was selected by Jesus to be the first leader after the death of Jesus. While the author of the canonical Acts gave Peter a leading role at the beginning of his story, he abruptly dismissed Peter in chapter 12 in order to focus his attention on Paul. Nevertheless, other second-century authors exploited this Galilean companion of Jesus and imagined much more complete versions of Peter's life and death. Peter appeared as a martyr (1 Clement), a Greek-speaking author of letters (1 and 2 Peter), a preacher (*Kerygma Petrou*), a leading figure (characterized both positively and negatively) in the canonical Gospels, a varied figure in non-canonical acts narratives (from a miracle worker to a misguided interlocutor), and a seer in three quite distinct apocalypses (Ethiopic, Greek, and Coptic). These characterizations of Peter span the early Christian horizon from nascent Orthodoxy (proto-orthodoxy) to full-blown Christian mystical, gnostic, and ascetic tendencies.[18] The letter of 1 Clement, the two pseudo-Petrine letters that became part of the canon, as well as the Apocalypse of Peter (Ethiopic and Greek) and the Gospel of Peter are reasonably dated to the first half of the second century. Even without the explosion of stories that tell of Peter's exploits around the Mediterranean region—found in abundance beginning in the late second century—these early stories and uses of Peter demonstrate the lengths to which different Christian communities would go to link

[18] Lapham (2003) provides the latest failed attempt to construct a consistent 'Petrine theology' from the jumbled mess of three centuries' worth of Peter traditions. On the other hand, see the more helpful overview in Smith (1985) and the convincing survey of Petrine traditions by Grappe (1995).

themselves to this apostle (among other apostles who were given similar literary and ideological roles in the various social memories and commemorative sites of early Christian communities).

One of the most famous examples of this rather ubiquitous narrative and ideological memory practice surrounding Peter, which also serves as a useful example of how the apostle's location could be reinscribed, is found in the story of Peter battling Simon Magus in Rome. This is a tale that is told in many of the extant versions of the Acts of Peter and in the *Pseudo-Clementine* literature. The story is also used by Eusebius—who knew the story from Justin (*Hist. eccl.* 14.4). In Eusebius and the *Pseudo-Clementine* versions, Peter is reported to have gone to Rome in order to pursue Simon Magus and hinder him from spreading his problematic teaching. As Christine Thomas has made clear, the narrative in the earliest extant texts that we have—found in several versions of the Acts of Peter—is based on a complex intertextual transition and reimaging of the story that was originally found in Acts.[19] The goal of the authors of the Acts of Peter was to make Peter the protagonist in a miracle-filled battle with Simon. But rather than taking place in Samaria, as told in the canonical Acts, the story is set both in Jerusalem and then in Rome where Peter came to be remembered as the dominant leader. In a later rendition of the story that is contained in the *Pseudo-Clementine* literature, the battle actually is first set in Caesarea and then moves to Rome where Peter defeated Simon Magus.[20]

Several major features that we see in the early Peter stories like the contest between Peter and Simon can help us understand the ways in which people were beginning to identify as Christians. The Peter stories developed Christian religious identity through constructing aetiologies that linked the faithful community members to martyred leaders. The earliest stories of origins in Christian associations were focused on the personalities of central leaders—a literary and ideological pattern that continues through the entire history of Christianity. In the first and second centuries, this is true of the gospels and the acts stories, both in and out of the canon. Even the Gospel of Mark, with its very negative approach toward the role of the apostles (in which Peter appears as a *negative* example of discipleship), was turned on its head by Papias in the second century when he claimed

[19] Thomas (2003). Also see Matthews (1996) and (1997).
[20] T. V. Smith (1985). But also see Reed (2008).

that Mark's Gospel actually was based on the teaching of Peter (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 3.39.15).

The intense focus on apostolic personalities in the extant literature also has led to the long-standing and misguided description of Christian origins as a religion that was founded by powerful leaders who died as martyrs for their cause (Jesus, Paul, Peter, James, etc.). In other words, this literature that draws attention to strong personalities is so rhetorically persuasive that modern scholars still confuse the stories of Jesus in the gospels or the stories of the apostles in the 'acts' with viable historical reconstructions of how Christian groups actually formed. These amazing literary characters were *not* the founders of Christianity. Rather, the social memories of the martyred male leaders are nearly impervious to critical analysis because they are linked so integrally to the long-term structures of the Christian mythology that is implicitly and explicitly defended by dominant confessional and scholarly institutions. Hopefully, an analysis of why these social memories became so popular among these early Christian groups can help us better understand the more complex power relations, sociopolitical settings, economic interworkings, and community formation efforts that led people to identify as Christians.

Dennis MacDonald identified five major characteristics of the aetiologies and stories that concern the apostles: Christophanies (post-resurrection appearances of Jesus), miracle stories, conversion stories, anecdotes (stories that portray the apostle's character), and martyrdom stories.[21] In varying ways, each of these narrative characteristics played a role in providing authenticity to the people and communities telling the stories. As part of the aetiological process, the stories of miracle-working apostles and the tales of a post-resurrection Jesus speaking to his close comrades helped to solidify the link between the storytellers and their emerging Christian beliefs—attempting to provide the audience with a direct line of contact to the *Christos*. The intense interest in apostle stories that developed in the second century also derived from attempts to encourage selflessness and courage among the members of Christian associations (moral exhortation through the memory of the 'saints'), as well as stemming from a desire to highlight the magnificence of the apostles. These stories also exhibit a strong desire to link members

[21] MacDonald (1992).

more directly to the martyr myth as the core story of the Christian tradition. This focus on individual (male) leaders (in a 'cult of personality') is a pervasive feature in group aetiologies, regardless of the fact that this individualized focus masks the complexity of normal social formation as it conceals the agency of the actual group members.[22]

MOVING PETER TO ROME: SHIFTING LANDSCAPES

The fact that Peter is said to have gone to Rome in pursuit of Simon Magus is, in many respects, an ideological, theological, and literary creation that helped in the development of a broader social memory of Peter's role in the shaping of nascent Christianity in the imperial capital. As such, it was part of a group formation process that attempted to define identity through spatial connections; early Christians in Rome used aetiologies to help construct the ideology of place. The 'anywhere' nature of Christianity, as Jonathan Z. Smith has referred to the typical religions of the Roman world, provides the background for thinking about the aetiological desire to locate Peter in Rome and gradually associate special places with his character.[23] Attachment to place is always part of identity formation.

In the case of the development and use of the 'Peter in Rome' stories we confront a series of issues that evolved after the construction of the post-70 monuments in Rome celebrating the Roman victory in the war against the Jews, and, sixty years later, the controversies and repercussions surrounding the Bar Kokhba Revolt in the mid-to-late 130s. From the 130s to the 160s (in particular) we also find a great deal of ideological debate and differing philosophical theologies among early Christian groups in the city. Marcion of Sinope (from Pontus), Valentinus (from Alexandria), and Justin (from Samaria by way of Ephesus) had all arrived in the capital by the late 130s, and the positions they represented came to dominate the ideological landscape of Christian identity formation. Thus,

[22] For a historical reconstruction of early Christianity that moves the focus away from the individual leader, see Johnson-DeBaufre (2005).

[23] J. Z. Smith (2004).

rather than asking the age-old question of whether Peter actually went to Rome, a more interesting question is, how do the evolving Peter stories in the social memory of the group members fit into this ideological and sociopolitical environment that impacted Christian religious identity formation in the city of Rome?[24]

The idea of a 'traumatic period' may be too strong of a characterization when referring to post-135 Christians in Rome. Nevertheless, Hadrian's foundation of Aelia Capitolina—and thus the apparent demise of any valid hope that Jerusalem would be rebuilt and the Temple re-established—must have been vexing and disturbing to some Christians. By the 130s, for Christians and Jews in Rome, Jerusalem was mainly a mythic place in their community aetiologies. Nevertheless, the founding of Aelia Capitolina can be understood as creating a traumatic chasm between many aetiological stories of Christian origins (those that were linked to the Hebrew epic) and the reality of Roman political history. In a sense, after 135 Christianity had no place to call home. Post-70 Christian authors—starting with Mark—had already spent considerable mental and literary energy constructing stories that explained the destruction of the city; but its virtual disappearance from Roman geography sixty-five years later in the reign of Hadrian must have led to another intense time of myth-making and reformulations of the social memories of the Roman-Christian groups. The complete loss of Jerusalem resulted in more uncertainty for Christians whose identities were already quite volatile in the context of the imperial capital.

During periods when group members believe they are facing volatility and trauma, social memory plays a heightened role in group identity processes. Group agents who shape collective identity are responsible for imagining and framing the past in order to explain the present. In so doing, these agents can imagine the aetiology as traumatic: 'Events are not inherently traumatic. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution.'[25] Thus, as the group agents (producers of aetiologies, literature, and teaching in early Christian groups) 'remembered' the death of the group's leaders through martyr stories, and as they contemplated the destruction of Jerusalem, they used the

[24] Lampe's study of the physical setting of early Christians in Rome (Trastevere and Porta Capena) could potentially be used to further explicate the ways that physical settings impact social memories (2003).

[25] Alexander (2004) 8.

past to situate their group in a type of traumatic narrative. The past became traumatic as it was mediated through early Christian group identity processes. While stories of origin serve to reassure group members of their present stability by rooting the community in a sturdy past, they also provide explanations and interpretations of tragic events in the group's social memory. As traumas are imagined by the group in the process of developing a social memory, 'the collective identity will become significantly revised. This identity revision means that there will be a searching re-remembering of the collective past, for memory is not only social and fluid but deeply connected to the contemporary sense of the self.'[26] Gradually, 'the "lessons" of the trauma become objectified in monuments, museums, and collections of historical artifacts. The new collective identity will be rooted in sacred places and structured in ritual routines.'[27] For early Christians in Rome during the post-Bar Kokhba period, the social memory of Peter's move from Jerusalem to Rome would fit quite well with the newly realized gap between the fictive homeland and the realities of Christians in Rome (especially for Gentile believers).

The social memory of Peter's relocation to Rome would also have served to bolster the claims of authority for Christian leaders in the city as anti-Valentinus and anti-Marcion propaganda. Both Marcion and Valentinus came to Rome with philosophical and theological argumentation that further challenged the Christian need to have an active connection to the Judaean heritage. It should be noted that both of these leaders linked their social memories and authority claims to an apostolic line of succession from Paul. For Marcion, it was Paul who most clearly identified the preternatural spirit that was sent by the universal, loving God. Valentinus is said, in later reports, to have claimed Paul's (fictive) student Theudas as his own Christian teacher (reported by Clement of Alexandria). With help from the prolific apologist Justin (an opponent of Marcion and Valentinus), the Hebrew epic had to be clearly re-established as a necessary part of future 'orthodox' Christian aetiologies. And while there is no evidence that these three second-century Christian thinkers worked to construct memories of Peter in Rome, their lively debates served to augment the rationale for his move to the city in Christian social

[26] Alexander (2004) 22. [27] Alexander (2004) 22–3.

memory. Thus, by the late second century, Irenaeus would establish both the link to the Hebrew epic and the desire for clear apostolic lines of succession (from Peter) as major features of Christian social memory. As Otto Zwierlein has recently and convincingly argued, one key reason that Peter was moved to Rome in the late second century was to counter gnosticizing forms of Christianity.[28] The necessary background for this social memory of Peter's move is found in the mid-second century, as Christians responded to the loss of Jerusalem and the very successful theological stances of Marcion and Valentinus, which were bolstered by their own social memories of succession from the apostle Paul.

Moving Peter to Rome also provided Rome's Christian leaders with a direct link to both Paul and Peter, which in first-century literature (like Paul's letter to the Galatians) was a tenuous connection at best. Thus, in their social memory work the proto-orthodox leaders in the mid-to-late second century made claims to both Paul and Peter through comparable stories of their miracles, opponents, and martyrdoms in Rome. The anonymous author of 1 Clement, writing at the end of the first or beginning of the second century, had already linked the deaths of these two characters in chapter 5 of the letter. But there is no evidence in the letter that the full social memory of their lives and martyrdom in Rome had already been developed. In 1 Clement, Peter and Paul simply appear as examples of martyrs; there is no evident link to Rome as the location of key events in their lives and deaths (despite the fact that most scholars of early Christianity accept the social memory constructions of later second-century authors and thus assume the opposite to be true).[29] By linking Peter and Paul in Rome, early Christians bolstered the idea that Christianity had a harmonious past, a constructed memory in which these key leaders were considered co-workers, living and dying in the same city (despite evidence to the contrary).

In light of the need to explain the fissure between the idea of Jerusalem as integral to the Hebrew epic and the reality of Jerusalem

[28] Zwierlein (2009).

[29] For a recent example, see Bockmuehl's (2012, 111) assessment of 1 Clement, 'Here, we may conclude in brief that in the letter to Corinth, composed most likely in the last decade of the first century, the Roman church appealed inter alia to the example of the apostles Peter and Paul, who had within living memory ministered and suffered martyrdom in Rome and who, it seems, were personally known and remembered in Corinth as well.'

as a destroyed site, we should also note that at the end of the second century, many Peter stories were increasingly interested in portraying him as oppositional to Judaism. This is already a trait that is found in the canonical letters of 1 and 2 Peter. Although the *Pseudo-Clementine* literature can be understood as a later exception, after the Roman wars against the Judaeans most of the other Petrine traditions rapidly devolved into anti-Jewish sentiments. The Gospel of Peter and the apocalyptic literature that is associated with Peter trend towards outright accusations against the Jews for killing Jesus and explain the destruction of Jerusalem as a direct result of Jesus' death.

While some early Christians framed Peter within an anti-Jewish bias, for others, moving Peter to Rome also eased the tense and tenuous connection of Gentile Christians in Rome with the Hebrew epic's central place, Jerusalem. The defeat of the Judaeans and the utter destruction of Jerusalem had been celebrated in Rome and across the Empire from the time of the Flavians to the reign of Hadrian.[30] By the end of the second century, the main traditions of both Peter and Paul were located in the vibrant city of Rome, rather than the non-existent and disparaged city of Jerusalem. Although proto-orthodox Christian agents worked hard to claim a Judaean heritage, with stories of Peter and Paul living and dying in Rome, there was no need to encourage or justify pilgrimage or ceremony in Judaea. With the shift of settings, Peter's new homeland (Rome) was ripe for commemoration and ritual elaboration. The fact that Jerusalem could not be the site of a ritualized space until the time of Constantine needs to be factored into the discussion of why Peter became so famously situated in Rome.

PLACING PETER IN ROME

As Christian stories inscribed meaning to both Peter and Paul through a focus on martyr and death traditions in Rome, second-century Christians were well poised to begin constructing social memories that were tied to the Roman urban landscape. As early as the mid-second century (160–70 CE), it should come as no surprise to

[30] See Eck (1999); Goodman (2005) and (2007); Noreña (2003).

modern scholars versed in social memory theory that tomb sites for Peter and Paul were being established within easy reach of the Christians in the Roman capital. These sites functioned to develop and sustain memories and organize experience around the central myth of martyrdom (connecting Paul and Peter to the gospel stories of Jesus) and the heroic 'founders' of the movement. The availability of socio-religious activity (commemorative rituals) at newly designated memorials (the *tropaia* of Peter and Paul) constructs, maintains, and strengthens the social memory for the participants. As Lynn Meskell notes, 'Since memories are motionless, their spatialization transforms them into something more tangible, localizing memory in time.'[31]

The site that is venerated as Peter's tomb (or memorial) has a long and storied history that cannot be fully explored in this essay.[32] Nevertheless, as sceptical as scholars are about whether Peter actually died in Rome, there is no doubt that some Christians were telling stories about his martyrdom there by the mid-second century. Eusebius' note about Gaius' reference (early third century) to Peter's (Vatican) and Paul's (Ostian Way) *tropaia*, reminds us of the inevitable link between social memory and ritualized space (*Hist. eccl.* 2.25.7). At the very moment when we begin to see specific interest in the deaths of Paul and Peter in Rome, we also find this cryptic reference to spatialized commemoration. By thinking within the framework of social memory, the 'sudden' appearance of memorialized space (over 100 years after Peter's death) is reasonably explained as a natural outgrowth of the second-century aetiological and ideological social processes.

In proto-orthodox forms of Christian memory, the extensive focus on martyrdom traditions buttressed the practice of tomb veneration.[33] The popular accounts of martyrdoms that began to proliferate at about the same time the memorial to Peter was built can be

[31] Meskell (2003) 39. Archaeologists are increasingly interested in the fact that sites actively encode meanings. Sites are not passive; they are active expressions of beliefs and ideas in material forms that are in a continuous dialogue with the thought world of the participants. See Insoll (2012).

[32] The classic presentations of the discovery of the Peter memorial are Toynbee and Ward-Perkins (1956); Chadwick (1957); and O'Connor (1969). The surge of publications about Peter's tomb in the 1950s, after the Vatican excavations were completed, is recorded in De Marco (1964).

[33] On the rise of martyr traditions in early Christianity, see Moss (2010) and Aitken and Berenson Maclean (2004).

linked to the 'processes in Christian practice whereby spectacular lives and the extremes of torture and death became emblems of Christian identity'.[34] Among the reasons that Elizabeth Castelli observes for the Christian affinity for martyrdom stories, the fact that they were a minority and marginal group in Rome is relevant to our present topic. She notes, 'the Christian tendency to generate identity through rhetorical strategies of differentiation and assertions of superiority intersected with the social and political realities implied by quite small numbers and significant social marginality'.[35] Prior to the mid-third century, we have no evidence for Christian public meeting spaces in Rome.[36] The memorial of the martyred Peter was likely one of the first 'public' spaces in the city. As a commemorative site for a cult leader who had died a martyr at the hands of the Romans (according to the developing social memory), the memorial could work alongside the 'acts' stories to bolster Christian identities that portrayed group members as linked to heroes who suffered noble deaths in the Roman capital. As Castelli states, 'When early Christians generated texts, artistic representations, liturgies, and architectural installations devoted to the martyred, "memory" in its fullest sense was at the heart of the project.'[37]

The growth of ritualized and spatialized practices at Christian memorials in the late second-century Roman context affixed memory work to material experience. As a mausoleum and memorial site on the second-century Roman landscape, the Vatican Hill necropolis, in which Peter's memorial is said to be located, was not a high-profile public location.[38] The memorial would not have served as a major gathering place for second- and third-century Christians. Nevertheless, there are many other reasons that people in Greek and Roman cultures built tombs and memorials and practised rituals at burial sites.[39] Besides linking group members to the 'acts' stories, Christian tombs (*memoriae* and *tropaia*) served social functions that were similar to burial sites in the larger Roman social contexts.[40] They were places of sacrifice and offerings for the dead, ancestor veneration, and other practices of filial and group (fictive kinship) piety.

[34] Castelli (2004) 3. [35] Castelli (2004) 36.
[36] For a summary of the evidence, see Beard, North, and Price (1998) i. 267–78.
[37] Castelli (2004) 25. [38] See Liverani, Spinola, and Zander (2010).
[39] A standard resource is Antonaccio (1994.).
[40] See Denzey (2007) and Corley (2010). On the setting and style of Peter's memorial, see Wallace-Hadrill (2008).

These sites played a role in rituals related to group meals, appeasing evil spirits, and the variety of escalating practices related to the cult of the saints. They also functioned as public displays of group identity, social status, and wealth. These cultic, social, and economic aspects of memorials are all part of the larger function of constructing identity and shaping social memory. Jan Assmann's summary observation is to the point: 'On the social level, with respect to groups and societies, the role of external symbols becomes even more important because groups, which, of course, do not "have" a memory tend to "make" themselves one by means of things meant as reminders such as monuments, museums, libraries, archives, and other mnemonic institutions.'[41] Christian identities were being negotiated within the everyday settings of burial and monument building.

Being in possession of a memorial also may have bolstered the claim for a particular Christian group's rights to an apostle's memory.[42] Gnostic tendencies in early Christianity downplayed the death traditions and had no interest in identifying tombs and memorials that were connected to the physical world. With the development of Christian tomb memorials, proto-orthodox forms of Christianity benefited from the spatialized commemoration practices. The group that was responsible for the memorial may have secured more authority over other Christian groups who were also using Peter in their social memory constructions. In opposition to Valentinus and similar gnosis-based schools of thought, the early Christian ideological agents who were able to connect their death and martyrdom traditions to actual sites on the Roman landscape were at a distinct advantage. As Halbwachs observed, if gnosticizing Christian groups had prevailed, 'There would have been no concern with commemorating in Jerusalem the passion of Christ, his death, and his resurrection, since these events would have been but an appearance, a game of sensible images, without a deep and supernatural significance. It would not have been thought necessary to establish in Christian memory the places where these illusionary scenes took place.'[43] The same could be said of Peter in Rome. If Valentinus was the main

[41] Assmann (2010) 111.

[42] Since Peter's social memory was highly contested within second-century Christianity, the group that built the memorial may have been making a claim to being the 'authorized' owners of Peter's legacy. See Cullmann (1962) 120.

[43] Halbwachs (1992) 228.

Christian teacher in the city, it would have been very unlikely that a tomb memorial would have come to represent the social memory of the apostle.

Finally, it is important to note that there is also a reciprocal relationship between the material space and the production of social memory. The built environment encourages social memory practices and mythologizing. Enhanced stories of martyrdom could develop as a result of the newly established memorials for Peter and Paul. The memorials did not simply result from and represent pre-existing mid-second-century social memories; the ritualized activities at the memorials could also stimulate new elements of social memory. As N. Boivin has recently argued,

> Ritual and material culture enable bodily understanding, and probably better address the somatic experiences of pain, grief, confusion, and joy that challenge individuals at critical junctures in their life stories. While language may often be adequate for dealing with everyday activities and experiences, ritual helps to grasp the elusive and unknowable at the margins of these experiences, and thus contributes to both the generation of key transformations, and the creation of a broader, at times deeply somatic and experiential understanding of the mysterious entity that is life.[44]

As early Christians began to commemorate and ritualize tomb veneration on the Roman landscape, their social memories would have been impacted by their experiences. Social memory not only leads to ritualized behaviours in sites of memory, the remembered past is also evolving out of the lived experiences.

CONCLUSION

Except for the early Christian leaders who were expressly said to have been martyred in Jerusalem before 70 (Jesus, Stephen, James, and James), after the destruction of Jerusalem, the 'apostles' were ideologically removed from the devastated city and placed in locations all around the Roman Empire. Without the multiple defeats in the Jewish Wars, there is little to recommend that the Peter in Rome

[44] Boivin (2009) 284.

aetiologies and physical settings would have come to fruition. But with the Judaean downfall, during a period of cultural trauma for Jews and *Christos* believers, the 'Rock' had to be moved to the imperial capital. Over the course of the next century, stories of his miraculous career and martyrdom in the city grew more vibrant in the social memory of the early Christians.

Through the social memory process, Peter's character became much more accommodating of Gentile Christian associations than we could have ever imagined after reading Paul's denunciation in Galatians 2. But due to the Roman debates about the value of the Judaean epic traditions, the social memory of Peter was also heavily invested in the anti-Marcion and anti-Valentinus campaigns of the proto-orthodox Christians. Partially in response to gnosis-based ideologies, Peter's death and martyr traditions were further developed during the second century and highlighted in the burgeoning 'acts' literature. By 170 a memorial marked a small necropolis site that some early Christians were evidently venerating as his tomb. The social memory work related to Peter shows the extent to which early Christians participated in the common practices of the Roman world (in their various social identity formation processes). It also reveals a subtle and consistent pattern of diverging with the ideas of imperial Rome. Peter in Rome was an idea and socially constructed reality that harnessed the noble death story and used it to promote a minority religious group as a brave, heroic people who could overcome their oppressive setting.

Relying on the work of scholars who have carefully examined the traditions about Peter, this essay has attempted to demonstrate the enduring value of using social memory theory as an explanatory category for the study of Christian origins. In every case where we find a reference to Peter, even in the letters of Paul, he is a pliable character who is adapted to fit the needs of a particular narrative and social setting. The stories, social memories, and artefacts related to Peter in Rome present a veritable microcosm of critical biblical studies and church history, combining denominational infighting, with textual, art-historical, and archaeological debates that span over eighteen hundred years. The lively accounts of Peter's life and teaching—including the debates about whether Peter lived and died in Rome—present us with an opportunity to think about how traditions about the saints and martyrs developed in the second century, and inspired ritual activity in urban environments.

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Part V

A Perspective from Neuropsychology

13

The Neuroscience of Memory

Ann-Kathrin Stock, Hannah Gajsar, and Onur Güntürkün

INTRODUCTION

Most of history is based on the memories of humans who once reported what they saw or heard. Thus, every slip of their memories, every false reconstruction, and every one of their subjective reinterpretations was transferred into the written sources or pictorial representations that now constitute the storehouse of information with which historians reconstruct a vanished past. Hence, the science of human memory intrinsically matters to the science of history. We hope, therefore, that the following outline of the constituents and characteristics of neural systems that jointly create our memories will be useful for understanding cultural memory, too. Before we embark on the necessary detail, we want to lay out one essential assumption that by now is shared by the vast majority of cognitive neuroscientists: researchers have accumulated countless evidence that mental functions like memory correspond to the biological dynamics of the brain. Accordingly, we hope to convince our readers that if you remember a few aspects of the chapter that you are about to read, we will have successfully changed your brain at an anatomical and at a functional level. Welcome, then, to this change of your mental status!

HOW DOES MEMORY WORK?

Before addressing the neuroscience of memory proper, we need to differentiate between two closely linked phenomena: learning and

memory. While the acquisition of new information is called learning, the ability to retain and retrieve previously learned information is termed memory. We are equipped with multiple and parallel memory systems, each endowed with different functional and neural specificities (Henson and Gagnepain 2010; Montaldi and Mayes 2010). As a consequence, brain damage can lead to quite specific losses of one kind of memory while leaving- others intact (Dickerson and Eichenbaum 2010). The most basic distinction usually made by cognitive neuroscientists is that between declarative and non-declarative memory (Henke 2010). Put simply, this categorization is based on whether one can explicitly report on the content of his or her memories. As such, non-declarative memory contains information about habits, motor programmes, and abilities such as riding a bike (so-called procedural memory). In addition, non-declarative memory comprises learned emotional reactions and changes elicited via classical conditioning like those first demonstrated by Pavlov (Smith 1995; Windholz 1998). We will not discuss these kinds of memories in further detail since their impact on history as an academic science is probably small.

In contrast, declarative memory is what most lay people would classify as memory. It comprises two different memory stores that seem to function in partly different ways. The first is episodic memory, which contains knowledge about events in our own lives and things we have experienced. The second is semantic memory, which stores facts and information we have learned throughout our lifetime (Henson and Gagnepain 2010). These different kinds of memories are described in further detail in Figure 13.1 and will be further



Figure 13.1 Graph: different types of memories.
By the authors.

elaborated in the following sections. Most of our semantic memories about historical facts and events are eventually based on the episodic memories of contemporary witnesses. The implications for the interpretation of historical accounts will therefore be explained in this chapter. But first, we would like to start with a quick overview of the biological and anatomical aspects of our brain structure that are crucial our understanding of memory functions.

THE ANATOMY OF MEMORIES

When you look at a human brain, the first thing you see is the cortex (Figure 13.2a). The cortex is divided into two hemispheres and each of them can be subdivided into anatomically and functionally different areas by the specific pattern of gyri and sulci. For example, the back of the cortex prevalently processes visual information while an area in the left temporal lobe represents the sounds of words. The cortex is made up of grey and white matter. Grey matter contains cell bodies, dendrites, and synapses of neurons. Dendrites serve as the input surface of neurons with which the incoming signals of other nerve cells are integrated. These incoming signals terminate on dendrites. The contact zone between two neurons is called a synapse and is illustrated in Figure 13.2d and e. The grey matter of the cortex is subdivided into six layers that are constituted by specialized neuron types with different input-output characteristics (Figure 13.2b and c). White matter, on the other hand, mainly consists of the axons of neurons. Axons transmit the neuronal signal like a cable to other neurons that can be close by or very distant. Neuronal signals are



Figure 13.2 Graph: different levels of neuronal processes.
By the authors.

transferred electrically by an electrical phenomenon called action potential. When an action potential reaches the end of the axon, signal transduction between neurons takes place. This process is guided via the release of chemical substances called neurotransmitters at the synapse of an axon. There, the neurotransmitter reacts with receptors on the dendrites of adjacent neurons, where it generates an electrical impulse that eventually results in a new action potential of the recipient neuron. Learning changes the efficacy of synapses, thereby increasing or decreasing the probability that the receiving neuron generates an action potential after receiving an impulse from the first neuron. While you are reading these lines, cortical synaptic changes go on in your cortex and will enable you to remember parts of our chapter. But where in your brain do these synaptic changes occur?

The pioneering work of Karl Lashley (1950) showed that memories are distributed over the cortex. In his studies, Lashley investigated how well rats were able to memorize a way out of a maze after he removed different parts of their cortex. He observed that it did matter to memory performance how much brain tissue was removed, but not where he removed the tissue. He thus concluded that there is no specialized location of memory in the cortex, an assumption that has been partially corroborated in subsequent research to date (Bruce 2001). Lashley was right that there is no specific 'memory area' in the cortex. He was wrong, however, in his assumption that memory traces are holistically distributed over the cortex in an even manner. Instead, we now know that cortical memory traces are constituted in those parts of the brain that were active during the unfolding of the events that will later on become a memory.

If you watch a cricket match for the first time together with a friend who explains the rules to you, you will accumulate a large number of new memories. It is likely that the visual aspects of your memories (e.g. the jerseys of the players, their movement patterns) will cluster close to your visual cortex since these are the areas that are most active while you observe the match. In addition, the movement patterns of the players will subconsciously activate your motor system so that you will develop memories that cluster close to the motor representations of your arms and feet. The rules that are explained to you by your friend create memories in the left hemisphere where the majority of language processes take place. Thus, memories of events are created in those areas that are active while these events happen.

SYNAPTIC PLASTICITY: HOW THE LEARNING OF NEW INFORMATION WORKS IN DETAIL

We can now proceed to outlining the ways in which neuronally encoded information is transferred into a more stable memory store. For this to occur, synaptic plasticity is essential. It is a mechanism via which experiences can lead to changes of the cellular structure of our brain, ultimately resulting in what we call learning (Patterson and Yasuda 2011). When we reactivate neuronal networks that have previously been changed or modified by means of synaptic plasticity, we are able to reactivate certain aspects of our previous experiences that caused these changes. Thus, we build and use a memory store.

The findings of two researchers have decisively shaped our understanding of the molecular mechanisms underlying learning and memory: Donald O. Hebb and Eric Kandel. Hebb (1949) suggested that external stimuli (e.g. an object that we see) lead to an activation of neurons in the brain in such a way that we can form an internal representation of the object. To describe the group of simultaneously activated neurons that enable us to perceive distinct stimuli, Hebb coined the term 'cell assembly'. He suggested that objects would prevail in our short-term memory as long as continuous activation kept them 'circulating' within the cell assembly. In case of a sufficient circulation (either via a very strong single signal or via a weaker signal repeated multiple times), Hebb predicted a more permanent consolidation via growth processes that create or enhance reciprocal connections of the involved neurons, rendering their communication more effective (see Figure 13.3 for illustration). For this theory, the central take-home message learned by each and every neuroscience student is that *cells that fire together, wire together*. In this context, physical proximity is not a mandatory prerequisite. Hence, the cells of an assembly may well be distributed over many different brain regions, yet still communicate with each other



Figure 13.3 Schematic illustration of the Hebbian theory using sensory properties of a rose.
By the authors.

via long distance axons. Importantly, Hebb's model implies that cells involved in perception are also partially involved in memory processes based thereon (Henson and Gagnepain 2010; Haxby et al. 2000; Cabeza et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2012). In the following, we will use the terms 'cell assembly' and 'neuronal network' as descriptions of these processes.

As a consequence of the physiological long-term changes induced via these mechanisms, an activation of only some of the neurons involved in a cell assembly (or a neuronal network, as we previously put it) would result in the reactivation of all neurons interconnected within. Even though numerous details of Hebb's assumptions had to be modified, the basic principles of his model have enabled us to explain many phenomena of the human mind (for an overview over the current debate, see Shimamura 2010).

The first researcher to substantiate the Hebbian theory on a cellular level was Eric Kandel, who received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2000 for his findings. Thanks to his work (for review, see Kandel 2006) and that of many other great scientists (e.g. Bliss and Lomo 1973) who followed his lead, we now know that the interconnections of cells showing either a very strong activation or a synchronous activity pattern are strengthened via a number of different genetic and biochemical mechanisms (Yonelinas et al. 1996; Parks and Yonelinas 2007). In order to retain our neuronal and cognitive flexibility, we are also equipped with a mechanism that helps us counteract this process by weakening certain connections in the brain whenever necessary. This opposing mechanism is in effect whenever there is either a very weak activation and/or an asynchronous activity pattern. However, both of these opposing mechanisms can lead to very specific and long-lasting morphological changes in the synapses of our brain. Such changes in the structure of particular neurons enable us to remember things in the long run because they can persist over long periods of time during which they do not necessarily require neuronal activation or any other kind of maintenance (Behr et al. 2009).

An example illustrating the above concepts might be the memory of a rose. Roses have different properties, including the way they look, feel, and smell. Imagine you spent the summers of your childhood in your grandparents' garden. Whenever you saw the roses, you could also smell their scent and touch them at the same time. Maybe you sometimes pricked your fingers with their thorns. Because you repeatedly experienced all these things together, your brain built a neuronal network for roses that comprised knowledge about their smell, looks, and so on. Years later these memories lie dormant while

you have grown up and have moved to a big city where you got a job. One early summer morning, on your way to work, you happen to pass a front yard and smell the scent of roses. At first, only your olfactory neurons become activated so that you can perceive the smell. However, the whole neuronal network for roses is quickly reactivated because your childhood experiences led to strong ties between the olfactory representation of the scent of roses and other (e.g. visual and somatosensory) memories concerning roses. Straightaway, you know that the flower you have smelled is a rose. You know how to spell its name; you can easily describe how it looks; and you remember that you once got pricked by it as a child. Because different neuronal networks can be interconnected, you may also suddenly remember your grandparents' garden and the warm summer sun shining through the leaves of the trees.

To sum up our discussion so far: within the brain, information processing takes place at two levels. On the macroscopic level, there are the different brain areas. They are specialized and activated only for the processing of certain kinds of information. On the microscopic level, there are neuronal networks. These are groups of conjoint neurons that often fire in synchrony and with a high frequency. They enable us to represent a certain process, thought, or memory. Neuronal networks are often scattered over several different brain areas and are competing with other neuronal ensembles (Shimamura 2010). Different neurotransmitters can strongly influence the longevity of memory traces (Perez-Otano and Ehlers 2005), with the result that some of them persist for as long as a lifetime.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MEMORY FORMATION

There are four successive steps to the formation and usage of a memory trace:

1. Perceiving a stimulus and drawing attention to it.
2. Laying down a memory trace.
3. Retrieval of the information encoded in a memory trace.
4. Rehearsal and (re)consolidation of the information encoded in a memory trace.

In the following sections, we will survey these processes roughly in order to illustrate how different factors can modify or distort our memory.

ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION

Before a certain event becomes part of our memory, we first need to perceive it. However, we are constantly surrounded by a vast amount of information competing for access to our conscious perception. The majority of this information is filtered and never reaches our conscious perception. Imagine for example, that you are visiting a friend's party and standing in a crowd of many people talking to each other. If you try to follow each of the conversations taking place at the same time, you will soon discover that it is simply not possible. Although all of the voices are equally loud, you will find yourself following one conversation and ignoring all the others. This is called the cocktail party phenomenon (Wood and Cowan 1995) and it reflects our ability to direct our attention to relevant information while suppressing other input. On a cellular level, this means that the excitation threshold of neuronal networks specialized for the attended information is lowered with the result that these neurons reach the action potential threshold more easily. For example, if a monkey is confronted with relevant or irrelevant visual stimuli, the activity recorded from one of its visual neurons will be greater if the monkey is paying attention to a stimulus deemed relevant to eventually obtaining a reward (Moran and Desimone 1985).

This increase in neuronal activity relevant to attention is modulated either intentionally ('top-down') or unintentionally ('bottom-up'). In the case of bottom-up modulation, the allocation of attentional resources is most strongly determined by the salience (noticeability) of a stimulus. Imagine standing next to heavy traffic. In this case, an ambulance with a siren is more noticeable (i.e. salient) than one of the other cars since the sound is louder and operates at a different frequency than the sounds that are emitted by the other cars. In the case of top-down regulation, however, this does not necessarily hold true. Since top-down attention is guided by our plans and motives, we can consciously increase the amount of attention we draw to less salient stimuli. If we were actively searching for a certain car (because it belongs to a friend who is going to pick us up) we could draw more attention to the features of our friend's car than to the physically more salient ambulance. In other words, the strength of top-down attention influences our sensibility towards the salience of a stimulus.

An impressive demonstration of how powerful top-down attention can be is an experiment carried out by Simons and Chabris (1999). They

presented a video showing a basketball game and instructed the viewers to count passes for one of the teams. The subjects were so occupied by this task that most of them did not notice that a huge black gorilla crossed the court several times. Hence, people missed out on some exceptionally salient information due to the effects of their top-down attention. Another interesting fact about attention is that it seems to be altered by the culture and environment in which we grow up. In a recent experiment on top-down guided attention, Hedden et al. (2008) discovered that the patterns of brain activation differ systematically between people raised in Asian or Western cultures. Brain areas that are typically activated when people pay top-down attention showed stronger activity in Asians while they were making judgements about a stimulus and taking its visual context into account. For Westerners, this activity was higher when they were instructed to ignore the visual context of a stimulus and to pay attention to its details. This finding supports the assumption that Asians process information in a more context-driven manner that Western people. Besides cultural (i.e. environmental) influences, the focus of our attention via top-down processes heavily depends on our intentions, which, in turn, are based on our values and beliefs. As a consequence, we often actively search for information that confirms our opinion (Nickerson 1998). Thus, reports of facts and experiences matching the reporter's value systems need to be judged more critically than those contradicting them.

As illustrated by several findings, there are multiple factors that have specific influences on which information enters our brain. Since only that information can potentially be transformed into a memory, the next section is dedicated to factors that might influence the transformation of sensory information into a memory trace.

LAYING DOWN A MEMORY TRACE

The inner part of the temporal lobe, an area called the medial temporal lobe, is most crucial for memory processes. This knowledge has been derived from the observation that humans with lesions in this brain structure are incapable of forming new memories and are also, albeit to a lesser extent, constrained in their ability to remember old memories (see Corkin 2002). A seahorse-shaped structure folded into the medial temporal lobe, the hippocampus, also plays a key role,

as it is the structure that enables us to create and to retrieve episodic and, to some extent, semantic memories (see Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993). It is important to state that the hippocampus is not our memory depository. Instead, it enables the cortex to function as a vast memory storehouse. As we have seen, cortical memory engrams are formed in those areas in which the events were perceived and processed. But how are we able to activate these distributed memory fragments conjointly when retrieving our memory? As will be outlined below, the hippocampus seems to be crucial to this function, and hence crucial to memory.

The cortical memory trace itself consists of strengthened synaptic connections between neuronal networks that are established conjointly with hippocampal activity. The most important feature of the hippocampus is that it is equipped with a vast number of connections to all parts of the cortex. As a consequence, hippocampal neurons act like switchboards via which all cortical assemblies can be accessed. Just a few numbers elucidate why such a switchboard function is needed: the cortex hosts about 2×10^{10} neurons. Each of them receives input via *c.*2×10^{4} synapses. The probability that one cortical neuron has a synaptic connection to another cortical neurons is thus about $1{:}10^{6}$. Therefore, if you want to remember that a rose has a certain scent, has thorns, and has a certain colour and shape, you should be able to specifically strengthen those synapses that combine the different assemblies of rose-specific features and are distributed across cortical fields. Given a low probability of $1{:}10^{6}$, it is not very likely that you will find enough synapses between these distributed cortical assemblies to create a stable overarching assembly for all aspects of the memory of a rose. To guarantee a stable and overarching assembly for roses, you have to connect the diverse cortical assemblies to a structure that has neurons with a much higher density of interconnections. The hippocampus is such a structure.

The probability that two hippocampal neurons have a common synapse is 1:25. The hippocampal interconnectivity, therefore, is about 40,000 times denser than that of the cortex (Morris et al. 2003). Hence, the hippocampus has a binding function within memory formation. When we encounter a new event, hippocampal neurons are able to quickly change the synaptic strengths between each other and those cortical neurons that processed the specific information of this event. As a consequence, the cortical assemblies are bound to each other via the hippocampus. Here it is important to

note that the specific information of the event is stored in the cortex. The hippocampus binds the cortical spots of information into a coherent episode. Through repeated activation via the hippocampus during memory consolidation, the memory trace becomes increasingly stable and immune to disruption while cortical assemblies receive multiple chances to slowly increase the number of synapses between their distributed assemblies. As a consequence, the hippocampus becomes increasingly less involved until the point is reached when its binding function is rendered unnecessary. At this stage, we could lose our hippocampus during a stroke and would still be able to recall semantic information ('Rome is the capital of Italy') or an old episode ('I remember my first day in Rome'). However, after losing our hippocampus, we would be unable to create new episodic memories and would have a very limited ability to create new semantic memories.

As we do not remember everything that has ever been processed by our brain, the hippocampus does not bind all information. Instead, there seems to be some selection within this process. This raises the question of the criteria on which this selection is based. One aspect is how devotedly or deeply we encode information (see section 'Rehearsal and (Re)consolidation of the Information Encoded in a Memory Trace'), a factor that is closely related to top-down attention. Emotions are another important factor.

When you recall the memories of the roses in your grandparent's garden (see above), it seems likely that those memories are accompanied by feelings (e.g. how happy the impression of the roses made you or how your grandparents took care of you). Memory researchers agree that emotions profoundly influence how we encode information. To understand the interplay of emotions and memory, it is very helpful to look at the anatomical structures facilitating these two functions. As we mentioned before ('How Does Memory Work'), emotional memories underlie a neural system that decisively differs from declarative memory systems. This system is called the limbic system and is crucial to the learning and generation of emotions. An emotion evolves in the combination of new or pre-existing experiences and bodily reactions like arousal. For this purpose, the limbic system has connections to neuronal networks holding these experiences as well as to structures regulating physical reactions.

In this context, a structure called the amygdala is especially important. Individuals with damages to the amygdala are mostly incapable of learning emotional reactions (Davis 1992). The amygdala is a

cluster of small nuclei located in the centre of the limbic system. It is, furthermore, adjacent to the tip of the hippocampus and can hence exert a strong influence on it (Phelps 2004). As a child, the positive feelings of happiness accompanied by slight physiological arousal (e.g. you may consider the feelings of warmth in case you experience something really good) were encoded simultaneously to the different aspects of the roses (e.g. the scent, the shape, and the colour) and the information about your grandparents and their house. When such a simultaneous activation occurs, the amygdala will upregulate hippocampal activity. Taken together, these processes vividly strengthen connections of networks encoding the information about the roses in the garden and the emotional experience of happiness. As a consequence of the accompanying feelings of happiness, the memory trace of the roses hence becomes easier to retrieve.

RETRIEVAL OF THE INFORMATION ENCODED IN A MEMORY TRACE

As in attention-guided perception, there are two ways in which memories can be evoked: bottom-up (unintentionally) and top-down (intentionally).

Unintentionally retrieving a memory seems like a rather effortless process to those doing it. Indeed, it does not necessarily involve conscious awareness, let alone mental effort. These bottom-up processes are usually triggered by an external cue like the scent of a rose. The external cues lead to activation in brain regions that are in charge of dealing with this kind of stimulus material. In case the activation surpasses a certain threshold and the activated neurons are already part of a larger neuronal network, all kinds of different memories may be evoked. An example may be being bullied at school. Imagine you had a rather unpleasant time at school because some of your classmates used to tease you. If you were bullied over a longer period of time and the teasing made you feel bad or even afraid, it is likely that you learned to associate many different kinds of co-occurring stimuli with this. Thus, your 'school' information becomes embedded into your 'bully' network. Moreover, this happens quite efficiently since a strong emotional involvement upregulates the involved synapses. In people for whom the interconnections between

the different neuronal representations are very pronounced, even the sound of a school bell might be sufficient to trigger a traumatic memory or a bad feeling. In others, who have less pronounced interconnections, it might take the more overwhelming experience of returning to their old school (i.e. being simultaneously exposed to many 'school' stimuli at the same time) to evoke such memories. This observation can be explained using the concept of activity thresholds: even in prewired neuronal networks, the activity within its parts needs to surpass a certain threshold in order to reactivate the neuronal networks as a whole. Depending on the level of the threshold (i.e. strength of interconnections) and the strength of an incoming signal (i.e. the amount of neuronal activity evoked), this can be achieved by either a (stronger) single input or by the accumulation of several (weaker) inputs (Yonelinas et al. 1996; Parks and Yonelinas 2007).

In contrast, trying to retrieve information via the top-down activation of a prewired neuronal network is an effortful process resembling a directed search, as the sought-after memory is not something that you just stumble over. Quite on the contrary, it starts in the absence of potentially helpful external cues that might elicit sufficient activity to surpass the activation threshold of the neuronal network. A good example for this may be a test at school. Imagine a subject in which you were never really interested. In order to pass a test, you simply learned the facts by heart. Having no interest in or emotional attachment to the topic whatsoever, you later find yourself stuck in a test fighting to come up with the correct answers. Since you did not properly embed the relevant information in various neuronal networks, there are very few ways to access it. It can therefore be helpful to try to associate to-be-remembered items with multiple unusual information sources of different sensory modalities because this accelerates the retrieval process.

A curious case illustrating this example was described in a case study by Aleksandr Luria (1987). Luria had found a man of extraordinary memory skills who also presented with synaesthesia—a condition in which a stimulus of a certain sensory modality co-elicits sensations in other sensory modalities. For example, synaesthetes often describe that they actually see the colour of a scent they smell. This implies that they have augmented interconnections between sensory modalities and are hence capable of forming more widespread multimodal neuronal networks facilitating memory retrieval. In other words, their complex sensory sensations enable synaesthetes

to form more and perhaps stronger interconnections between the neuronal representations of facts and sensations. As a consequence, they are provided with more possibilities to reactivate the neuronal network they need to access certain information. Yet still, for the average person, the most crucial aspect in an exam situation is having sufficiently rehearsed the facts (see sections 'Synaptic plasticity: How the learning of new information works in detail' and 'Rehearsal and (Re)consolidation of the Information Encoded in a Memory Trace') in order to be able to retrieve them until the test is passed.

Taken together, then, there are two different ways to retrieve a memory trace: top-down and bottom up. These two retrieval strategies partly rely on distinct brain structures (Ciaramelli et al. 2008), yet have one common crucial aspect: in order to retrieve a memory, the respective neuronal network needs to be reactivated. The underlying strategies and ways in which that reactivation is accomplished may differ, but all of them eventually (and quite similarly) result in the last step of network reactivation. However, in reality, most memory retrievals are guided by both processes in varying proportions. For instance, when we try to remember facts we have learned by heart for an exam, we could ease the challenge by associating the required facts with items on our desk like a pen or a ruler. Or, using the premier example of Graeco-Roman mnemotechnique, we can associate the information with specific *loci*, such as the rooms of an imaginary house (Assmann 1999, 35–8; Small 1997, 96–111); conversely, the Roman house can be viewed as a memory theatre (Bergmann 2001). In the exam, we can try to retrieve the facts by such top-down mechanisms. If this doesn't work, rearrange the desk with the items that were present during learning. Since the pen and the ruler were part of the learned network, retrieving the relevant semantic part of the neuronal network might be facilitated via additional input from the strengthened interconnections with these items. They might provide additional activity to surpass the activity threshold required for the reactivation of the neuronal network. However, these two dissociable mechanisms provide different weak points at which distortions can occur. Even though it is not fully comprehensive, Table 13.1 lists the most common causes and effects of distortions in memory retrieval.

As already mentioned, not all psychiatric conditions result in memory impairments. Instead, there is also a condition resulting in excessive or even permanent retrieval of unwanted information: the post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD (for more information, see Box 13.1).

Table 13.1 Causes and Effects of Memory Distortions

Ultimate cause	Effects on the brain	Effect on behaviour/retrieval capacities
Different forms of dementia	Can drastically reduce the number of functional neurons and/or neuronal interconnections	Neuronal networks may be destroyed or rendered inaccessible so that the encoded information will be inaccessible or completely lost
Traumatic injuries/strokes/ tumours	Destruction of brain parts involved in neuronal networks	
Mild concussion/mild hypoxia Environmental influences incl. intoxication (e.g. ethanol, lead, arsenic), malnutrition, dehydration, infections (e.g. herpes simplex encephalitis), poisonous plants and organisms (e.g. pfisteria)	Distortion of chemical processes and neurotransmitter systems within the brain	Temporary (in more severe cases permanent) inability to retrieve information that would usually be readily available
Mood disorders (especially severe depression)	Most likely due to changes in neurotransmitter systems. However, the causes are far from being completely unravelled	'Pseudo-dementia' (inability to retrieve information) that usually vanishes as soon as the depressive episode is terminated. Also, memories with a negative content are more easily retrieved during a depressive episode
Personality disorders (e.g. narcissism in a sovereign)	Striking changes in neuronal networks are not mandatory	A very firm conviction about the principles according to which the self (episodic memory) or the world (semantic memory) operate, can work both as a cue and as a filter. Information contradicting one's view will either be not activated at all (top-down attention) or not believed to be a 'true' memory (different salience of internal beliefs and external information).

Box 13.1 Too Much of Everything: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

As illustrated in the section 'Laying Down a Memory Trace', the emotions accompanying an event influence its processing. As a rule of thumb, stronger emotions provide you with better encoding of an event because they lead to greater neuronal activity and elicit the release of greater amounts of neurotransmitters and stress hormones. In general, this mechanism is extremely expedient but under certain circumstances, it can also become a curse:

Imagine a girl named Laura. At age 15 she was involved in a car accident where she had to watch her little brother die. She was horrified both by what had happened to her and by watching her brother suffer. Even though most of her attention was drawn to her brother, the enormous stress enabled her brain to encode most of the available information related to her trauma. This included the sensation of physical pain and panic, but also the taste of blood, the smell of petrol, and the sound of the car's horn seconds before the crash. Due to the circumstances described above, she created an extremely stable memory trace comprising all of these aspects. When Laura had physically recovered and had mourned her brother, she expected to start to feel better again. Much to her dismay, the opposite was the case. One day she left home to do some grocery shopping. When she heard someone honk on the street, an overwhelming flashback memory hit her and she suddenly felt relegated to that very day as if she had been forced into a horrifying time-travel. The honking had activated part of her neuronal network thus eliciting the full reactivation of all associated information. After a couple of such panic attacks had been triggered by different cues (e.g. the smell at a petrol station, biting her tongue during sport), she started to believe that leaving home was what made her panic. Following this logic, she soon ceased leaving the house. Trying to avoid all situations triggering a panic attack also aggravated her situation because the steady avoidance mechanisms themselves became a cue that constantly reminded her of what she was trying to hide from. She had reached a vicious circle of involuntary rehearsal and reconsolidation which strengthened the underlying neuronal network each and every day. After one year, Laura had to seek professional help.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a condition that can affect everybody but is most common among persons who have experienced extremely stressful events (e.g. war, persecution, physical violence, rape, or torture). The long-lasting memories of the relevant events are often very explicit and accurate. However, panic, pain, and fear substantially narrow our perception and attention to the perceived threat. Things that are not perceived as being part of the threat often do not make it to the encoding stage and even if they do, they are often remembered with great inaccuracy. Also, distortions can occur because of a mechanism called generalization: we quite readily associate new stimuli or aspects with traumatic content because it is so readily available on a neuronal level. Just think of Laura who started being afraid of going outside. In the same manner, somebody who was originally persecuted by a certain group might unconsciously start to feel that she had been persecuted by others as well.

REHEARSAL AND (RE)CONSOLIDATION OF THE INFORMATION ENCODED IN A MEMORY TRACE

As we saw earlier, rehearsal is often needed in order to maintain and/or to consolidate a memory trace. However, the concomitant reactivation yields the possibility of changes or distortions due to the fact that neuronal networks can be altered while activated (whereas changes to inactive neuronal networks are almost impossible) (Davis and Love 2010). This leads to a quite paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the more often a memory trace is rehearsed or reactivated, the more consolidated it is (i.e. retrieval becomes easier and more likely, see also Box 13.1). On the other hand, the more often a memory trace is rehearsed or reactivated, the more things get associated with it (i.e. the more prone it becomes to false positive error). As can be seen, the process of rehearsal/reconsolidation has contradictory consequences, some of which can distort the accuracy of our memories. Since there are many different possible sources of intrusions, we will limit our focus to the most important ones.

First of all, there is new knowledge concerning the remembered facts. The problem is that new knowledge is never stored in an empty space. As long as it is associated with a topic that we know about or as long as it is related to an experience we have made, the new information will to some degree be embedded in pre-existing neuronal networks, thus extending them. Later, it often becomes nearly impossible to distinguish truly original from add-on aspects of a memory trace (Shimamura 2010). Referring to our rose garden example, a romantic relationship later in life might influence the original memory about the grandparents' garden. A lover giving roses right before a nasty break-up would surely somehow be embedded in the pre-existing neuronal network that encodes roses. Later in life, the scent of roses could thus simultaneously activate both pleasant childhood memories and unpleasant feelings of misery. As a result, it would become impossible to reactivate the original network containing the grandparents' garden without co-activating the later, less desirable part of the network as well. As time goes by, and through building new associations and interconnections of neuronal networks, we continuously add new aspects and pieces of information to our memories. With the ongoing accumulation of add-on information it

becomes increasingly harder to distinguish it from the primal memory contents.

Secondly, a change in personal values may exert an even broader effect that may provoke changes in almost any memory trace as long as its content is somewhat related (Davis and Love 2010). Imagine living in a country that underwent a radical change in political systems. Before the revolution, you had favoured a certain politician whom you had believed to be both competent and trustworthy (Figure 13.4a). After the turmoil, the old regime was unmasked and you learned that this politician and his colleagues had been corrupt and involved in criminal affairs. On the neuronal level, you may now encode that everything associated with the old regime is bad. However, your new views operate on an already existing neuronal network encoding information about that particular person and the old regime along with all its aspects and information on how you used to feel about them. After the negative change of attitude has been integrated into the respective neuronal network, a conflict begins to occur every time the memory trace gets reactivated (Figure 13.4b). Being asked about that politician years later activates the neuronal network, including the memory of having liked him. However, everything else you later learned about him also is being reactivated (including the more recent extension of your network that contains contradicting information). When confronted with two divergent pieces of information (only one of which fits your current attitude) you may become very convinced that you disliked not only this person but also all decisions taken by the regime of these days. You may even think that your old view (in case you remember it at all) was only expressed in order to avoid reprisals (Figure 13.4c).

Thirdly, new associations of different aspects already linked to the pertaining memory can lead to distortions. Put simply, learning about the association of things you previously considered separate and unconnected can massively change the way you remember them and think about them. An illustration of this principle may be not having associated smoking with cancer and death. In case you already have built an association between cancer and death, learning that smoking can cause cancer will also make you assume that smoking can cause death.

Last but not least, there is the stunning phenomenon of false memories (Ramirez et al. 2013). It is indeed possible to 'implant' the memory of incorrect facts or events that have never happened



Figure 13.4 Schematic illustration on how changes in personal values can affect a neuronal network that codes for semantic beliefs.
By the authors.

in such a way that they cannot be distinguished from 'true' memories. A paradigmatic experiment illustrating this is called 'Lost in the mall' (Loftus 1999). In the experiment, adult participants were given stories about events in their childhood that had been written down by their relatives. Little did they know that one of the stories (getting lost in the mall at age 6) was completely fictional and had never happened to them. After reading the stories, six out of twenty-four participants claimed to remember the event. Even more to the surprise of the

experimenters, they also came up with additional information about the event which had not been part of the original story! Making things even worse, the participants were unable to distinguish between true and false memories which seemed to be equally stable over time.

Further experiments showed that repeated exposure to false stories increased the percentage of people who considered them to be previous parts of the lives. Thus, some participants had correctly rejected them as false at the first encounter. However, when hearing the stories again weeks later, a portion of those participants suddenly claimed that the false stories were true. The reason for this change of mindset is easy to explain. On first encounter, the subjects had no memory trace for this story; thus it was rather easy to identify the story as a hoax. On the second encounter this was not the case because the subjects already had an assembly of the story, as they had heard it some weeks ago (for an illustration of this mechanism, see Duncan et al. 2012). Given that change, it became much more difficult to decide whether they remembered the story because they had heard it from the experimenter or if it had been an actual episode of their life. In a similar fashion, it could be demonstrated that the testimony of eyewitnesses can be dramatically influenced and distorted by suggestive questions or repetitive interrogation aiming at a certain outcome (Loftus 1996). Likewise, prejudices and stereotypes can exert a similar influence (Davis and Love 2010).

As an effect of the phenomena described above, your true memories cannot be easily stripped of intrusive false positive memories in order to erase their undesired contents. Rather, false memories are a permanent problem. Living in an environment, therefore, that strongly questions your memories and/or is suggestive about things that have never actually taken place puts you at great risk of losing a grip on your original true memories. Clearly, this has implications for the study of cultural and collective memory as carried out by scholars in the humanities, social sciences, and media studies.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, memories are neither persistent nor objective. Knowledge about ourselves and our world is not stored in fixed physical arrangements that can be activated on demand. Rather, memories are based on

dynamic biological structures and processes. As a consequence, they are neither impartial nor fixed. The most important applicable findings that we would like to emphasize in the vast field of memory research can be summed up as follows:

There is a long list of circumstances (not exhaustively covered in this chapter) that possibly or imperatively change (or even inhibit) the way in which we perceive our environment. Therefore, alterations of our attention and perception can influence our ability to store information in our brain and retrieve information from it. Knowledge about things we have learned or experienced is encoded and stored in neuronal networks, and memories are effectively protected from being modified only so long as these networks are inactive. The reason for this is that every time we (try to) retrieve a piece of information, it is re-formed and reactivated, putting it at risk of being influenced, distorted, or even changed by our current state, opinions, and knowledge. Under certain circumstances, the content of our memories can thus be dramatically changed without us even noticing. However, knowing about the dynamics of synaptic plasticity and about the integration of new elements into already prewired information enables us to understand that the recollection of facts and experiences always comprises aspects of interpretation and can be influenced by more recent or current events. As a result, dealing with memory to some extent resembles sleuthing. Our subjective past is a fragile neuronal construction, ever-changing when being used.

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